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SUVOROF 

BYW.LYONBLEASE 

WITH  AN  INTRODUCTION 
BY  MAJOR-GENERAL  SIR 
C.    E.    CALLWELL,    K.C.B. 


NEW  YORK 
E.  P.  DUTTON  &   COMPANY 
PUBLISHERS 


FOREWOED 

An  account  of  the  circumstances  in  which  this  book 
was  written  will  best  explain  its  many  deficiencies.  I 
began  to  write  it  in  1917,  when  I  was  on  the  Staff  of  a 
Hospital  in  Petrograd.  Owing  to  the  pressure  of  my 
ordinary  duties,  which  were  at  intervals  considerable, 
I  was  unable  to  spend  any  time  in  the  Imperial  Library, 
where  a  large  collection  of  papers  relating  to  Suvorof, 
the  Suvorovskii  Sbornik,  had  been  deposited.  Still 
less  was  I  able  to  consult  the  Military  Records  at 
Moscow.  I  was  confined  to  the  study  of  matter  already 
published,  and  in  Petrograd  to  such  volumes  as  I  could 
find  in  the  booksellers'  shops.  Fortunately  these  were 
numerous.  In  November,  I  was  sent  down  to  the 
Field  Hospital  on  the  Roumanian  Front,  taking  with 
me  my  manuscript  and  two  or  three  books.  The  rest 
of  my  library,  at  some  volumes  of  which  I  had  hardly 
glanced,  I  left  in  a  big  box.  This  has  by  now,  I  suppose, 
fallen  with  my  spare  kit  into  the  hands  of  pillagers.  At 
any  rate,  it  was  left  behind  when  the  Base  Hospital 
went  home,  and  I  cannot  get  hold  of  it.  From 
Roumania  I  was  recalled  to  Odessa,  where,  for  the  first 
time,  I  got  into  a  Public  Library.     To  the  City  Librarian, 

Professor  Popruzhenko,  and  his  assistant,  Mr.  Deribas, 

vii 


viu  SUVOROF 

I  am  much  indebted.  I  am  even  more  obliged  to  Mr. 
Edmund  Harris,  in  whose  house  I  lived.  His  own 
library  was  very  useful,  and  his  natural  hospitality 
seemed  to  be  only  aggravated  by  the  triple  alliance 
against  him  of  pneumonia,  extortionate  demands  from 
his  workmen,  and  a  civil  war  in  which  his  house  played 
an  involuntary  but  conspicuous  part.  I  regret  that  his 
recent  death  in  exile  prevents  me  from  giving  him  a 
copy  of  the  book.  I  never  knew  a  man  who  bore  with 
more  fortitude  and  sweetness  of  temper  the  blows  of  a 
remorseless  fortune. 

As  there  has  been  published  in  Russian  an  enormous 
quantity  of  literature  about  Suvorof,  I  think  I  have 
been  able  to  gather  enough  raw  material  to  make  a 
substantially  true  picture  of  him.  For  military  events 
I  have  been  compelled  to  rely  on  such  books  as  Pyetrof 's 
Histories  of  the  Turkish  Wars  and  Milyutin's  superb 
History  of  the  War  of  1799,  with  its  abundant  citations 
from  original  documents.  There  are  as  many  anecdotes 
about  Suvorof  as  about  our  Doctor  Johnson,  and  many 
of  these  have  been  published  in  one  or  other  of  the 
numerous  periodicals  interested  in  Russian  antiquities 
and  history.  I  have,  with  one  or  two  exceptions, 
repeated  none  that  are  not  related  by  honest  eye- 
witnesses. On  the  whole,  I  think  that  this  book  will 
be  found  to  contain  as  much  essential  truth  as  many 
which  are  more  ostentatiously  based  upon  manuscript 
authorities,  and  indeed  seem  to  bear  not  a  little  of  the 
original  dust  upon  their  pages. 

My  principal  omissions  are  English,  French,  German, 


FOREWORD  ix 

Polish,  and  Italian  books.  I  had  not  time  to  learn  the 
Polish  language  as  well  as  the  Russian.  Of  French  and 
German  books  I  could  find  only  a  few  in  Russia,  and 
of  English  and  Italian,  none  at  all.  It  is  hardly  less 
difficult  to  lay  hands  on  some  of  them  in  England.  I 
have  abandoned  all  hope  of  getting  the  books  that  I 
left  in  Petrograd.  The  Bibliography  I  have  made  as 
complete  as  I  can,  though  I  have  not  been  able  to 
recollect  the  exact  titles  of  all  my  Petrograd  books. 

I  am  very  greatly  indebted  to  my  wife,  who  at 
various  times  has  reduced  the  whole  of  my  rough 
manuscript  to  legibility,  and  in  the  end  spent  many 
hours  in  Japan  in  pounding  a  clumsy  typewriter  and 
making  the  thing  fit  for  the  printer. 

W.  L.  B. 


INTRODUCTION 

In  the  following  pages  the  life  story  is  told  of  a  very- 
remarkable  man,  of  a  principal  performer  in  some  of 
the  most  memorable  events  in  modern  history,  of  the 
foremost  of  Russians  with  the  solitary  exception  of 
Peter  the  Great.  They  present  us  with  the  picture  of 
a  singular  personality,  of  an  ardent  patriot,  of  an  excep- 
tionally brilliant  and  successful  soldier.  Strange  as 
were  Suvorof's  ways  and  interesting  as  was  his  indi- 
viduality in  his  private  capacity,  it  is  rather  in  his 
character  of  leader  of  troops  and  commander  in  the 
field  that  his  career  must  ever  be  instructive  to  posterity 
and  attractive  to  the  student  of  history. 

Fought  for  the  most  part  in  regions  far  removed 
from  centres  of  culture  and  of  military  thought,  his 
campaigns  have  perhaps  scarcely  been  studied  as 
assiduously  in  the  past  as  they  ought  to  have  been, 
seeing  how  varied  and  how  far-reaching  are  the  lessons 
that  are  to  be  deduced  from  them.  They  shed  a  beacon 
light  upon  the  art  of  countering  the  mercurial  methods 
of  the  partisan,  which  often  prove  so  great  a  bugbear 
to  leaders  of  a  trained  and  disciplined  soldiery.  Of 
effective  achievement  mainly  and  primarily  attributable 
to  the  fostering  of  mobility  and  elasticity  in  the  field, 
they  afford  numerous,  diversified  and  striking  examples. 
Those  dramatic  events  of  1800  in  Switzerland — the 
desperate  affray  by  the  Devil's  Bridge,  the  sudden 
tidings  of  Korsakof's  discomfiture,  the  escape  from  the 
trap,  the  weary  retreat  over  the  heights  to  Chur, 
admirably  indicate  what  strategical  uncertainties  and 

xi 


xii  SUVOROF 

perplexing  tactical  problems  a  general  may  find  himself 
beset  with  when  he  undertakes  operations  at  the  head 
of  a  formidable  force  in  a  mountain  country.  Nor  does 
the  history  of  war  furnish  us  with  many  more  convincing 
examples  of  the  dangers  and  difficulties  which  assail 
armies  in  the  field  when  the  plans  of  their  leaders  are 
interfered  with  by  chatterers  in  distant  capitals,  than 
is  to  be  found  in  the  conduct  of  the  Aulic  Council  and  its 
consequences,  after  the  famous  Russian  chieftain  had 
been  entrusted  with  the  task  of  driving  back  the  French 
legions  out  of  the  territories  which  they  had  overrun. 

Amongst  prominent  figures  in  history,  few  have  been 
more  traduced  than  has  the  victor  of  the  Ruimnik  and 
the  Trebbia.  In  consequence  of  his  enthusiasm  for 
monarchial  autocracy,  Suvorof  was  anathema  to  French 
writers  of  the  Revolutionary  era,  and  they  painted  his 
actions  in  the  darkest  colours.  His  name  has  in  this 
country  been  too  much  associated  with  Lord  Byron's 
mordant  and  oft -quoted  line,  "hero,  buffoon,  half 
demon  and  half  dirt."  Granted  that  the  great  soldier 
was  something  of  a  buffoon,  the  reference  to  dirt  amounted 
to  a  cruel  libel  and  the  epithet  "demon"  was  wholly 
inappropriate.  Bon  Juan  pictures  him  in  connection 
with  the  taking  of  Izmail,  and,  as  his  conduct  on  that 
occasion  unquestionably  was  open  to  some  criticism,  it 
may  not  be  out  of  place  to  say  a  word  upon  this  subject. 

The  fortress  had  been  formally  summoned  and  the 
Grand  Vizier  had,  very  properly,  met  the  summons 
with  an  uncompromising  refusal.  Military  authorities 
in  the  seventeenth  century,  and  before  that  era,  had 
been  in  substantial  agreement  that  a  stronghold  which 
would  not  yield  after  having  been  called  upon  to  do  so 
was  liable  if  taken  by  assault  to  be  sacked  and  to  have 
its  garrison  put  to  the  sword.  Cromwell  always  pleaded 
that  no  quarter  need  be  given  in  such  a  case,  and  he 
acted  on  that  principle  at  Basing  House  and  at  Drogheda, 
although  at  Gowran  House  and  Old  Castletown  he 
contented  himself  with  the  massacre  of  the  defending 


INTRODUCTION  xiii 

officers,  sparing  the  rank  and  file.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
fastnesses  did  in  practice  in  those  days  in  nineteen  cases 
out  of  twenty  haul  down  their  flag  rather  than  stand  an 
assault,  in  deference  to  what  was  to  all  intents  and 
purposes  a  law  of  war.  With  the  development  of 
modern  ideas  and  humaner  methods,  such  drastic  pro- 
cedure fell  to  a  great  extent  into  desuetude.  But  the 
principle  had  not  been  forgotten.  Writing  to  Canning 
some  thirty  years  after  the  fall  of  Izmail,  Wellington 
declared  that  he  would  have  considered  himself  justified 
in  putting  the  garrisons  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo  and  Badajoz 
to  the  sword,  and  that  had  he  done  so  at  the  former  it 
would  have  saved  him  5000  men  before  the  latter  place 
of  arms.  Twenty  years  after  Izmail,  Suchet  deliber- 
ately slaughtered  large  part  of  the  garrison  of  Tarragona, 
and  he  bitterly  upbraided  his  opponent,  the  wounded 
Contreras,  for  persisting  in  the  defence  of  an  untenable 
town.  It  has  always  to  be  remembered  that  the  van- 
quished in  a  combat  can  only  pray  for  quarter  as  an 
act  of  grace  ;  they  cannot  claim  it  as  a  right,  although 
it  nowadays  is  almost  always  granted. 

But  in  the  case  of  storming  a  fortress  this  question 
of  quarter  to  its  defenders,  as  also  that  of  the  conduct 
of  the  victors  towards  its  citizens,  was  influenced  by 
the  theory  that  the  assailants  were  entitled  to  pillage 
the  place.     That  theory  no  doubt  dated  back  to  the 
medieval  days  when  warfare  was  prosecuted  with  the 
utmost  savagery;  but  the  theory  had  been  carried  on 
into  much  later  days  by  the  mercenaries  of  the  seven- 
teenth and  eighteenth  centuries,  for  whom   prospects 
and  possibilities  of  plunder  provided  one  of  the  main 
inducements  to  serve.     Traditions  are  amongst  soldiers 
carried  on  from  one  generation  to  another,  and  there 
can  be  no  doubt  that  at  the  time  of  Izmail  and  Sering- 
apatam  and  San  Sebastian  and  Tarragona  the  rank  and 
file   of  European   armies,    even   perhaps   some   of  the 
officers,  were  imbued  with  the  notion  that  the  sacking 
of  a  fortified  city  which  had  been  taken  by  storm  was  a 


xiv  SUVOROF 

procedure  that  was  sanctioned  by  precedent  and  was 
warranted  by  the  circumstances  of  the  case. 

It  will  be  urged  that  there  was  a  very  substantial 
difference  between  what  occurred  within  the  Peninsular 
strongholds  taken  by  British  troops,  and  what  occurred 
within  the  enceinte  of  the  Turkish  fortress  on  the  Lower 
Danube.  The  excesses  committed  in  the  one  case  were 
entirely  imauthorised,  whereas  at  Izmail  massacre  and 
rapine  enjoyed  up  to  a  point  the  full  approval  of  Suvorof 
and  his  lieutenants.  At  Ciudad  Rodrigo  and  Badajoz 
there  moreover  were  no  reprisals  on  the  part  of  the 
victorious  troops  against  the  vanquished  garrisons, 
whereas  thousands  of  Osmanli  warriors  were  slaughtered 
at  Izmail  without  mercy. 

But  in  connection  with  this  latter  topic  we  should 
not  forget  that  the  conditions  in  the  cases  of  the  Spanish 
places  of  arms  differed  widely  from  those  that  obtained 
within  the  Ottoman  ramparts.  Resistance  collapsed 
as  soon  as  the  assailants  had  won  their  way  within  the 
enceintes  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo  and  Badajoz,  whereas  there 
was  desperate  fighting  in  the  streets  of  Izmail ;  and 
at  San  Sebastian,  where  defence  continued  after  the 
stormers  had  forced  the  breaches,  the  conquerors  took 
a  heavy  toll  of  their  antagonists.  In  so  far  as  the 
outrages  to  which  the  citizens  were  subjected  are  con- 
cerned, the  Russians  could  at  least  excuse  themselves 
on  the  ground  that  Izmail  was  for  the  most  part  peopled 
by  Turks  ;  the  inhabitants  of  the  Spanish  fortresses  on 
the  other  hand  were  friends  of  the  assailants,  not 
enemies,  but  that  availed  them  little.  Finally,  it  has 
to  be  borne  in  mind  that  warfare  as  between  Muscovite 
and  Osmanli  had  for  years  past  been  carried  on  in  ruth- 
less fashion,  that  animosity  between  these  hereditary 
foes  was  stimulated  on  both  sides  by  religious  fervour, 
and  that  there  is  not  the  slightest  reason  to  suppose 
that  Ottoman  troops  who  had  fought  their  way  into 
a  Russian  city  would  have  displayed  forbearance. 
Nobody  to-day  would  suggest  that  the  bloodshed  and 


INTRODUCTION  xv 

pillage  which  continued  at  Izmail  after  the  defence  had 
been  beaten  down  were  not  to  be  deprecated,  nor  that 
Suvorof's  attitude  in  connection  with  the  matter  was 
not  open  to  censure.  But  the  case  against  him  was 
not  in  reality  so  bad  as  some  have  pretended. 

Advance  in  the  art  of  fortification  and  in  military 
science  completely  transformed  the  conditions  of  fortress 
warfare  during  the  century  that  followed  Izmail  and 
Praga,  and  it  is  interesting  to  note  that,  on  the  occasion 
of  the  one  signal  instance  of  a  storming  that  has  occurred 
in  these  later  years,  the  victorious  assailants  were 
Russians  and  the  defenders  were  Turks.  That  was  at 
Kars  in  1877.  But  Kars  was  then  secured  by  detached 
forts,  and  it  was  the  detached  forts  that  were  taken  by 
storm.  There  was  no  question  of  street  fighting.  It 
is  not  solely  due  to  the  relatively  indulgent  methods  of 
conducting  war  which — before  the  Germans  re-intro- 
duced in  Belgium  and  France  the  practices  of  a  ruder 
age — were  supposed  to  prevail  in  these  later  days,  that 
the  horrors  of  Magdeburg  and  Drogheda  and  Izmail 
are  hardly  likely  to  repeat  themselves  in  the  course  of 
struggles  between  civilised  races.  Long-range  artillery, 
and  the  influence  which  this  has  exerted  over  the  laying 
out  of  defence  works,  also  affect  this  question. 

The  uncouth  antics  and  wayward  outbursts  which 
make  Suvorof  cut  so  strange  a  figure  in  our  eyes,  were 
perhaps  to  some  extent  a  pose  ;  but  they  manifested 
themselves  too  frequently  and  at  too  inappropriate 
moments  to  leave  much  doubt  that  this  remarkable 
leader  of  men  was  not  in  all  respects  quite  right  in  the 
head.  Still,  history  indicates  that  the  type  of  warrior 
of  ardent  temperament  who  is  ever  bent  on  violent 
offensives  when  in  the  field,  is  apt  to  prove  himself 
eccentric  in  other  matters.  Bliicher  was  a  case  in 
point.  In  our  own  annals  we  have  had  Nelson,  Wolfe, 
and  the  "  Salamander  "  Cutts.  His  eccentricities  have 
perhaps  been  one  cause  why  Suvorof's  outstanding 
merits  as  a  commander  have  hardly  been  sufficiently 


xvi  SUVOROF 

recognised  outside  the  ranks  of  his  own  countrymen. 
And  yet  those  eccentricities  were  one  of  his  most  precious 
assets  as  a  chieftain  lording  it  over  the  impressionable 
Russian  peasantry  who  composed  the  rank  and  file  of 
the  armies  that  he  led  from  victory  to  victory.  His 
singular  personality  was  a  cardinal  factor  in  his  handling 
of  his  men.  His  demeanour,  his  grotesque  posturings, 
his  exclamatory  communications,  may  seem  to  us  the 
tricks  of  a  mountebank,  to  the  soldiers  of  Catherine  and 
Paul  they  endeared  a  general  in  whom  officers  and  men 
came  to  place  implicit  trust. 

Next  to  Frederick  the  Great,  Napoleon  and  Wellington, 
unquestionably  the  greatest  soldier  of  the  last  half  of 
the  eighteenth  century  and  of  the  wars  that  followed 
the  French  Revolution,  Suvorof  was  in  some  respects 
more  successful  than  either  of  the  two  former.  He 
never  practically  had  a  really  untoward  reverse  on  the 
battlefield  to  deplore.  There  was  no  Kolin  and  no 
Kunersdorf  in  his  case  to  dim  the  glories  of  Fokchany 
and  of  the  passage  of  the  St.  Gothard.  He  met  with  no 
discomfiture  in  combat  so  distressing  as  befell  Napoleon 
at  Aspern  and  at  Leipzig.  Almost  as  uniformly  vic- 
torious in  action  as  the  Iron  Duke,  Suvorof  never 
experienced  so  mortifying  a  failure  when  compassing 
the  downfall  of  a  stronghold  as  Wellington  encountered 
before  Burgs  in  Old  Castile.  He  proved  himself  in  the 
course  of  his  many  years  of  active  service  in  various 
theatres  of  war  to  be  an  exponent  of  well-nigh  every 
type  of  effective  military  operation,  adapting  his  methods 
to  the  circumstances  of  each  particular  case  with  un- 
failing originality  and  with  consistent  good  fortune. 

He  mastered  the  art  of  vanquishing  elusive  guerilla 
bands,  whether  the  bands  were  composed  of  Poles 
fighting  under  educated  leaders  or  were  made  up  of 
nomad  Tartars,  children  of  the  limitless  steppes.  Otto- 
man valour  and  tenacity  behind  entrenchments  had 
become  traditional  from  the  date  on  which  the  tide  of 
Turkish  penetration  westwards  began  at  last  to  ebb  ;  but 


INTRODUCTION  xvii 

Suvorof  never  quailed  when  confronted  with  the  Sultan's 
legions  no  matter  how  strongly  they  might  be  posted, 
and  he  overcame  them  under  such  conditions  by  tactics 
peculiarly  his.  Face  to  face  with  practised  French 
commanders  such  as  were  Macdonald  and  Joubert,  he 
more  than  held  his  own  in  combat.  A  plainsman 
himself  and  at  the  head  of  plainsmen,  he  nevertheless 
contrived  to  prosecute  one  of  the  most  remarkable 
mountain  campaigns  in  the  history  of  war ;  for  a  parallel 
to  his  forcing  his  way  over  the  high  Alps  from  Airolo  to 
Altdorf  in  defiance  of  stalwart  opposition,  we  have  almost 
to  go  back  to  the  days  of  Hannibal.  He  received  his 
baptism  of  fire  as  a  young  staff  officer  in  the  Seven 
Years'  War,  winning  his  spurs  as  member  of  the  most 
lethargic  army  in  Europe  ;  thanks  to  his  precepts  and 
his  heartening  example,  that  army  less  than  a  generation 
later  rivalled  in  dash  and  mobility  the  fiery  levies  who 
fought  under  the  eyes  of  Dumouriez  and  Hoche.  We 
may  occasionally  feel  tempted,  when  conning  over  the 
record  of  what  he  accomplished,  to  criticise  the  pro- 
cedure adopted  in  some  particular  case,  to  look  askance 
at  a  policy  which  verged  at  times  seemingly  upon  the 
reckless.  And  yet  we  have  to  admit  that,  whether  he 
set  to  work  in  the  right  way  or  in  the  wrong  way,  he 
almost  invariably  conquered  in  the  end.  In  war  nothing 
succeeds  like  success.  The  result,  it  is,  that  counts, 
and  not  the  means  by  which  the  result  has  been 
arrived  at. 

Nor  were  Suvorof 's  services  to  his  country  at  an  end 
when  the  old  man  passed  away,  ignored  by  his  Sovereign 
and  neglected  by  the  court.  His  teachings  and  his 
theory  of  making  war  were  not  forgotten.  The  tale  of 
his  achievements  was  to  animate  coming  generations  of 
Russian  warriors  in  many  a  strenuous  campaign,  and 
on  many  a  hard-fought  field.  Had  there  been  no 
Suvorof  tradition,  would  some  of  his  successors  in  charge 
of  Muscovite  armies,  one  wonders,  have  won  the  signal 
triumphs  that  they  did  ?     Would  Diebitch  have  made 


xviii  SUVOROF 

his  swoop  almost  to  the  Golden  Horn  in  1829,  and 
would  Paskievitch  have  been  simultaneously  carrying 
all  before  him  by  lightning  strokes  dealt  the  Osmanli  in 
the  inhospitable,  roadless  tracts  of  Kars  and  Erzerum  ? 
Would  Tchernaief  in  1865,  master  of  only  2000  infantry 
and  a  dozen  guns,  have  stormed  the  great  walled  city  of 
Tashkend  defended  by  30,000  fighting  men  ?  Would 
Gourko  have  passed  the  Balkans  in  mid- winter  in  1877, 
and  have  come  down  like  an  avalanche  upon  Thrace 
before  the  bewildered  enemy  could  gather  his  scattered 
legions  together  to  arrest  the  rush  ?  The  glory  of  All 
the  Russias  is  under  eclipse,  their  greatness  has  for 
the  moment  passed  away.  If  ever  there  is  to  be  a 
revival,  if  ever  those  teeming  Slav  multitudes  are  to 
recover  the  place  in  the  world  which  they  occupied 
before  the  upheaval  of  1917,  the  memory  of  such  men 
as  Suvorof  will  assuredly  have  played  its  part  in  restoring 
an  emotional  race  to  sanity  and  in  resuscitating  the 
patriotism  of  a  nation  that  has  fallen  from  its  high  estate. 

C.  E.  C. 


CONTENTS 


PAGB 

Foreword .        .       vii 

Introduction  by  Major-General  Sir  C.  E.  Call  well,  K.C.B.  .        xi 


CHAPTER   I 

PREPARATION 

Ancestry — Early  Life — Education  —  Enlistment  and,  Promotions 
—  The  Seven  Years'  War  —  Suvorofs  Appreciation  of  its 
Lessons— Regimental  Command— A  Letter— Training  his  Men  1 


CHAPTER   n 

THE    FIRST    POLISH   WAR 

The  state  of  Poland— Entry  of  Suvorof  on  the  Scene  in  1770— 
Guerilla  Warfare — Battle  of  Landskron,  1771  —  Battle  of 
Stalovitch — Correspondence  with  the  Commander-in-Chief — 
Siege  of  Cracow,  1772 — Partition — Correspondence  ...         14 


CHAPTER   m 

THE    FIRST    TURKISH    WAR 

Turkish  Warfare  —  Victories  of  Rumyantsof — Suvorof  captures 
Turtukai,  1773  —  Correspondence  —  Captures  Turtukai  again 
—Affair  at  Hirsof,  1773— Battle  of  Kozludzhi,  1774— Failure  of 
the  Plan  of  Campaign — Peace  of  Kutchuk-Kainardzhi — Suvorof 
marries  unhappily — His  freakish  Character       ....        36 


XX  SUVOROF 


CHAPTER  IV 

FRONTIEE    WORK 

PAOK 

Rebellion  of  Pugatchyof,  1772— Intervention  of  Suvorof,  1774— 
Across  the  Volga— Capture  of  Pugatchyof— Suvorofs  Little 
Ways— Potyorakin— Correspondence — The  Tartars— Revolt  in 
the  Crimea,  1777— Squabbles  with  Prozorovski— Suvorof  in 
Charge — Migration  of  the  Christians — Astrakhan  and  the  Road 
to  India— Grievances — The  Tartars  again— Feasts  and  Fights 
— Correspondence — Command  of  Petersburg  Division,  1785— 
The  Imperial  Progress,  1787— Suvorof  one  of  the  Sights  .  62 


CHAPTER   V 

THE    SECOND    TURKISH    WAR 

Alliance  of  Russia  and  Austria  against  Turkey — Outbreak  of  War, 
1787— Suvorof  at  Kinburn— Battle  at  Kinburn,  1787— Suvorof 
Wounded— Attack  from  the  Sea,  1788— Siege  of  Otchakof- 
Letter  to  his  Daughter— Difference  with  Potyomkin— Suvorof 
in  Moldavia,  1789-  Battle  of  Fokshani— Battle  of  the  Ruimnik 
— Rewards — Correspondence — Fruitless  Campaign  of  1790 — 
The  Amiable  Coburg — The  Storm  of  Izmail — Alienation  of 
Potyomkin — Peace  with  Turkey .85 


CHAPTER   VI 

KICKING    HIS    HEELS 

Suvorof  at  Petersburg  —  Sent  to  Finland  —  Correspondence  — 
Jealousy — On  Military  Hospitals — Craving  for  Work— Daily 
Life — His  Daughter — Books  and  Newspapers — Ossian — Enjoys 
a  Wedding — Transferred  to  Kherson  —  Troubles  with  Con- 
tractors and  the  Treasury  —  Hospitals  again  —  Letter  to  a 
Godson — A  French  War  threatened 125 


CHAPTER   VII 

THE    SECOND    POLISH    WAR 

Poland  after  the  Partition — Rising  of  1794 — Rumyantsof  sends 
Suvorof  into  the  Country — Battles  of  Kruptchitsa  and  Brest — 
Halt  at  Brest — Battle  of  Kobuilk — Storm  of  Praga  and  Capitu- 
lation of  Warsaw — Suvorof  as   Pacificator — Anecdotes  True 


CONTENTS  xxi 

PAGE 

and  False — Recall  to  Petersburg,  1795 — An  Adventure  by  the 
Way — Upsetting  the  Court — Sent  to  Tultchin — The  Science  of 
Victory — How  it  worked  in  Practice — The  Foundation  of 
Modern  Russian  Training — Death  of  Catherine  the  Great         .       151 


CHAPTER   VIII 

DOWNFALL    AND    EXILE 

Paul  I.  and  Prussianism — Suvorof  fails  to  please— Dismissed — 
Exiled — Troubles  with  his  Wife  and  his  Property — His  Son 
— Daily  Life— Recalled — Recalcitrant — Plans  for  a  French 
War — Meditates  a  Monastery — Recalled  again,  1799 — War  at 
last 200 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE    ITALIAN    CAMPAIGN,    FIRST   STAGE 

The  French  Revolutionary  Armies — Suvorof  s  Method  compared 
— Paul  and  Suvorof — Suvorof  leaves  for  Vienna — People  and 
Ministers— Arrival  at  Verona — Instructing  the  Austrians — The 
March  to  the  Adda — Crossing  the  Adda — Entrance  into  Milan 
— Wresthng  with  the  High  War  Council  at  Vienna — Entrance 
into  Turin — More  Difficulties — Suvorof  wants  to  go  Home — 
Operations  in  Switzerland — The  French  cross  the  Apennines 
—The  March  to  the  Tidone— Battle  of  the  Trebbia— Return  to 
Alessandria 217 

CHAPTER  X 

THE    ITALIAN    CAMPAIGN,    SECOND    STAGE 

Correspondence  and  Complaints — The  French  cross  the  Apennines 
again — Battle  of  Novi — International  Fame — A  Dinner  Party 
—  Anecdotes  —  Plan  of  a  Swiss  Campaign  —  Its  Vices  and 
Dangers 269 

CHAPTER   XI 

THE    SWISS    CAMPAIGN 

Alternative  Routes — March  on  the  St.  Gothard — The  Pass  taken 
by  Storm — Rosenberg's  Flank  March — The  Devil's  Bridge — No 


xxii  SUVOROF 

PAai 
Thoroughfare  over  the  Mountains  —  Korsakofs  Defeat  at 
Zurich— In  the  Trap— Decision  to  fight  out  of  it — Battles  in 
the  Muottothal  and  Klonthal — Through  to  Glaris — Over  the 
Mountains  again  —  Safe  but  not  Sound  —  Correspondence  — 
Recall  to  Russia        .        .  305 


CHAPTER   XII 

RETURN    AND   DEATH 

Letting  himself  go — Meeting  with  Korsakof — Catching  the  Wind 
—  Christmas  Games — Taking  it  out  of  Thugut's  Son-in-Law — 
Correspondence  with  Nelson  —  Breaking  down  —  Desperate 
Remedies— Another  Blow  from  Paul— Arrival  at  Petersburg- 
Death         340 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 361 

INDEX 365 


LIST  OF  MAPS  AND  PLANS 


PAOB 

1.  Map  illustrating  Operations  in  Poland                  .            .            .17 

2.   Battle  of  Landskron 

23 

3.  Battle  of  Stalovitch 

25 

4.  Map  illustrating  Operations  in  Moldavia 

41 

5.  Capture  of  Turtukai 

42 

6.  Affair  of  Hirsof 

51 

7.  Battle  of  Kozludzhi 

55 

8.  Battle  of  Fokshani  . 

97 

9.  Battle  of  Ruimnik    . 

101 

10.  Storm  of  Izmail 

113 

11.  Battle  of  Kruptchitsa 

157 

12.  Battle  of  Brest         .... 

160 

13.  Battle  of  Kobuilk     . 

.     167 

14.  Storm  of  Praga 

175 

15.  Crossing  of  the  Adda 

229 

16.  Map  illustrating  Operations  in  Italy 

249 

17.  Battles  of  the  Trebbia 

255 

18.  Battle  of  Novi 

283 

19.  Map  illustrating  Operations  in  Switzerlan 

d 

307 

20.  Battles  in  the  Muottothal  and  Klonthal 

319 

21.  General  Map  of  Russia 

.     358 

xxm 


CHAPTER  I 

PREPARATION 

Ancestry — ^Early  life — ^Education — Enlistment  and  promotions — ^The 
Seven  Years'  War — Suvorof  s  appreciation  of  its  lessons — ^Regi- 
mental command — A  letter — ^Training  his  men. 

Of  the  ancestry  and  early  life  of  Alexander  VftSjsilyevitcJi! 
Suvorof  very  little  is  known.  His  family^ was  of  Swedish 
origin.  Probably  its  founder  was  a  man  called  Yud;* 
Suvor,  one  of  the  descendants  of  a  Swedish  immigrant 
who  settled  near  Moscow  in  the  sixteenth  century.  A 
certain  Ivan  Grigoryevitch  Suvorof  was  a  clerk  attached 
to  the  Pryeobrazhenski  regiment  in  the  time  of  Peter 
the  Great.  By  his  second  marriage  this  Ivan  had  a  son 
Vassili,  who  became  the  father  of  the  great  Alexander. 
Vassili  was  a  man  of  good  capacity,  proof  against  bribery 
and  influence,  a  good  linguist,  and  rather  more  than 
ordinarily  careful  in  money  matters.  Born  in  1705, 
he  entered  the  administrative  side  of  the  military 
service,  and  in  1753  was  made  General  and  a  member 
of  the  Military  College.  Catherine  had  a  very  high 
opinion  of  him  on  account  of  his  "  incorruptible 
honesty."  ^  In  1720,  while  still  a  boy,  he  married 
Avdotya  or  Evdokia  Theodosyevna  Manukof,  the 
daughter  of  a  secretary  who  in  1737  was  tried  for  the 
misappropriation  of  funds  in  his  charge.^    There  were 

1  See  Catherine's  letter  to  Dr.  Zimmerman,  15th  January  1790, 
Russkaya  Starina  (1887),  8.  The  Military  College  had  authority  over 
all  matters  except  the  actual  conduct  of  war — commissariat,  equip- 
ment, and  the  like. 

'  For  some  notes  about  him  see  Russkaya  Starina  (1900),  civ.  258, 

1  B 


2  SUVOROF 

three  children  of  this  marriage  —  Anna,  Maria,  and 
Alexander.  Alexander  was  bom  at  Moscow  on  the 
24th  November  1780. 

Nothing  in  his  ancestry  seems  to  have  foreshadowed 
the  coming  greatness  of  Alexander  Vassilyevitch.  If 
there  were  any  remarkable  members  of  it,  they  were 
mute  and  inglorious.  His  father  was  a  respectable 
administrator;  his  mother  died  fifteen  years  after  his 
birth,  and  no  note  of  her  appearance,  character,  or 
influence  upon  his  education  has  been  preserved.  But 
from  one  source  or  another  the  boy  had  got  some 
unusual  aptitude.  His  health  was  bad.  He  was  short, 
thin,  and  ugly.  Nothing  in  his  body  suggested  power. 
Nevertheless,  his  eyes  must  have  had  some  of  the  keen- 
ness and  fire  which  they  preserved  until  the  end,  and  the 
spirit  v/hich  looked  out  from  them  can  never  have  been 
feeble.  His  father  intended  to  find  him  a  post  of  some 
civil  kind,  and  he  learned,  not  very  well,  French, 
German,  and  a  little  Italian.  These  languages,  and 
the  ordinary  equipment  of  a  civilised  man,  reading 
and  writing  and  the  like,  were  the  sum  of  his  regular 
studies.  But  his  private  reading  took  him  into  military 
history  and  biography.  There  he  read  with  passion. 
Some  chance  encounter  among  his  father's  books  must 
have  set  him  on  the  track  down  which  he  was  to  travel 
almost  until  the  day  of  his  death.  For  study  of  this 
kind  his  energy  seemed  inexhaustible,  and,  without  any 
of  the  common  childish  liking  for  the  pomp  of  war, 
he  devoted  himself,  while  yet  a  boy,  earnestly  to  military 
service.  Ordinary  companions  and  ordinary  games  he 
had  none.  When  he  was  not  shut  in  his  garret  poring 
over  books,  he  was  galloping  on  horseback  in  the  sun 
and  wind  or  rain,  to  harden  his  body  and  accustom  it 
to  the  fatigues  of  war. 

This  overmastering  desire  for  a  military  career  re- 
ceived no  encouragement  from  Vassili  Suvorof .  But  the 
puzzled  and  anxious  father  was  wise  enough  not  to  resort 
to  threats  and  punishments,  and  if  he  did  not  help  the 


PREPARATION  8 

boy,  he  at  least  let  him  alone.  There  was,  at  last,  a  crisis. 
When  Alexander  was  eleven  years  old,  Hannibal,  the 
negro  general  of  Peter  the  Great,  paid  a  visit  to  Moscow.^ 
The  father  had  the  good  sense  to  ask  his  old  colleague's 
opinion,  and  Hannibal  advised  him  to  let  the  boy  follow 
his  own  bent.  Vassili  gave  way.  Any  youth  who 
wished  to  become  an  officer  must  first  pass  through  the 
lower  ranks,  and  this  wise  regulation  of  Peter  the  Great 
was  usually  evaded  by  the  enrolment  of  mere  babies  as 
privates  in  the  Guards.  By  the  time  the  child  had 
become  a  man,  he  had  nominally  completed  his  service 
as  a  private  and  a  non-commissioned  officer,  and  could 
proceed  at  once  along  the  primrose  path  of  promotion 
by  favour.  Alexander  Suvorof  came  late  into  the 
service,  and  he  began  at  the  bottom.  In  1742  he  was 
enrolled  in  the  Semyonovski  Guards,  and  in  1745  he 
began  actually  to  serve. 

The  interval  he  had  spent  in  study,  no  less  ardent 
and  more  systematic  than  before.  Plutarch,  Cornelius 
Nepog,  and  Julius  Caesar  were  his  classical  authors, 
Montecucculi  and  Turenne  among  the  moderns,  and  he 
got  such  acquaintance  as  was  possible  with  the  campaigns 
of  Alexander  and  Hannibal,  of  Cond6,  Prince  Eugen  of 
Savoy,  and  Mar6chal  de  Saxe.  Hiibner  and  RoUin 
gave  him  some  general  history  and  geography.  Wolf 
and  Leibnitz  some  philosophy.  For  artillery  and  forti- 
fication he  had  Vauban,  and  his  father  was  able  here  at 
least  to  give  him  help.  When,  at  the  age  of  fifteen,  he 
put  on  his  private's  uniform,  he  knew  more  of  the  history 
and  art  of  war  than  most  of  the  carpet  officers  to  whom 
he  had  to  present  arms. 

This  life  of  reading  and  meditation  continued  after 
he  joined  his  regiment.  He  did  not  throw  himself  into 
practice  as  fiercely  as  into  theory,  and  his  work  was 
apparently  not  well  done.  No  doubt,  he  had  already 
determined  to  be  a  great  general,  but  he  was  careless 
about  making  himself  a  perfect  private.  His  natural 
1  This  Hannibal  was  an  ancestor  of  the  poet  Pushkin. 


4  SUVOROF    ' 

independence  of  temper  and  hatred  of  forms  seem  to 
have  led  him  to  avoid  some  of  his  duties.  He  did  not 
live  in  barracks,  but  with  an  uncle,  who  had  a  commis- 
sion in  the  Pryeobrazhenski  Guards  ;  he  preferred  light 
duties  to  heavy ;  and  on  one  occasion  he  played  the 
malingerer.  Most  of  his  biographers  have  represented 
him  as  an  ardent  soldier.  But  the  latest  research  has 
shown  that  he  did  not  work  with  the  unquenchable 
happiness  of  a  young  man  whose  trade  is  also  his  hobby.^ 
One  incident  of  this  period  he  recalled  in  later  life.  He 
was  doing  sentry  duty  at  Mon  Plaisir  in  the  time  of  the 
Empress  Elizabeth.  She  passed  by  him  and  offered 
him  a  silver  rouble.  He  refused  it,  saying  that  the 
regulations  forbade  a  sentry  to  take  money.  "  Young 
man,'*  said  the  Empress,  "  you  know  your  duty,"  and 
offered  him  her  hand  to  kiss.  Then,  throwing  the  rouble 
at  his  feet,  "  I'll  put  the  rouble  there  on  the  ground  ; 
when  you're  relieved,  pick  it  up."  He  took  the  coin  in 
due  course,  and  kept  it  till  the  day  of  his  death.  ^ 

Few  other  details  of  his  service  have  come  down  to 
us.  His  companions  were  not  intimate  with  him,  or 
they  were  not  of  the  sort  who  compose  memoirs  and 
diaries,  and  no  letters  or  memoranda  of  his  own  have 
been  preserved.  What  he  looked  like,  thought,  and  did 
during  these  years  of  formation  cannot  be  known.  The 
bare  facts  of  his  successive  promotions  are  almost  all 
that  is  on  record.  In  1747  he  was  made  Corporal,  in 
1751  Sergeant.  From  May  to  October  1752  he  was 
engaged  in  carrying  despatches  to  Dresden  and  Vienna. 
On  the  15th  April  1754  he  became  at  last  a  commissioned 
officer,  and  received  a  Lieutenancy  in  the  Ingermanland 
regiment  of  infantry.  By  some  freak  of  fortune,  his 
earliest  duties  were  purely  administrative,  and  it  is 
doubtful  whether  this  born  leader  of  men  ever  com- 

1  Maslovski ;  in  the  Russian  Biographical  Dictionary,  x.  9.  This 
part  of  the  article  is  based  on  "Suvorof  Soldat"  (documents  of  the 
Archives  of  the  Semyonovski  Regiment),  Petrograd,  1900, 

2  Fucjljs,  Misc.,  63. 


PREPARATION  5 

manded  a  company.  He  was  two  years  with  his  first 
regiment,  but  seems  to  have  spent  a  considerable  part 
of  the  time  on  leave,  engaged  in  family  affairs.  In 
January  1756  he  became  Senior  Commissary  of  Stores, 
in  the  following  October  Lieutenant  General  Auditor, 
attached  to  the  Military  College,  and  in  December 
Senior  Major.  What  the  disciple  of  Caesar  and  Prince 
Eugen  thought  of  all  this  store-keeping  and  clerking, 
flour  and  porridge  and  pickled  cabbage,  reports  and 
instructions  and  accounts,  we  can  only  guess.  It  seems 
that  his  father  must  have  been  using  his  interest  in  the 
administrative  departments  to  get  Alexander  on  in  the 
service.  From  the  latter' s  frequent  and  unrestrained 
expressions  of  feeling  in  later  life,  it  is  obvious  that  he 
would  rather  have  been  drilling  a  single  company  or 
squadron  than  be  involved  in  this  domestic  business. 
Nevertheless,  his  chance  came  in  the  great  war  which 
broke  out  in  1756.^ 

The  Seven  Years'  War  gave  Suvorof  his  first  view  of 
active  service.  He  persuaded  his  father  to  use  his  in- 
fluence, and  as  early  as  1757  he  was  sent  to  the  front,  but 
in  the  capacity  of  Ober-Proviantmeister.^  His  duties 
were  still  administrative,  the  purchase  and  forward- 
ing of  stores  from  Memel  to  the  troops  actually  in  the 
field.  But  in  1759  he  was  appointed,  with  the  rank 
of  Lieutenant-Colonel,  to  the  staff  of  Prince  Volkonski, 
and  afterwards  to  that  of  Count  Fermor,  who,  in  the 
previous  year,  had  dragged  an  unwieldy  mass  of  Russian 
soldiers  through  the  indecisive  battle  of  Zorndorf. 
Fermor  was  superseded  by  Count  Saltikof ,  but  remained 
with  the  army,  and  Suvorof  was  therefore  present  at 
the  complete  but  profitless  victory  of  Kunersdorf.  He 
was  a  mere  spectator,  but  this  unparalleled  example  of 

1  Apparently  he  read  in  this  year  two  papers  before  the  newly 
founded  Society  of  Lovers  of  Russian  Literature  at  Petrograd.  They 
were  dialogues,  the  first  between  Cortez  and  Montezuma,  the  second 
between  Alexander  and  Herostratos.  Neither  has  any  literary  merit. 
Pyetrushevski  (2nd  edition),  9. 

»  Russkaya  Siarina  (1887),  Ivi.  212. 


6  SUVOROF 

refusal  to  follow  up  a  victory  must  have  made  a  profound 
impression.  Had  Suvorof  been  in  the  place  of  Saltikof, 
nothing  could  have  saved  Frederick  from  destruction, 
and  the  whole  history  of  modem  Germany  would  have 
been  different. 

In  the  subsequent  operations  of  the  war  he  took  a 
more  active  part.  In  1760  he  was  in  Tottleben*s  raid 
on  Berlin.  In  the  next  year,  in  command  of  part  of 
General  Berg*s  light  horse,  he  distinguished  himself  in 
the  affair  of  Reichenbach  and  in  raids  upon  Frederick's 
entrenched  camp  at  Schweidnitz.  During  the  siege  of 
Colberg  by  Rumyantsof  he  was  constantly  engaged 
with  the  troops  of  Platen,  who  attempted  to  throw 
supplies  into  the  place.  Once  he  was  wounded,  two 
horses  were  killed  under  him,  and  he  was  twice  within 
an  ace  of  being  taken  prisoner.  He  seems  to  have 
behaved  on  every  occasion  like  a  gallant  cavalry  officer, 
and  Berg  recommended  him  as  "  quick  in  reconnaissance, 
bold  in  fight,  and  cool  in  danger."  ^  The  campaign  of 
1761  was  the  last  in  which  the  Russian  Army  took  part. 
The  death  of  the  Empress  Elizabeth  in  December  was 
followed  by  the  conclusion  of  peace  by  Peter  III. 

The  Seven  Years'  War  thus  gave  Suvorof  consider- 
able experience  of  all  sorts  of  military  activity.  But 
more  important  than  the  mere  practice  in  the  handling 
of  troops  was  the  understanding  which  he  obtained  in 
this  war  of  the  way  in  which  all  war  should  be  conducted. 
All  Europe  had  much  to  learn  from  a  struggle  in  which 
a  single  state  with  a  highly  disciplined  army  had  made 
head  against  a  combination  of  much  greater  apparent 
strength.  But  the  lessons  of  the  war  were  for  the  most 
part  not  well  learned,  not  even  in  Prussia  itself.  The 
extraordinary  successes  of  Frederick  cast  a  spell  over 
the  military  minds  of  the  Continent,  and  his  strategy, 

1  Pyetnishevski,  15.  Suvorof  s  work  during  the  Seven  Years'  War 
is  described  in  detail  in  Campagnes  du  Feldmarechal  Souxcarrow,  i.  2, 
et  seq.  The  Campagnes  are  a  pirated  reprint  of  a  translation  of  Von 
Anting' s  biography,  of  which  the  greater  part  was  read  and  corrected 
by  Suvoiof  himself. 


PREPARATION  7 

his  tactics,  his  drill,  and  even  his  uniforms  were  imitated 
with  slavish  fidelity  for  a  whole  generation  after  his 
death.     The  results  were  generally  disastrous.     In  fact, 
the  chances  of  a  repetition  of  any  particular  combina- 
tion of  military  events  are  very  slight.     "  War,"  said 
Thucydides,  twenty-one  hundred  years  before  Frederick, 
"  is  the  last  of  all  things  to  go  according  to  programme." 
Strategy  is  nothing  more  than  putting  a  force  into  the 
position  from  which  it  can  strike  with  most  effect,  and 
Frederick's  plans  were  successful,  not  in  virtue  of  their 
formal  perfection,  but  because  he  could  rely  upon  himself 
and  his  subordinates  to  execute  marches  according  to 
programme,  without  delay  or  deviation.     As  with  his 
strategy,  so  with  his  tactics.     His  turning  movements 
and   flank  attacks   succeeded  because   his   men   could 
carry  them  out  against  the  enemy  who  opposed  them. 
There  was  no  special  worth  in  such  tactics  as  against  the 
French  armies  of  the  Revolution,  which  attacked  in 
column  at  great  speed  and  broke  the  centre  before  the 
wing  had  closed  upon  them.     The  value  of  Frederick's 
drill,  as  of  all  drill,  lay  in  this,  that  it  accustomed  his 
men  to  the  instantaneous  obedience  of  orders,  and  made 
it  certain  that  on  the  field  of  battle  the  word  of  command 
would  be  followed  by  the  execution  of  the  required 
manoeuvre  in  the  shortest  possible  time.     In  short,  the 
successes  of  Frederick,  as  of  all  great  commanders,  were 
due  to  the  moral  qualities  with  which  he,  his  generals, 
and  his  troops  carried  out  his  designs,  and  not  to  any 
mystic    properties    of    the    designs    themselves.      His 
imitators  failed  because  they  and  their  armies  fell  short 
of  him  and  his  armies  in  practical  rather  than  theoretical 
capacity.     They  missed  the  real  secret :    the  boldness 
of  his  strokes  and  the  swiftness  of  his  recoveries. 

Suvorof  was  not  the  man  to  fall  into  such  an  error, 
and  the  incompetence  of  the  Allies,  and  especially  of  the 
Russians,  made  a  profound  impression  upon  him.^    The 

1  A  Russian  infantry  regiment  required  an  hour  to  deploy  into 
battle  formation  I    Vassilyef,  Suvorof,  16. 


8  SUVOROF 

soldier  will  study  the  failures  of  his  predecessors  more 
safely  than  their  successes.  He  can  learn  to  avoid  their 
mistakes,  but  nothing  but  his  own  genius  will  enable 
him  to  imitate  their  triumphs.  Suvorof  s  natural  bias 
against  formalism  was  encouraged  by  the  very  events 
which  drove  most  of  his  contemporaries  into  excess  of 
it.  They  thought  that  Frederick  succeeded  through  the 
perfection  of  his  forms.  He  saw  that  Frederick's 
opponents  failed  through  want  of  mobility,  decision, 
and  readiness  to  take  risks.  The  imitators  aggravated 
want  of  energy  by  loading  themselves  with  forms,  while 
he  came  to  the  bold  and  sound  conclusion  that  forms 
were  worse  than  useless,  except  as  the  channels  of  energy. 
With  him,  energy  was  first  and  last.  "  Remember,*' 
he  said,  "  that  victory  depends  on  the  legs  ;  the  hands 
are  only  the  instruments  of  victory."  The  essential 
contrast  between  the  military  sincerity  of  Frederick 
and  the  sluggishness  and  indecision  of  his  opponents 
thus  produced  in  Suvorof  an  effect  diametrically  opposed 
to  that  produced  in  almost  all  his  contemporaries,  and 
made  him  the  most  original  commander  in  Europe 
between  Frederick  and  Napoleon. 

On  the  26th  August  1762,  Suvorof  was  promoted  to 
the  rank  of  Colonel.  His  first  command  was  the 
Astrakhan  regiment  of  infantry.  Tsar  Peter  was  re- 
moved soon  after  the  conclusion  of  peace,  and  Suvorof 
actually  received  his  promotion  from  the  hands  of 
Catherine.  During  her  absence  at  Moscow  for  the 
coronation,  his  regiment  was  in  garrison  at  Petersburg, 
and  after  her  return,  on  the  6th  April  1763,  he  was 
transferred  to  the  Suzdal  regiment,  which  took  the  place 
of  the  Astrakhan  regiment.  The  change  from  the  vigor- 
ous life  of  a  cavalry  leader  on  active  service  to  the  sober 
management  of  a  garrison  unit  must  have  been  infinitely 
depressing.  But  material  for  piecing  together  a  con- 
tinuous narrative  of  this  part  of  his  life  is  wanting. 
One  private  letter  alone  has  been  preserved,  the  first  of 
a  long  series  of  complaints.     It  was  written  in  bad 


PREPARATION  9 

French  on  the  7th  February  1764  to  Louise  Ivanovna 
Kulyevna.^  His  epistolary  style  was  always  disorderly, 
sometimes  incoherent,  and  in  this  letter,  as  usual,  he 
spilled  his  thoughts  on  to  his  paper  without  any  elegance. 

Come  here  (Petersburg) ;  you  will  be  three  or  four 
times  a  week  at  a  masked  ball,  two  or  three  times  at 
the  theatre  ;  I  profit  by  it  as  much  as  my  health  allows 
me,  for  unfortunately,  though  I'm  never  in  bed  and  am 
not  keeping  my  room,  but  the  goodness  of  the  waters 
of  the  Neva  has  so  weakened  my  stomach  that  it  revolts 
against  me  continually,  and  the  air  here  has  bred  worms 
in  my  belly,  endlessly,  which  torment  me  to  death  ; 
the  pains  in  my  head  and  chest  do  not  diminish, 

Thin  and  pale  as  a  homeless  ass. 

My  skeleton  chatters  its  ghastly  jaw  ; 

Like  a  ghost  through  the  realm  of  air  I  pass. 
Like  a  ship  that  sinks  in  the  ocean's  maw. 

I  am  almost  face  to  face  with  death.  He  drags  me  step 
by  step  from  the  world.  But  I  hate  him,  I  never  want 
to  die  so  ignominiously,  and  I  should  wish  never  to  suffer 
it  otherwise  than  on  the  field  of  Mars. 

This  gloomy  letter  represented,  no  doubt,  only  a  mood. 
But  throughout  his  life,  Suvorof  was  inclined  to  be 
unhappy  everywhere  except  on  active  service,  and  his 
passion  for  hard  work  in  the  field  and  personal  distinc- 
tion was  never  fully  satisfied.  Nevertheless,  the  mere 
management  and  training  of  men  gave  him  some  pleasure, 
and  these  bursts  of  complaint  must  have  alternated 
with  periods  of  real  happiness.  On  the  1st  July  1765 
his  Suzdal  regiment  was  sent  to  Ladoga,  where  he  made 
his  first  experiments  in  his  special  methods.  He  was 
far  enough  from  the  capital,  and  the  loose  organisation 
of  the  Russian  military  system  allowed  him  in  great 
measure  to  follow  his  own  bent,  without  much  inter- 
ference from  inspectors  and  sticklers  for  uniformity. 

Some  of  his  activities  were  remote  from  ordinary 

^  It  is  in  the  Sbornik  ;  printed  in  Letters  and  Papers^  p.  23. 


10  SUVOROF 

conceptions  of  the  duties  of  a  regimental  commander. 
Service  in  the  Russian  Army  was  practically  for  life, 
and  a  regiment  could  therefore  be  organised  like  a  great 
family.  The  commanding  officer  could,  if  he  pleased, 
acquire  an  enduring  influence  over  his  men.  This  Suvorof 
set  himself  to  do.  He  built,  besides  a  cavalry  stable,  a 
church  and  two  schools,  one  for  officers'  children,  and 
the  other  for  those  of  private  soldiers,  and  he  laid  out  a 
garden  in  which  his  men  worked.  But  his  principal 
task  was  the  training  of  his  men  as  soldiers.  His  orders 
to  his  troops  and  his  official  letters  to  his  superior  officer. 
General  Weimarn,  show  that  he  was  already  putting 
into  practice  the  theories  which  he  afterwards  elaborated 
for  whole  armies.  He  knew  that  victory  fell  not  to  the 
commander  who  worked  out  the  most  ingenious  paper 
plans,  but  to  him  who  could  call  upon  his  troops,  at  a 
moment's  notice,  to  do  a  two  days'  march  in  one  day, 
and  fight  a  battle  at  the  end  of  it.  First  and  foremost 
he  put  the  moral  equipment  of  his  men.  Courage, 
self-confidence,  and  the  endurance  of  fatigue  were  the 
cardinal  virtues.  The  soldier  must  be  ready  and  able 
to  go  anywhere  and  face  anything,  and  the  very  idea 
of  retreat  must  not  be  allowed  to  enter  his  head. 

"  Help,  danger,"  and  other  figments  of  the  imagina- 
tion are  all  right  for  old  women,  who  are  afraid  to  get 
off  the  stove  because  they  may  break  their  legs,  and  for 
lazy,  luxurious  people,  and  blockheads — for  miserable 
self-protection,  which  in  the  end,  whether  good  or  bad, 
in  fact,  always  passes  for  bravery  with  the  story-tellers.^ 

Pusillanimous  cavalry  tactics  he  specially  condemned. 
Shock  tactics  were  seldom  practised  even  at  this  date. 
The  Russian  regular  cavalryman  was  still  a  man  who 
used  carbine  and  pistols  rather  than  a  swordsman. 
The  Cossack  was  little  better  than  a  forager. 

For  cavalry  to  use  firearms  is  extremely  undesirable  ; 
sword  and  lance  are  incomparably  better ;    there  has 

1  Pyetrushevski,  i.  66. 


PREPARATION  11 

sometimes  been  an  unexpected  opportunity  for  firing 
during  a  pursuit ;  but  even  in  this  case  cold  steel  is 
better,  because  one  may  find  one's  self  without  a  shot  in 
one's  carbine  and  cannot  afford  to  waste  time  in  re-load- 
ing. ...  In  pursuit  the  cavalry  must  simply  charge  boldly 
with  an  unbroken  front ;  except  the  flankers,  who  may 
fire  pistols  ;  but  only  with  careful  aim.^ 

This  desire  to  accustom  his  men  to  fighting  at  close 
quarters  led  him  into  unusual  paths.  He  enlisted  both 
housewifery  and  religion  in  the  service  of  the  good  cause. 
He  not  only  built  a  church,  but  personally  attended  to 
the  prayers,  and  the  washing,  patching,  and  darning,  of 
his  men. 

The  German  or  French  peasant  knows  his  Church, 
his  faith,  and  his  prayers  ;  the  Russian  hardly  knows 
his  village  priest — in  my  regiment  we  taught  these 
peasants  a  few  prayers.  So  they  got  to  perceive  that 
in  everything  God  was  with  us,  and  strove  towards 
honour.  The  officers  know  that  I  myself  am  not 
ashamed  to  work  at  this.  .  .  .  Suvorof  was  Major,  and 
Adjutant,  and  everything  down  to  Corporal ;  I  myself 
looked  into  everything  and  could  teach  everybody. 

Every  man  passed  through  my  hands,  and  he  was 
told  that  nothing  more  remained  for  him  to  know,  if 
only  he  did  not  forget  what  he  had  learned.  Thus  he 
was  given  confidence  in  himself,  the  foundation  of 
bravery.2 

This  was  not  mere  pettifoggery.  The  Russian  army 
was  recruited  from  among  the  serfs,  and  consisted  in 
great  part  of  those  whom  their  masters  could  most  easily 
spare.  Idleness,  drunkenness,  and  dishonesty  were  thus 
common  qualities,  almost  qualifications.  The  Slav 
lethargy  and  indifference  to  appearances,  which  made 
even  the  modem  Russian  Army  the  least  smart  in 
Europe,  allowed  personal  slovenliness  full  play  in  the 
days  of  Catherine,  and  such  discipline  as  existed  depended 
largely  on  brutal  and  ferocious  punishments.  Suvorof 
tried  to  improve  the  character  of  his  men  by  encouraging 

1  Pyetrushevski,  72,  73.  »  Ibid.,  67. 


12  SUVOROF 

godliness  and  cleanliness  together.  His  regiment  was  a 
sort  of  reformatory  school  as  well  as  an  instrument  of 
war.  In  the  soil  thus  fertilised,  he  planted  the  specific 
military  virtues  of  obedience,  endurance,  and  speed. 
He  was  most  original  in  keeping  his  men  as  much  as 
possible  on  a  war  footing.  Marches  by  day  and  night, 
wading  and  swimming  across  rivers,  and  sham  fights 
were  of  constant  occurrence,  and  were  undertaken  with- 
out warning  or  preparation.*  On  one  occasion  he 
suddenly  ordered  his  troops  to  take  a  monastery  by 
storm,  and  sent  them  tumbling  over  the  wall  among  the 
monks,  who  must  have  taken  them  for  a  pack  of  devils. 
All  these  experiments  in  command  were  sketches  of  his 
later  system.  He  practised  his  men  in  hard  realities, 
setting  his  mind  to  making  them  healthy,  bold,  and 
hardy,  without  regard  to  the  niceties  of  forms.  The 
specifically  Prussian  virtues,  mechanical  exactness  and 
complete  moral  subjection  of  the  subordinate  to  the 
conamander,  were  not  there.  For  those  he  had  to  sub- 
stitute other  things  more  suited  to  the  Slav  character ; 
personal  indifference  to  hardship,  and  an  almost  parental 
relation  between  officer  and  soldier.  It  is  not  difficult 
to  see  in  this  Ladoga  period  of  Suvorof 's  life  an  elabora- 
tion of  the  lessons  of  the  Prussian  War. 

No  doubt,  he  was  already  master  of  the  art  of  getting 
on  to  intimate  terms  with  his  men.  He  was  not  yet 
famous,  and  there  was  no  Boswell  to  set  him  down  as 
he  lived  among  his  men  at  Ladoga.  But  he  must  have 
already  been  something  of  the  jesting,  porridge-eating, 
back-slapping  brother-in-arms  that  he  remained  through- 
out the  time  of  his  greatest  fame.  He  was  never 
happier  than  when  he  had  pulled  off  his  jacket  and 
shirt,  and  sprawled  half-naked  in  the  sun,  exchanging 
jokes  on  terms  of  friendship  with  all.  He  spared  no 
man  while  work  was  to  be  done,  but  he  encouraged 
liberty,  equaUty,  and  fraternity  when  it  was  finished. 
If  he  saw  that  they  darned  their  socks  and  washed 
1  Pyetrushevski,  68. 


PREPARATION  18 

their  shirts,  it  was  not  as  a  schoolmarm,  but  as  one  of 
themselves.  Hard  work  seemed  lighter  when  he  shared 
it,  and  rough  living  lost  its  discomfort  when  the  Colonel 
himself  endured  it  with  the  rest.  His  men  grew  to 
like  doing  their  utmost,  because  they  grew  to  like  giving 
him  pleasure.  By  encouragement  and  example  he 
wound  his  unit  up  to  a  high  pitch,  and  in  1769  he  got 
the  opportunity  of  playing  upon  the  instrument  which 
he  had  made. 


CHAPTER  n 

THE   FIRST   POLISH   WAB 

The  State  of  Poland — ^Entry  of  Suvorof  on  the  scene  in  1770 — Guerilla 
warfare — ^Battle  of  Landskron,  1771 — Battle  of  Stalovitch — Corre- 
spondence with  the  Commander-in-Chief— Siege  of  Cracow,  1772 
— ^Partition — Correspondence. 

It  is  a  matter  for  regret  that  much  of  Suvorof's  mili- 
tary reputation  depends  on  his  successes  in  Polish 
Wars.  He  was  thus  the  instrument  of  one  of  the  great 
political  crimes  of  modem  history.  In  the  second  half 
of  the  eighteenth  century  the  situation  of  Poland  was 
one  with  which  students  of  modern  Imperialism  are 
familiar.  The  internal  condition  of  the  country  had 
long  been  one  of  weakness  and  uncertainty,  and  powerful 
neighbours  waited  for  the  time  when  an  excuse  for  inter- 
vention should  offer  itself.  Russia,  Prussia,  and  Austria, 
restrained  not  by  compunction  for  the  perishing  nation- 
ality of  Poland,  but  by  their  mutual  jealousy  and  distrust, 
waited  and  manoeuvred  for  the  moment  when  they  could 
decently  step  in  to  restore  that  Order,  in  whose  name  as 
many  crimes  have  been  committed  as  in  that  of  Liberty. 
Each  maintained  its  group  of  partisans  in  the  country, 
and  through  this  channel  administered,  from  time  to 
time,  further  doses  of  the  poison  from  which  the  destined 
victim  was  suffering.  The  elective  monarchy,  and  the 
liherum  vetOy  or  right  of  a  single  member  of  the  Diet  to 
prohibit  the  execution  of  any  of  its  decrees,  made  the 
Polish  nobility  a  very  convenient  instrument  of  foreign 
intrigue.     By  playing  the  jealousy  of  the  nobility  against 

14 


THE  FIRST  POLISH  WAR  15 

the  King  and  the  jealousy  of  one  group  of  nobles  against 
another,  the  neighbouring  Powers  were  able  to  infect 
the  whole  state  with  a  creeping  palsy.  The  peasants 
were  mere  serfs.  The  industry  and  commerce  of  the 
country  were  in  the  hands  of  Jews,  and  there  was  no 
Polish  middle  class.  Political  power  was  concentrated 
in  a  small  space,  and  pressure  upon  a  very  limited  area 
moved  the  whole  fabric. 

Towards  the  end  of  the  third  quarter  of  the  century 
the  ill  condition  became  acute,  and  the  methods  of  the 
expectant  heirs  more  direct.  The  collapse  of  the  power 
of  the  Crown,  the  factiousness  of  the  nobility,  and  the 
complete  impotence  of  the  mass  of  the  people  made 
possible  the  three  successive  partitions  by  which  the 
Kingdom  of  Poland  was  extinguished.  The  first  appro- 
priation of  territory  was  made  by  Austria  in  1770, 
though  a  formal  partition  did  not  take  place  until  two 
years  later.  But  the  earliest  steps  were  taken  by  Russia. 
In  1764  Catherine  II.  secured  the  election  of  Stanislav 
Poniatowski,  a  discarded  favourite  of  her  own,  as  King 
of  Poland.  His  election  was  accompanied  and  secured 
by  the  despatch  of  Russian  troops  and  the  expenditure 
of  a  considerable  sum  of  Russian  money.  This  election 
did  not,  nor  was  it  intended  to,  put  an  end  to  the  political 
disorganisation  of  the  country.  The  new  King  was 
chosen  by  the  Russian  Empress,  not  because  of  his 
capacity  for  making  head  against  the  truculent  nobility, 
but  because  of  his  incapacity,  of  his  inevitable  need  of 
further  assistance  from  the  Power  which  had  set  him  on 
the  throne.  It  is  not  the  habit  of  such  an  Imperialism 
as  that  of  Catherine  of  Russia  to  spoil  its  own  chances 
by  nominating  a  strong  man  where  a  puppet  will  suffice. 
In  such  a  case  a  lively  sense  of  impotence  in  the  nominee 
is  the  first  condition  of  his  appointment.  The  advantages 
which  he  can  acquire  from  the  appearance  of  Royalty 
are  to  be  used  for  the  advantage  of  his  patron.  The 
real  governor  remains  for  the  time  being  out  of  the 
picture,  but  near  enough  to    be    called    in  when  the 


16  SUVOROF 

difficulties  of  the  domestic  situation  make  it  decent  to 
interfere  once  more.  Stanislav  was  a  good-natured  man, 
of  modest  character  and  mediocre  capacity.  Under 
these  conditions  his  election  did  not  alter  the  state  of 
Poland.  His  partisans,  of  whom  the  Princes  Czartoryski 
were  the  most  powerful,  aimed  at  the  increase  of  the 
authority  of  the  Crown  as  the  only  means  of  checking 
the  growing  insolence  of  the  nobility.  The  alternative, 
an  appeal  from  the  Crown  to  the  common  people,  did 
not  present  itself  as  an  alternative,  and  the  absence  of 
any  educated  non-noble  class  would  have  made  such  an 
appeal,  in  fact,  fruitless.  The  Radziwils,  on  the  other 
side,  headed  the  defenders  of  the  old  system,  and  while 
one  side  talked  severely  of  order,  the  other  declaimed 
in  terms  of  liberty.  Complaints  against  the  Czartoryski 
were  lodged  in  Petersburg,  but  Catherine  and  her  advisers 
were  still  not  prepared  for  strong  measures.  The  sick 
man  must  get  a  little  worse  before  they  would  divide 
his  estate. 

The  religious  disease  of  Poland  combined  with  the 
political  to  reduce  the  strength  of  the  country  against 
permeation  from  abroad.  At  the  Diet  of  Vilna  in  1563 
it  had  been  decreed  that  all  the  nobility  of  whatever 
faith,  provided  they  were  Christians,  should  have  the 
same  political  rights.  This  Toleration  Act  had  been 
made  the  basis  of  more  than  one  subsequent  Royal 
election,  and  more  than  one  King,  in  return  for  Protestant 
support,  had  pledged  himself  to  maintain  the  rights  of 
the  Dissidents,  most  of  whom  were  members  of  the  Greek 
Church.  But  the  wars  of  Russia  with  Sweden  gave  the 
Roman  Catholics  opportunities  of  which  they  were  not 
slow  to  avail  themselves,  and  the  members  of  the  Greek 
and  other  Dissenting  churches  began  to  suffer  disabilities 
and  even  persecution.  Stanislav  was  inclined  to  favour 
them,  and  Russia  and  Prussia,  to  whom  religious  liberty 
was  as  good  political  coin  as  anything  else,  supported 
him.  In  1768  a  Diet  was  requested  to  confirm  the  rights 
of  the  Dissidents.    The  opposition  was  strong,  and  Prince 


THE  FIRST  POLISH  WAR 


17 


Ryepnin,  the  Russian  representative  at  Warsaw,  went 
so  far  as  to  arrest  four  Roman  Catholics  and  transport 


them  to  Russia.  Patriotism  wanted  no  further  excuse. 
On  the  1st  March  1768  eight  of  the  bolder  spirits  issued 
a  declaration  from  Bar,  establishing  a  Polish  Confederacy 

c 


IS  SUVOROF 

independent  of  the  foreign  Governments  and  their 
nominees.*  The  numbers  of  the  confederates  grew 
rapidly.  Count  Krasinski,  and  Pulawski,  the  inspirer 
of  the  movement,  were  chosen  as  Marshals  of  the  Con- 
federacy, and  the  revolt  assumed  a  serious  appearance. 

The  affair  had  now  reached  the  point  at  which  the 
rival  Powers  could  begin  to  collect  the  spoils.  It  was 
found  necessary  to  reinforce  the  Russian  troops  for  the 
purpose  of  suppressing  the  revolt  and  restoring  the 
power  of  the  Crown.  A  small  army  was  collected  at 
Smolyensk,  under  Lieutenant-General  Nummers,  and 
Suvorof  and  his  Suzdalskii  regiment  were  included  in  it. 
Suvorof  was  created  a  Brigadier  on  the  22nd  September 
1768,  but  it  was  not  until  February  1770  that  he  actually 
handed  his  regiment  over  to  its  new  Colonel,  Stackelburg. 
His  orders  to  join  Nummers  gave  him  an  opportunity 
of  testing  the  results  of  his  regimental  training,  and  he 
had  every  reason  to  be  satisfied.  From  Ladoga  to 
Smolyensk  was  more  than  570  miles  of  the  worst  marching 
country  in  Europe.  He  covered  the  distance  in  30 
days  ;  not  a  single  sick  man  was  left  behind  at  Ladoga, 
six  fell  ill  on  the  journey,  and  one  died.^  At  Smolyensk 
he  was  given  the  command  of  a  Brigade,  comprising 
four  battalions  and  two  squadrons  of  cavalry. 

The  events  of  the  next  two  or  three  years  need  not  be 
described  in  detail.  Poland  was  at  that  time  covered 
with  woods  and  swamps.  The  villages  and  most  of 
the  towns  were  collections  of  miserable  hovels.  The 
roads  were  mere  tracks,  passable  in  summer,  but  for 
most  of  the  year  filled  with  mud  and  water,  and  the  only 
inns  were  wayside  huts  occupied  by  Jews.  The  warfare 
was  of  the  guerilla  sort,  giving  opportunity  for  individual 
skill  and  bravery,  but  for  little  on  the  grand  scale. 
Small   bands   of   partisans   moved   over   the   wretched 

1  A  Confederacy,  according  to  the  Constitution  of  Poland,  was  a 
sort  of  legalisation  of  the  divine  right  of  rebellion  ;  a  formal  means  of 
protest  against  Acts  of  the  Crown. 

■  Pyetrushevski,  i.  29. 


THE  FIRST  POLISH  WAR  19 

country,  and  Prussiian  and  Austrian  territory  afforded 
them  a  temporary  refuge,  in  case  the  local  pressure  of 
the  Russian  troops  became  too  strong.  Von  Weimarn, 
the  Russian  Commander-in-Chief,  was  a  man  of  more 
erudition  than  vigour.  Scattered  encounters  between 
numerically  insignificant  bodies  of  troops  took  place 
continually,  but  the  methodical  sweeping  of  the  country- 
side, the  only  certain  way  of  dealing  with  such  enemies 
as  the  Confederates,  was  not  possible  to  such  a  man  as 
Von  Weimarn,  especially  when  he  had  so  few  men  at  his 
disposal.  The  Due  de  Choiseul,  then  in  power  in  France, 
openly  supported  the  Confederates.  He  had  also  inspired 
the  Sultan  to  declare  war  against  Russia,  and  the  double 
strain  was  too  much  for  the  Russian  military  machine. 
Nevertheless,  for  Suvorof,  this  was  an  excellent  field 
for  his  first  practical  experiments,  and  he  executed  some 
very  fine  marches  and  raids.  On  one  occasion,  he  carried 
his  infantry  in  carts  from  Minsk  to  Warsaw,  a  distance 
of  375  miles,  in  12  days.^  On  another,  he  marched 
45  miles  out  from  Brest,  all  night  and  half  the 
next  day  on  the  road,  and  defeated  a  detachment  of  the 
enemy  2000  strong.  In  this  affair  he  tried  to  repeat 
the  English  performance  at  Minden,  and  charged  cavalry 
with  the  bayonet ;  the  Poles  galloping  away  without 
resistance.^  In  the  autumn  of  1769  he  fixed  his  base  of 
operations  at  Lyublin,  and  from  that  centre  struck  out, 
now  in  one  direction,  now  in  another,  as  he  received 
news  of  the  approach  of  the  enemy  parties.  On  one  of 
these  expeditions  he  fell  into  the  Vistula.  A  burly 
grenadier  pulled  him  out  by  the  hair,  but  he  was  badly 
bruised  by  striking  against  a  pontoon,  and  was  not 
thoroughly  recovered  until  three  months  later.^  On  the 
whole,  he  had  little  to  do,  and  his  energetic  nature  chafed 
in  inactivity.     On  the  1st  January  1770  he  was  pro- 

1  Campagnes,  i.  28. 

«  Pyetrof.  On  this  occasion,  owing  to  the  smallness  of  his  force, 
Suvorof  gave  orders  that  quarter  should  not  be  given.  Nevertheless, 
he  brought  back  about  40  prisoners. 

^  CampagneSt  i.  37. 


20  SUVOROF 

moted  to  the  rank  of  Major-General,  but  he  cared  more 
for  work  than  for  anything  else,  and  throughout  this 
year  his  correspondence  is  full  of  complaints.  Vigorous 
operations  against  the  Polish  Confederates  were  impos- 
sible, largely  because  the  Turkish  threat  from  the  south 
was  so  much  more  formidable.  The  troops  actually  in 
Poland  were  badly  led  and  wanting  in  discipline,  and 
Suvorof  had  constantly  to  draw  attention  to  the  slovenli- 
ness, corruption,  and  plundering  habits  of  those  in 
command  of  the  co-operating  detachments.  Of  one 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Dryevitz  he  writes  sneeringly  : 

What  do  I  care  if  he  has  not  studied  his  Russian 
grammar  for  three  whole  years  ?  At  least  I  am  learning 
German  from  him.  .  .  .  He*s  a  foreigner,  under  no  ties  to 
Russia,  his  interest  is  in  prolonging  the  war,  not  in  cutting 
it  short.  His  boasts  about  his  victories  are  sheer  empti- 
ness ;  they  were  won  by  his  Russian  soldiers.  What 
are  these  mighty  dispositions  against  the  rebels  ?  Only 
speed,  energy,  and  the  discovery  of  their  whereabouts. 
His  intelligent  and  strong  troops  he  keeps  in  a  bunch, 
incapable  of  dealing  a  blow,  rather  than  use  them  intelli- 
gently, with  the  desire  of  ending  this  unrest.  The  use 
of  him  as  a  commander  is  the  shame  of  those  of  us  who 
are  his  seniors  in  rank,  even  if  without  capacity  or  worth 
or  service  equal  to  his,  the  shame  of  Russia,  which  has 
long  been  free  from  the  age  of  such  barbarities  as  his. 
While  he  is  carelessly,  luxuriously,  magnificently  making 
holiday  at  Cracow,  I  with  a  handful  of  men  am  compelled 
to  struggle  like  a  Cossack  bandit  with  every  cut-throat 
who  comes  along.^ 

Suvorof 's  complaints  on  this  as  on  other  occasions 
were  partly  provoked  by  the  foreign  origin  of  their  object, 
and  throughout  his  life  he  was  almost  continually 
jealous  and  resentful  at  having  to  work  under  or  on  equal 
terms  with  men  of  inferior  capacity  to  his  own.  But 
he  was  also  thoroughly  dissatisfied  with  the  necessarily 
few  opportunities  of  the  Polish  affair.     In  the  whole  of 

1  Pyelnishevski,  i.  89.  Dryevitz  was  accused  of  having  cut  off  the 
hands  of  some  of  his  Polish  prisoners.     Ibid.  i.  90. 


THE  FIRST  POLISH  WAR  21 

1770  he  only  twice  encountered  the  enemy  in  considerable 
force,  and  the  Russian  triumphs  over  the  Turks  at 
Larga,  Kagul,  and  Tchesma  held  out  the  promise  of 
much  greater  things  in  the  other  theatre  of  war. 

In  1771  the  Polish  War  assumed  larger  proportions. 
The  indefatigable  Choiseul,  not  contented  with  his 
diplomatic  success  in  Turkey,  determined  to  make  the 
threat  from  the  direction  of  Poland  more  serious.  In 
1769  he  had  sent  the  Comte  de  Tollis  with  a  considerable 
sum  of  money  to  stimulate  the  Confederates,  but  de 
Tollis  took  his  money  back  to  Paris,  thinking  the  enter- 
prise hopeless.  In  his  place  Choiseul  sent  Dumouriez, 
who  was  greatly  disappointed  with  the  numbers  and 
character  of  the  Confederates,  but  determined  to  make 
an  attempt  to  convert  their  undisciplined  rabble  into 
an  army.  He  got  officers  from  France,  arms  from  Silesia 
and  Hungary,  transport  from  Bavaria,  and  with  Austrian 
and  Prussian  deserters  as  a  nucleus,  worked  his  miscel- 
laneous collection  of  men  on  foot  into  something 
approaching  military  shape.  About  60,000  men  were 
ready  for  the  campaign  of  1771,  and  in  the  spring 
Dumouriez  began  a  vigorous  offensive  from  the  Austrian 
frontier,  proposing  to  cut  off  the  scattered  Russian  posts, 
and  even  threaten  the  rear  of  Rumyantsof's  army 
operating  against  the  Turks  in  Moldavia.  His  first 
efforts  prospered.  Several  Russian  detachments  were 
simultaneously  beaten  in  the  plain  of  Cracow  and  driven 
across  the  Vistula  with  heavy  losses.  But  the  Con- 
federates defeated  themselves.  With  these  first  victories 
order  disappeared,  and  the  bulk  of  the  army  gave  itself 
up  to  rejoicing  and  plunder.  This  was  the  moment  for 
Suvorof.  He  had  already  dispersed  several  parties  of 
insurgents,  and  attempted  to  take  the  fortress  of  Land- 
skron  by  storm.  Here,  for  the  time  being,  he  failed, 
and,  in  the  course  of  several  unsuccessful  attacks,  almost 
all  his  superior  officers  were  wounded,  Suvorof  himself 
being  grazed  by  a  bullet.  But  after  the  occupation  of 
Cracow  by  Dumouriez  he  gained  his  first  substantial 


22  SUVOROF 

victory.  Much  against  his  will  he  was  forced  to  co- 
operate with  Dryevitz,  but  the  result  showed  that 
Dryevitz  was  not  so  bad  as  Suvorof  had  previously  made 
out.  On  the  10th  of  May  the  joint  forces  encountered 
Dumouriez  himself  with  a  considerable  army  at 
Landskron. 

The  Poles  lay  along  a  ridge.  The  fortress  itself 
covered  the  left  flank,  and  the  right  and  centre  were 
protected  by  two  woods.  On  the  right  the  ridge  was 
inaccessible,  and  along  the  front,  in  addition  to  the 
trees,  the  slopes  were  covered  with  brushwood,  which 
formed  a  stiff,  natural  entanglement.  The  attack  of 
the  Russians  was  expected,  the  position  was  carefully 
chosen,  and  the  fortress  with  its  30  guns  was  in  itself 
a  most  formidable  obstacle.  But  the  overthrow  of 
Dumouriez  was  instantaneous  and  complete.  Suvorof 
took  in  the  situation  at  a  glance,  and,  without  waiting 
for  his  infantry,  laimched  the  Cossacks  of  Tchuguyef 
and  a  squadron  of  carabineers  straight  at  the  enemy's 
centre.  Dumouriez,  to  whom  such  a  cavalry  attack 
upon  unbroken  infantry  appeared,  not  unnaturally, 
absurd,  ordered  his  men  to  hold  their  fire  until  the 
Russians  reached  the  crest  of  the  ridge  itself.  This  was 
sound,  orthodox,  military  doctrine,  and  a  steady 
infantry,  by  a  couple  of  volleys  at  point  blank  range, 
even  without  artillery,  would  have  emptied  almost 
every  saddle  in  front  of  them.  But  Suvorof  knew 
Dumouriez*s  troops  better  than  the  French  commander 
himself.  As  the  Cossacks  swept  yelling  up  the  slope, 
the  Poles  turned  and  ran.  Dumouriez  and  a  few  other 
officers  in  vain  tried  to  stop  them,  and  Miutchiski 
actually  led  some  of  the  infantry  forward  against  the 
Russian  foot.  But  the  battle  was  decided  in  the  first 
few  minutes.  The  Polish  left  wing  retired  in  good 
order  into  Landskron.  But  about  500  Poles  were 
killed,  two  field-guns  remained  in  Suvorof's  hands,  and 
the  fortress  itself  was  left  alone  merely  because  the 
victors  had  only  8  guns  to  bring  against  the  30  which 


THE  FIRST  POLISH  WAR 


23 


defended  it.  Dumouriez  himself  shook  the  dust  of 
Poland  from  his  feet,  and  went  straight  back  to  France.^ 
Suvorof  completed  his  brief  campaign  by  defeating 
another  detachment  of  Poles  under  Pulavski  at  Zamostye. 
He  then  returned  to  Lyublin.  In  17  days  he  had 
marched  about  475  miles,  and  fought  8  battles  or 
skirmishes. 

The  defeat  at  Landskron  left  the  Poles  for  a  time 


portress  of^**^ 

landskronYi^   ^ 


Battle  of  LANDSKRON. 


SCALE-  INGUSH  M/l£S 
O  '/z  /  Z 


without  a  leader,  and  without  even  the  nucleus  of 
what  could  be  called  an  army.  But  Count  Oginski  of 
Lithuania,  who  had  hitherto  held  away  from  the  in- 
surgents, at  length  threw  in  his  lot  with  them,  and  on 
the  30th  August  fell  suddenly  upon  a  Russian  detach- 
ment under  Colonel  Albuitch  and  killed  or  captured 
the  greater  part  of  it  at  Rudka.     Around  him  there 


1  Pyetrof,  iii.  223.  Dumouriez  gives  his  own  account  of  the  Polish 
business  in  La  Vie  et  les  Memoires  du  G&neral  Dumouriez.  Suvorof 
himself  declared  that  Dryevitz  behaved  with  "  skill,  manUness,  and 
courage."     Pyetrushevski,  i.  104. 


24  SUVOROF 

soon  gathered  a  force  of  several  thousand  men,  and  the 
work  of  Landskron  seemed  all  undone. 

As  early  as  the  28rd  July  Weimam  had  warned 
Suvorof  to  watch  the  suspicious  movements  of  Oginski. 
On  the  21st  September  he  sent  him  elaborate  instruc- 
tions how  to  act  in  co-operation  with  Dryevitz.  Whether 
Suvorof  received  these  instructions  or  not,  is  doubtful. 
At  any  rate,  he  learned  of  the  defeat  of  Albuitch,  and 
wrote  on  the  1st  September  to  inform  Weimarn  that  he 
was  at  once  starting  for  Lyublin.  On  the  2nd  he  was 
at  Kotsk,  on  the  5th  at  Vyala,  and  on  the  6th  at  Brest. 
From  there  he  marched  to  Byereza,  and  then  to  Nesvizh, 
where  he  at  last  got  certain  information  of  the  where- 
abouts of  Oginski.  Bidding  Colonel  Diring  and 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Klxvabulof,  who  were  near  at  hand 
with  small  bodies  of  troops,  to  join  him  as  soon  as 
possible,  he  marched  swiftly  towards  Stalovitch.  He 
had  with  him  822  men,  and  Oginski's  strength  was  about 
5000.  But  the  Poles  had  no  news  of  Suvorof,  and 
imagined  that  there  were  no  Russians  in  their  neigh- 
bourhood but  a  few  small  detachments  like  that  of 
Diring.     They  were  taken  completely  by  surprise. 

The  village  of  Stalovitch  lay  in  an  open  plain  in 
front  of  a  large  marsh,  across  which  ran  a  single  cause- 
way, 200  yards  long.  Suvorof,  avoiding  a  frontal 
attack,  marched  during  the  night  of  the  9th  round  to 
the  rear  of  the  town.  It  was  very  dark,  and  for  the 
last  part  of  the  march,  the  only  guide  was  the  light 
in  the  bell-tower  of  a  neighbouring  monastery.  Aiming 
at  the  causeway,  the  Russians  dashed  across  it  as  the 
startled  enemy  opened  fire.  The  village  was  soon 
taken,  and  the  Poles,  leaving  many  prisoners  and  some 
of  their  cannon  to  the  Russians,  hid  themselves  in 
the  houses,  or  fled  out  of  the  place.  Only  Oginski's 
Guard,  his  so-called  "  Janissaries,"  offered  a  steady 
resistance,  and  Oginski  himself  barely  escaped  capture. 
Some  of  Albuitch's  men  heard  the  shouts  and  the  firing, 
leaped  from  the  windows  of  the  houses  in  which  they 


^ 


THE  FIRST  POLISH  WAR  25 

lay,  and  joined  their  comrades.     The  surprise  so  far 
had  succeeded. 

This,  however,  was  only  the  first  stage.  A  large 
part  of  the  Polish  force  lay  outside  the  town,  and 
Oginski  was  able  to  collect  them  in  some  order  in  a 
trenched  camp  upon  a  neighbouring  hill.  Here  he  was 
attacked  at  daybreak  by  Suvorof .  After  a  brief  artillery 
preparation,  the  Russians  broke  in  with  horse  and  foot, 
and  the  Poles  were  soon  put  to  flight.  Many  surrendered. 
A  detachment  of  1000  horse  under  General  Byelak 
came  up  when  the  battle  was  finished,  and  was  sent 


Battle  of  STALOYITCR 


flying  after  the  rest.  Oginski  got  away  into  Prussia 
with  a  handful  of  horsemen,  and  the  second  army  of 
the  Polish  Republic,  like  the  first,  ceased  to  exist.^ 

Neither  the  desperate  energy  of  the  Poles  nor  the 
readiness  of  the  French  to  make  use  of  them  was  ended 
by  this  shattering  defeat.  In  September  1771  the 
Baron  de  Viomenil  arrived  in  Poland  to  reconstruct 
the  army  of  the  Republic.  On  the  Russian  side  Von 
Weimarn  was  replaced  by  Alexander  Ilyitch  Bibikof, 
who  had  served  in  the  Seven  Years'  War  without  being 
stereotyped  in  the  form  of  a  Prussian  drill  sergeant. 
The  last  official  transactions  between  Weimarn  and 
1  Campagnes,  i.  49.    Pyetrof,  iii.  250. 


26  SUVOROF 

Suvorof  were  of  the  bitterest  kind.  The  retiring 
Commander-in-Chief  rebuked  the  victor  of  Stalovitch 
for  his  presumption  in  marching  against  the  enemy 
without  express  orders,  and  reported  him  to  the  Military- 
College  for  giving  inadequate  information  about  his 
proceedings,  the  losses  of  both  sides,  the  distribution 
of  the  booty,  and  so  forth.  Nothing  came  of  this,  and 
Suvorof,  who  had  previously  received  the  1st  Grade  of 
the  Order  of  St.  Anne  and  the  3rd  Class  of  the  St. 
George,  was  presented  in  December  1771  with  the 
Order  of  St.  Alexander  Nevski,  which  even  Bibikof 
had  not  obtained.^  With  his  new  Commander-in-Chief 
Suvorof  succeeded  in  keeping  on  better  terms.  A  letter 
written  to  Bibikof  in  awkward  French  shows  that  the 
two  were  intimate. 

An  animal,  I  say,  of  our  species,  accustomed  to 
troubles  in  spite  of  inevitable  inconvenience,  thinks 
himself  dull  when  he  is  without  any,  and  too  long 
occasional  rests  lull  him  to  sleep.  How  sweet  to  me 
are  those  wearinesses  of  the  past !  I  looked  for  nothing 
but  the  good  of  my  country,  embodied  in  my  duty  as 
a  servant  of  my  august  Empress,  without  doing  special 
wrong  to  the  people  among  whom  I  found  myself,  and 
even  misfortunes,  by  whomsoever  caused,  gave  me 
nothing  but  encouragement.  Reputation  is  the  lot  of 
every  honest  man ;  but  I  have  built  this  reputation 
on  my  country's  glory,  and  its  triumphs  were  only  for 
her  profit.  Never  did  self-love,  the  most  often  aroused 
by  wandering  instinct,  become  master  of  my  actions, 
and  I  forgot  myself  wherever  there  was  room  for 
patriotism.  A  wild  education  so  far  as  social  inter- 
course is  concerned,  but  some  innocent  habits  in  my 
nature  and  a  customary  generosity  made  my  labours 
easy  ;  my  feelings  were  free  and  I  did  not  sink  beneath 
them.  God  !  could  I  soon  but  find  myself  in  similar 
case  !  At  present  I  languish  in  an  idle  life,  fit  for  those 
mean  spirits,  which  live  only  for  themselves,  which  seek 
the   crown   of   happiness   in   this   lassitude,    and   from 

1  This  correspondence  between  Von  Weimarn  and  Suvorof  and  the 
reports  to  the  Military  College  are  in  the  Moscow  Archives  of  the  General 
Staff,  quoted  in  Pyetrushevski,  i.  120. 


THE  FIRST  POLISH  WAR  27 

pleasure  to  pleasure  hurry  into  bitterness.  Misanthropy 
already  casts  a  shade  upon  my  brow,  and  I  think  I  foresee 
in  the  result  a  greater  suffering  ;  an  active  soul  should 
always  be  fed  with  the  practice  of  its  trade,  and  frequent 
exercise  is  as  healthy  for  it  as  the  ordinary  exercises  of 
the  body.^ 

This  letter  was  written  on  the  5th  December  1771. 
Between  the  defeat  of  Oginski  and  the  resumption  of 
hostilities  in  the  spring,  Suvorof  s  energies  were  occupied 
in  drilling  his  troops,  and  endeavouring  to  maintain 
discipline  under  exceptionally  difficult  circumstances. 
Polish  hospitality  was  too  much  for  some  of  his  officers 
and  Polish  wealth  for  some  of  his  men,  and  he  was 
constantly  making  complaints  about  coffee  parties  in 
Polish  country  houses  and  indiscriminate  plunder  and 
robbery.  He  was  also  very  keen  in  preventing  harsh 
treatment  of  Polish  prisoners  and  deserters  :  "  Feed 
them  well,"  he  said,  "  even  if  you  give  them  more  than 
their  due  portion."  "  A  generous  reception  of  repentant 
rebels  serves  our  interest  better  than  the  shedding  of 
their  blood."  The  Russians  were  in  Poland  to  main- 
tain "  peace  in  Israel,"  not  as  foreign  conquerors.  As 
for  spies,  "  the  rebels  have  spies  only  to  tell  them  where 
we  are  busying  ourselves  ;  they  are  so  many,  that  when 
we  hunt  them  out  I  examine  them  and  let  them  go 
home."  2  But  this  sort  of  police  war  was  not  to  his  taste, 
and  the  affair  at  Cracow  in  1772  finally  disgusted  him. 

The  campaign  of  1772  was  carried  on  differently 
from  those  of  previous  years.  Bibikof  decided  to  divide 
his  troops  into  three  armies  ;  one  to  act  in  the  field, 
and  the  other  two  to  reduce,  one  after  another,  such 
strong  places  as  remained  in  Polish  hands.  As  there 
were  no  men  to  spare,  the  fortresses  were  to  be  taken 
by  siege  and  not  by  storm.  This  would  in  any  case 
have  meant  an  indefinite  prolongation  of  the  war,  and 

1  Bibikof,  Memoirs  of  General  Bibikof,  164. 

^  Moscow  Archives  of  the  General  Staff ;  quoted  in  Pyetrushevski,  i. 
121. 


28  SUVOROF 

unhappily  the  first  place  to  be  captured  was  the  Russian 
stronghold  of  Cracow.  The  commandant  was  Colonel 
Stackelburg,  Suvorof's  successor  as  head  of  the  Suzdal 
regiment,  a  brave  man,  but  destitute  of  all  other  soldierly 
qualities.  As  Suvorof  declared,  he  never  drilled  his 
troops.  "  Who  could  be  found  more  worthy,  more 
equitable,  more  wise  than  Stackelburg ;  only  in  frost, 
in  rain,  in  wind,  and  in  the  heat  he  has  the  belly-ache." 
In  addition  to  being  lazy,  Stackelburg  was  fond  of  the 
society  of  priests  and  women,  and  Suvorof  was  particu- 
larly displeased  with  his  facility  in  foreign  languages.^ 
Under  his  command  the  garrison  of  Cracow  fell  into  a 
state  of  lethargy  and  invited  surprise. 

On  the  night  of  the  21st  January  the  French  officers 
in  charge  of  the  Polish  levies  at  Tuintse  made  a  daring 
attempt  against  Cracow.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Choisy 
was  in  command,  and  the  enterprise  was  as  successful 
as  it  was  daring.  Stackelburg  was  invited  to  a  recep- 
tion at  the  house  of  a  Polish  lady,  who  had  previously 
complained  that  the  cries  of  a  particular  sentry  kept 
her  awake  at  night.  The  obliging  Stackelburg  removed 
the  sentry  from  his  post,  the  exit  of  the  main  rubbish 
shoot  of  the  citadel,  and  went  off  to  the  reception  with 
a  light  heart.  A  small  party  crept  in  single  file  up  the 
evil-smelling  passage,  took  the  garrison  by  surprise,  and 
threw  open  the  gates  to  the  main  body  of  the  assailants.* 

Suvorof  was  furious  at  this  disaster,  which  was  due 
to  sheer  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  garrison.  He 
marched  from  Lithuania  upon  Cracow.  From  there  he 
sent  a  letter  to  Bibikof,  denouncing  Stackelburg  in  un- 
sparing language. 

Now  I  must  inform  your  Excellency  of  the  cause  of 
the  incredible  happenings  in  the  fortress.  Count  Stackel- 
burg !  First,  he  is  one  of  the  darlings  of  Ivan  Ivan- 
ovitch   Weimam,   corresponding  with   him   in   foreign 

1  Moscow  Archives  of  the  General  Staff,  20C,  Bk.  89. 

'  Moscow  Archives  of  the  General  Staff  and  Orders  of  the  Military 
College,  1773.  Pyetrof,  iv.  4  ;  quoted  in  Pyetrushevski,  128  et  seq. ; 
Journal  de  la  Si^ge  de  Cracovie. 


THE  FIRST  POLISH  WAR  29 

languages,  and  therefore  from  the  day  of  his  taking  over 
the  regiment  he  never  drew  sword  ;  secondly,  here  in 
a  district  where  he  has  many  acquaintances,  priests  and 
old  women  have  utterly  turned  his  head.  Instead  of 
being  active  in  usefulness,  he  is  merely  a  good-natured 
man,  and  has  slept  on  the  reputation  of  being  that.i 

He  joined  forces  with  General  Branitski,  and  with 
rather  more  than  3000  men  took  such  steps  as  were 
possible  to  recapture  the  citadel.  Having  no  siege 
artillery,  he  mounted  his  field-guns  on  neighbouring 
houses,  and  battered  the  walls  in  preparation  for  an 
assault.  This  was  a  very  desperate  enterprise.  The 
place  was  sufficiently  strong  to  withstand  the  bombard- 
ment, and  he  could  not  afford  to  lose  any  of  his  few 
hundred  men  in  attempts  against  unbreached  walls. 
Twice  he  tried,  by  firing  off  cannons  behind  his  lines  and 
moving  his  men  about  in  confusion,  to  entice  the  enemy 
from  their  stronghold  into  traps,  but  both  attempts  failed. 
Two  mines  were  driven  through  the  rocky  soil.  But 
Suvorof  s  was  ever  the  bolder  way,  and,  after  one  or 
two  sallies  had  been  driven  back,  he  decided  to  storm 
the  castle  on  the  night  of  the  18th  February,  before 
the  galleries  were  completed.  While  all  his  men  were 
concentrated  against  the  citadel,  the  protection  of  the 
rear  was  entrusted  to  parties  of  Jews,  called  out  from 
the  Ghetto  and  hastily  armed. 

Covered  by  artillery  and  musketry  fire,  the  troops 
advanced  against  the  main  gate.  The  petard  attached 
to  the  gate  failed  to  shatter  it,  and  a  disorderly  battle 
took  place  around  and  through  the  archway,  both  sides 
firing  at  short  range,  and  the  assailants  climbing  at 
some  points  into  the  embrasures  from  which  the  cannon 
were  playing  upon  them.  At  last,  after  losing  about 
100  killed  and  45  wounded,  Suvorof  drew  off  his  men. 
For  the  time  being  there  was  nothing  more  to  be  done. 
But  soon  after  this  failure  a  messenger  from  the  garrison 
was  captured,  and  it  appeared  from  the  letters  taken 

1  Bibikof. 


80  SUVOROF 

upon  him  that  the  besieged  were  in  want  of  food  and 
medical  stores.  There  was  now  no  question  of  aban- 
doning the  blockade.  But  Suvorof  recognised  the 
futility  of  such  proceedings,  if  it  was  desired  to  bring 
the  war  to  a  speedy  end,  and  he  wrote  to  Bibikof  in 
plain  terms. 

So  be  it  I  Our  unsuccessful  storm  appeared  the 
extreme  of  boldness  ;  but  it  showed  at  the  time  that 
the  impossibility  of  it  was  aggravated  by  our  incapacity 
for  such  operations.  Without  Vauban  and  Cohorn  it 
would  have  been  better  for  us  to  study  a  little  in  the 
Petersburg  neighbourhood.  Our  timing  was  bad.  But 
if  we  are  to  go  in  for  single  sieges,  then  there  will  never 
be  a  real  end.  While  we  take  one  fortress,  they  can 
fortify  themselves  in  another  ;  and  while  we  are  squan- 
dering our  strength  they  will  certainly  get  additions  to 
theirs.     We  shan't  take  three  fortresses  in  a  year.^ 

Nevertheless,  there  was  nothing  to  be  done  but  to  go 
on  with  the  blockade.  Heavy  guns  were  brought  up  in 
April,  and  substantial  damage  was  at  last  done  to  the 
defences.  The  defenders  were  already  shaken  by  their 
privations.  So  early  as  the  29th  February  Choisy  wrote 
to  Viom^nil,  "  Dry  bread,  barley  porridge  and  courage 
are  the  only  food  we  have  for  officers  and  men."  ^  The 
arrival  of  the  siege-guns  made  further  resistance  im- 
possible, and  Choisy  opened  negotiations.  On  the  12th 
April  it  was  agreed  that  the  place  should  be  surrendered 
on  the  15th,  the  garrison  to  retain  their  private  property, 
and  the  French  not  to  be  prisoners  of  war,  entitled  to 
be  exchanged.  On  the  15th  they  marched  out.  Suvorof 
gave  back  the  sword  which  Choisy  offered  to  him,  and 
embraced  the  defeated  but  not  disgraced  commander. 
About  700  prisoners  were  taken  on  this  surrender.^ 

1  Bibikof,  179. 

'  Viom6nil,  Lettres  sur  les  Affaires  de  Pologne. 

•  Campagnes,  i.  60 ;  Pyetrof,  iv.  9  ;  Journal.  Some  writers,  e.g. 
Bibikof,  say  that  Suvorof  compelled  the  enemy  to  come  out  by  way  of 
the  rubbish  shoot  through  which  they  went  in.  This  is  untrue.  In 
that  case  he  would  hardly  have  returned  Choisy's  sword,  and  he  would 
certainly  not  have  kissed  him. 


THE  FIRST  POLISH  WAR  31 

The  recapture  of  Cracow  was  almost  the  last  military 
event  of  the  Polish  war.  A  great  part  of  the  country 
was  now  in  the  possession  of  foreign  troops.  Austria, 
having  long  exhausted  the  possibilities  of  matrimony, 
had  resorted  in  this  case  to  more  direct  methods  of 
aggrandisement.  As  early  as  the  end  of  1770  Austrian 
forces  had  occupied  the  Duchy  of  Tsips,  in  Galicia,  at 
a  time  when  the  Austrian  Government  was  actually 
giving  shelter  in  other  directions  to  armed  parties  of 
the  Confederates.  In  1772  she  went  still  further,  and 
by  May  about  40,000  of  her  soldiers  were  in  movement 
towards  Cracow.  Not  wishing  to  be  anticipated,  Prussia 
had  disposed  troops  along  and  across  the  western  frontier 
of  Poland,  and  there  were  now  some  20,000  of  them 
actually  on  Polish  soil.  The  three  armies,  united  only 
in  their  intention  of  getting  some  part  of  the  country 
for  themselves,  were  an  inconvenience  to  each  other, 
and  tact  and  good  management  were  constantly  required 
to  prevent  actual  collisions  between  them.  Suvorof 
seems  at  this  time  to  have  made  a  journey  to  Berlin, 
where  he  saw  Frederick  and  complained  to  him  of  the 
conduct  of  the  Prussian  postmasters.^  But  this  quasi- 
political  work  was  even  more  detestable  to  him  than 
inactivity,  and  he  wrote  at  last  to  Bibikof,  begging  to 
be  removed. 

Give  in  to  me,  my  dear  sir.  Such  a  home  of  philos- 
ophers as  man  never  saw.  Here  I  have  been  about 
four  years,  and  often  I  think  of  running  away  .  .  .  your 
fault  ...  I  have  been  rude,  and  they  intrigue  against 
me  .  .  .  They  quarrel  with  me  .  .  .  I'm  a  good-natured 
man  ;  I  don't  know  how  to  say  "  no."  Here  I'm  afraid 
of  my  neighbours  the  Jesuits,  and  all  these  D'Altoni. 
Forgive  me  .  .  .  Please  send  some  one  else.  Why  the 
devil  should  I  go  on  talking  with  them  ?  ^ 

With  D'Alton,  the  Austrian  Civilian  Commissioner, 

^  This  fact  is  stated  in  one  of  the  Russian  periodicals  on  German 
authority.     I  cannot  give  the  exact  reference. 
2  Bibikof. 


82  SUVOROF 

he  came  into  open  conflict,  and  his  embarrassments 
were  ended  by  his  own  removal  and  a  request  from  the 
Russian  Government  to  the  Austrian  that  D' Alton 
might  be  sent  somewhere  else.  But  the  affairs  of  Poland 
had  now  got  beyond  his  scope.  Arms  gave  place  to 
the  toga,  and  the  diplomatists  completed  the  work  which 
the  soldiers  had  begun.  The  half-hearted  attempts  of 
the  three  conspiring  Powers  were  replaced  by  open  and 
barefaced  villainy.  The  pretence  of  restoring  order  was 
abandoned,  and  it  became  simply  a  question  of  dis- 
tributing plunder.  As  the  actual  hour  for  the  crime 
approached,  the  motives  of  the  three  participators  had 
become  defined.  Frederick,  no  doubt,  knew  his  own 
intentions  at  an  earlier  stage  than  either  of  his  associates. 
His  Silesian  experience  pointed  the  way  to  further 
enterprises  of  the  same  sort,  and  such  an  accomplished 
appropriator  of  the  territory  of  others  saw  further  along 
the  road  to  the  Partition  of  Poland  than  those  to  whom 
this  would  be  a  first  attempt  in  the  kind.  The  actions 
of  Russia  and  Austria  had  been  hesitating,  but  the 
first  years  of  the  Turkish  War  gave  each  of  them  im- 
portant, though  different,  reasons  for  inclining  to  the 
views  of  Prussia.  Panin,  Catherine's  Foreign  Minister, 
had  been  against  partition,  not  because  he  sympathised 
with  the  Poles,  but  because  he  felt  that  Russia  had 
already  the  preponderating  influence  in  Poland,  and 
that  a  united  Poland  under  the  thumb  of  Russia  was 
better  than  a  divided  Poland  of  which  two-thirds  would 
be  irrevocably  lodged  in  the  hands  of  competing  Powers. 
But  Russia  had  now  incurred  considerable  losses  in  men 
and  money  during  the  Turkish  War,  and  required  some 
compensation.  The  Crimea  would  not  be  sufficient,  and 
Moldavia  and  Wallachia,  where  her  most  striking  vic- 
tories had  been  won,  could  not  be  annexed  without 
incurring  the  jealousy  of  Austria.  Austria,  on  the  other 
hand,  had  previously  feared  the  strength  of  Turkey. 
But  now  that  that  strength  had  been  proved  to  be  a 
mere   bubble,   it   was   immaterial   to   Austria   whether 


THE  FIRST  POLISH  WAR  33 

Turkey  continued  to  hold  Moldavia  and  Wallachia  or 
not,  so  long  as  they  did  not  swell  the  formidable  re- 
sources of  Russia.  An  alternative  must  therefore  be 
found  for  Russia  in  some  other  quarter,  and  nothing 
could  have  been  more  convenient  for  this  purpose  than 
the  territory  offered  by  the  disorders  and  weaknesses  of 
Poland. 

The  three  Powers  therefore  came  at  last  to  an  agree- 
ment, and  jealousies  and  antagonisms,  which  might  very 
well  have  involved  them  in  an  expensive  and  destructive 
war,  were  resolved  by  the  beautiful  expedient  of  an  alliance 
for  the  plunder  of  another  State.  Each  appropriated 
part  of  Poland,  and  the  residue,  with  a  new  constitution, 
guaranteed  by  Russia,  was  left  for  a  time  in  peace  with 
the  good-natured  king  Stanislav  on  the  throne.  The 
blessed  word  "  compensation  "  was  thus  introduced  into 
the  vocabulary  of  Imperialist  diplomacy,  and  the  Parti- 
tion of  Poland  illustrated  with  the  completeness  of 
perfect  art  the  first  principle  of  the  modern  science  of 
Empire,  that  our  own  property  is  best  protected  by 
sharing  in  the  forcible  distribution  of  that  of  others. 
Two  contending  ambitions  are  by  this  means  satisfied 
at  the  minimum  of  expense,  and  two  great  States, 
instead  of  wasting  each  other  in  an  internecine  struggle, 
combine  in  perfect  harmony  to  enrich  each  other  at 
the  expense  of  a  third,  too  weak  to  defend  itself.  In 
more  recent  times,  the  doctrine  has  been  practised  more 
frequently  at  the  expense,  and  often  even  for  the  benefit 
of  the  inhabitants  of  uncivilised  or  barbarous  countries. 
But  the  first  pattern,  the  Partition  of  Poland,  was  done 
upon  the  living  body  of  a  European  people  of  old 
civilisation  and  the  greatest  natural  genius.  Italians, 
Belgians,  and  Norwegians  had  afterwards  good  cause  to 
regret  its  apparent  success,  and  the  world  has  since  been 
at  war  to  prove  that  it  was  in  fact  a  failure. 

Suvorof  had  left  the  Polish  stage  before  the  last 
scene  of  the  tragedy  was  played  out.  He  had  had  one 
more  violent  conflict  with  a  colleague,  this  time  with  a 

D 


84  SUVOROF 

certain   Colonel   Renn.     In  August   1772   he  wrote  a 
characteristic  letter  to  Bibikof . 

With  Renn  our  affairs  go  from  bad  to  worse.  He's 
a  notorious,  turbulent,  debauched  man,  evil-minded, 
and  to  speak  frankly,  an  appropriator  of  the  goods  of 
others.  Here  he  has  done  nothing  but  be  churlish,  and 
except  what  I  have  said  already,  he  has  shown  himself 
fit  for  nothing.  His  bulging  pocket  holds  everything. 
His  insults  are  beyond  my  patience ;  he  sets  an  alto- 
gether vicious  example  for  others. 

But  Renn  made  some  amends,  for  at  the  end  of  the 
month  Suvorof  wrote  again  : 

I  have  forgiven  everything,  if  only  Renn  will  hence- 
forth refrain  from  his  cunning  lies.^ 

This  was  the  last  of  his  petty  worries,  and  in  October 
he  was  transferred  to  Finland. 

Once  away  from  the  Polish  tangle,  he  began  to  look 
back  upon  it  with  regret.  A  letter  written  to  Bibikof 
on  the  21st  October,  when  he  had  arrived  at  Vilna, 
shows  how  little  impression  the  discomforts  had  actually 
made  upon  him,  and  shows,  too,  that  his  own  behaviour 
had  given  him  good  cause  for  satisfaction.  He  describes 
the  letter  as  written  "  k  I'Anglaise."  ^ 

I  follow  my  destiny,  which  comes  from  my  own 
country  and  draws  me  from  a  land  where  I  have  wanted 
to  do  nothing  but  good,  and  at  least  I  have  always 
tried  to  do  it.  My  heart  was  never  embarrassed  by  it, 
and  my  duty  never  raised  an  obstacle.  Sincere  in  my 
acts,  I  took  precautions  only  against  moral  evil,  and 
physical  evil  died  out  of  itself.  My  unrepentant  virtue 
is  well  content  with  the  satisfaction  which  they  show 
towards  my  conduct ;  here  they  know  me  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  good  side  of  my  reputation,  since 
I  only  stayed  here  a  short  time,  or  at  least  because  I 
feel  I  have  not  served  this  country  well  enough.     Simple 

1  Moscow  Archives  of  the  General  Staffs  quoted  in  Pyetrushevski,  i.  188. 
•  Apparently  because  of  its  frankness.    Its  incoherence  is  Suvorof  s 
own. 


THE  FIRST  POLISH  WAR  35 

acknowledgement  awakes  in  me  a  love  for  this  country, 
where  they  wish  me  nothing  but  good  ;  I  leave  it  with 
regret. 

But  if  I  contemplate  the  D's,  the  R's,  the  Alts,  the 
iniquitous  ministers  of  my  guiltlessness,  I  begin  to 
breathe  freely ;  here  I  finish  my  career  as  a  man  of 
honour,  I  get  rid  of  them,  my  feeble  complaints  aggra- 
vate my  annoyance,  greatest  where  I  wished  most  to 
exceed  my  duty.  I  did  not  hate  them,  I  could  never 
despise  them  ;  and  what  change  could  I  expect  in  their 
tortuousness,  knowing  their  qualities  as  I  did  ? 

It  is  true,  I  did  not  enter  too  much  into  relations 
with  women,  but  when  I  did  regale  myself  with  them 
respect  was  never  absent.  Time  was  too  short  for  the 
practice  of  that  sort  of  art,  and  I  was  afraid  of  them ; 
it  is  they  who  govern  the  country  here  as  elsewhere ; 
I  did  not  feel  strong  enough  to  defend  myself  again^ 
their  charms.^ 

So  ended  the  second  stage  of  Suvorof's  military 
career.  The  third  followed  almost  at  once.  In  April 
he  was  sent  from  Finland  to  the  Russian  headquarters 
at  Jassy,  where  he  was  given  a  command  in  the  Army 
of  Wallachia  under  General  Saltikof,  son  of  the  in- 
glorious victor  of  Kunersdorf. 

1  Bibikof,  208.     "  D  "  is  Dryevitz  and  "  R,"  Renn. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE   FIRST   TURKISH   WAR 

Turkish  warfare — ^Victories  of  Rumyantsof — Suvorof  captures  Tur- 
tukai,  1773 — Correspondence — Captures  Turtukai  again — Affair 
at  Hirsof,  1773 — ^Battle  of  Kozludzhi,  1774^Failure  of  the  plan 
of  campaign — ^Peace  of  Kutchuk-Kainardzhi — Suvorof  marries 
unhappily — EQs  freakish  character. 

The  war  against  the  Turks,  which  began  in  1769,  was 
the  first  stage  in  the  expulsion  of  that  race  from  the 
Europe  which  they  had  so  long  desolated  and  profaned. 
At  the  beginning  of  it,  the  frontier  between  Russia  and 
Turkey  stretched  from  Kief  on  the  Dnyepr  to  the  Sea  of 
Azof.  Between  the  two  countries  swept  the  vast  and 
uninhabited  steppe.  The  line  of  the  Dnyestr  had  been 
fortified  by  the  Turks  at  Khotin,  Bendyeri,  and  Akker- 
man,  with  advanced  fortresses  at  Otchakof  and  Kinburn, 
but  the  real  defence  of  the  country  was  the  fertile  but 
untilled  desert  which  lay  in  front  of  it.  Russia  could 
only  hope  to  attack  it  through  Poland  on  the  one  side, 
and  from  the  Black  Sea  on  the  other.  A  successful 
advance  in  either  direction  would  turn  the  formidable 
natural  obstacles,  which  could  otherwise  be  overcome 
only  by  a  superlatively  well -organised  system  of  com- 
missariat and  transport.  Such  a  system  had  hitherto 
been  far  beyond  the  powers  of  the  Russian  State,  and 
the  campaigns  of  Minnich,  earlier  in  the  century,  had 
broken  down  owing  to  the  fearful  losses  inflicted  by 
cold,  hunger,  and  disease.  Poland  being  already  open 
to  the  passage  of  Russian  troops,  these  had  penetrated 

36 


THE  FIRST  TURKISH  WAR  87 

deeply  into  Moldavia  and  Wallachia  by  the  time  that 
Suvorof  joined  them.  This  new  theatre  of  war  afforded 
him  an  admirable  opportunity  for  the  display  of  his 
genius. 

The  methods  adopted  generally  by  the  Russians  in 
this  war  showed  a  great  advance  on  those  of  previous 
campaigns  against  the  Turks.  During  the  eighteenth 
century,  however  aggressive  the  policy  and  strategy  of 
Russia  in  its  dealings  with  the  Asiatic  peril,  the  tactics 
of  its  armies  in  the  field  had  always  been  defensive. 
The  soldiers  were  arranged  in  such  a  way  as  to  testify 
to  the  terrible  reputation  of  the  Turkish  hosts  in  attack. 
The  main  formation  was  the  square  of  infantry,  pro- 
tected at  the  angles  and  along  the  flanks  by  artillery. 
Round  the  square  were  set  the  "  chevaux  de  frise  '* ; 
each  section  of  which  was  carried  into  action  by  six 
men,  and  was  attached  by  hooks  and  chains  to  those 
on  each  side  of  it.  Within  the  square  was  the  infantry 
reserve,  ready  to  strengthen  the  sides  at  whatever  point 
they  gave  way  before  the  whirlwind  rush  of  the  Turkish 
cavalry.  The  light  baggage  train  was  also  collected 
inside  the  square,  while  the  heavy  waggons  were  formed 
into  a  special  lager  at  a  safe  distance  from  the  battle- 
ground. The  cavalry  was  regarded  as  so  hopelessly 
inferior  to  the  Turkish,  that  it  was  kept  well  in  the 
rear,  and  only  released  when  the  enemy  was  thoroughly 
broken  by  the  fire  of  the  artillery  and  infantry.  The 
whole  scheme  of  this  order  of  battle  was  thus  defensive. 
The  tactical  initiative  was  surrendered  to  the  Turks. 
Their  artillery  and  infantry  were  despised,  but  all  their 
enemies  dreaded  the  ferocious,  even  if  completely  un- 
disciplined attacks  of  their  light  horse.  These  were 
permitted  to  sweep  down  upon  the  squares  in  the  hope 
that  after  one  or  more  attempts  their  losses  from 
artillery  and  musketry  fire  would  reduce  them  to  utter 
chaos.  Even  then  it  would  be  impossible  for  the  square 
to  move  in  pursuit.  Only  the  cavalry  could  be  expected 
to  follow,  and  that  with  the  utmost  caution.     Under 


88  SUVOROF 

these  circumstances  a  decisive  victory  over  the  Turks 
was  obtained  with  great  difficulty.^  If  driven  back  by 
the  infantry,  they  dispersed  and  fled  with  such  rapidity 
that  an  energetic  pursuit  could  seldom  be  undertaken. 
A  shattering  blow  against  them  could  as  a  rule  only  be 
delivered  when  they  could  be  shut  in  a  fortress  and 
besieged.  A  whole  army  might  be  destroyed  by  storm 
or  capture.  But  a  victory  in  the  field,  however  much 
it  redounded  to  the  glory  of  those  who  took  part  in  it, 
was  seldom  of  decisive  military  importance.  Against 
such  an  adversary,  terrible  in  attack  and  feeble  in 
defence,  devoid  of  discipline,  of  calculation,  and  of 
endurance,  as  unresisting  and  headlong  after  a  defeat 
in  the  field  as  he  was  reckless,  cruel,  and  covetous 
before  the  battle  was  joined,  the  certain  road  to  victory 
was  that  of  resolute  aggression.  The  subsequent  mili- 
tary career  of  Suvorof  and  his  whole  theory  of  war 
were  largely  determined  by  his  experience  against  the 
Turks,  and  his  virtues  and  vices  as  a  general  both 
sprang  from  the  same  root.  His  methods  were  learned 
before  he  served  in  Turkey,  but  they  were  developed 
and  confirmed  in  this  fighting  along  the  Danube.  There 
he  became  convinced  that  the  secret  of  success  was  to 
march  swiftly  and  to  attack  boldly,  and  as  he  never 
failed  when  matched  against  a  slow  and  irresolute 
enemy,  so  he  was  at  last  overthrown  when  he  encoun- 
tered one  who  marched  as  swiftly  and  as  boldly  as 
himself,  and  had  at  the  same  time  the  advantage  of 
numbers  and  position. 

Without  doubt,  there  were  good  soldiers  in  the  Turkish 
Wars  before  Suvorof,  and  he  was  not  the  only  one  who 
understood  how  they  should  be  fought.  It  did  not 
require  his  appearance  to  improve  upon  the  old  methods 
of  dealing  with  this  barbarous  enemy.     The  need  for 

1  It  is  curious  to  find  a  Byzantine  writer  advising  the  Emperor 
(circa  500  a.d.)  to  use  exactly  the  same  device  for  defending  Constan- 
tinople against  Scythia.  See  Oman,  Ttie  Art  of  War:  The  Middle 
Ages,  23. 


THE  FIRST  TURKISH  WAR  39 

increased  mobility,  both  in  attack  and  in  pursuit,  was 
obvious,  and  Rumyantsof,  the  Russian  Commander- 
in-Chief,  had  from  the  first  set  himself  to  abolish  much 
of  what  was  obsolete.  The  Turks  had  actually  become 
much  less  formidable  than  in  previous  wars,  and  their 
generals  were  less  energetic  and  their  troops  less  stubborn 
than  in  the  days  when  they  were  the  terror  of  European 
civilisation.  Their  system  remained  the  same,  but  the 
life  had  gone  out  of  it,  and  the  Turkish  armies,  though 
occasionally  energetically  and  successfully  led,  were 
generally  of  poor  quality.  Rumyantsof  had  thus  been 
able  to  win  victories  which  resembled  those  of  Clive  in 
India.  In  1770  at  Larga,  with  30,000  men,  he  had 
beaten  more  than  80,000  Tartars  ;  and  he  followed  up 
this  exploit  by  defeating  at  Kagul,  with  only  17,000 
men,  an  army  of  180,000  Turks.  Rumyantsof  retained 
the  square  as  the  ordinary  formation  of  the  infantry, 
finding  it,  as  the  English  found  it  a  hundred  years  later 
in  the  Sudan,  the  best  means  of  breaking  a  charge  of 
fanatics,  mounted  or  on  foot.  But  he  reduced  its  size, 
and  though  the  "  chevaux  de  frise  "  were  actually  used 
on  some  occasions  in  the  next  Turkish  War,  their  use 
was  almost  entirely  abandoned  by  Rumyantsof.  In- 
stead of  massing  all  his  troops  into  a  single  huge  square, 
he  divided  them  into  several  squares,  with  cavalry  in 
the  intervals.  This  plan  had  all  the  value  of  the  old 
in  defence,  while  it  enabled  the  whole  force  to  move 
with  greater  freedom  against  the  enemy,  and  avoid  the 
serious  breaches  in  the  formation  which  might  arise 
from  inequalities  in  the  ground.  At  the  same  time  one 
square  could  lend  support  to  another  as  a  solid  mass, 
and  at  Kagul  the  broken  troops  of  one  unit  were  in 
fact  saved  in  this  way  by  throwing  themselves  into 
another  which  simultaneously  moved  towards  them. 

Rumyantsof  had  also  increased  the  efficiency  of  his 
troops  by  improving  their  arms.  To  make  the  fire  of 
the  infantry  more  effective,  he  added  to  each  battalion 
50  Jagers,  whose  shorter  and  more  manageable  muskets 


40  SUVOROF 

made  them  better  marksmen  than  the  ordinary  grena- 
diers. The  cavalry  he  found  particularly  incompetent, 
and  as  cavalry  they  were  in  fact  useless  against  the 
Turks.  They  were  armed  in  such  a  way  as  to  make 
them  mere  infantry  on  horseback,  incapable  of  charging 
the  enemy.  The  cuirassiers,  in  addition  to  their  breast- 
and  back-plates,  carried  a  sword  and  two  pistols;  the 
carabineers  carried  a  sword,  carbine,  and  bayonet,  and 
two  pistols  ;  and  the  hussars  a  sabre,  carbine,  and  two 
pistols.  Rumyantsof  turned  the  two  last  into  cold  steel 
cavalry,  and  made  it  impossible  for  them  to  waste  time 
in  firing  by  depriving  them  of  their  carbines  and 
bayonets.  They  were  thus  compelled  to  rely  upon 
their  individual  courage  and  the  vigour  of  their  attacks, 
instead  of  halting  to  fire  off  their  carbines  and  being 
overwhelmed  by  the  superior  horsemanship  of  the  Turks. 
With  the  artillery  Rumyantsof  did  not  interfere.  It 
was  immensely  superior  to  the  Turkish  ;  and  posted  at 
the  angles  and  on  the  flanks  of  the  squares  of  infantry 
gave  confidence  to  the  Russians  and  inspired  a  whole- 
some terror  in  the  ranks  of  their  enemies.^  Enough 
has  been  said  of  the  reforms  of  Rumyantsof  to  show 
that  he  required  in  some  respects  little  instruction  from 
Suvorof.  His  tactical  changes  were  exactly  those  that 
would  have  been  made  by  Suvorof  himself,  and  the 
latter  only  improved  upon  them  to  the  extent  of 
employing  a  number  of  small  squares  of  equal  size  in 

1  Each  regiment  took  into  action  two  or  more  light  guns,  which 
could,  if  necessary,  be  carried  on  the  shoulders  of  the  men.  The 
Russians  had,  in  addition,  field  artillery,  6-  or  9-pounders.  See  Pyetrof, 
ii.  4.  On  earlier  methods  against  the  Turks  and  the  reforms  of 
Rumyantsof,  see  Pyetrof,  ii.  426  ;  Bogdanovitch,  97  ;  Pyetrushevsld, 
i.  183  ;  Valentini,  19.  Baron  de  Tott,  in  his  Mimoires  sur  les  Turcs 
ei  les  Tartares  (Amsterdam,  1785),  says  that  artillery  (sc.  field  artillery) 
was  unknown  to  the  Turks  until  this  war.  He  was  a  French  ofiicer, 
and  was  at  the  time  engaged  in  organising  the  defences  of  Constan- 
tinople. His  third  volume  contains  an  invaluable  description  of  the 
Turks  and  his  experiments  in  casting  cannon  and  accustoming  the 
barbarians  to  their  use.  He  says  (i.  128)  that  the  gunners  thought 
more  of  making  a  great  noise  than  of  hitting  their  object. 


Shumla 


■"■        'hill II' ili\llll,',l'';!!i<i'%    •jVarna 


42 


SUVOROF 


two  lines  instead  of  one  large  square  supported  by  other 
smaller  squares.  Nevertheless  Suvorof,  though  he  had 
little  opportunity  of  making  innovations,  found  in  this 
Turkish  War  more  than  one  occasion  for  displaying  his 
characteristic  energy. 

His  first  exploit  was  his  capture  of  Turtukai.  This 
little  town,  situated  on  the  southern  bank  of  the  Danube 
to  the  south-east  of  Bucharest,  was  one  of  the  strong 
posts  by  which  the  Turks  hoped  to  hold  the  line  of  the 
river  at  the  beginning  of  1773.  Rumyantsof  had  driven 
the  enemy  out  of  Moldavia  and  Wallachia  and  had 


TURTUKAI. 


Entnnchmenh 
(2) 


occupied  part  of  the  Dobrudzha  itself.  But  the  badness 
of  Russian  roads  is  only  less  than  that  of  Turkish. 
Transport  was  accordingly  very  slow,  and  supplies  for  a 
big  campaign  across  the  Danube  were  not  to  be  obtained 
in  the  conquered  territories.  Rumyantsof,  therefore,  felt 
unable  to  carry  out  Catherine's  vigorous  scheme  for 
pushing  on  to  the  Balkans,  and  confined  himself  to  a 
series  of  isolated  attempts  against  the  Turkish  system 
of  defence.  The  enterprise  against  Turtukai  was 
arranged  by  Saltikof,  who  threatened  the  fortress  of 
Rushtshuk,  45  miles  further  up  the  river,  with  his  main 
body,  while  he  detailed  Suvorof  with  the  Astrakhan 
regiment  of  infantry,  three  squadrons  of  regular  cavalry, 


THE  FIRST  TURKISH  WAR  43 

and  a  regiment  of  Cossacks,  with  seven  guns,  to  capture 
Turtukai  at  all  costs. 

Opposite  Turtukai,  which  lay  on  the  slopes  of  the 
southern  bank,  under  the  protection  of  two  entrenched 
camps  and  a  battery  of  guns,  the  river  Ardyesh  flows 
into  the  Danube  through  the  marshy  flats  of  the  northern 
bank.  At  the  beginning  of  May  Suvorof  collected  a 
fleet  of  17  boats  in  the  Ardyesh  at  Negoesht,  some  miles 
above  its  confluence  with  the  Danube.  Each  boat  held 
about  40  men,  not  counting  the  rowers,  and  as  these 
last  were  also  soldiers,  it  was  possible  to  transport  some 
700  men  at  one  passage.  On  the  8th  he  sent  this 
miniature  fleet  down  the  river,  ordering  it  to  wait  under 
shelter  of  the  reeds  at  the  mouth,  near  the  village  of 
Oltenitsa.  Thither  he  marched  with  the  remainder  of 
his  forces.  In  the  meantime  the  enemy,  believing 
that  the  Russian  strength  was  concentrated  in  the 
feigned  attack  upon  Rushtshuk,  prepared  to  fall  upon 
Suvorof  at  Negoesht.  A  force  of  600  horse  and  300 
foot  left  Turtukai  on  the  8th,  crossed  the  Danube,  and 
at  dawn  on  the  9th  encountered  some  of  Suvorof's 
Cossacks  near  the  river.  The  Cossacks  retired  to 
Oltenitsa,  where  they  were  reinforced  by  both  infantry 
and  cavalry.  The  Turks  were  vigorously  attacked,  and 
fled  in  disorder  to  their  boats.  Not  a  few  were  drowned, 
85  corpses  were  counted  on  the  field  of  battle,  and  an 
indefinite  number  lay  hidden  in  the  reeds  and  long 
grass  with  which  the  place  was  covered.  The  Turkish 
commander,  Bim  Pasha,  and  eight  others  were  taken 
prisoner,  and  it  was  ascertained  from  them  that  the 
garrison  of  Turtukai  was  about  4000  strong. 

A  less  vigorous  soldier  might  have  been  content 
with  this  success.  But  Suvorof,  though  his  repeated 
demands  for  more  infantry  had  been  ignored  by  Saltikof , 
determined  to  carry  out  his  original  plan.  At  dusk  on 
the  9th  his  flotilla,  under  command  of  Major  Ryebok, 
pushed  out  from  the  mouth  of  the  Ardyesh,  and 
four  guns,  posted  on  the  angle  between  the  left  bank  of 


44  SUVOROF 

that  river  and  the  Danube,  opened  a  steady  fire  on  the 
Turkish  battery  below  Turtukai.  To  cause  further 
perturbation  to  the  enemy  Suvorof  caused  his  train  of 
ox-waggons  to  be  driven  along  the  road  towards  the 
Danube,  so  that  the  huge  cloud  of  dust  might  be  taken 
to  cover  the  approach  of  a  formidable  army.  His 
cavalry  were  told  to  get  across  as  best  they  could  by 
swimming.  The  attack  was  completely  successful.  The 
Russians  landed  at  two  points,  and  only  a  few  men  were 
lost  out  of  those  who  swam.  Suvorof  himself  led  a 
colunm  against  the  camp  below  the  town  and  was 
wounded  in  the  right  leg  by  a  shell.  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Maurinof  with  a  second  column  took  the  Turkish  battery 
with  the  bayonet.  When  the  battery  fell  into  the  hands 
of  Maurinof  the  capture  of  the  camp  became  an  easy 
task,  and  Major  Ryebok  was  ordered  to  occupy  the 
town  itself.  Ryebok  carried  out  his  orders,  drove  the 
Turks  out  of  the  camp  and  battery  above  the  town,  and 
entering  the  streets  joined  hands  with  the  other  Russian 
forces  in  the  middle  of  it.  The  enemy  offered  little 
resistance,  and  none  who  awaited  the  Russians  escaped 
alive.  The  bulk  of  them  fled  in  all  directions,  leaving 
the  victors  in  undisputed  possession  of  the  south  bank 
of  the  Danube.  The  trophies  were  6  standards,  16 
guns  and  50  ships  and  boats.  The  whole  town  was 
destroyed,  and  the  Bulgar  population,  to  the  number 
of  663,  carried  over  to  the  north  bank.  The  Russian 
losses  in  the  fighting  on  both  banks  were  88  killed  and 
wounded,  and  Suvorof  himself  estimated  those  of  the 
enemy  at  about  1500,  or  almost  three  times  the  numbers 
of  all  the  Russian  troops  actually  engaged.^ 

Immediately  after  the  capture  of  Turtukai,  Suvorof 
sent  a  characteristic  report  of  the  success  to  Saltikof. 
On  a  scrap  of  paper  three  inches  square,  he  wrote: 
"  Your  Excellency  1     We   have  won.     Glory  to   God, 

^  Pyetrof,  iii.  29  et  seq. ;  Pyetnishevski,  i.  148  et  seq.  Before  the 
destruction  of  the  town,  Suvorof  allowed  four  men  from  each  section 
to  pillage  for  themselves  and  their  comrades  ;  Campagnes,  i.  83. 


THE  FIRST  TURKISH  WAR  45 

glory  to  you."  To  Rumyantsof  he  sent  a  second  note, 
consisting  of  a  doggerel  distich  : 

Glory  to  God,  glory  to  you, 
Turtukai's  taken,  and  I'm  there  too.^ 

These  very  unusual  despatches  were  followed  by  some 
still  more  extraordinary  letters  to  Saltikof.  The  day 
after  the  battle  Suvorof  wrote  to  his  superior,  who  was 
also  his  personal  friend,  in  the  tone  of  a  schoolboy, 
and  dragged  in  some  schoolboy  Latin  : 

Yesterday  we  did  in  truth  veni,  vedi,  vici ;  and  I 
was  top  boy.  I  have  served  your  Excellency  before, 
I'm  a  clumsy  fellow.  Only,  daddy,  do  give  me  the 
second  class  quickly.^ 

Two  days  later  came  a  more  sober,  but  still  not  too 
dignified  letter  : 

Don't  omit,  your  Excellency,  my  dear  comrades,  and 
for  God's  sake  don't  forget  me.  I  think  I  have  really 
deserved  the  Second  Class  of  St.  George ;  however 
warmly  disposed  I  may  be  to  myself,  still  I  do  think 
so  myself.  My  chest  and  my  bruised  side  give  me 
much  pain,  and  my  head  seems  all  swollen  up  ;  forgive 
me  ;  let  me  go  to  Bucharest  for  a  day  or  two  to  cure 
myself  at  the  baths. 

The  next  day  he  wrote  again  to  congratulate  Saltikof 
on  his  promotion  to  the  rank  of  General-in-Chief,  and 
added  : 

I  trust  that  your  kindness  to  me  will  not  change 
henceforth.  Be  as  much  beloved  by  your  soldiers  as 
your  father  was.* 

Suvorof  was  a  great  man.  But  he  had  the  weakness 
of  many  other  great  men,  a  craving  for  acknowledgement 

1  The  message  to  Saltikof  is  printed  in  Pyetrof,  p.  33  ;  that  to 
Rumyantsof  in  CampagneSy  i.  84. 

2  He  referred  to  the  2nd  Class  Cross  of  St.  George. 

3  These  letters  are  quoted  by  Pyetrushevski,  p.  154.  They  are 
in  the  Archives  of  Military  Education  at  Petrograd. 


46  SUVOROF 

and  applause,  and  his  requests  were  sometimes  couched 
in  almost  grovelling  language. 

Unfortunately,  his  success  at  Turtukai  was  not  fol- 
lowed by  any  general  activity  on  the  part  of  Saltikof. 
Only  some  vigorous  attacks  by  Major-General  Weissman 
enlivened  the  general  dulness  of  the  Russian  front,  and 
when  Weissman  was  unfortunately  killed  in  the  hour 
of  victory  at  Kutchuk-Kainardzhi  on  the  28rd  June, 
Suvorof  was  the  only  leader  of  real  competence  left 
under  Rumyantsof's  command.  This  failure  to  make 
a  general  aggressive  movement  as  usual  spoilt  Suvorof's 
temper,  and  his  private  correspondence  with  Saltikof 
must  have  given  even  that  dull  man  many  hours  of 
uneasiness.  The  sight  of  the  Turkish  troops  occupying 
the  ruins  of  Turtukai  and  reconstructing  their  lagers 
and  batteries  was  aggravated  by  an  attack  of  recurrent 
fever,  which,  in  Suvorof's  case,  rose  and  fell  every  48 
hours.  Some  allowance  must  be  made  for  the  effect 
of  this  upon  his  spirits,  but  his  letters  were  neverthe- 
less remarkably  impatient  and  inconsistent  with  each 
other,  and  must  have  been  infinitely  exasperating  to 
Saltikof.  On  the  29th  May  he  wrote  begging  to  be 
allowed  to  attack  Turtukai.  On  the  4th  June  he  asked 
in  two  separate  letters  for  leave  to  go  to  Bucharest  to 
get  cured.  On  the  5th  he  received  orders  from  Rum- 
yantsof  to  attack  Turtukai,  and  promptly  wrote  to 
inform  Saltikof  of  his  intention  to  remain  at  his  post. 
On  the  7th  he  again  asked  for  leave,  but  that  very  night, 
having  received  some  reinforcements,  directed  Prince 
Myeshtsherski  to  make  a  dash  across  the  river  against 
the  enemy.  The  prince  found  the  Turks  on  the  alert, 
and  abandoned  his  attempt,  whereupon  on  the  8th 
Suvorof,  not  asking  again  for  leave,  actually  went  to 
Bucharest.  From  there  he  wrote  to  Saltikof.  The 
letter  of  the  8th  hinted  at  the  faults  of  others.  In  that 
of  the  9th  he  wrote  more  clearly  : 

Be  so  good  as  to  judge  whether  I  can  resume  the 
command  of  such  miserable  cowards,  and  if  it  would 


THE  FIRST  TURKISH  WAR  47 

not  be  better  for  me  to  pick  up  work  when  and  where 
I  can  than  to  inflict  the  shame  of  this  pettifogging 
barrack-square  soldiery  upon  me  ;  to  see  under  me  people 
breaking  their  oaths  and  violating  all  their  military- 
duty  ?  G.  B.  is  the  cause  of  everything  ;  all  lost  heart. 
Can  such  a  man  be  a  colonel  in  the  Russian  army  ? 
Wouldn't  a  paper  general,  even  a  senator,  be  better  ? 
What  a  shame  it  is  !  All  lost  heart.  For  God's  sake, 
your  Excellency,  burn  this  letter.  Again  I  remind  you 
that  I  don't  want  him  for  an  enemy,  and  I  would 
abandon  everything  rather  than  have  him.  My  penal 
servitude  in  Poland,  due  to  my  frankness,  everybody 
knows.  There  is  still  a  way  out ;  be  good  enough,  as 
soon  as  possible,  to  send  our  young  men  a  Major-General. 
All  here  are  younger  than  I ;  he  can  be  my  shadow  ;  I 
will  give  him  the  arrangements ;  order  him  only  to  attack 
boldly.  Then  recall  G.  B.  on  some  pretext  or  other,  and 
then  for  the  time  being  send  a  couple  of  bold  and  manly 
infantry  staff  officers.  .  .  .  God  help  me,  when  I  think 
of  this  meanness  of  spirit,  my  bones  turn  to  water. 

On  the  10th  he  wrote  asking  for  another  battalion : 

Prince  Myeshtsherski  is  an  honest  man,  but  not 
accustomed  to  command  ;  nor  is  Bat,  and  he  is  a  coward 
to  boot. 

On  the  11th  came  another  letter,  and  on  the  14th 
he  returned  to  Negoesht  and  wrote  that  he  was  again 
in  good  health  and  would  make  the  attempt  against 
Turtukai.i 

The  infantry  battalion  arrived,  and  Suvorof  also  dis- 
mounted some  of  his  carabineers,  and  began  training 
them  as  infantry.  The  second  assault  on  Turtukai  took 
place  on  the  night  of  the  16th  June,  and  was  as  success- 
ful as  the  first.  On  this  occasion  Suvorof  commanded 
4100  men,  and  about  3200  were  used  in  the  actual 
attack.     The  Turks  were  again  estimated  at  about  4000. 

1  College  of  Military  Instruction,  No.  509  ;  quoted  in  Pyetrushevski, 
at  p.  157.  The  "  G.  B."  and  *'  Bat "  of  these  letters  are  Colonel 
Baturin,  who  commanded  the  column  which  Suvorof  led  in  person  on 
the  first  occasion. 


48  SUVOROF 

The  crossing  was  made  in  three  lines  of  boats.  Ryebok 
led  the  first,  with  two  companies  of  the  Astrakhan 
regiment  and  60  picked  marksmen.  Baturin,  accom- 
panied by  Suvorof  in  person,  was  in  command  of  the 
second,  and  Myeshtsherski  of  the  third.  About  three 
hours  before  nightfall  the  landing  was  accomplished, 
and  the  enemy  were  at  once  driven  out  of  their  lager 
up  into  a  rectangular  entrenchment  on  the  crest  of  the 
hill.  There  Ryebok  attacked  them  with  his  usual 
gallantry,  plunged  into  the  ditch,  scrambled  over  the 
parapet,  and  drove  a  force  of  four  times  his  own  strength 
headlong  out  of  the  place.  Nevertheless,  a  counter- 
attack was  made  with  great  stubbornness,  and  for  three 
hours  the  combat  raged  in  and  around  the  entrench- 
ment. Baturin  again  failed  to  give  adequate  support, 
but  his  detachment  at  length  took  up  a  position  on 
Ryebok's  left  on  the  higher  ground  round  the  enemy's 
right  flank.  The  steady  fire  of  the  artillery  at  last 
wore  down  the  enemy,  and  a  bayonet  charge  cleared 
the  entrenchment.  The  Turks  took  refuge  in  their  other 
lager,  on  the  bank  of  the  river  above  the  ruins  of  the 
town.  Suvorof  summoned  the  remainder  of  his  troops 
from  the  other  bank  and  prepared  for  an  attack  upon 
their  new  position.  But  the  enemy  disputed  the  land- 
ing and  at  the  same  time  surrounded  and  attacked  the 
entrenchment  from  all  sides.  This  final  rally  gave  little 
trouble.  The  fresh  troops  landed  on  the  right  bank, 
brushed  aside  the  Turks  who  stood  in  their  way,  and 
marched  against  the  rear  of  the  main  body,  as  Suvorof 
left  the  entrenchment  and  attacked  it  in  front.  The 
enemy  broke  and  fled  once  more  into  the  lager,  but 
without  waiting  for  Suvorof's  attack,  evacuated  it  and 
hurried  off  towards  Rushtshuk,  pursued  by  the  Russian 
cavalry.  They  left  a  Pasha  and  800  other  dead  on  the 
field,  and  the  Russians  carried  off  9  guns  and  35  boats. 
The  losses  of  the  victors,  even  after  such  a  stubborn 
contest,  were  only  6  killed  and  96  wounded.^ 

1  CampagneSf  i. ;  Pyetrof,  iii.  90. 


THE  FIRST  TURKISH  WAR  49 

No  more  came  of  the  second  occupation  of  Turtukai 
than  of  the  first,  and  the  death  of  Weissman,  on  the 
23rd  June,  seemed  to  paralyse  the  Russian  armies. 
Suvorof  went  on  training  his  troops  and  fitting  out 
his  river  squadrons,  and,  as  usual,  complaining  of  his 
subordinates : 

The  Anzheron  squad  of  recruits,  under  Major  Tyeglef, 
has  50  sick  out  of  150 — perhaps  he  has  gone  to  Bucharest 
after  the  girls. 

Of  two  staff  officers  he  wrote  : 

One  is  clumsy,  a  meddler ;  the  other  hardly  out  of 
his  cradle. 

Baturin  had  gone  to  Bucharest  without  leave,  and  so 
on.  What  is  peculiar  about  these  complaints,  which 
were  so  constant  with  Suvorof,  and  so  violent,  is  that 
they  are  all  contained  in  private  letters,  and  are  very 
seldom  expressed  in  any  official  report.  Either  Suvorof 
felt  himself  too  fresh  in  the  command  of  troops  to 
make  enemies  among  his  subordinate  officers,  or  he  was 
reluctant  to  spoil  the  career  of  any  person  in  his  power. 
As  he  never  showed  fear  of  his  equals,  the  first  explana- 
tion is  hardly  likely  to  be  correct.  He  certainly  dis- 
liked spoiling  the  fortunes  of  inferiors,  and  probably 
shrank  from  using  his  authority  for  the  professional 
destruction  of  men  like  Baturin,  even  while  he  could 
not  keep  his  feelings  out  of  his  private  correspondence. 
When  honours  and  rewards  were  distributed  in  1773, 
Suvorof  got  the  2nd  Class  of  the  Order  of  St.  George, 
while  both  Baturin  and  Ryebok  received  the  4th  Class,  the 
former  for  his  dubious  services  in  the  first  action,  and 
the  latter  for  his  unquestionable  gallantry  in  the  second. 
So  far  as  Suvorof  himself  was  concerned,  Rumyantsof 
was  not  slow  to  give  honour  where  honour  was  due.  On 
the  7th  July  he  was  transferred  from  Saltikof's  army  to 
that  of  Potyomkin,  operating  lower  down  the  Danube. 
But  his  journey  from  Negoesht  was  interrupted  by  an 
accident  which  might  have  killed  him.     Unsteadied  by 

E 


50  SUVOROF 

fever  and  his  wound,  he  slipped  and  fell  down  the  stairs 
of  the  monastery  at  Negoesht,  and  he  lay  in  bed  at 
Bucharest  for  two  weeks.  When  he  was  able  to  take 
up  his  new  command,  he  was  sent  by  Rumyantsof  to 
Hirsof,  a  fortress  on  the  Turkish  side  of  the  Danube, 
about  half-way  between  Matchin  and  Silistria.  The 
nearest  Turkish  army  lay  at  Karasu,  some  miles  to  the 
south-east,  and  Suvorof  at  once  proposed  to  make  an 
attack  upon  it  in  conjunction  with  Lieutenant-General 
Ungem,  who  commanded  the  Russian  troops  imme- 
diately to  the  north  of  Hirsof.  Unfortunately  Rum- 
yantsof, whose  boldness  in  the  field  was  spoilt  by  the 
timidity  of  his  strategy,  disapproved  of  the  plan,  and 
it  was  abandoned.  Suvorof  had  to  content  himself,  or 
rather  discontent  himself  with  improving  the  defences 
of  the  post  and  waiting  for  the  inevitable  advance  of 
the  enemy.  He  also  summoned  to  his  assistance  Major- 
General  Miloradovitch  with  his  brigade. 

On  the  night  of  the  3rd  September  the  Russian 
scouts  found  some  3000  Turkish  cavalry  encamped 
about  13  miles  away  on  the  road  to  Karasu.  At  7 
o'clock  in  the  next  morning  6000  cavalry,  followed  at 
a  short  distance  by  about  4000  infantry,  encountered 
the  Russian  outposts  and  drove  them  back  upon  Hirsof. 
By  mid-day  the  enemy  were  within  cannon-shot. 

Suvorof  drew  up  his  forces  parallel  with  the  Danube 
to  the  north  of  the  fortress.  This  stood  upon  an 
eminence  running  from  the  river  bank  at  right  angles 
to  the  direction  of  its  current.  At  the  end  of  this  ridge 
furthest  from  the  water  was  a  strong  redoubt.  About 
a  mile  to  the  north  stood  another  low  hill  a  mile  distant 
from  the  Danube.  On  this  was  placed  a  second  and 
smaller  redoubt.  These  two  hills  were  included  in  the 
Russian  system  of  defence.  Further  still  to  the  north 
was  a  third  hill,  outside  the  Russian  lines,  with  its 
northern  slopes  falling  into  the  river  Borui,  which  here 
runs  at  a  right  angle  into  the  Danube.  Suvorof's  own 
men  were  nearest  the  fortress  itself,  and  were  separated 


THE  FIRST  TURKISH  WAR 


51 


from  those  of  Miloradovitch  by  the  small  stream  of  the 
Borui.  At  the  confluence  of  the  two  rivers  was  a  trench- 
work  protected  by  pits  and  "  chevaux  de  frise,"  and  here 
Suvorof  took  up  his  own  station.  The  general  scheme 
was  such  that  the  enemy,  to  attack  the  troops  in  the 
field,  must  expose  their  left  flank  to  the  fire  of  the 
fortress  and  the  two  redoubts.  If  they  succeeded  in 
getting  into  line  in  front  of  Suvorof,  the  first  redoubt 
would  still  gall  their  left,  while  Suvorof s  line  would 
have  the  second  redoubt  and  the  trenches  in  front  of 
it.  The  troops  of  Miloradovitch,  who  was  ill,  were 
commanded  by  Colonel  Prince  Motchebelof,  and  covered 


Fortress 


Advance  oF  TurA^ 
Affair  of  HIRSOF. 

SCALE  —  ENGLISH  MILES. 
0  '/i  /  1^2 


Motchebe/oF 


by  the  Borui,  could  come  into  action  when  and  at  what- 
ever point  their  intervention  would  be  most  effective. 

The  Russian  skirmishers  withdrew  in  feigned  dis- 
order. The  Turks  were  allowed  to  pass  the  two  redoubts 
without  a  shot  being  fired,  and,  showing  signs  of  French 
training,  formed  in  three  lines  opposite  Suvorof.  But 
when  they  surrounded  the  trench -work  they  were 
greeted  with  a  brisk  fire  of  musketry  and  fell  away  in 
disorder.  Motchebelof  then  led  one  regiment  across  the 
Borui  and  attacked  their  right,  and  two  other  squares 
simultaneously  moved  out  between  the  small  redoubt 
and  the  trenclx-work,  and  supported  by  all  the  available 
guns,  attacked  their  centre  and  left.     For  a  time  the 


52  SUVOROF 

troops  climbing  up  from  the  Bond  were  held  back,  but 
reinforcements  came  up,  and  the  Turks  were  driven 
over  the  top  of  the  hill  which  lay  opposite  the  trench- 
work.  The  reinforcements  worked  round  the  rear  of  the 
enemy,  and  the  field  artillery,  dragged  up  and  posted 
on  the  hill  itself,  completed  the  overthrow  of  their  right 
wing.  A  desperate  attempt  by  some  of  the  Turkish 
horse  to  take  Motchebelof  himself  in  the  rear  was  frus- 
trated by  the  fire  of  the  troops  remaining  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Borui,  and  the  enemy  fled  with  their 
usual  precipitancy,  the  centre  and  left  making  no  attempt 
to  hold  up  the  tottering  right  wing.  The  Russian 
hussars  chased  them  for  twenty  miles,  and  the  Cossacks 
only  gave  up  the  pursuit  long  after  nightfall.  Over 
1000  Turks  were  killed,  and  6  guns  and  a  mortar  were 
taken.  The  Russian  losses  were  10  killed  and  167 
wounded.^ 

The  campaign  of  1774  gave  Suvorof  his  last  victory 
in  this  Turkish  War.  Rumyantsof  at  last  determined 
to  undertake  a  general  offensive,  cross  the  Danube,  and 
penetrate  as  far  as  possible  into  Turkish  territory.  The 
line  of  the  river  was  already  broken  in  more  than  one 
place.  The  fortresses  of  Izmail  and  Brailof  on  the  left 
bank  had  been  in  the  hands  of  the  Russians  since 
1771,  and  the  northern  Dobrudzha  had  in  consequence 
been  occupied  by  them  as  far  south  as  Hirsof.  If  a 
further  advance  was  to  be  made,  Silistria,  at  any  rate, 
must  be  captured,  and  Rumyantsof  also  aimed  at 
taking  Rushtshuk.  These  strong  places  secured, 
the  way  would  be  open  to  Shumla  and  Varna,  beyond 
which  and  over  the  chain  of  the  Balkans  lay  the  road 
to  Adrianople  and  Constantinople.  The  first  stage  of 
the  plan  was  to  be  carried  out  in  three  movements. 
Saltikof,  with  10,000  men,  was  to  take  Rushtshuk, 
and  Rumyantsof  himself,  with  12,000,  Silistria  ;  while 
Kamyenski  and  Suvorof,  with  14,000,  were  to  advance 
through   Bazardzhik  upon   Shumla,  where  the  Grand 

1  Campagnes,  i.  95  ;  Pyetrof,  iii.  92. 


THE  FIRST  TURKISH  WAR  53 

Vizier,  Mukhzin  Sadi  Mehemet,  lay  with  the  main 
Turkish  army.^ 

The  plan  as  a  whole  failed  miserably,  largely  owing 
to  deficient  transport  and  the  consequent  want  of 
supplies.^  Neither  Rushtshuk  nor  Silistria  fell,  and  no 
general  advance  took  place.  The  third  movement 
was  a  partial  success  and  remained  incomplete  only 
because  of  the  failures  elsewhere.  Kamyenski,  with 
8000  men,  marched  south  from  Izmail,  to  meet  Suvorof, 
crossing  the  Danube  at  Hirsof  with  6000,  at  Babadagh. 
The  enterprise  began  inauspiciously.  Suvorof,  resenting 
his  subordination  to  a  man  only  slightly  his  senior  in 
rank,  and  very  much  his  inferior  in  capacity,  disregarded 
the  arrangements  for  the  junction,  and  after  a  strong 
rebuke  from  Kamyenski,  met  him  at  Bazardzhik  instead 
of  Babadagh.  Loyalty  to  a  colleague,  who  was  also  a 
rival,  was  not  one  of  his  virtues,  and  in  this  case  he 
risked  the  defeat  of  an  army.  From  Babadagh,  on  the 
20th  June,  Suvorof  having  been  on  the  march  since 
1  o'clock  in  the  morning,  they  moved  in  company 
towards  Kozludzhi. 

The  very  day  when  the  Russians  left  Bazardzhik,  the 
Grand  Vizier  arrived  with  40,000  men  at  Kozludzhi, 
on  the  march  from  Shumla  to  Hirsof.  On  the  22nd 
the  light  troops  of  the  two  armies  encountered  each 
other  in  the  middle  of  a  dense  wood,  which  lay  between 
the  advancing  Russians  and  Kozludzhi.  The  Russians 
had  the  worst  of  the  combat.  Their  cavalry  were 
driven  back  by  a  mixed  force  of  cavalry  and  infantry, 
and  three  battalions,  coming  up  to  help  them,  were 
unable  to  stem  the  advance  of  the  enemy.  In  the 
midst  of  the  trees,  through  which  there  ran  nothing 
but  a  single  track,  the  numbers  and  impetuosity  of 
the  Turks  gave  them  an  immense  advantage,  and  it 
was  only  at  the  very  edge  of  the  wood  that  the  Russian 
infantry,  further  reinforced,  and  able  at  last  to  form 
square,  succeeded  in  breaking  the  attack  by  musketry 

1  Pyetrof,  iv.  32.  2  jj^-^^  33^ 


54  SUVOROF 

and  artillery  fire.  Suvorof  himself  was  in  command 
of  the  Russian  vanguard,  and  at  one  moment  only  the 
speed  of  his  horse  saved  him  from  the  sabre  of  a  furious 
Janissary. 

Their  advance  stopped  in  this  way,  the  Turks  hurried 
back  through  the  wood,  and  Suvorof,  taking  great  risks, 
plunged  into  the  trees  after  them.  He  invited  defeat. 
To  advance  with  weary  troops  through  a  dense  forest, 
along  a  single  road,  and  that  a  very  bad  one,  was  the 
height  of  folly.  In  such  a  place  order  and  discipline 
could  be  of  little  service  against  an  enemy  whose  capacity 
for  fierce  attacks  upon  broken  formations  was  notorious. 
No  doubt  there  would  be  little  to  fear  from  the  Turkish 
cavalry  in  the  wood  itself.  But  the  Russians,  struggling 
out  into  the  open  after  an  exhausting  march,  ought  to 
have  been  cut  down  to  a  man.  The  commander  who 
would  take  such  risks  must  be  either  a  fool  or  a  genius  ; 
and  even  a  genius  could  hardly  have  escaped  disaster 
if  his  adversary  had  not  been  himself  a  fool.  Suvorof 
thought  he  knew  his  Turk,  and  the  event  showed  that 
he  was  right.  Nevertheless  the  victory  of  Kozludzhi  is 
one  of  those  which  geniuses  need  not,  and  ordinary  men 
must  not,  try  to  imitate.  Along  the  winding  and 
broken  track,  littered  with  the  dead  bodies  of  men, 
horses,  and  oxen,^  and  here  and  there  blocked  by  a 
waggon  or  intersected  by  a  trench,  the  Russians  struggled 
for  some  hours.  The  pace  was  thoroughly  Suvorovian. 
Suvorof  s  men  had  not  fed  that  day,  nor  had  the  horses 
been  watered,  and  many  men  and  animals  died  of  sheer 
exhaustion.  The  enemy  soon  found  that  the  Russian, 
entangled  among  the  trees  and  undergrowth,  was  not, 
after  all,  as  terrible  as  he  had  appeared  on  the  edge  of 
the  wood,  and  the  fighting  was  almost  constant.  Never- 
theless, after  four  miles  of  this  scrambling  battle, 
Suvorof  got  his  men  out  into  the  open.     On  the  ridge 

1  The  draught  animals,  which  seem  to  have  been  in  great  nmnbers, 
had  probably  fallen  from  exhaustion.  Routed  Turks  always  ride  and 
drive  their  animals  to  death. 


THE  FIRST  TURKISH  WAR 


55 


before  them  was  drawn  up  the  whole  Turkish  army, 
and  they  were  greeted  with  a  heavy  fire  from  the  enemy's 
artillery,  which  was  on  this  occasion  unusually  strong. 
Fortunately  a  heavy  shower  of  rain  fell,,  spoilt  many 
of  the  Turkish  cartridges,  and  at  the  samci  time  soaked 
the  long  and  cumbrous  garments  which  most  of  the 
Turks  wore.  The  dreaded  whirlwind  charge  was  de- 
layed, and  Suvorof  had  time  to  draw  up  his  troops  in 
two  lines  of  five  squares,  with  the  cavalry  oxx  the  flanks. 
He  had  about  5000  men  on  the  spot,  and  some  2000 
Arnauts  were  still  engaged  in  clearing  the  wood  of 
Turks.     The  rest  of  the  Russian  army  was  out  of  reach. 


Turkish 
Camp   1 

KOZLUDZHli 

KOZLUDZHP. 

SCALE'  ENGLISH  MILES. 
ft                                      O         1         Z         3         * 

1 

and  all  Suvorof  s  own  field  artillery  seemed  hopelessly 
bogged  among  the  trees. 

No  sooner  had  he  got  his  men  into  order  of  battle 
than  he  led  them  against  the  enemy.  The  Turks 
advanced  to  meet  them.  Several  charges  were  driven 
off,  and  the  Russians  moved  steadily  forward,  keeping 
up  a  close  fire  from  muskets  and  the  regimental  artillery. 
The  Turkish  lager  on  the  crest  of  the  ridge,  four  miles 
away,  was  at  last  reached,  and  halting  his  troops  on 
the  edge  of  the  gully  which  lay  in  front  of  it,  Suvorof 
succeeded  in  bringing  up  a  few  of  his  field  guns  and 
poured  a  heavy  fire  into  the  camp.  The  Turks  were 
soon  in  hopeless  confusion.  A  few  returned  the  Russian 
fire.     But  for  the  most  part  they  were  cutting  the  gun 


56  SUVOROF 

traces  and  riding  away  on  the  horses,  carrying  off  their 
private  property,  shooting  their  own  officers,  and 
thinking  of  nothing  but  escape.  Into  this  crowd  of 
discomfited  ruffians  the  Russian  shot  fell  without 
ceasing,  and  a  stream  of  fugitives  overflowed  the  further 
wall  of  the  ]  lager  and  poured  away  in  the  direction  of 
Shumla.  At  sunset  the  whole  place  was  in  the  hands  of 
Suvorof,  with  29  cannon,  107  flags,  and  the  great  bulk 
of  the  tents.,  waggons,  and  stores.^ 

It  was  the  fate  of  Suvorof  s  Turkish  victories  to 
be  barren  of  fruit.  On  this  occasion  nothing  stood 
between  the  victors  of  Kozludzhi  and  Shumla  but  the 
miserable  remnant  of  the  Grand  Vizier's  army,  not  more 
than  1000  strong.  Nevertheless  the  advance  was  not 
pressed,  and  the  Russians  stayed  at  Kozludzhi  for  six 
days.  This  was  the  decision  of  a  council  of  war  at 
which  Suvorof  was  present.  The  only  argument  in 
favour  of  delay  was  the  exhaustion  of  the  troops,  and 
even  Suvorof  himself,  who  had  been  on  horseback  for 
some  twenty  hours,  must  have  needed  rest.  But  a  halt 
of  six  days  was  sheer  waste  of  time  and  opportunity, 
and  Rumyantsof  himself  wrote  to  Kamyenski : 

Not  days  nor  hours,  but  even  moments  are  valuable 
in  such  a  situation  ;  want  of  provisions  cannot  serve 
you  as  an  excuse.^ 

It  is  safe  to  assume  that  Suvorof  was  not  in  favour  of 
so  long  a  halt,  unless,  indeed,  he  was  so  ill  and  fatigued 
that  he  felt  himself  incapable  of  pushing  on.  It  is 
certain  that  the  bad  feeling  between  him  and  Kamyenski 
never  ceased  from  this  date,  and  that  a  few  days  after 
the  battle  he  went  again  to  Bucharest  "  for  reasons  of 
health." 

Nevertheless  the  victory  at  Kozludzhi,  in  the  military 
sense  incomplete,  was  a  very  powerful  political  argu- 
ment, and  the  Turks  abandoned  all  hope  of  bringing 

^  CampagneSy  i. ;  Pyetrof,  iv.  49. 
'  Archives  of  Military  Instruction,  quoted  in  Pyetrushevski,  i.  180. 


THE  FIRST  TURKISH  WAR  57 

the  war  to  a  successful  end.  On  the  10th  July  a  treaty 
of  peace  was  signed  at  Kutchuk-Kainardzhi.  Turkey 
acknowledged  the  independence  of  the  Crimea,  a  diplo- 
matic fiction  which  meant  that  she  left  the  Crimea  to 
Russia,  to  be  appropriated  formally  whenever  Russia 
pleased ;  and  she  literally  conceded  Kinburn,  Azof, 
Kertch,  and  Enikale,  with  the  free  right  of  navigation 
on  the  Black  Sea.  Turkey  also  agreed  to  pay  an 
indemnity  of  4,500,000  roubles. 

After  the  conclusion  of  his  Turkish  campaign  Suvorof 
married.  It  is  not  clear  why  he  should  have  taken 
this  step  so  late  in  life.  Apparently  he  had  never 
before  shown  any  desire  for  marriage,  and  he  had  not 
found  any  difficulties  in  celibacy.  His  worst  enemies 
never  accused  him  of  sexual  irregularities,  and  though 
he  was  always  fond  of  feminine  society,  it  was  most 
probably  because  it  flattered  him,  and  not  because  it 
satisfied  any  other  want.  His  military  career  had 
absorbed  all  his  energy,  and  he  had  poured  all  his 
emotional  force  into  a  habit  of  life  as  absorbing  as  that 
of  a  religious  devotee,  without  any  of  the  perilous 
inactivity  of  a  mere  life  of  meditation.  To  such  a 
nature  and  in  such  circumstances  celibacy  must  have 
been  easy.  Nevertheless  he  decided  to  change  his 
state.  It  may  be  that  his  father,  who  was  then  68, 
and  died  in  the  following  year,  pressed  him  to  marry 
and  continue  the  family  name.  It  may  be  that  at 
the  age  of  43  he  was  himself  occasionally  conscious  of 
loneliness.  Whatever  his  motives  for  the  change,  he 
made  a  bad  choice.  The  bride  was  Varvara,  daughter 
of  Prince  Ivan  Prozorovski,  whom  he  met  at  Moscow 
in  1773,  either  when  he  was  on  his  way  to  Turkey,  or 
when  he  returned  on  leave  after  the  battle  at  Hirsof. 
She  was  poor,  but  of  good  family,  beautiful,  lively,  and 
20  years  younger  than  himself,  the  last  woman  to 
live  happily  with  such  a  man.  An  acquaintance  has 
described  her  as  "  a  beauty  in  the  Russian  sense ; 
ruddy  and  buxom,  with  a  mind  of  no  high  order  and 


58  SUVOROF 

an  old-fashioned  education."  i  "  Fat  and  stupid  '*  is 
the  description  of  another.*  For  a  man  who  cared 
nothing  for  beauty,  and  was  unusually  intolerant  of 
slowness  of  mind,  such  a  mate  was  beyond  hope  unfit. 

Very  little  record  of  the  affairs  of  the  joint  household 
has  come  down  to  us.  For  some  time  there  was  no 
formal  parting.  The  two  lived  together  whenever 
Suvorof's  duties  permitted  it,  and  the  pleasure-loving 
wife  must  have  been  terribly  dull  in  some  of  the  little 
provincial  towns.  There  were  two  children:  Natalya, 
bom  on  the  12th  August  1775,  and  Arkadii,  bom  on 
the  15th  August  1784.  But  in  September  1779  a 
formal  separation  took  place.  This  was  patched  up 
in  the  following  January,  but  after  other  quarrels  and 
reconciliations  a  final  separation  was  arranged  early 
in  1784.  Varvara  Ivanovna  went  to  live  in  Moscow 
on  an  allowance  of  1200  roubles  a  year,  which  was 
afterwards  increased  to  3000. 

Suvorof's  marriage  must  therefore  be  added  to  the 
list  of  the  failures  of  great  men  in  matrimony.  Doubt- 
less his  wife  was  of  less  worth  than  himself,  but  if  he 
had  been  wise,  he  would  not  have  chosen  an  inferior. 
Not  only  was  she  an  unfit  companion  for  him,  but  he 
was  also  an  unfit  companion  for  her,  and  her  side  of 
the  story,  if  it  could  be  known,  would  probably  be  as 
pathetic  as  blameworthy.  Nothing  of  the  correspond- 
ence between  the  two  has  been  preserved.  He  accused 
her  of  infidelity,  and  apparently  with  reason.  Her 
case  is  not  on  record.  No  doubt  she  could  plead  many 
neglects  on  his  part,  but  precisely  how  many  dull  and 
lonely  hours  she  spent,  while  he  was  engrossed  in  his 
master  passion,  cannot  be  told.  The  subordination 
of  her  claims  upon  his  society  to  those  of  his  soldier^ 
repelled  her,  as  her  frivolity  and  want  of  appreciation 

1  "  Anecdotes  of  Vigel "  (Zapiski  Vigela)  in  the  Russkii  Vyestnik 
(1864),  298.  See  also  Shubinskii's  "  W^ife  of  Suvorof  "  (Zhena  Suvorova) 
in  the  Istoritcheskii  Vyestnik  (1877),  7. 

*  Istoritcheskii  Vyestnik  (1900),  Ixxx.  530. 


THE  FIRST  TURKISH  WAR  59 

repelled  him.  Such  men  commit  a  kind  of  spiritual 
adultery  with  their  public  work,  hardly  less  painful  in 
its  consequences  to  their  wives  than  the  other  adultery 
of  which  they  are  never  guilty.  That  Suvorof  was 
not  wholly  lacking  in  the  domestic  virtues  is  clear  from 
the  many  proofs  of  his  affection  for  his  daughter.  But 
daughters  are  not  such  tests  of  character  as  wives. 
They  are  never  upon  terms  of  equality.  They  require 
fewer  concessions,  fewer  abdications,  renunciations, 
and  abstentions,  and  fewer  positive  acts  of  affection. 
Suvorof  never  worked  easily  upon  terms  of  equality 
with  any  one,  and  besides  being  absorbed  in  the  study 
and  practice  of  the  art  of  war,  he  was  always  an  imperious 
and  quick-tempered  man.  This  combination  of  neglect 
and  egoism  would  have  been  fatal  to  a  marriage  with 
any  but  an  exceptional  woman.  To  the  misfortune 
of  both  Varvara  Ivanovna  and  himself,  she  was  not 
above  the  average,  even  if  she  was  not  below  it. 

Of  his  children  he  saw  little.  The  boy  lived  with 
his  mother  till  he  was  eleven  years  old.  The  daughter 
was  taken  away  from  her  at  the  age  of  three,  and  placed 
in  the  Smolnii  Institute  at  Petersburg,  an  establishment 
recently  founded  for  the  education  of  daughters  of  the 
nobility.  She  was  a  good-natured  and  benevolent 
little  person.^  With  both,  their  father  carried  on  an 
intermittent  correspondence,  which,  in  the  case  of 
Natalya,  consisted  of  long  and  very  affectionate  letters. 
But  of  personal  intercourse  there  was  almost  nothing, 
and  scandal  declared  that  Suvorof  at  first  refused  to 
acknowledge  Arkadii  as  his  own  son.^  Nevertheless, 
he  took  a  serious  view  of  his  responsibilities,  and  his 
correspondence  shows  him  as  not  only  an  affectionate 
but  also  a  wise  father. 

This  want  of  family  life  had  no  doubt  something  to 
do  with  the  fantastic  aspect  of  his  character  which  in 
the  remainder  of  his  life  became  so  conspicuous.    Celibacy 

1  Istoritcheski  Vyestnik  (1900),  Ixxx.  529. 
'  Masson,  M^moires  secrets  sur  la  Russie,  i.  318. 


60  SUVOROF 

tends  to  exaggerate  abnormalities,  in  part  directly, 
through  the  frustration  of  the  sex  impulse,  and  in  part 
indirectly,  through  the  mere  absence  of  objects  of 
affection  and  consideration.  Doubtless,  Suvorof  would 
in  any  case  have  developed  into  a  testy  old  man,  very 
fond  of  mischief  and  requiring  very  careful  manage- 
ment by  his  women  folk.  But  he  could  hardly  have 
risen  to  the  heights  of  wilful  and  deliberate  perversity 
of  which  so  many  examples  have  been  recorded,  had  he 
not  lived  for  most  of  his  time  without  a  wife.  Absence 
of  family,  and  especially  of  feminine  influence  is  certainly 
responsible  for  the  excessive  development  of  this  part 
of  his  nature. 

Some  of  his  biographers  have  puzzled  themselves 
with  this  freakishness,  and  gravely  explain  it  as  a 
deliberate  pose,  assumed  to  attract  the  attention  of 
his  superiors,  and  get  promotion  more  rapidly  than  a 
more  ordinary  person  could  expect.^  This  is  a  rational, 
but  a  too  rational  explanation.  Suvorof  was  not  the 
first  great  man  to  be  eccentric,  and  in  his  case,  as  in 
others,  it  is  not  necessary  to  go  deeper  than  high  animal 
spirits  and  a  liking  for  mischief.  He  had  all  the  Russian 
instinct  for  clowning,  for  exuberant  gesture  and  grimace, 
which  is  apparent  in  so  many  of  the  national  dances. 
This  he  indulged  to  the  full,  both  in  getting  on  to  good 
terms  with  his  men  and  in  expressing  his  contempt 
for  the  petty  social  idolatries  of  his  day.  A  man  who 
keeps  a  clear  view  of  things  in  their  true  proportions 
cannot  avoid  the  temptation  to  shock  the  feelings  of 
those  who  strain  at  the  gnats  of  the  great  realities, 
and  swallow  the  camels  of  social  convention  and  the 
etiquette  of  Courts.  Suvorof's  escapades  were  often 
of  this  kind,  and  persisted  and  were  exaggerated  long 
after  the  favour  of  Princes  had  ceased  to  have  anything 

1  See,  e.g.t  Schmidt,  i.  135  ;  Laveme,  106  n.  As  an  historian 
Schmidt  had  other  Teutonic  qualities  besides  his  accuracy.  An 
unconquerable  seriousness  is  one  of  them.  Laverne,  as  a  Frenchman , 
should  have  known  better. 


THE  FIRST  TURKISH  WAR  61 

more  to  give  him.  He  was  no  doubt  clumsy  among 
courtiers,  and  to  some  extent  may  have  used  his  eccen- 
tricity as  a  cloak.  But  he  was  big  enough  to  transcend 
the  rules  of  conventional  good  manners,  and  more  often 
than  not  it  is  safe  to  assume  that  he  said  or  did  some- 
thing outrageous  for  the  sheer  pleasure  of  throwing 
into  confusion  some  pompous  or  pedantic  egoist,  who 
had  converted  social  trifles  from  conveniences  into 
matters  of  religion.  Though  he  occasionally  used  the 
language  of  flunkeyism  for  his  own  advancement,  he 
was  never  a  flunkey  at  heart,  and  he  delighted  in  shock- 
ing people  who  were.  Those  will  best  understand  this 
side  of  Suvorof's  character  who  most  appreciate  the 
mixture  of  high  seriousness  and  impish  malevolence 
which  makes  up  the  genius  of  Mr.  George  Bernard 
Shaw.  That  it  was  in  later  life  not  always  displayed 
with  wisdom  or  good  effect  may  be  partly  attributed 
to  his  disappointment  in  marriage.  But  it  was  a 
natural  and  not  an  assumed  eccentricity,  and  he  enjoyed 
indulging  it  for  its  own  sake,  and  not  for  what  he  hoped 
to  get  by  it. 


CHAPTER   IV 


FRONTIER   WORK 


Rebellion  of  Pugatchyof,  1772 — Intervention  of  Suvorof,  1774 — ^Across 
the  Volga — Capture  of  Pugatchyof — Suvorofs  little  ways — 
Potyomkin — Correspondence — ^The  Tartars — Revolt  in  the  Crimea, 
1777 — Squabbles  with  Prozorovski — Suvorof  in  charge — Migration 
of  the  Christians — Astrakhan  and  the  road  to  India — Grievances — 
The  Tartars  again — Feasts  and  fights — Correspondence — Command 
of  Petersburg  Division,  1785 — ^The  Imperial  Progress,  1787 — 
Suvorof  one  of  the  sights. 

By  the  end  of  the  Turkish  War  Suvorof  had  acquired 
a  great  professional  reputation,  and  even  before 
Rumyantsof  was  ready  to  release  him,  his  services 
were  required  in  another  quarter.  Early  in  1772  the 
ordinary  turbulence  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  lands 
beyond  the  Volga  developed  into  a  dangerous  rebellion. 
This  border  country  between  European  civilisation  and 
Asiatic  barbarism  was  a  perpetual  menace  to  the  stability 
of  Russia,  and  its  savage  anarchy  was  held  back  by  a 
hardly  less  savage  system  of  police.  At  this  time 
the  whole  social  organisation,  already  strained  by  the 
Polish  and  Turkish  Wars,  seemed  about  to  collapse.  A 
Cossack  named  Emilian  Pugatchyof,  representing  him- 
self to  be  the  late  Emperor  Peter  III.,  put  himself 
at  the  head  of  the  rising,  and  for  months  the  inhabitants 
of  eastern  Russia,  almost  as  far  as  the  walls  of  Moscow, 
suffered  countless  barbarities  at  the  hands  of  parties 
of  Kirghiz,  Kalmucks,  Tartars,  Cossacks,  and  Russian 
criminals.  It  was  not  until  the  end  of  1773  that  Suvorofs 
old   chief,    Bibikof,   arrived    at  Kazan  and    began  to 


FRONTIER  WORK  63 

co-ordinate  the  measures  of  defence.  But  in  April  of 
the  next  year  Bibikof  died,  and  Pugatchyof,  more 
dangerous  than  ever,  succeeded  in  burning  the  town 
of  Kazan  itself.  The  conclusion  of  peace  with  Poland 
and  Turkey  left  Catherine  free  to  deal  with  this  ferocious 
system  of  slaughter  and  pillage.  In  July  1774  Count 
Peter  Panin  took  charge  of  the  operations,  and  Colonel 
Mikhelson  drove  Pugatchyof  across  the  Volga,  and 
began  to  beat  him  from  one  point  of  vantage  to  another. 
Suvorof's  appointment  had  been  made  in  March, 
but  Rumyantsof  would  not  let  him  go  until  peace  had 
been  concluded.  It  was  therefore  not  until  the  24th 
August  that,  after  a  brief  visit  to  his  newly  wedded 
wife  at  Moscow,  he  reached  Ulokhovo  and  had  an  inter- 
view with  Panin.  The  same  day  he  started,  with  50 
men,  for  Penza  and  Saratof.  He  marched  with  his 
usual  haste,  leaving  alone  the  scattered  bands  of 
marauders  and  the  parties  of  landowners  and  their 
armed  servants  whom  he  met  on  the  road.  He  aimed 
only  at  Pugatchyof  himself.  At  Saratof  he  learned 
that  Mikhelson  had  inflicted  another  heavy  blow  on 
the  rebel  leader.  Adding  a  few  more  to  his  little  party 
of  soldiers,  he  hurried  on  to  Tsaritsin,  where  he  found 
that  Pugatchyof  had  left  four  days  before,  and  had 
plunged  into  the  barren  wastes  on  the  eastern  bank  of 
the  Volga.  With  two  squadrons  of  cavalry  and  two  of 
Cossacks,  and  300  infantry  mounted  on  horses  taken  by 
Mikhelson  from  the  bandits,  Suvorof  went  after  him. 
In  these  regions  there  was  no  food  or  fuel  to  be  got, 
and  he  drove  50  oxen  before  him  to  supply  the  place  of 
the  ordinary  soldier's  bread.  The  sun  by  day  and  the 
stars  by  night  were  the  only  guides,  and  news  was  picked 
up  from  the  rare  inhabitants  and  the  armed  parties 
which  had  started  from  other  points  in  pursuit  of 
Pugatchyof.  At  last,  at  the  village  of  Malo  Uzenye, 
Suvorof  heard  that  the  bandit  had  been  seized  by  his 
own  followers  and  taken  to  Yaitsk.  Pushing  on  to 
that  place  with  more  haste  than  ever,  he  found,  to 


64  SUVOROF 

his  bitter  disappointment,  that  the  captive  had  been 
handed  over  to  Colonel  Simyonof,  who  commanded 
the  garrison  of  the  post.  In  the  last  nine  days  Suvorof 
had  covered  400  miles. 

At  Yaitsk  he  took  charge  of  Pugatchyof  and  his 
twelve-year-old  son.  The  boy  was  put  in  a  cart,  the 
father  in  a  big  wooden  cage  on  wheels,  and  Suvorof 
made  for  Simbirsk  with  an  escort  of  three  companies 
of  infantry,  200  Cossacks,  and  two  cannon,  with  great 
torches  blazing  all  night  around  the  cage  to  prevent 
a  surprise  and  a  rescue.  At  Simbirsk,  on  the  12th 
October,  he  handed  over  his  prisoners  to  Panin. 

One  or  two  sketches  of  Suvorof  on  this  chase  after 
Pugatchyof  were  made  by  an  official  who  was  for  some 
days  in  his  company.  He  rode,  as  always,  with  a  single 
Cossack.  At  the  end  of  a  day's  march  the  Cossack 
lit  a  bimdle  of  straw  in  default  of  better  fuel.  Suvorof 
dismounted,  took  off  his  coat  and  breeches,  and,  holding 
his  shirt  over  his  head,  warmed  his  back  at  the  blaze. 
Then  he  warmed  his  chest  and  stomach,  and  lastly  sat 
and  warmed  himself  all  round.  Then  he  put  on  his 
uniform  again,  wrapped  himself  in  his  cloak,  and, 
lying  down  on  a  bundle  of  hay,  with  his  saddle  for  a 
pillow,  went  straight  off  to  sleep.^  In  more  civilised  sur- 
roundings he  was  less  accommodating.  On  one  occasion 
the  cavalcade  pulled  up  at  a  house  with  a  high  flight 
of  steps  leading  up  to  the  front  door.  Suvorof 's  adjutant 
told  the  civilian  that  he  had  been  careful  to  tell  the 
housewife  not  to  clean  the  house  and  not  to  put  a  cloth 
on  the  table  "  because  my  general  can't  bear  them." 
Suvorof  then  trotted  up,  exclaimed,  "  Merciful  God  ! 
Good  morning  !  "  dismounted,  and  ran  up  the  steps, 
followed  by  the  adjutant.  They  came  out  as  quickly 
as  they  went  in,  the  adjutant  first,  and  Suvorof  after 
him  crying  at  the  top  of  his  voice,  "  Hey,  hey,  hey,  hey  !  " 
Down  the  steps  and  out  through  the  gates  they  went. 

1  Reminiscences  of  Senator  Paul  S.  Rumitch,  Rtiss,  Star.  (1870), 
u.  823. 


FRONTIER  WORK  65 

In  the  road  some  one  contrived  to  pacify  the  frantic 
general,  and  it  was  explained  that  the  unfortunate 
woman  had  disregarded  her  orders  and  had  laid  the 
cloth.^  This  is  the  first  appearance  in  contemporary 
memoirs  of  Suvorof  the  eccentric.  The  same  observer 
was  present  at  his  interview  with  Panin  at  Simbirsk, 
and  noticed  the  profundity  of  his  numerous  bows  and 
the  puzzled  amusement  of  his  colleague,  Count  Pavel 
Potyomkin.2 

After  the  conclusion  of  his  Pugatchyof  expedition 
Suvorof  began  to  correspond  with  Count  Grigori  Potyom- 
kin,  the  new  favourite  of  the  Empress.  The  letters 
show  him  in  a  new  aspect,  that  of  a  flatterer  and  a 
sycophant.  To  Potyomkin  Suvorof  paid  unceasing 
court.  He  was  a  gorgeous  creature,  a  Russian  Duke 
of  Bedford,  the  Leviathan  among  the  favourites  of 
Catherine.  His  great  gifts  of  imagination  were  matched 
by  great  deficiencies  in  practical  capacity.  Many  con- 
temporaries, Russian  and  foreign,  have  described  his 
powerful  body,  his  high  forehead  and  eager  eyes,  his 
bright  complexion  and  loose  mouth,  the  width  and 
depth  of  his  knowledge,  his  amazing  memory,  the 
rapidity  and  variety  of  his  conversation,  his  vast  schemes 
of  conquest,  his  craving  for  power,  his  bursts  of  energy 
and  his  prolonged  and  immovable  lethargy,  his  con- 
descension towards  his  inferiors  and  his  jealousy  and 
harshness  towards  his  rivals,  his  overflowing  good 
humour  and  his  sudden  and  capricious  fits  of  rage. 
During  the  critical  part  of  Suvorof  s  career  thi^  man  was 
the  most  powerful  in  Russia.  Catherine,  even  while 
she  chided  him  for  his  laziness  and  indecision,  like  a 
true  woman  paid  great  deference  to  the  judgement  of 
her  big  lover.  Fortunately  for  Suvorof,  Potyomkin 
looked  upon  him  with  favour,  and  however  he  dis- 
approved of  his  antics,  was  willing  to  tolerate  them 
in  one  who  was  such  a  useful  instrument  of  his  own 

*  Reminiscences  of  Senator  Paul  S.  Rumitch,  Russ.  Star.  (1870), 
324.  a  Ibid.  351. 


66  SUVOROF 

ambitions.  "  He  plays  the  fool  occasionally,"  he  said, 
"  but  with  all  his  folly  he*s  a  man  of  brains  and  capacity  ; 
he  deserves  watching.*'  ^  Suvorof,  on  his  part,  was 
sensible  of  the  value  of  the  great  man  to  himself,  and 
for  some  years  the  two  worked  in  a  sort  of  partnership. 
"  One  hand  washes  the  other,"  says  the  Russian  pro- 
verb. Potyomkin  thus  used  and  advanced  Suvorof,  and 
the  latter  applied  himself  diligently  to  tickling  the  vanity 
of  Catherine's  great  parasite.  It  is  not  without  some 
feeling  of  humiliation  that  we  read  the  letters  into 
which  Suvorof  poured  streams  of  most  unworthy  adula- 
tion. 

Thus  on  the  24th  October  he  wrote  from  Moscow 
after  receiving  a  letter  of  praise  from  Catherine.  He 
referred  to  Potyomkin's  goodness,  to  which  he  ascribed 
his  own  happiness : 

...  a  recognition  so  favourable,  so  great,  that  I 
cannot  summon  strength  to  express  my  sincere  grati- 
tude. I  can  collect  myself  only  to  make  the  most 
unrestrained  recognition  to  my  protector,  my  upholder 
in  my  military  service,  and  my  benefactor,  of  his  ex- 
cessive kindnesses,  the  value  of  which  will  never  cease  to 
abide  in  my  grateful  heart.  Honour,  Dear  Sir,  by  means 
of  your  powerful  intercession,  a  man  whose  hopes  are 
reposed  in  your  admirable  benevolence.  The  greatness 
of  that  benevolence  will  thus  be  the  more  remarkable, 
and  will  compel  me  to  sing  your  praises,  while  I  shall 
ever  remain,  with  the  profound  consideration  which  I 
owe  you  and  with  unhypocritical  devotion,  etc.^ 

On  the  12th  June  1777  he  wrote  in  the  same  strain 
asking  for  a  command : 

Only  to  your  exalted  person  can  I  have  recourse  ! 
Continue  to  protect,  dear  sir,  one  who  with  unfeigned 
devotion  and  most  deep  respect  will  remain  to  the  end 
of  his  life  your  most  humble  servant.' 

1  Laveme,  105  n.  The  words  were  spoken  to  the  Austrian  General 
Jordis. 

2  VoTontsof  Archives^  xxiv.  286. 
»  Ibid.  288. 


FRONTIER  WORK  67 

On  the  12th  March  1779  he  wrote  : 

This  new  mark  of  your  Excellency's  kindness  to  me 
transcends  all  my  strength  and  the  sensibility  of  the 
gratitude  which  I  owe  you.  Permit  me,  illustrious 
Prince,  to  devote  the  remainder  of  my  life  to  spreading 
the  praises  of  your  so  limitless  benevolence,  and  to  be 
always  with  most  deep  respect,  etc.^ 

On  the  21st  April  1784  he  wrote  : 

I  humbly  thank  your  Serenity  for  all  your  great 
kindness  to  myself.  ...  I  confide  myself  to  the  exalted 
patronage  of  your  Serenity  and  will  eternally  be,  with 
most  profound  respect,  etc.^ 

This  extravagant  language,  selected  at  random  from 
many  letters,  is  not  pleasant  to  read.  It  is,  of  course, 
possible  that  Suvorof  fell  into  an  error  very  common 
among  men  of  action,  and  believed  Potyomkin  to  be  a 
much  greater  thing  than  he  really  was.  To  the  soldier, 
accustomed  to  authority,  order,  and  obedience,  politics 
will  often  seem  a  profound  mystery,  and  the  men 
professionally  engaged  in  it  a  little  beyond  his  power  to 
understand.  In  fact,  politicians  are  rarely  more  than 
ordinary,  and  great  places  in  the  State  are  most  often 
not  occupied  by  great  men.  But  Suvorof,  accus- 
tomed from  childhood  to  solitude  and  camps,  was  in 
his  view  of  the  Court  a  very  simple  and  ignorant  man. 
He  may,  as  a  shy  and  uncomfortable  man  will,  have 
exaggerated  what  he  supposed  to  be  the  qualities  of  a 
true  courtier.  But  this  explanation,  consistent  with  the 
letters,  is  not  consistent  with  all  the  facts.  It  is  im- 
possible to  avoid  the  conclusion  that  Suvorof,  for  all 
his  greatness,  had  in  him  some  rather  mean  jealousy, 
and  that  he  realised  the  power  of  Potyomkin,  and 
flattered  him  unmercifully  in  order  to  get  on  in  the 
world.     If  he  had  looked  upon  Potyomkin  as  one  great 

1  Vorontsof  Archives,  296. 
^  Ibid,{804i.    See  further  the  letters  set  out,  post,  pp.  77,  81. 


m 


68  SUVOROF 

man  should  look  upon  another,  he  would  have  had  more 
respect  for  his  own  dignity  and  for  the  other  man's 
understanding  than  to  address  him  in  such  a  style. 
He  wrote  himself  down  to  the  level  of  Potyomkin. 
Neither  to  Platon  Zubof,  who  succeeded  Potyomkin 
in  the  favour  of  Catherine,  nor  to  Rumyantsof,  the 
only  other  soldier  of  his  day  whom  he  did  not  pass 
in  the  race  for  promotion,  did  he  ever  behave  with 
such  servility.  He  despised  Potyomkin's  capacity  as  a 
soldier,  at  the  same  time  that  he  understood  the  fatal 
consequences  of  his  jealousy  as  a  favourite,  and  so  long 
as  he  felt  his  own  prospects  insecure,  he  flattered  him 
in  a  style  which  really  degraded  one  man  as  much  as 
the  other.  Potyomkin,  on  his  side,  though  he  laughed 
at  Suvorof's  antics,  found  him  a  very  useful  instrument. 
The  man  was  an  admirable  soldier,  who  would  go  any- 
where and  do  anything,  and  would  never  be  a  rival  of 
his  own.  A  rupture  did  not  take  place  until  Suvorof 
was  strong  enough  to  stand  upon  his  own  feet ;  and  it 
was  to  Potyomkin's  favour  that  he  owed  the  opportunity 
of  his  greatest  triumphs.  It  is  not  pleasant  to  con- 
template a  society  in  which  a  man  must  play  the  lick- 
spittle for  years  to  get  the  chance  of  showing  himself  a 
hero  at  the  last. 

The  few  years  immediately  following  the  Pugatchyof 
rising  were  spent  by  Suvorof  in  work  of  a  less  exciting 
character.  During  the  greater  part  of  1775  he  com- 
manded about  80,000  men  in  the  disaffected  districts, 
and  had  charge  of  the  work  of  restoring  order.  In 
August  he  visited  Moscow  to  wind  up  the  affairs  of  his 
father,  who  had  just  died,  and  Catherine  appointed  him 
to  the  command  of  the  Petersburg  division.  This  was 
not  to  his  taste,  and  he  asked  for  a  year's  leave.  But 
events  in  the  south  soon  required  the  presence  of  an 
energetic  and  capable  officer,  and  at  the  end  of  November 
Potyomkin  sent  him  to  the  Crimea.  The  inhabitants 
of  this  district,  declared  by  the  treaty  of  peace  inde- 
pendent of  Turkey,  were  not  yet  reconciled  to  their 


FRONTIER  WORK  69 

new  state  of  dependence  on  Russia.  They  were  for  the 
most  part  Tartars,  nomad  tribes  who  covered  not  only 
the  country  west  and  south  of  the  Caspian,  but  also  the 
whole  sweep  of  fertile  but  uncultivated  land  from  the 
frontier  of  Poland  to  the  Black  Sea.i  They  were  cattle- 
breeders,  plunderers,  and  slave-traders,  with  many  of 
the  virtues  of  savages :  courage,  loyalty,  and  fidelity  to 
their  pledged  word  ;  but  intolerant  of  Western  and  even 
of  Slav  civilisation.  Among  the  Tartars  of  the  Crimea 
were  many  Greeks  and  Armenians,  in  whose  hands  were 
all  the  trade  and  industry  of  the  district.  Soon  after 
the  conclusion  of  peace  Russia  began  her  peaceful 
penetration  of  Tartar  territory.  The  centre  of  Tartary, 
so  far  as  such  a  loosely  organised  society  had  a  centre, 
was  in  the  Crimea.  To  control  the  Crimea  was  to  be 
at  least  the  predominant  power  among  the  tribes.  The 
Khan  of  the  Crimea,  Sahib  Girei,  was  deposed  by  the 
tribes  early  in  1775,  and  Devlet  Girei  was  chosen  in  his 
place.  Rumyantsof  produced  Shahin,  a  brother  of 
Sahib  Girei,  and  getting  the  support  of  some  of  the 
neighbouring  tribes,  began  to  work  by  persuasion, 
threats,  and  bribes  to  procure  his  acceptance  by  the 
rest. 

The  Tartars  were  soon  thoroughly  aroused,  and 
Turkey  began  to  insist  upon  the  literal  observance  of 
the  treaty.  The  Turkish  troops  were  not  withdrawn 
from  the  Crimea,  the  Pasha  of  Trebizond  threatened  an 
expedition,  the  frontier  forts  were  strengthened,  and 
Russian  couriers  were  sometimes  cut  off  on  the  roads 
by  parties  of  Tartars.  The  policy  of  permeation  had 
produced  the  desired,  or  at  least  the  expected,  result, 
and  20,000  Russian  troops  invaded  the  Crimea  in  the 
beginning  of  November  1776.  Suvorof  arrived  at  the 
end  of  the  month,  leaving  his  wife  and  infant  daughter 
at  Poltava.  He  took  charge  of  part  of  the  command 
of  Prince  Prozorovski.     In  March  1777  the  usurping 

^  There  is  a  very  graphic  account  of  the  Tartars  in  de  Tott's  Memoirs^ 
vols.  i.  and  ii. 


70  SUVOROF 

Shahin  Girei  appeared  in  the  Crimea.    Devlet  Girei  fled, 
and  the  new  Khan  was  proclaimed. 

Suvorof  was  soon  tired  of  policing  the  Crimea  and 
preparing  defences  against  the  Turks,  and  he  did  not 
like  Prozorovski.  His  fever  gave  him  an  excuse  for 
getting  leave  to  go  to  Poltava.  While  he  was  there, 
Shahin  Girei  forgot  the  pit  from  which  he  was  digged, 
and  in  October  the  Tartars  were  in  open  revolt  against 
their  new  Russian  masters.  Prozorovski  was  too 
lethargic,  the  discontent  spread  rapidly,  and  in  a  battle 
between  the  Tartars  and  the  Russian  troops  450  of 
the  latter  and  2000  of  the  former  were  killed  and 
wounded.  Rumyantsof  received  the  report  of  Prozo- 
rovski, found  no  mention  of  Suvorof  in  it,  and  asked 
the  reason.  Learning  with  great  indignation  of  his 
absence  at  Poltava,  he  forbade  Prozorovski  to  give  any 
leave  to  officers  of  the  frontier  troops,  and  ordered 
Suvorof  to  return  at  once  to  duty.  Suvorof  did  not 
disobey,  but  wrote  direct  to  Potyomkin  asking  for  a 
separate  command.  He  was  given  that  of  the  corps  of 
Kuban.  He  reached  Kuban  in  the  middle  of  January 
1778,  and  there  occupied  himself  with  the  ordinary 
duties  of  a  frontier  commander,  improving  the  defences, 
cutting  off  raiding  parties  of  nomads,  and  looking  after 
the  discipline,  training,  and  health  of  his  troops.  But 
he  was  also  something  of  a  diplomatist  in  this  field,  and 
his  primitive  habits,  ridiculous  or  disgusting  to  a  Euro- 
pean ambassador,  enabled  him  to  make  many  friends 
among  the  nomads.  The  Kuban  frontier  was  very 
quickly  set  in  order,  while  the  continued  incompetence 
of  Prozorovski  kept  the  Crimea  in  an  uproar.  In  April 
Prozorovski  was  ordered  home  on  leave,  and  Rumyantsof 
put  Suvorof  in  his  place. 

The  situation  had  changed  for  the  worse.  Not  only 
were  the  Tartars  thoroughly  discontented,  but  a  Turkish 
squadron  of  8  ships  was  hovering  in  the  neighbour- 
hood. To  Prozorovski  Suvorof  behaved  stiffly,  even 
with  insult.    He  did  not  visit  the  man  he  was  to  super- 


FRONTIER  WORK  71 

sede.  When  Prozorovski  sent  to  ask  for  an  interview, 
he  said  he  was  too  ill.  To  a  second  request  he  sent  the 
answer  that  he  was  out  at  dinner,  and  would  be  going 
next  day  to  visit  the  Khan.  Prozorovski  gave  up  the 
attempt  to  see  him,  sent  his  report  by  an  aide-de-camp, 
and  retired  from  the  Crimea.  Suvorof,  having  cleared 
the  ground  of  his  rival,  threw  himself  vehemently  into 
his  new  duties.  He  divided  the  peninsula  into  districts, 
increased  and  improved  the  defences  against  the  Turks, 
and  issued  detailed  instructions  to  his  garrisons  for  their 
feeding,  training,  health,  and  behaviour  towards  the 
Tartars.  With  the  Turkish  squadron  he  dealt  firmly. 
Some  of  its  seamen  had  landed  on  the  coast  and  killed 
a  Cossack.  Without  demanding  satisfaction,  Suvorof 
began  to  erect  batteries  at  the  mouth  of  the  gulf  in 
which  the  ships  lay.  In  reply  to  inquiries  what  this 
meant,  he  referred  politely  to  the  unhappy  accident 
which  had  caused  the  death  of  one  of  his  men,  and  went 
on  with  his  works.  After  three  days  the  Turkish  com- 
mander became  nervous,  beat  his  way  out  of  the  gulf  in 
the  face  of  an  unfavourable  wind,  and  anchored  outside. 
Another  and  a  much  larger  squadron  appeared  off  the 
coast  in  September.  Suvorof  strengthened  his  forts, 
increased  the  number  of  his  pickets  along  the  shore, 
and  refused  to  allow  the  Turks  to  land  even  for  food 
and  water.  Baffled  by  a  persistence  which  never  gave 
a  decent  excuse  for  violence,  the  whole  fleet  returned 
to  Constantinople  and  left  Suvorof  to  deal  with  the 
Tartars  by  themselves. 

The  most  difficult  part  of  his  task  was  the  removal 
of  the  Christian  population.  The  reason  for  this  step, 
unique  in  the  history  of  conquest  by  permeation,  was 
twofold.  The  Christian  colonists  would  be  useful  in 
populating  the  empty  districts  of  the  mainland,  in  case 
the  Crimea  should  for  any  reason  be  subsequently 
abandoned ;  and  as  the  Christian  tribute  formed  a 
large  part  of  the  revenues  of  the  Khan,  the  loss  of  it 
would  reduce  him  to  a  more  proper  condition  of  sub- 


72  SUVOROF 

missiveness  and  dependence  on  Russia.  Suvorof  was 
therefore  called  upon  to  transfer  some  thousands  of 
families  from  their  homes  to  a  distance  of  many  miles. 
It  was  a  task  of  enormous  difficulty,  requiring  a  vast 
number  of  ox-carts,  building  materials  for  the  new 
settlements,  supplies  of  food  for  the  journey,  and 
elaborate  measures  of  protection.  The  exodus  began  in 
the  face  of  protests  from  the  Khan,  and  in  default  of 
other  vehicles,  Suvorof  used  his  baggage  waggons  and 
the  private  carriages  of  his  officers.  In  the  second  half 
of  September  all  was  completed  ;  31,000  people  had 
been  transported  to  the  districts  between  the  rivers 
Berda  and  Kalmyus,  around  the  Sea  of  Azof,  and  along 
the  banks  of  the  Don.  It  was  impossible  that  such  a 
project  should  be  carried  out  without  great  suffering 
among  the  Christians  themselves.  Russian  transport 
and  Russian  organisation  of  supplies  are  always  bad, 
and  Suvorof  found  it  very  difficult  to  get  money.  In 
August  he  was  writing  frantically  to  Turtchaninof,  the 
Secretary  of  State : 

My  dear  Sir,  money,  money,  money ;  count  the  cost 
afterwards,  the  loss  won't  be  great.  .  .  .  We  must  com- 
pensate the  Christians.  .  .  .  Oh  my  dear  man,  it's  hard 
work ;  there's  not  a  bit  of  money  ;  I  would  gladly 
pledge  all  my  villages  ;  nobody  to  lend.  I'm  afraid 
the  enterprise  will  come  to  a  standstill.^ 

Six  months  after  the  completion  of  the  work  he  wrote 
to  Potyomkin  : 

The  Crimean  people  are  suffering  in  their  present 
situation  from  the  want  of  many  things  ;  look  with  a 
merciful  eye  on  those  who  have  sacrificed  so  much  for 
the  throne  ;  sweeten  the  bitterness  of  their  recollections.^ 

In  truth,  81,000  men,  women,  and  children  cannot 
be  moved  like  cattle  in  a  few  weeks  without  much 
hardship  ;    and  the  situation  of  these  wretched  Greeks 

1  Otyechestvenniya  Zapiski  (1824),  379,  382. 
*  Voronisof  Archives^  xxiv.  294. 


FRONTIER  WORK  73 

and  Armenians,  settled,  at  the  beginning  of  a  Russian 
winter,  in  an  unprepared  country,  at  the  mercy  of 
fraudulent  and  corrupt  contractors,  must  have  been 
beyond  description.  Suvorof  s  own  part  had  been  per- 
formed with  as  much  humanity  as  was  consistent  with 
speed,  and  the  Empress,  whose  feelings  were  not  much 
affected  by  the  tribulations  of  a  parcel  of  living  movables, 
praised  him  for  his  efficiency.  He  heard  of  this  from 
Turtchaninof,  and  wrote  one  of  his  overflowing  letters 
in  reply : 

Almighty  God  !  How  can  I  answer  your  letter  of 
the  1st  September  ?  Mere  gratitude  of  any  sort  is  too 
little ;  mine  is  without  bounds  !  No,  the  sacrifice  of 
myself  ;  the  last  drop  of  my  poor  blood  poured  out  on 
the  altars  of  the  all-gracious  Mother  could  not  repay  it. 
I  forget  my  wife,  in  the  agony  of  her  illness,  my  little 
girl,  myself  !  I  remember  myself  in  the  service  of  her 
Highness  alone,  wherever  it  may  be,  even  in  the  depths 
of  the  ocean.     God  give  me  strength  !  ^ 

In  January  1779  he  went  to  see  his  sick  wife  at 
Poltava.  But  he  stayed  there  only  ten  days,  and  after 
a  circuitous  journey  was  back  again  in  the  Crimea  in 
February.  In  March  Russia  and  Turkey  signed  a  new 
convention.  Turkey  recognised  Shahin  Girei,  and  the 
bulk  of  the  Russian  troops  were  withdrawn  from  the 
Crimea,  leaving  a  garrison  of  only  6000  men.  At  the 
end  of  July  Suvorof  was  once  more  free  and  returned 
to  Poltava.  There  he  stayed  for  a  few  months,  it  is 
not  known  in  what  sort  of  activity,  but  probably 
fretting  at  the  absence  of  important  work  and  quarrelling 
with  his  wife.  In  September  he  went  so  far  as  to  prepare 
a  case  for  a  divorce,  and  Varvara  Ivanovna  went  to 
Moscow.^ 

At  the  end  of  the  year  he  was  summoned  to  Peters- 

1  Otyechestvenniya  Zapiski  (1824),  387.  He  was  still  suffering  from 
fever,  and  his  wife  had  also  fallen  ill  of  it.  Ibid.  391.  See  also  his 
letters  to  Turtchaninof  in  Russkaya  Starina  (1900),  cii.  303  et  seq. 

*  Pyetrushevski. 


74  SUVOROF 

burg.  There  he  found  the  Empress  and  Potyomkin  full 
of  a  new  project.  England  and  France  were  now  at 
grips  in  India,  and  Potyomkin  thought  it  might  be 
possible  to  open  an  overland  route  for  the  trade  which 
would  fall  from  the  hands  of  England.  With  the 
jewelled  star  of  the  Order  of  St.  Alexander  Nevski, 
Suvorof  was  sent  to  Astrakhan.  There  he  was  to  estab- 
lish order  among  the  frontier  tribes  near  the  Caspian 
Sea.  He  set  off  in  the  good  spirits  with  which  he  always 
entered  on  a  new  piece  of  work,  taking  his  wife  with 
him  from  Moscow.  He  reached  Astrakhan  on  the  4th 
February.  But  the  whole  scheme  was  soon  shown  to 
be  a  mere  bubble.  Whatever  misfortunes  England 
might  experience  in  America,  she  remained  mistress  of 
India,  and  Suvorof  found  himself  once  more  reduced  to 
idleness  and  insignificance.     He  began  as  usual  to  fret. 

He  was  harassed  in  particular  by  three  things : 
Yakobi,  the  Governor  of  Astrakhan,  his  own  wife,  and 
some  writers  of  pasquinades.  The  Governor  was  left 
in  complete  independence  of  Suvorof,  and  as  usual  the 
latter  showed  signs  of  jealousy.  They  held  the  same 
rank,  that  of  Lieutenant-General,  but  the  Governor, 
not  unreasonably,  received  special  honours  in  his  own 
province.  At  one  dinner  Suvorof  was  punctual,  Yakobi 
late,  and  the  orchestra  began  to  play  as  soon  as  the 
Governor  came  in.  Suvorof  stalked  about  impatiently, 
and  condemned  the  dinner  as  cold,  over-cooked,  warmed- 
up.  As  soon  as  it  was  finished,  he  thrust  his  hand  out 
to  a  doctor,  who  was  among  the  guests,  and  begged 
him  to  feel  his  pulse.  "  I  have  not  dined  so  late  for 
years,**  he  said.  Yakobi,  who  seems  to  have  behaved 
like  a  gentleman  on  all  occasions,  was  obviously  offended, 
but  suppressed  his  feelings  and  went  home.  He  prob- 
ably knew  the  better  side  of  Suvorof,  and  their  official 
correspondence  shows  no  sign  of  any  serious  discord.^ 

Suvorof  and  his  wife  appear  at  Astrakhan  in  one  of 
the  very  few  definitely  recorded  scenes  of  their  joint 

1  Russ.  Star.  (1000),  cii.  520,  621. 


FRONTIER  WORK  75 

life.  They  came  to  church  to  make  a  solemn  recon- 
ciliation. He  wore  a  plain  uniform,  and  she  the  dress 
of  a  woman  of  the  people.  They  took  communion 
together  and  embraced  each  other  with  tears  in  the 
presence  of  the  priest.  But  the  ceremony  had  no  lasting 
effect,  and  their  relations  were  soon  as  bad  as  ever.^ 
Nothing  made  him  amiable  but  hard  work,  and  nothing 
made  her  happy  except  the  gaiety  of  a  capital  city.  At 
Astrakhan  they  bored  themselves  and  each  other. 

One  of  his  letters  to  Turtchaninof  contains  a  long 
complaint : 

Many  babies  have  been  raised  to  the  same  rank  as 
myself.  .  .  .  Pr[ozorovski],  bedecorated  for  his  numer- 
ous victories,  sends  to  me  the  rumour  that  I  should 
have  been  punished  if  I  hadn't  performed  this  duty 
thoroughly.  .  .  .  K[amyenski]  in  the  full  tide  of  victory 
promises  to  shoot  me  if  I  don't  win,  and  for  his  heroism 
gets  this  and  that  and  I  not  a  kind  word,  and  so  for 
Hirsof — instead  of  the  first  class  according  to  the  rules, 
although  my  victories  resound  everywhere,  like  Don- 
quixotism.  I  can't,  my  honoured  friend,  hide  the  fact 
that  when  I  betook  myself  to  the  society  of  brigands 
from  the  Ural  Steppe,  after  my  triumphant  pacification, 
I  expected  the  St.  Anne  for  myself ;  many  people  got 
swords,  I  should  have  been  content  with  the  Order  !  ^ 

This  rehearsal  of  old  grievances  was  flung  gratuitously 
into  the  midst  of  a  long  letter  about  the  transfer  of  the 
Christian  population  of  the  Crimea  and  other  matters 
of  serious  importance.  The  same  egoism  appears  in 
his  constant  references  to  the  attacks  of  pamphleteers 
which  he  experienced  in  Astrakhan. 

These  writers  of  pasquinades  were  a  new  phenomenon 
in  Suvorof 's  life.  Who  they  were  is  not  clear,  and  what 
they  wrote  only  appears  from  his  protests.  Probably 
neither  their  personalities  nor  their  performances  merited 
the  attention  of  a  man  of  sense.  But  Suvorof,  great 
man  as  he  was  to  show  himself,  was  abnormally  sensitive 

1  Russ.  Arkh.  (1872),  146. 

2  Russ.  Star.  (1900),  cii.  305. 


76  SUVOROF 

of  innuendo  and  insult,  and  his  outcry  at  Astrakhan  was 
ridiculously  shrill.  To  Turtchaninof  he  wrote  a  large 
number  of  formal  letters,  and  into  these  he  thrust  all 
sorts  of  irrelevant  references  to  the  pamphleteers.  Thus 
on  the  22nd  March  he  bade  the  Secretary  of  State 

Lament  for  poor  Varvara  Ivanovna  ;  who  is  dearer  to 
me  than  my  life,  or  else  God  will  condemn  you  I  Seeing 
her  condition,  I  cannot  staunch  my  tears.  Defend  her 
honour.  Save  the  honour  of  the  most  trustworthy  slave 
of  our  Mother,  now  almost  forty  years  in  the  service  of 
his  country.     Almighty  God  be  your  helper.^ 

Sending  Easter  greetings  to  Turtchaninof  and  his 
wife  in  May,  he  wrote  : 

I  have  the  honour  to  wish  you  many  happy  returns 
of  the  feast  which  is  past,  and  henceforth  I  wish  you 
joy  and  health  continuously  for  countless  years  to  come, 
and  to  live  them  in  joy — many  happy  returns  of  the 
day  !  .  .  .  I  only  beg  the  Creator  that  he  send  you  all 
blessings,  as  many  as  may  be,  for  your  kindness  and 
your  benevolence.  And  as  for  the  damned  traducer, 
please,  little  father,  Pyotr  Ivanovitch,  try  for  God's 
sake  to  roast  him  quickly.     With  this  I  conclude.^ 

In  more  than  one  of  these  letters  he  inserted  the 
words,  "  Remember  the  shameless  !  "  It  is  true  that 
Turtchaninof  was  on  intimate  terms  with  him,  and  was 
"  like  father  and  mother "  to  his  little  daughter  in 
Petersburg.^  But  the  same  lamentations  occur  in  letters 
to  Potyomkin  and  even  Panin.  To  the  former  he 
wrote,  setting  out  in  a  hurried,  almost  unintelligible 
style  what  the  libels  were : 

This — ^that  he  will  go  to  conquer  P[ersia].  I  only 
boast  that  I  have  served  nearly  forty  years  without 
reproach.  I  advised  Khur  about  contributions,  asked 
money  from  your  Excellency,  calculated  my  income  ; 
at  this  time  they  are  not  necessary  for  me  or  my  children. 
I  demanded  pretty  girls  from  Kh.,  a  disgraceful  story ; 

1  Rus8,  Star.  (1900),  cii.  307.  ^  lUd.  310.  ^  /jj-^.  311, 


FRONTIER  WORK  77 

I  know  nothing  of  it  except  in  marriage,  and  that  is 
why  I  make  such  a  defence  of  my  honour.  Per.  fine 
horses.  My  travelHng  expenses  most  luxurious.  There's 
no  chest  for  them.  All  sorts  of  extravagance,  diamonds 
from  the  highest  hands  in  the  World,  and  tissues  from 
India.  I  really  didn't  know  I  had  any.  And  so  forth. 
There's  a  triumvirate  of  pasquinaders  here  ;  A  Siberian, 
an  Armenian — Minai  Stepanof ,  and  a  Tartar — Imangulof . 
I  regard  this  stupid  meanness  with  contempt,  out  of 
the  respect  of  my  unshakable  spirit  for  your  Serenity. 
I  trust  that  you,  most  Serene  Prince,  will  view  this 
beastliness  with  no  less  disgust,  and,  for  the  sake  of 
the  gratification  I  have  given  your  Serenity's  august 
authority,  will  now  and  henceforward  graciously  tear  up 
all  such  criminal  publications,  protect  these  tried  servants 
of  your  great  Empress,  and  console  me,  who  am  ap- 
proaching old  age  and  death,  with  your  renowned  sense 
of  justice,  so  that  I  on  my  translation  from  this  world, 
may  present  to  Almighty  God  a  fitting  plea  of  inter- 
cession on  your  behalf.^ 

Even  Potyomkin  can  hardly  have  stomached  the 
concluding  paragraph.  The  last  billow  of  this  storm  in 
a  tea-cup  broke  over  the  head  of  Count  Peter  Panin. 
On  the  4th  June  the  frantic  victim  wrote  to  him  : 

My  stoical  letter  of  the  last  post,  with  the  postscript 
about  the  pasquilles  against  me  under  the  name  of 
Thet.  X.  must  have  reached  you,  my  dear  Sir ;  so 
patiently  I  await  your  answer  to  it,  especially  because 
I  have  not  had  a  letter  from  you  for  more  than  a  month. 
Honoured  friend,  make  yourself  half  a  quarter  of  an 
hour  to  dwell  in  thought  upon  my  depression  ;  all  those 
flattering  meteors  will  vanish,  melancholy  is  the  only 
nourishment  of  my  soul.^ 

Only  eight  days  later  he  was  writing  to  his  kinsman 
Khvostof,  exhorting  him  to  the  sternest  of  virtues  : 

I  remind  you  that  you  should  follow  Aristides  in 
rectitude,  Fabriciana  in  temperance,  Epaminondas  in 

1  Voronis.  ArkhiVy  xxiv.  312. 
*  Ihid.  323. 


78  SUVOROF 

truthfulness,  Cato  in  brevity,  Julius  Caesar  in  speed, 
Turenne  in  constancy,  Laudon  in  morals.^ 

He  played  more  parts  than  most  of  us,  and  there 
were  even  moments  when  he  achieved  brevity.  But  as 
a  rule,  his  nature  ran  away  from  his  examples,  and  it 
was  only  in  the  field  that  he  resembled  his  classical 
heroes  for  more  than  a  few  minutes  together.  The 
contrast  between  his  precepts  and  his  practice  was  never 
more  remarkably  illustrated  than  during  his  stay  in 
Astrakhan. 

Nevertheless,  his  life  was  not  an  unbroken  succession 
of  pangs  of  this  kind.  He  lived  in  a  gentleman's  house, 
and  could  be  seen  any  day,  walking  about  the  streets 
and  gardens,  giving  nuts  and  gingerbreads  to  children, 
and  behaving  for  the  greater  part  of  his  time  like  a 
reasonable  and  good-natured  man.  It  is  on  record  that 
he  stood  sponsor  to  a  Kalmuk  who  wished  to  be  baptized, 
and  took  no  small  pains  to  give  the  man  some  practical 
assistance.  No  other  details  of  his  life  have  been  pre- 
served. But  it  would  not  be  difficult  to  reconstruct  it 
from  what  is  more  definitely  known  of  him  in  later 
years,  when  his  littleness  and  jealousy  and  ill-humour 
were  no  less  conspicuous.  To  children  and  animals  he 
was  uniformly  kind,  and  if  he  was  often  angry  with  his 
inferiors,  it  was  only  by  fits.  Even  at  Astrakhan  he 
probably  passed  the  greater  part  of  his  time  in  happiness. 

On  the  11th  January  1782  he  received  orders  from 
Potyomkin  to  proceed  to  Kazan,  where  he  remained  until 
the  end  of  the  following  August.  By  that  time  the  Crimea 
was  once  more  in  a  state  of  unrest,  and  he  was  told  to 
take  over  the  command  of  the  troops  there  from  Count 
de  Balmaine.  Shahin  Girei  was  threatened  with  deposi- 
tion, this  time  in  favour  of  another  brother,  Arslan 
Girei.  He  had  fled  to  the  protection  of  de  Balmaine 
and  liis  army,  returned  at  their  head,  and  remained  in 
the  Crimea.     Here  Suvorof  came,  only  to  be  at  once 

1  Martchenko,  Suvorof  in  his  Autographs. 


FRONTIER  WORK  79 

transferred  to  the  river  Kuban.  This  was  the  extreme 
boundary  of  Russian  territory  on  the  side  of  the  Caucasus, 
and  he  was  entrusted  with  the  duty  of  maintaining 
order  and  establishing  Russian  ascendancy  among  the 
Tartars  of  that  region.  This  was  quite  to  his  taste. 
At  Yeisk,  on  the  eastern  shore  of  the  Sea  of  Azov,  he 
entertained  3000  of  the  nomads,  and  found  it  easy  to 
get  on  to  good  terms.  In  April  1783  Catherine  issued 
a  manifesto,  taking  the  Crimea,  Taman,  and  Kaman 
under  her  protection,  and  on  the  9th  July  Suvorof  held 
a  great  assembly  of  Tartars  to  swear  allegiance  to  their 
new  overlord.  The  Steppe  around  Yeisk  was  covered 
with  the  round  wicker-walled,  felt-roofed  tents  of  some 
6000  Tartars.  Russian  troops  were  on  their  guard,  but 
refrained  from  any  threatening  demonstrations.  The 
leaders  among  the  Tartars  were  summoned  to  an  open 
space,  they  listened  to  the  reading  of  Shahin  Girei*s 
renunciation  of  his  rights,  and  took  the  oath  to  Catherine. 
Dispersing  among  the  tents,  they  took  similar  oaths 
from  their  personal  followers.  There  followed  a  colossal 
banquet.  It  lasted  three  days,  and  in  the  course  of  it 
there  disappeared  100  oxen,  800  sheep,  a  large  quantity 
of  other  solids,  and  1250  gallons  of  vodka.  It  is  recorded, 
and  the  fact  is  not  at  all  improbable,  that  this  display 
of  loyalty  was  too  much  for  the  Tartars,  and  many  of 
them  paid  for  their  devotion  with  their  lives.-  On  the 
11th  July  the  guests  dispersed,  full  of  enthusiasm  for  a 
monarch  who  treated  her  subjects  in  this  lavish  style, 
and  a  few  weeks  later  Suvorof  received  from  Catherine 
the  Order  of  St.  Vladimir  of  the  first  class. 

Nevertheless,  this  formal  allegiance  did  not  prevent 
the  nomads  from  raiding  the  Don  territory  and  giving 
shelter  to  deserters  and  fugitives  from  justice.  Turkey 
was  not  slow  to  take  advantage  of  any  tendency  to 
resent  Russian  control,  and  Shahin  Girei  began  to  repent 
of  his  abdication.  To  avoid  an  outbreak  on  a  large 
scale,  Potyomkin  and  Suvorof  encouraged  a  half -formed 
desire  of  the  Tartars  to  migrate  to  the  Ural  Steppe, 


80  SUVOROF 

further  north,  and  pressure  was  applied  to  those  tribes 
who  would  not  go  of  their  own  will.  A  chain  of  posts 
was  stretched  from  Yeisk  along  the  Don,  and  to  the 
east  of  this  the  groups  of  men  and  herds  were  carefully 
shepherded  towards  the  Volga.  On  the  11th  August 
there  was  a  serious  fight  60  miles  to  the  north-east  of 
Yeisk.  The  Tartars  fell  upon  a  Russian  post,  Suvorof 
with  reinforcements  came  up,  and  after  a  vain  attempt 
at  persuasion,  attacked  them  fiercely.  There  followed 
a  massacre  of  the  brave  but  disorganised  barbarians. 
About  3000  were  killed,  and  the  Tartars  themselves 
killed  a  large  number  of  their  women  and  flung  their 
children  into  the  river  Eya.  Only  60  old  men,  women, 
and  children  were  taken  prisoner.  The  bulk  of  the 
cattle  and  horses,  estimated  at  20,000  head,  were  also 
captured,  and  deprived  of  these,  many  of  the  nomads 
who  escaped  from  the  field  perished  miserably  of 
hunger  on  the  Steppe.  The  advance  of  civilisation 
seems  often  to  be  accompanied  by  the  sacrifice  of  an 
unnecessary  number  of  minor  actors  in  the  great  comedy. 
This  untoward  incident  spoiled  the  whole  project  of 
transferring  the  Tartars  to  the  Ural  country.  A  general 
revolt  began  among  those  who  remained  near  the  Kuban, 
and  an  attack  was  actually  made  upon  Yeisk  itself. 
Suvorof  returning  swiftly  from  the  north,  the  raiders 
crossed  the  river.  An  attempt  to  arrest  Shahin  Girei 
failed,  and  Potyomkin,  showing  great  irritation,  ordered 
Suvorof  to  follow  him  beyond  the  Kuban.  On  the 
30th  September  an  expedition,  consisting  of  16  com- 
panies of  infantry,  16  squadrons  of  dragoons  and  as 
many  of  Cossacks,  and  16  guns,  left  Kopuil.  Suvorof 
ostentatiously  proclaimed  his  intention  of  going  to 
Poltava,  where  troops  were  to  be  concentrated  for  a 
threatened  war  with  Austria.  In  fact,  he  marched  east- 
wards along  the  right  bank  of  the  Kuban,  generally  by 
night,  and  over  such  difficult  ground  that  in  10  days 
he  covered  no  more  than  80  miles.  On  the  10th  October 
he  forded  the  river  at  its  junction  with  the  Laba,  the 


• 


FRONTIER  WORK  81 

infantry  up  to  their  necks  in  water  and  the  cavalry 
carrying  the  reserve  ammunition  and  baggage  slung 
between  each  pair  of  horses.  Eight  miles  beyond  the 
Kuban  they  fell  upon  a  large  body  of  Tartars,  near  the 
village  of  Kermentchik.  The  Russians  were  exhausted, 
but  the  nomads  were  completely  unprepared  ;  and  in 
a  running  fight  over  a  distance  of  6  miles  4000  of  them 
were  killed.  On  this  occasion  the  trophies  were  700 
men,  women,  and  children,  6000  cattle,  and  15,000  sheep. 
The  punitive  expedition,  after  an  exhausting  march, 
reached  Yeisk  at  the  end  of  October. ^  It  was  not  until 
the  autumn  of  1784  that  the  recalcitrant  Shahin  Girei 
made  his  final  submission,  induced  as  much  by  the 
promise  of  a  yearly  pension  of  200,000  roubles,  as  by 
the  threat  of  further  military  operations. 

Suvorof  had  left  Kuban  in  April,  and  went  by  way 
of  Moscow  to  Petersburg.  What  he  did  there  for  the 
next  few  months  is  not  known.  His  name  appears 
occasionally  in  the  correspondence  of  Turtchaninof  with 
Potyomkin,  but  not  in  connection  with  anything  worthy 
of  note.  The  only  living  pictures  of  him  in  this  period 
are  painted  by  himself  in  his  letters.  On  the  21st 
December  he  wrote  to  Potyomkin  this  strange  epistle  : 

Illustrious  Prince  and  dear  Sir  —  With  the 
approach  of  the  New  Year  I  most  humbly  greet  your 
Serene  Highness. 

The  year  which  is  now  expiring  I  have  passed  in  a 
village,  among  a  few  soldiers,  in  the  expectation  of 
receiving  from  your  Serene  Highness  some  special  com- 
mand of  my  own,  as  I  have  usually  commanded  a 
division  or  a  corps  ;  especially.  Dear  Sir,  there  is  a 
vacancy  for  me  in  the  Brusova  or  Ryenin  division. 
In  the  direction  of  the  first  are  some  villages  of  my  own. 
But  it  does  not  matter,  illustrious  Prince  !  where  I 
receive  from  your  Serene  Highness'  gracious  kindness  a 
special  command — even  in  Kamtchatka. 

1  Campagnes,  ii.  165  et  seq.  Suvorof  s  work  among  the  Tartars  is 
the  subject  of  several  papers  in  the  Don  Military  News  (Donskiya 
Voyenniya  Vyedomostyi),  to  which  I  was  unable  to  get  access. 

G 


82  SUVOROF 

In  my  spare  time,  I  have  bought  92  souls  with  a  bill 
of  exchange,  which  I  shall  discharge  in  two  years.  I 
have  left  behind  in  Kuban  savings  of  more  than  100,000 
roubles,  and  in  my  short  stay  salary  for  four  months. 
There's  my  avarice. 

At  Kopuil  the  commander  was  not  Filisof  but  Nikolai 
Rachmanof — on  to  the  field  with  a  regiment,  off  it  with 
a  battalion  (I  did  not  waste  so  many  men  in  proportion 
in  one  year  of  my  service) — and  he  composed  pasquilles 
against  me. 

I  have  served,  Dear  Sir!  more  than  40  years,  and  I 
am  almost  60  ;  my  one  wish  is  to  end  my  most  honour- 
able service  sword  in  hand.  My  long  stay  in  the  lower 
ranks  got  me  a  roughness  of  habit,  though  it  left  me 
with  a  spotless  heart,  and  deprived  me  of  all  acquaint- 
ance with  polished  manners  ;  living  all  my  life  in  the 
field,  I  was  late  in  accustoming  myself  to  them.  Study 
enlightened  me  in  virtue ;  I  lie  like  Epaminondas,  fly 
like  Caesar  ;  I  am  constant  as  Turenne  and  straightfor- 
ward as  Aristides  ;  not  understanding  the  devious  ways 
of  flattery  and  adulation,  I  am  often  displeasing  to  my 
superiors.  I  have  broken  my  word  to  none  of  my 
enemies,  I  have  been  happy,  because  I  have  ordained 
happiness. 

Give  peace  to  the  mind  of  one  not  guilty  before 
you — for  that  I  will  answer  before  the  Dread  Divine 
Tribunal — and  grant  me  a  separate  command.  Pluck 
me  out  of  idleness,  but  do  not  imagine  therefore  that 
I  have  been  in  the  least  dissatisfied  with  Count  Ivan 
Petrovitch,  only  that  I  cannot  live  in  luxury.  In  a 
strange  land — and  in  idleness,  too. 

I  trust  in  the  gracious  kindness  of  your  Serene  High- 
ness, and  will  be  to  my  death  with  the  profoundest 
respect,  etc.^ 

The  request  was  granted,  and  in  1785  Suvorof  re- 
ceived the  command  of  the  Petersburg  division.  But 
for  that  fact  as  little  is  known  of  his  life  in  the  north 
after  the  date  of  the  letter  as  before  it.  He  emerges 
into  the  light  only  in  October,  when  he  was  promoted 
to  the  rank  of  General-in-Chief  and  was  given  the 
command  of  the  troops  at  Krementchug.  In  1786  he 
1  Vorontsof  Archives^  xxiv. 


FRONTIER  WORK  83 

wrote  the  Autobiography  which  is  still  preserved  in  the 
Imperial  Library  in  Petrograd.  In  1787  he  was  seen 
among  the  men  who  surrounded  Catherine  during  her 
triumphal  progress  through  her  newly  acquired  terri- 
tories. The  task  of  settling  and  organising  these  natur- 
ally rich  but  hitherto  undeveloped  districts  had  been 
entrusted  to  Potyomkin,  and  since  the  treaty  of  Kutchuk- 
Kainardzhi  his  principal  task  had  been  the  establish- 
ment of  colonists,  the  planning  of  towns,  and  the 
erection  of  fortifications  in  "  New  Russia."  In  January 
1787  the  Empress  set  out  from  Petersburg  with  a  train 
of  14  carriages  and  120  sledges.  At  each  station  she 
found  560  fresh  horses;  during  the  darkness  the  road 
was  illuminated  by  huge  bonfires  at  every  hundred 
yards ;  the  inhabitants  of  the  towns  and  villages  along 
the  route  welcomed  her  with  cheers,  the  ringing  of 
church  bells,  and  shots  from  cannon.  At  Kief,  almost 
at  the  limit  of  her  old  dominions,  she  stayed  for  three 
months  ;  and  in  the  spring  she  proceeded  by  water, 
with  a  fleet  of  80  barges,  through  the  lands  which  her 
favourite  had  been  arranging  for  the  past  twelve  years. 
She  visited  Krementchug,  Potyomkin' s  new  town  of 
Kherson,  Sevastopol,  Simferopol,  and  Kafan,  and  re- 
turned by  way  of  Poltava  and  Moscow  to  the  capital. 

At  Kanyef  she  had  met  the  King  of  Poland  and  the 
Emperor  Joseph  II.,  and  at  Kief  she  was  visited  by  an 
enormous  number  of  foreign  magnates  of  every  nation. 
Against  this  gorgeous  background  of  palaces  and 
courtiers,  fireworks,  triumphal  arches,  music,  and  feast- 
ing we  are  furnished  with  one  or  two  glimpses  of  the 
ungraceful  figure  of  Suvorof .  The  French  Ambassador, 
the  Comte  de  Segur,  made  notes  of  him,  as  of  every 
other  unusual  incident.  "  Is  it  true,'*  he  asked  him, 
"  that  when  you're  with  the  army  you  never  go  to 
sleep  ?  "  "Oh  yes,"  replied  Suvorof ;  "  I  hate  idleness. 
To  prevent  myself  from  going  to  sleep,  I  always  keep 
a  very  punctual  cock  in  my  tent.  But  sometimes, 
when  I'm  lazy  and  want  to  rest  in  real  comfort,   I 


84  SUVOROF 

take  off  one  of  my  spurs."  ^  Another  Frenchman 
encountered  Suvorof  in  a  less  frivolous  mood.  This  was 
Colonel  Lameth.  Meeting  him  in  the  street,  Suvorof 
accosted  him  in  his  most  abrupt  style,  "  What's 
your  nationality  ? "  Lameth,  not  a  little  surprised, 
answered  urbanely,  "French.'*  There  followed  a  series 
of  demands.  "  Calling  ?  "  —  "  Soldier."  "  Rank  ?  " 
—  "  Colonel."  "  Name  ?  "  —  "  Alexander  Lameth." 
"  Good  !  "  and  Suvorof  turned  to  go.  But  Lameth  got 
in  front  of  him  and  opened  fire  in  his  turn.  "  What's 
your  nationality  ? "  "  Russian,"  replied  Suvorof. 
"  Calling  ?  "  —  "  Soldier."  "  Rank  ?  "  —  "  General." 
"  Name  ?  "— "  Suvorof."  "  Good  !  "  Whereupon  both 
laughed,  and  they  remained  on  good  terms  for  the  rest 
of  their  stay  in  Kief .^  For  the  rest,  no  doubt  he  devoted 
himself  to  keeping  his  men  fit,  sneering  at  his  professional 
rivals,  paying  court  to  Potyomkin,  and  sniffing  the 
rumours  of  fresh  wars,  which  came  blowing  from  the 
Balkans. 

1  De  S6gur,  M&moireSt  iii. 
«  Ibid, 


CHAPTER  V 

THE    SECOND   TURKISH   WAR 

Alliance  of  Russia  and  Austria  against  Turkey — Outbreak  of  war,  1787 
— Suvorof  at  Kinburn — ^Battle  at  Kinburn,  1787 — Suvorof  wounded 
— Attack  from  the  sea,  1788 — Siege  of  Otchakof — Letter  to  his 
daughter — ^Difference  with  Potyomkin — Suvorof  in  Moldavia,  1789 
Battle  of  Fokshani — Battle  of  the  Ruimnik — ^Rewards — Correspond- 
ence— Fruitless  campaign  of  1790 — The  amiable  Coburg — The 
storm  of  Izmail — Alienation  of  Potyomkin — Peace  with  Turkey. 

The  Peace  of  Kutchuk-Kainardzhi  proved  to  be  no  more 
than  an  armistice.  The  recognition  of  the  independence 
of  the  Crimea  was  from  the  day  of  the  signature  of  the 
treaty  a  mere  form,  and  as  the  Russian  hold  upon 
the  lost  province  was  steadily  tightened  the  restlessness 
of  the  Porte  increased.  Catherine's  triumphal  progress 
was  the  final  outrage,  and  the  whispers  of  her  European 
enemies  found  the  Turk  a  ready  listener.  The  Asiatic 
bandits  were  once  more  employed  for  the  ulterior  pur- 
poses of  civilised  European  States.  England  and  Prussia 
on  this  occasion  joined  with  France  to  incite  Turkey 
against  the  growing  power  of  Russia,  while  Sweden 
also  adopted  a  menacing  attitude  in  the  north.  The 
possibility  of  an  Austro-Russian  alliance  precipitated 
the  crisis.  The  growing  harmony  between  Catherine 
and  Joseph  II.  threatened  Turkey  with  a  partition  re- 
sembling that  of  Poland,  and  in  the  hope  of  anticipating 
an  aggressive  alliance,  Turkey  flung  out  a  formal  declara- 
tion of  war  on  the  24th  August  1787. 

This  came  too  late  to  prevent  the  union  of  the  two 
Christian  States,  and  Austria  prepared  for  an  attack 

86 


86  SUVOROF 

across  the  Danube  and  the  Carpathians,  while  the 
Russian  troops  were  collected  for  a  new  invasion  of 
Moldavia.  One  army,  that  of  the  Ukraine,  under 
Rumyantsof,  was  intended  to  act  as  a  guard  over 
Poland,  and  at  the  same  time  unite  the  active  army 
with  the  Austrians.  The  second  army,  that  of  Ekater- 
inoslav,  was  commanded  by  Potyomkin.  Its  plan  was 
to  march,  by  way  of  Otchakof,  across  the  Dnyestr 
and  the  Prut  to  the  Danube.  Suvorof's  sphere  of 
operations  was  the  Crimea,  where  he  commanded  20 
battalions  of  infantry  and  38  squadrons  of  cavalry. 
His  was  in  fact  the  post  of  danger.  His  fortress  of 
Kinburn  lay  on  a  narrow  peninsula  immediately  opposite 
Otchakof,  and  every  year  a  Turkish  squadron  sailed 
between  the  two  places.  On  the  18th  August,  before 
the  actual  declaration  of  war,  the  Turkish  commander 
at  Otchakof  informed  a  Russian  officer  from  Kinburn 
that  a  state  of  war  existed,  and  the  next  day  a 
brisk  but  indecisive  little  action  took  place  in  the 
narrow  gulf.  Even  after  this  general  hostilities  were 
avoided,  but  Suvorof,  finding  a  Turkish  squadron  lying 
dangerously  near  Kherson,  at  the  extreme  eastern  end 
of  the  same  gulf,  compelled  it  to  withdraw  by  throwing 
up  batteries  which  threatened  to  cut  the  Turks  off 
from  the  open  sea.  The  gallant  behaviour  of  a  Maltese 
named  Lombardo,  commanding  one  ship  of  the  Russian 
flotilla,  practically  compelled  the  whole  Turkish  fleet  to 
retreat  upon  Otchakof.  Suvorof's  own  work,  during 
the  few  weeks  preceding  and  following  the  declaration 
of  war,  consisted  in  visiting  the  different  parts  of  his 
district.  The  slovenliness  and  corruption  of  the  Turkish 
Government  had  progressively  increased  since  the  last 
war,  and  if  the  Russians  were  slow  in  collecting  their 
energies  for  the  struggle,  the  Turks  were  even  worse.^ 

1  There  is  a  good  contemporary  account  of  the  state  of  Turkey  in 
Volney's  Consid^ations  sur  la  guerre  actuelle  des  Turcs.  The  author, 
a  resident  in  Turkey,  takes  a  Gladstonian  view  of  the  Turks  and  the 
maintenance  of  them  as  necessary  to  the  European  balance  of  power. 
See  also  de  Tott's  M6moires. 


THE  SECOND  TURKISH  WAR         87 

It  was  not  until  the  end  of  September  that  the  Turkish 
dispositions  became  dangerous,  and  he  hurried  to  Kin- 
burn,  their  obvious  objective. 

For  the  delay  on  the  Russian  side  Potyomkin  was 
lespon^ible.  The  proper  method  of  defending  Kinburn 
was  an  attack  on  Otchakof.  But  Potyomkin  was  im- 
mersed in  lethargy,  and  his  overflowing  confidence  re- 
ceived a  great  shock  in  the  crippling  of  the  Sevastopol 
flfjet  by  a  storm.  So  complete  was  his  moral  overthrow 
tliat  he  thought  of  evacuating  the  Crimea,  and  even 
asked  leave  to  resign  his  command  and  go  to  Petersburg. 
"  Did  the  wind  blow  only  on  the  Russians  ?  "  asked 
Catherine,  and  told  him  he  had  no  more  endurance  than 
a  five-year-old  child.  But  her  sarcasm  failed  to  arouse 
him  in  time  to  rescue  Suvorof.^  Fortunately,  Suvorof 
was  the  last  man  in  the  world  to  look  for  salvation 
elsewhere  than  in  himself.  From  the  29th  September 
to  the  1st  October  the  Turks  bombarded  Kinburn  with 
great  vigour,  and  about  9  o'clock  on  the  morning  of 
the  last  day,  they  began  to  land  in  boats  in  two 
places. 

Kinburn  lay  across  a  long  and  narrow  peninsula, 
about  4  miles  from  its  western  point.  One  landing, 
8  miles  to  the  east,  was  a  mere  demonstration. 
The  real  attempt  was  made  from  the  west.  Here  the 
Turks  disembarked  at  the  extremity  of  the  peninsula 
some  5000  men  led  by  French  officers.  Suvorof  re- 
ceived the  news  with  great  coolness,  and  said,  "  Let 
them  all  jump  out ;  don't  interfere."  Accordingly  no 
attempt  was  made  to  prevent  the  landing,  and  the 
Turks  were  permitted  to  advance  steadily  along  the 
peninsula,  throwing  up,  as  they  came,  fifteen  separate 
lines  of  entrenchments,  sand-bags,  and  chevaux-de-frise, 
without  a  shot  being  fired  against  them.  The  trenches 
were  not  very  deep,  as  water  rose  in  them  at  a  short 
distance    below    the    surface.     They    were    therefore 

1  Potyomkin's  correspondence  during  this  war  has  been  printed  in 
Russkaya  Starina  (1875),  ii.  40  et  seq. 


88  SUVOROP 

strengthened  by  parapets  of  sand-bags.^  /^^  /^^ 
from  the  southern  edge  of  the  land  to  wi.  *^  ^  ^^^^^ 
distance  of  the  northern,  whence  the  movable  ^^^^V^ 
de-frise  formed  a  barrier  to  the  water's  edgl'  ^"^^'^ 
could  be  removed  at  any  time  for  advance  or  '{^^^^^^' 
At  3  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  when  the  last  linl  ^^^ 
completed  at  a  distance  of  about  1000  yards  from!' 
fortress,  Suvorof  gave  the  signal  for  the  attack,  a  sa^^ 
from  all  the  guns  which  could  be  brought  to  bear  up?^ 
the  enemy. 

Detailed  description  of  the  fight  which  followed  is 
impossible.  It  took  the  form  of  a  scramble  along  the 
sandy  spit  and  in  the  shallow  water  on  either  side  of 
it,  and  more  depended  on  personal  strength  and  courage 
than  on  any  tactical  dispositions.  The  Russians 
advanced  at  first  in  two  lines.  In  the  first  were  two 
battalions  and  five  companies  of  infantry,  and  in  the 
second  two  battalions.  Four  squadrons  of  cavalry 
and  some  Cossacks  moved  along  the  southern  shore 
somewhat  in  the  rear  of  the  infantry.  In  this  formation, 
Suvorof  himself  among  the  first,  they  attacked  the 
Turkish  entrenchments,  and  a  hand-to-hand  contest 
ensued,  which  continued  for  the  rest  of  the  day  and 
half  of  the  night.  The  opposing  troops  were  generally 
so  intermingled  that  the  artillery  on  both  sides  was 
silent  almost  throughout  the  action.  The  first  charge 
drove  the  Turks  out  of  ten  trenches,  but  the  battle 
surged  back  again,  and  at  one  moment  Suvorof  himself 
barely  escaped  being  killed.  Mistaking  a  Turk  holding 
a  horse  by  the  bridle  for  a  dismounted  Cossack,  he  was 
taken  completely  off  his  guard.  He  was  on  the  point 
of  being  cut  down,  when  a  musketeer  named  Novikof 
bayoneted  one  Turk,  knocked  down  another  with  the 
butt,  and  drove  off  a  third.  Seeing  the  danger  of  their 
commander  the  retreating  Russians  turned  and  swept 
the  enemy  back  once  more.  This  advance  was  harassed 
by  a  flanking  fire  from  the  Turkish  fleet,  but  the  guns 

^  CampagneSy  ii.  6,  14. 


THE  SECOND  TURKISH  WAR         89 

of  the  fortress  sank  one  ship,  and  the  daring  Lombardo, 
putting  out  against  the  whole  strength  of  the  enemy, 
actually  chased  seventeen  ships  and  sank  one  of  them. 
Taking  his  vessel  for  a  fire-ship,  the  enemy  squadron 
kept  at  a  safe  distance  for  the  rest  of  the  battle,  and  the 
hand-to-hand  fight  went  on  without  further  interference 
from  the  sea. 

During  this  naval  diversion  the  Russians  had  once 
more  given  ground.  The  commander  of  the  first  line, 
the  Ryebok  who  had  distinguished  himself  at  Turtukai 
in  the  last  war,  had  been  twice  wounded  and  carried 
off  the  field,  and  Suvorof  himself  was  hit  in  the  left 
side.  Falling  back,  the  Russians  even  abandoned  some 
of  their  regimental  cannon.  Suvorof  sent  for  rein- 
forcements. Every  man  who  could  be  spared  from  the 
fortress  and  all  the  guard  of  the  baggage  lager  in  the 
rear,  were  collected.  Followed  by  some  cavalry,  for 
whom  Suvorof  had  sent  in  the  morning  to  a  distance 
of  20  miles,  they  threw  themselves  into  the  surging 
mass  upon  the  promontory.  This  third  attack  was 
successful.  Suvorof  was  wounded  again  by  a  chance 
bullet  striking  his  left  arm.  But  his  men  were  now 
not  to  be  denied,  and  the  Turks  were  literally  driven 
into  the  sea.  By  way  of  compelling  his  men  to  stand 
their  ground,  the  Turkish  commander  had  recalled  all 
the  small  boats,  and  to  protect  himself,  had  built  a 
stockade  between  the  ships  and  the  land.  Nothing 
was  left  to  the  fugitives  but  a  choice  of  deaths.  Some 
escaped  by  swimming,  and  several  hundred  wounded 
were  picked  up  by  the  fleet  the  next  day.  But  many 
were  drowned,  and  the  corpses  on  the  field  of  battle 
were  estimated  at  1500.  Four-fifths  of  the  whole 
force  had  perished.  For  long  after  the  day  of  the 
battle  corpses  continued  to  be  thrown  up  on  the  beach, 
and  on  the  9th  November  no  fewer  than  70  of 
these  miserable  pieces  of  jetsam  were  collected  and 
buried.  The  Russian  losses  were  heavy.  About  250 
were  killed  and  750  wounded,  almost  one-third  of  the 


90  SUVOROF 

force  which  Suvorof  commanded  for  the  greater  part 
of  the  battle,  and  a  proportion  unusually  large  in  the 
record  of  his  Turkish  victories.^ 

The  rest  of  the  year  passed  without  any  important 
military  event.  Suvorof  spent  the  time  in  training  his 
troops,  and,  to  avoid  a  second  descent  upon  Kinburn, 
kept  the  ice  broken  all  round  the  promontory.^  As 
late  as  February  he  was  still  suffering  from  his  wound, 
and  his  left  arm  could  not  hold  the  bridle.  But  this 
did  not  prevent  him  undertaking  journeys  on  horseback 
of  as  much  as  350  miles.  In  the  meantime  the  prospects 
of  a  general  success  improved.  In  January  Austria 
declared  war  against  Turkey,  and  a  decent  display  of 
energy  on  the  part  of  the  Allies  should  have  driven  the 
enemy  across  the  Danube.  But  neither  the  Austrians 
nor  the  Russians  were  competently  led,  and  on  land 
practically  the  whole  year  was  wasted.  Nevertheless, 
in  a  series  of  naval  actions,  in  which  the  guns  of  the 
fortress  of  Kinburn  played  some  part,  the  Prince  of 
Nassau-Siegen  destroyed  the  Turkish  Black  Sea  Fleet.^ 
For  Suvorof  this  year  was  of  importance,  because  during 
it  began  an  estrangement  between  him  and  Potyomkin, 
or  rather  a  dissolution  of  that  strange  relationship  of 
patron  and  client  which  had  so  long  existed  between 
them.  On  the  20th  June  the  Turks  made  a  sea  attack 
upon  Kinburn,  but  were  driven  off  with  the  loss  of 
17  ships  and  1800  prisoners,  the  Russians  losing 
less  than  100  men.  After  this  the  great  military  enter- 
prise of  the  year  was  begun ;  the  siege  of  Otchakof . 
The  siege  occupied  nearly  six  months,  and  wasted 
20,000  Russian  lives.     Potyomkin's  lethargy  and  caprice 

1  Campagnes,  ii.  5  et  seq.  ;  Pyetrof,  i.94,et  seq.  A  few  weeks  after 
the  battle  the  cable  of  Lombardo's  ship  was  broken  in  a  gale.  It  drifted 
into  the  middle  of  the  Turkish  fleet  and  its  commander  was  made  a 
prisoner  {Campagnes,  ii.  25). 

*  See  his  instructions  in  Pyetrof,  1.  Appendix  8. 

•  Nassau-Siegen  was  a  soldier  of  fortune.  He  commanded  the 
floating  batteries  at  the  siege  of  Gibraltar.  See  Le  Prince  Charles  de 
Nassau-Siegen,  by  the  Marquis  D'Aragon.  In  the  Black  Sea  he  was 
assisted  by  Paul  Jones. 


THE  SECOND  TURKISH  WAR         91 

never  appeared  more  fatal  to  the  success  of  his  enter- 
prises. He  lacked  both  the  courage  for  a  storm  and 
the  patience  for  a  siege.  He  began  siege  operations 
half-heartedly,  hoping  that  the  Turks  would  surrender 
to  the  mere  display  of  force,  and  even  when  his  batteries 
had  at  last  inflicted  heavy  damage  upon  the  fortress, 
shrank  from  ordering  a  direct  assault.  It  was  not 
until  the  17th  December,  when  many  of  his  men  and 
animals  had  perished  miserably  of  cold  and  hunger, 
that  he  carried  the  place  by  storm.^ 

During  the  earlier  operations  Suvorof  had  commanded 
the  left  or  northern  wing  of  the  besieging  army,  and  a 
letter  to  his  daughter  gives  a  sketch  of  him  : 

Darling  Suvorovie,  I  kiss  you  !  You  have  again 
delighted  me  with  your  letter  of  the  30th  April ;  I 
answered  one  of  yours  yesterday.  If,  please  God,  we 
are  alive  and  well  and  see  each  other,  glad  shall  I  be 
to  talk  to  you  about  heroes  old  and  new ;  only  teach 
me  how  to  follow  after  them.  Eh  !  Suvorovie,  how  are 
you,  my  soul,  in  your  white  dress  ?  Keep  well  and  grow 
big.  My  humble  respects  to  gracious  Madame  Sophia 
Ivanovna.  What  a  caterwauling  they're  setting  up 
at  night  now  in  Otchakof — ^the  dogs  howl  like  wolves, 
the  cows  moo,  the  cats  squall,  the  goats  bleat !  I  sleep 
on  a  sand  bank ;  it's  so  far  into  the  sea,  the  gulf — as  I 
walk  I  can  hear  what  they're  saying  ;  they're  so  near 
us,  lots  of  them  on  such  huge  ships,  six  big  ones,  up  to 
the  sky,  sails  on  them  a  verst  across  ;  we  can  see  them 
smoking  their  tobacco  ;  they  sing  doleful  songs.  On 
one  ship  there  are  more  of  them  than  you  have  flies 
in  the  whole  Smolni — red  men,  green  men,  blue  men, 
grey  men.  Their  guns  are  as  big  as  the  room  where 
you  sleep  with  the  sisters.  God  bless  you  ! — Your 
father  Alexander  Suvorof.^ 

However  cheerfully  he  might  write  to  his  twelve- 
year-old  daughter,  he  was  in  fact  chafing  at  his  inaction. 

*  On  the  day  of  assault  the  temperature  was  20  degrees  below 
zero,  Fahrenheit. 

2  This  letter  is  in  the  Sbornik.  It  is  printed  in  Letters  and  Papers^ 
p.  80. 


92  SUVOROF 

His  impatience  at  Potyomkin*s  delays  and  pusillanimity 
gradually  overcame  his  ambition  and  his  interest. 
Operations  began  on  the  1st  July,  and  on  the  27th  the 
Turks  made  a  sally  directly  against  Suvorof's  own 
position.  Suvorof  wanted  nothing  better,  and  a  savage 
battle  began  among  the  gardens  and  cottages  on  the 
outskirts  of  the  town.  But  his  men  were  hard  pressed 
and  began  to  give  way.  Throwing  himself  on  the 
ground  before  them  he  cried,  "  Stop,  my  Paladins  I 
theyVe  not  hit  you  ;  they've  hit  me  I  you're  crushing 
me  I  Stop  ! "  They  halted,  and  some  sprang  to  pick 
him  up.  Thereupon  he  leaped  to  his  feet,  crying 
"  You've  healed  me."  ^  But  this  rally  was  short. 
Suvorof  himself  was  wounded  in  the  neck  by  a  bullet, 
and  as  the  enemy  were  on  the  spot  in  superior  numbers, 
he  instructed  his  successor  to  withdraw.  Unhappily 
the  retreat  became  a  rout,  and  the  Russian  losses 
reached  the  figure  of  500  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners. 
Three  times  Potyomkin,  instead  of  falling  upon  the 
Turks  and  entering  the  fortress  on  their  heels,  had  sent 
orders  to  Suvorof  to  discontinue  the  fight,  and  a  fourth 
messenger  found  the  surgeons  taking  the  bullet  out  of 
Suvorof's  neck.  In  response  to  the  peremptory  order, 
the  latter,  doubtless  smarting  more  from  disappointment 
than  from  the  wound,  insolently  replied  in  doggerel : 

"I'll  not  get  this  rock  off, 
I'll  look  at  Otchakof." 

A  few  days  later  he  retired  to  Kinburn,  and  the 
breach  between  him  and  Potyomkin  was  never  quite 
healed.  His  letters  to  the  Grandee  were  still  of  the 
same  flattering  kind.  But  his  contempt  for  the 
Favourite  Faineant  never  waned,  and  the  latter  never 
forgot  how  his  fantastic  client  had  insulted  him. 
Nevertheless,  at  the  end  of  the  year  Potyomkin  recom- 
mended   Suvorof    for    his    services   during    the    whole 

1  This  incident  was  related  by  an  eye-witness  to  Glinka.  See 
Russkoe  Tchtyeniye  (1842),  ii.  197. 


THE  SECOND  TURKISH  WAR         93 

campaign,  and  the  Empress  sent  him  a  diamond  aigret 
bearing  her  initial.  The  next  year  brought  him  greater 
glory  and  a  complete  loss,  if  not  of  Imperial,  at  least 
of  Vice-Imperial  favour. 

In  the  interval  he  narrowly  escaped  death  by  accident. 
When  barely  convalescent  he  was  roused  in  his  room 
at  Kinburn  by  the  explosion  of  a  magazine,  and  for 
several  minutes  the  air  was  filled  with  bursting  shells. 
He  leapt  from  his  bed  a  few  seconds  before  it  was  broken 
to  pieces,  and  splinters  wounded  him  in  the  face,  chest, 
and  knee.  Eighty  officers  and  men  were  killed  and 
wounded,  and  Suvorof's  own  condition  was  for  a  time 
very  grave.  Nevertheless,  his  constitution  and  his 
temperate  living  triumphed,  and  by  the  beginning  of 
the  next  year  he  was  completely  recovered.  In  the 
campaign  of  1789  he  was  fortunate  enough  to  be  inde- 
pendent of  the  luxurious  indolence  of  the  Commander- 
in-Chief.  In  January  Potyomkin  travelled  to  Petersburg, 
and  a  triumphal  reception  eclipsed  for  a  time  the  rising 
splendours  of  Platon  Zubof,  the  new  favourite  of  the 
Empress.  In  the  beginning  of  March  he  returned  to 
his  army  of  Ekaterinoslav,  where  he  lapsed  once  more 
into  inactivity.  The  army  of  the  Ukraine  behaved 
with  more  vigour,  and  General  Derfelden  in  the  beginning 
of  April  twice  inflicted  heavy  defeats  on  the  enemy  in 
the  neighbourhood  of  Buirlad.  Here,  at  the  end  of 
April,  Suvorof  took  over  the  command.  To  gratify 
the  jealousy  of  Potyomkin  the  two  Russian  armies 
had  just  been  united  under  him  alone,  and  Rumyantsof, 
deprived  of  his  command  of  the  army  of  the  Ukraine, 
spent  the  whole  of  1789  in  idleness  at  Jassy.  This 
army  was  now  put  under  the  direct  command  of  Prince 
Ryepnin,  to  whom  Suvorof  was  responsible  for  the 
detachment  at  Buirlad. 

The  Moldavian  theatre  of  war  presented  few  striking 
features.  Bounded  on  the  west  by  the  Carpathians 
and  on  the  east  by  the  Steppes  of  Bessarabia,  it  consists 
of  long  valleys  running  north  and  south  between  low 


94  SUVOROF 

chains  of  hills.  The  three  main  valleys  are  those  of  the 
Seret,  the  Buirlad,  and  the  Prut,  and  down  these  run 
the  main  roads.  Suvorof*s  station  at  Buirlad  lay  in 
the  midst  of  these  three  channels  of  communication, 
at  a  point  where  gaps  in  the  hills  to  east  and  west  lead 
to  Falchi  on  the  Prut  and  Adzhud  on  the  Seret.  It  was 
thus  possible  for  him  to  move  without  difficulty  into 
either  of  the  other  two  valleys,  or  advance  along  that  of 
the  Buirlad,  as  occasion  required.  The  extreme  left  of 
the  Austrians  extended  to  the  Seret,  so  that  contact 
could  easily  be  made  with  them. 

The  military  situation  at  the  beginning  of  1789  was 
not  favourable  to  the  Allies.  Potyomkin's  procrastina- 
tion in  the  previous  years  had  produced  no  worse 
consequences  than  the  deaths  of  some  thousands  of  men 
and  animals  from  exposure.  The  Austrians,  equally 
dilatory  and  more  pedantic,  had  strung  their  troops 
out  in  a  long  line  along  the  frontier  of  the  Banat  and 
Transylvania,  and  on  the  18th  August  the  Grand  Vizier, 
Yussuf  Pasha,  inflicted  a  crushing  defeat  upon  one 
section  of  it  near  Staraya  Orshova.  The  advance  of 
an  Austrian  force,  in  co-operation  with  Rumyantsof, 
in  northern  Moldavia,  had  compelled  the  Turks  to 
withdraw.  But  the  enemy  had  no  reason  to  look 
forward  with  any  apprehension  to  the  opening  of  the 
campaign  of  1789.  As  soon  as  the  subsidence  of  the 
Spring  floods  made  military  operations  possible,  the 
Grand  Vizier  prepared  for  new  triumphs.  Unfortunately 
for  his  fame,  he  chose  on  this  occasion  to  come  within 
reach  of  Suvorof . 

The  Turkish  plan  was  simplicity  itself.  The  Prince 
of  Coburg  lay  at  Adzhud,  35  miles  north-west  of 
Fokshani  on  the  Seret,  with  18,000  Austrians.  Suvorof 
was  at  Buirlad,  40  miles  from  Coburg,  with  Derfelden's 
Russian  Division,  13,000  strong,  consisting  of  15 
battalions  of  infantry,  18  regiments  of  cavalry, 
and  30  field-guns,  besides  the  regimental  artillery. 
The  remainder  of  the  Russians  were  in  the  neighbour- 


THE  SECOND  TURKISH  WAR         95 

hood  of  Olviopol,  unable  to  move  owing  to  want  of 
supplies,  or  just  beginning  a  leisurely  march  in  the 
direction  of  Bendyeri.  Osman  Pasha,  in  command  of 
the  Turks  at  Fokshani,  decided  to  fall  upon  Coburg 
and  annihilate  him,  and  then  deal  with  the  Russians. 
Coburg  applied  for  help  to  Ryepnin,  who  ordered  Suvorof 
to  go  to  his  assistance.  Leaving  about  3000  men  to 
hold  Buirlad,  Suvorof  set  out  with  the  remaining  10,000 
at  6  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  the  27th  July.  He 
sent  ahead  a  messenger,  with  a  letter  of  two  words : 
"  Coming.  Suvorof."  At  10  o'clock  in  the  evening 
of  the  next  day  he  marched  his  men  up  on  the  Austrian 
left.  The  journey  of  40  miles,  over  some  of  the  worst 
roads  in  the  world,  had  been  completed  in  28 
hours.i  The  29th  was  spent  in  throwing  three  pontoon 
bridges  across  the  Trotusha.  Coburg  sat  in  anxious 
council  with  his  officers,  but  asked  in  vain  for 
Suvorof  s  advice.  His  first  appeal  brought  an  incom- 
prehensible answer.  His  second  messenger  could  only 
say  that  the  general  was  at  his  prayers.  The  third 
had  to  inform  Coburg  that  Suvorof  was  asleep.  Suvorof 
was  determined  at  all  costs  to  avoid  a  general  conference. 
"  Otherwise  we  should  have  wasted  all  the  time  in 
discussions,  diplomatical,  tactical,  enigmatical ;  they 
would  have  smothered  me,  and  the  enemy  would  have 
settled  our  arguments!  by  smashing  up  our  tactics."  ^ 
The  Prince,  whatever  his  faults,  was  at  least  a  model 
of  courteous  patience.  He  waited  until  11  o'clock, 
when  he  received  this  letter  from  Suvorof  : 

The  troops  advance  at  2  in  the  morning  in  three 
columns,  centre  consisting  of  Russians.  The  enemy 
to  be  attacked  with  all  forces,  not  troubling  about 
petty  attempts  to  right  or  left,  so  as  to  get  by  dawn  to 
the  river  Putna,  which  we  are  to  cross,  continuing  the 

1  I  was  at  Buirlad  in  April  1917.  The  country  between  that  place 
and  Jassy  was  still  flooded,  the  water  in  some  places  being  more  than  a 
mile  across.  South  of  Buirlad,  however,  the  inundation  was  very  much 
less,  though  the  mud  was  still  indescribably  Balkan. 

'  Quoted  in  Fuchs,  Campaign  of  1799, 


96  SUVOROF 

attack.  They  say  that  the  Turks  before  us  are  50,000 
and  beyond  them  50,000  more  ;  pity  that  they  are  not 
all  together,  it  would  have  been  better  to  finish  with 
them  all  at  once.^ 

Coburg,  as  modest  as  he  was  urbane,  received  these 
orders  with  judicious  meekness,  and  the  disunion  which 
would  have  been  provoked  by  such  treatment  of  almost 
everybody  else,  was  in  this  case  avoided. 

The  actual  start  was  made  at  3  in  the  morning, 
and  there  were  only  two  columns  instead  of  three. 
The  Austrians  formed  the  right,  the  Russians  the  left, 
but,  to  deceive  the  enemy,  some  Austrian  horse  rode 
ahead  of  Derfelden's  men.  Marinesht  was  reached  on 
the  31st,  and  on  the  evening  of  the  same  day  there  was 
some  brisk  cavalry  fighting  between  that  place  and 
the  river  Putna.  The  rivers  Putna  and  Seret,  which 
at  the  level  of  Marinesht  on  the  right  bank  of  the  latter 
are  five  and  a  half  miles  apart,  converge  very  rapidly 
7  miles  lower  down,  and  the  Putna  cuts  almost 
at  right  angles  across  the  road  from  Marinesht  to 
Fokshani.  For  another  seven  miles  the  rivers  run 
almost  parallel,  a  mile  apart,  separated  by  a  chain  of 
low  hills.  Fokshani  itself  is  situated  on  the  little  river 
Milka,  which  runs  into  the  Putna  at  that  point.  The 
first  cavalry  encounters  took  place  between  the  two 
rivers  north  of  the  point  of  convergence,  the  Turks 
being  separated  from  their  main  body  by  the  Putna. 
After  some  vigorous  charges  the  Russian  horse  were 
pushed  back  by  superior  numbers,  but  eventually  the 
enemy  were  driven  over  the  river  in  such  confusion 
that  the  tent  of  Osman  Pasha  himself  was  actually 
captured  and  burnt  to  the  ground.  Darkness  and 
heavy  rain  put  an  end  to  this  day's  fighting. 

The  work  of  throwing  a  pontoon  bridge  over  the 
Putna  was  begun  at  once,  in  spite  of  the  continuous  rain 
and  the  swelling  of  the  river  itself.     A  night  attack 

^  Laverne,  161  n.  The  author's  authority  was  a  French  Engineer 
officer,  who  was  told  the  story  by  an  Austrian  officer  named  Jordis, 


I 


THE  SECOND  TURKISH  WAR 


97 


by  the  Turks  drove  the  advanced  troops  back  across 
the  river  and  was  repelled  with  some  difficulty  by  an 
Austrian  battalion  on  the  left  bank.  Nevertheless, 
the  bridge  was  finished  by  11  o'clock  and  Suvorof 
crossed  at  once.  At  4  o'clock  in  the  morning  the 
Austrians  followed,  and  by  7  o'clock  both  forces, 
beating  away  the  Turkish  horse  who  had  attempted 
to  oppose  the  crossing,  advanced  towards  Fokshani. 
At  a  distance  of  3  miles  from  the  river,  it  being 
then  9  o'clock,  they  encountered  the  enemy  in  force. 


uiuiiiliu 

Battle  of  FOKSHANI 


SCALE-  ENGUSH  MILES 
■>        I        2       3^5 


Turkish  Troops 
shown  l^hus  •*> 


The  Turks  attacked  in  front  and  from  both  flanks  at 
once.  The  Allies  were  never  in  danger,  and  their 
continuous  artillery  and  musketry  fire  dispersed  every 
charge.  Crossing  a  deep  gully,  crowned  on  the  far 
side  by  a  wood,  they  moved  forward  unbroken,  the 
enemy  making  no  attempt  to  use  these  formidable 
natural  defences.  Swerving  to  the  left  from  the  road, 
Suvorof  led  his  detachment  through  a  tract  of  marshy 
ground  covered  with  reeds,  which  concealed  his  move- 
ments from  the  enemy.  Emerging  from  this,  outside 
their  right  flank,  he  was  attacked  by  their  cavalry, 
and  his  Cossacks  fell  back  upon  the  infantry.     But  as 

H 


98  SUVOROF 

before,  the  latter  had  no  difficulty  in  coping  with  the 
Turks,  drove  them  back  in  their  turn,  and  opened  fire 
at  point-blank  range  upon  the  entrenched  line  in  front 
of  Fokshani.  To  their  right  the  Austrians  adopted  the 
same  tactics.  The  Turkish  artillery  was  silenced,  and 
on  all  sides  the  merciless  fire  poured  upon  the  masses 
of  undisciplined  infantry  in  the  trenches.  The  Spahis 
galloped  headlong  from  the  field,  and  pursued  by  the 
allied  cavalry,  the  footmen  ran  in  all  directions.  By 
4  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  the  position  was  taken. 
Some  of  the  fugitives  took  refuge  in  the  monastery  of 
St.  Spiridon,  a  short  distance  to  the  rear.  Here  they 
were  attacked  by  the  Austrians  and  Russians  simul- 
taneously, the  gates  were  beaten  in  by  artillery,  and 
every  Turk  was  killed,  a  few  desperate  spirits  blowing 
up  the  powder  magazine  in  a  cellar  of  the  monastery 
rather  than  surrender. 

The  victory  was  lightly  won.  The  Russian  casualties 
were  150,  the  Austrian,  200.  The  Turkish  dead  alone 
were  reckoned  at  1500,  and  the  victors  retained  12 
guns  and  16  standards  as  trophies.  The  ease  with 
which  the  small  civilised  army  had  defeated  the  host 
of  barbarians  of  four  times  its  own  strength,  shows 
with  how  little  effort  Europe  might  have  expelled  the 
Turks,  if  only  it  could  have  resolved  to  unite  against 
them.  Nevertheless,  the  completeness  of  their  defeat 
at  Fokshani  was  soon  to  be  eclipsed  by  their  stupefying 
overthrow  on  the  Ruimnik  and  the  storm  of  the  great 
fortress  of  Izmail.^ 

For  Suvorof  the  battle  at  Fokshani  brought  not  only 
fame,  but  the  friendship  of  his  Austrian  colleague. 
Coburg,  the  pattern  of  a  courtly  gentleman,  willingly 
acknowledged  the  superiority  of  his  fantastic  associate, 
and  without  any  sign  of  jealousy  or  rivalry  praised  him 

1  Campagnes,  ii.  35  et  seq. ;  Pyetrof,  ii.  82  et  seq.  Shortly  before 
the  battle  Suvorof  had  injured  one  of  his  feet,  and  he  limped  badly. 
The  Turks  in  consequence  nicknamed  him  "  Topal  Pasha,"  or  "  Captain 
Stump  "  (Campagnes,  ii.  51). 


THE  SECOND  TURKISH  WAR         99 

and  thanked  him.  The  friendship  between  these  two 
remained  unbroken,  and  Suvorof  s  constant  affection 
for  the  bland  and  unassuming  aristocrat  is  one  of  the 
most  pleasing  expressions  of  his  versatility. 

On  the  5th  August  Suvorof  returned  to  Buirlad, 
The  victory  at  Fokshani,  tactically  complete,  had  no 
strategic  consequences.  Neither  he  nor  Coburg  had 
sufficient  troops  for  an  advance  into  Turkish  territory, 
and  Potyomkin,  with  the  main  Russian  army,  was  still 
beyond  the  Dnyestr.  The  initiative  was  still  with 
the  Turks,  and  the  Grand  Vizier  began  at  once  to 
meditate  revenge.  Making  a  feint  from  Izmail  into 
Bessarabia,  he  gathered  a  large  army  for  a  second 
attack  on  Suvorof  and  Coburg  in  Moldavia.  The 
diversion  in  Bessarabia  was  well  countered  by  Prince 
Ryepnin,  who  pushed  right  up  to  the  walls  of  Izmail 
itself.  But  the  principal  movement  was  made  in  such 
force  that  Coburg' s  advanced  army  was  at  one  time 
in  great  difficulties.  About  90,000  Turks  threatened 
him  at  Fokshani,  and,  as  before,  he  sent  for  help  to 
Suvorof  at  Buirlad.  The  latter  had  received  some 
reinforcements  from  Ryepnin,  and  on  the  night  of  the 
18th  September  he  left  Buirlad  with  about  7800  men. 
Coburg,  with  about  17,000  Austrians,  came  into  contact 
with  the  enemy  on  the  19th,  and  some  hard  fighting 
took  place  between  Fokshani  and  the  river  Ruimna. 
By  10  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  21st  Suvorof  s 
little  army,  much  fatigued  by  its  march  over  the  muddy 
roads,  united  with  the  Austrians  between  the  rivers 
Milka  and  Ruimna.  Beyond  the  latter  lay  the  enemy, 
and  Suvorof  climbed  a  tree  to  reconnoitre  their  position. 
The  ground  presented  some  formidable  obstacles  to 
an  advance  on  the  part  of  the  Allies.  The  banks  of 
the  Ruimna  rose  steeply,  and  beyond  the  rise  there 
was  a  fall  into  a  swampy  bottom  traversed  from  right 
to  left  by  another  stream.  Beyond  this  was  a  steeper 
and  loftier  ascent  to  the  hill  crowned  by  the  wood  of 
Kruingu  Meilor.     This  hill  was  almost  surrounded  by 


100  SUVOROF 

marshland,  which  swept  round  into  the  bed  of  the 
Ruimnik.  The  only  easy  approach  to  it  was  by  a 
narrow  neck,  which  led  directly  to  the  summit  from 
the  bank  of  the  Ruimna,  without  falling  to  the  level  of 
the  intervening  marsh.  But  this  neck  also  was  in 
part  covered  by  the  wood  of  Kayat,  and  the  whole 
ground  was  cut  up  by  a  number  of  the  ravines  and 
gullies  which  everywhere  intersect  the  soft  clayey  soil 
of  this  region.  The  main  Turkish  force,  with  28  guns, 
was  entrenched  on  the  height  of  Kruingu  Meilor,  its 
flanks  extending  over  a  front  of  a  mile  to  the  steep 
banks  of  the  swampy  streams  to  north  and  south.  On 
the  right  it  was  additionally  protected  by  dense  masses 
of  thorn  bushes  and  high  grass,  but  the  left  was  open. 
Here,  however,  was  situated  the  little  village  of  Boksa, 
which  was  occupied  by  the  Turks  as  part  of  their  defence 
works.  In  front  of  the  village  one  battery  swept  the 
approach  from  Kayat,  and  another  fired  across  the 
front  of  the  line  of  trenches,  so  as  to  take  an  attacking 
force  in  flank.  In  case  of  defeat  the  wood  in  his  rear, 
extending  almost  to  the  extremity  of  his  left,  threatened 
the  Grand  Vizier  with  the  loss  of  everything  which 
could  not  get  away  on  its  own  feet.  But  defeat  was 
not  within  his  contemplation.  With  more  energy  he 
might  have  destroyed  Coburg  before  Suvorof  came  on 
the  scene.  But  where  victory  was  certain,  a  day  was 
of  no  importance.  The  same  fatal  confidence  inspired 
him  still,  and  though  he  had  thrown  up  earthworks  to 
defend  the  bridge  across  the  Ruimnik  at  Martinesht 
directly  to  his  rear,  he  was  so  careless  that  his  trenches 
in  front  of  Kruingu  Meilor  itself  were  not  completed 
when  they  were  actually  attacked  at  the  end  of  the  battle. 
He  had  sent  forward  a  strong  detachment  to  occupy 
the  village  of  Turgo-Kukuli,  at  the  point  where  the 
approach  to  his  main  position  sprang  from  the  bed  of 
the  Ruimna,  a  mile  and  three-quarters  from  Boksa, 
and  he  awaited  with  equanimity  the  approach  of  his 
enemy. 


THE  SECOND  TURKISH  WAR       101 

Suvorof  s  mind  was  soon  made  up.  The  Allies  were 
to  cross  the  Ruimna  at  Zoresht  and  Bogatch,  2  miles 
below  Turgo-Kukuli.  The  Russians  v:oUld^  then  move 
upon  Turgo-Kukuli,  drive  out  the  , troops  occupying 
it,  and  follow  them  along  the  high  gjt>u  ad '  >;©  B(5ksa' 
As  soon  as  Boksa  was  taken  the  Austrians  were  to 
attack  the  Turkish  right,  while  the  Russians  pressed 
on  against  their  left.  The  enemy  would  thus  be  driven 
into  the  wood  and  through  it  into  the  Ruimnik.     The 


Kruingu  -^     "^  -u^  -'  - 

^t^    Kayat       <*"Rnu<;A     ^  _    - 

Battle  of  RUIMNIK  \  ^'^ 

SCALB-  ENGLISH  MILLS  l 

0 


plan  involved  a  march  across  the  front  of  the  enemy's 
position  from  the  point  of  crossing  the  Ruimna  to  Turgo- 
Kukuli,  and  in  the  face  of  any  other  adversary  than  the 
Turk,  it  would  have  involved  a  very  rash  exposure  of 
the  Russian  troops.  But  a  Turkish  army  made  risks 
justifiable  which  could  never  be  undertaken  in  opera- 
tions against  any  other,  and  the  event  attested  the 
wisdom  of  Suvorof  s  judgement.  At  7  o'clock  on 
the  evening  of  the  21st  the  Allies  moved  towards  the 
Ruimna  and  began  to  throw  pontoon  bridges  across  it. 
The  Turkish  advanced  post  held  stolidly  to  its  position, 
the  bridges  were  completed,  and  by  dawn  all  the  troops 


102  SUVOROF 

were  drawn  up  in  order  of  battle  on  the  right  bank  of 
the  river.     Suvorof  had  about  7000  men,  Saxe-Coburg 
18,000.     Itn  both  armies  the  infantry  were  drawn  up 
in"  two  lin^s  of  'squares,  with  the  cavalry  in  the  rear, 
the- Ati^trians' f or  th^  first  time  adopting  this  formation 
for  their  infantry.*    The  Russian  squares  were  six  in 
number,   three  in   each  line,   and   the   Austrians  ten, 
six  in  the  first  line  and  four  in  the  second.     In  both 
armies  the  squares  of  the  second  line  covered  the  gaps 
between  those  of  the  first.     The  Austrians  faced  south- 
east, the  Russians  south-west,  and  it  was  the  weakness 
of  the  plan  of  battle  that  as  it  was  developed,  and  the 
Russians  moved  upon  Turgo-Kukuli  while  the  Austrian 
line  was  directly  towards  the  wood  of  Kruingu  Meilor 
and  Martinesht,  the  gap  between  the  two  forces  must 
become  very  much    wider.     In  effect,   the   Austrians 
were    to    march    across    the    base    of    an    equilateral 
triangle,  2  miles  long,  while  the  Russians  went  round 
the   other  two   sides.      Suvorof  accordingly   requested 
his   colleague   to   detach  two  squares   of   infantry  and 
four  sections  of  Hussars,  under  Major-General  Karaczay, 
to   occupy    this    space,   and    cover  his  own  left   flank 
during  the  attack  on  the  Turkish  advanced  post. 

This  post,  about  15,000  strong,  held  the  ridge  from 
Turgo-Kukuli  itself  to  the  wood  of  Kayat.  Its  right 
flank  was  covered  by  a  powerful  battery,  which  swept 
the  whole  of  the  slope  to  the  Ruimna.  The  front  was 
further  protected  by  a  deep  gully,  which  was  not  at 
first  visible  to  the  Russians,  owing  to  the  dense  crop 
of  unreaped  maize  which  covered  the  intervening  ground. 
Coming  up  in  some  disorder  to  this  gully,  the  Russians 
were  attacked  from  the  right  by  7000  Turkish  horse, 
carrying  infantry  behind  them  on  their  saddles.  The 
right  and  centre  squares  of  the  first  line  received  the 
enemy  with  great  steadiness,  and  beat  off  two  attacks 
with  musketry  and  artillery  fire.  The  whole  force  then 
pushed  steadily  down  into  the  gully,  and  began  the 
ascent  of  the  opposite  slope. 


THE  SECOND  TURKISH  WAR       103 

In  the  meantime  the  Austrian  main  body  had  come 
into  contact  with  the  Turks  to  the  north-east.  The 
Grand  Vizier,  seeing,  as  he  could  not  fail  to  see,  the 
wide  and  widening  gap  between  the  two  allied  armies, 
flung  a  great  mass  of  cavalry  into  it.  This  force 
immediately  split  up  into  two.  One,  of  16,000  men, 
fell  upon  Suvorof's  left,  at  the  moment  when  his  first 
line  of  squares  had  crossed  the  gully  and  the  second 
had  not  yet  descended  into  it.  The  other,  of  10,000, 
was  directed  upon  Coburg's  right.  Simultaneously 
18,000  horse  left  the  Turkish  right,  plunged  through  the 
swamp,  and  furiously  attacked  the  Austrian  left.  Each 
of  the  Allies  was  thus  subjected  to  an  attack  on  both 
flanks  at  once.  The  attack  on  the  Austrian  left  was 
entangled  in  a  wood,  and  soon  broke  up  in  face  of  fire 
from  artillery  and  infantry.  That  on  the  Austrian 
right  was  more  formidable.  Coburg  remained  firm, 
ordered  the  flanking  square  of  his  second  line  to  face  to 
the  right,  and  sent  two  squadrons  of  Hussars  to  make 
connection  between  it  and  Karaczay's  detachment. 
The  square  blew  away  the  attack^  and  Karaczay  fell 
upon  the  left  of  the  discomfited  enemy.  Nevertheless, 
the  latter  displayed  unusual  powers  of  resistance,  and 
Karaczay  had  to  halt  and  re-form  no  less  than  seven 
times.  It  was  not  until  the  flanking  square  in  the 
Austrian  first  line  also  attacked  the  enemy's  right, 
that  the  mellay  at  last  came  to  an  end,  and  the  Turks 
drew  off. 

The  attack  on  Suvorof's  left  was  no  more  successful. 
The  flanking  square  in  his  second  line  was  actually 
broken  at  more  than  oile  spot,  but  the  next  square 
came  to  its  assistance,  and  the  enemy  were  driven  back. 
Suvorof  then  ordered  these  two  squares  to  move  slowly 
after  the  enemy,  supported  by  the  remaining  square 
of  the  second  line  and  a  detachment  of  Austrian  Hussars, 
while  he  proceeded  with  his  attack  upon  the  position 
in  front  of  him.  With  some  difficulty  the  squares  of 
the  second  line  performed  their  task.     The  Turks  who 


104i  SUVOROF 

had  been  driven  off  from  the  Austrian  right  joined  with 
those  retreating  before  the  Russian  left,  and  a  very 
savage  attack  by  both  together  upon  the  pursuing 
Russians  was  not  beaten  back  until  Karaczay  had  once 
again  thrown  himself  into  the  fray.  From  this  time 
the  weak  spot  in  the  allied  line  was  left  untouched 
by  the  enemy,  and  in  fact,  Suvorof's  detached  second- 
line  squares  and  the  two  squares  from  Coburg's  right, 
together  with  Karaczay' s  force,  almost  filled  the  interval. 
The  allied  line,  therefore,  remained  almost  unbroken, 
though  its  right,  under  Suvorof ,  was  still  moving  towards 
Turgo-Kukuli  at  right  angles  to  the  main  line  of  advance. 
This  preliminary  operation  was  soon  concluded.  The 
Turks  in  front  of  Suvorof,  both  attacks  on  his  flank 
having  failed,  began  to  draw  off  in  their  customary 
disorder  towards  the  wood  of  Kayat,  leaving  all  their 
guns  and  baggage  behind  them.  Suvorof  launched  his 
cavalry  in  pursuit,  and  they  were  chased  through  the 
village  into  the  wood,  while  the  infantry  occupied  their 
abandoned  entrenched  camp. 

It  was  now  about  midday.  All  the  enemy's  cavalry 
attacks  had  failed,  his  advanced  force  in  Turgo-Kukuli 
had  been  beaten  and  scattered,  and  the  allied  troops 
were  ready  for  the  assault  of  his  main  position.  Coburg 
halted  his  men  on  the  near  side  of  the  swampy  stream 
that  lay  between  him  and  the  Turkish  trenches,  while 
Suvorof,  sending  the  centre  square  of  his  first  line  into 
the  wood  of  Kayat,  swept  round  the  trees  with  his  main 
body  and  drew  them  up  on  the  far  side,  facing  the  enemy. 
Here  he  gave  them  half  an  hour's  rest,  and  at  1  o'clock 
marched  against  the  village  of  Boksa.  The  interval 
between  the  Russian  and  Austrian  troops,  as  has  been 
already  stated,  was  no  longer  of  great  extent.  Never- 
theless, the  same  marshy  bottom  which  lay  between 
the  Austrians  and  the  Turks  also  cut  between  the  two 
sections  of  the  allied  army,  and  along  this  the  Grand 
Vizier  once  more  despatched  a  large  force  of  cavalry. 
As  before,  this  was  dispersed  by  Karaczay  and  the  squares 


^ 


# 


THE  SECOND  TURKISH  WAR       105 

from  Suvorof's  second  line.  In  the  meantime  the 
squares  of  the  Russian  first  line  marched  straight  upon 
Boksa.  Arrived  within  musket  shot  of  the  Turkish 
batteries,  which  fired  for  the  most  part  over  their  heads, 
the  squares  halted  and  returned  the  artillery  fire.  The 
Turkish  guns  were  soon  silenced,  and  the  village  was 
cleared  with  the  bayonet.  Some  of  the  fugitives  ran 
direct  to  Martinesht,  but  the  majority  fell  back  on  the 
main  position  behind  them. 

The  flanking  batteries  having  been  taken,  the 
combined  attack  upon  this  position  was  made  without 
delay.  Suvorof  brought  his  second-line  squares  up  on 
the  left  of  those  of  the  first  line  and,  seeing  the  enemy 
still  at  work  with  pick  and  shovel,  requested  Coburg, 
who  was  now  crossing  the  marsh,  to  take  the  shallow 
trenches  opposite  him  with  cavalry.  At  the  same 
moment  his  own  horse  passed  through  the  intervals 
between  the  squares  and  charged  the  Turkish  left. 
This  unusual  method  of  attack  succeeded  on  the  Ruimnik 
as  at  Landskron.  The  scattered  Turkish  fire  did  little 
execution,  the  horsemen  leapt  the  half-dug  trenches, 
and  the  artillerymen,  standing  by  their  guns  as  if  they 
had  been  chained  to  them,  were  cut  down  to  a  man. 
The  cavalry  then  dispersed  the  Turkish  horse  and  fell 
upon  the  infantry.  Crowded  between  the  wood  and 
the  triumphant  Allies,  the  Grand  Vizier's  40,000  infantry 
were  unable  to  disengage  themselves  or  manoeuvre, 
and  his  superiority  in  numbers  gave  him  no  superiority 
in  strength.  In  a  quarter  of  an  hour  after  the  first 
cavalry  attack,  the  Russian  and  Austrian  foot  were 
everywhere  across  the  trenches,  and  plied  their  bayonets 
vigorously  upon  the  struggling  mass  of  Janissaries. 
It  was  impossible  for  such  a  small  attacking  force  to 
cumber  itself  with  prisoners,  and  no  quarter  was  given. 
By  4  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  the  surging  mob  was 
being  driven  pell-mell  into  the  trees  of  Kruingu  Meilor. 
The  right  and  left  wing  squares  of  the  victors  passed 
round  the  skirts  of  the  wood,  and  fired  heavily  into  the 


h 


106  SUVOROF 

flanks  of  the  routed  enemy.  The  Turkish  horse  fled 
headlong  through  Martinesht  and  got  across  the  Ruimnik, 
for  the  most  part  by  swimming.  The  infantry  fared 
worse.  Some  chmbed  trees  and  concealed  themselves 
in  the  branches.  Others  hid  among  the  undergrowth 
or  in  holes  or  gullies.  The  great  mass,  ridden  down 
by  the  remorseless  cavalry  of  the  pursuers,  scrambled 
off  towards  Martinesht,  or  huddled  together  in  irregular 
groups  and  offered  a  desperate  resistance  for  want 
of  any  means  of  escape.  The  Grand  Vizier  himself 
was  dying  of  malaria,  and  had  hitherto  been  sitting  in 
a  carriage.  At  this  point  he  dragged  himself  on  to  a 
horse,  and  holding  up  a  copy  of  the  Koran,  begged  his 
troops  to  stand  their  ground.  But  neither  these  appeals 
to  their  religious  zeal  nor  the  two  guns  which  he  at  last 
turned  upon  them  were  of  avail.  They  continued  to 
give  back,  and  he  was  more  than  once  seen  to  ride 
round  a  group  of  fugitives,  imploring  and  threatening, 
until  they  thrust  forcibly  by  him  and  ran  for  the  bridge 
at  Martinesht.^  The  breaking  up  of  the  huge  mob 
could  not  be  finished  in  a  moment,  and  almost  inert 
though  it  was,  the  utmost  efforts  of  the  attackers  pushed 
it  but  slowly  off  the  ground.  The  accidental  or  inten- 
tional explosion  of  a  large  quantity  of  their  own 
ammunition  completed  the  demoralisation  of  the  Turks, 
and  their  retreat  became  as  nearly  a  rout  as  was  possible 
over  ground  so  cumbered  with  trees,  waggons,  and 
corpses.  The  distance  from  the  edge  of  the  wood  to 
Martinesht  was  4  miles,  and  upon  this  space  it  was 
estimated  that  no  less  than  8000  of  the  enemy  lay  dead. 
The  flood  of  panic-stricken  fugitives  poured  on  to  the 
bridge,  which  was  already  blocked  with  waggons, 
horses,  oxen,  and  camels.  Escape  by  this  road  being 
hopeless,  the  multitude  flung  themselves  into  the  river 
and  hundreds  were  drowned.  The  Austrians  halted 
a  mile  and  a  half  from  the  town,  but  Suvorof  marched 
his  men  right  up  to  the  river,  and  upon  the  masses 

^  Campagnes,  ii.  85. 


THE  SECOND  TURKISH  WAR       107 

on  the  bridge,  on  the  banks,  and  in  the  water  itself 
his  infantry  poured  an  unceasing  fire.  Darkness  and 
fatigue  at  last  put  an  end  to  the  slaughter,  and  the 
remnants  of  the  shattered  host  were  allowed  to  escape. 

The  Russians  passed  the  night  on  the  bank  of  the 
river.  Some  light  cavalry  were  sent  southwards  to 
clear  out  the  Turks  from  the  neighbouring  village  of 
Odaya,  and  at  daybreak  Coburg  despatched  some 
hussars  and  a  battalion  of  infantry  to  beat  up  the  Turks 
in  the  wood  of  Kruingu  Meilor.  These  operations 
completed  one  of  the  most  overwhelming  victories  that 
Europeans  have  ever  gained  over  the  Turks  :  a  victory 
which  proved,  no  less  incontestably  than  Kagul,  that 
nothing  was  required  to  rid  Europe  of  the  Asiatic  pest 
except  organisation  and  energy  in  following  up  successes 
in  the  field.  The  Turkish  dead  alone  were  reckoned 
at  15,000,  and  the  small  number  of  400  prisoners 
indicated  the  desperate  nature  of  the  fighting.  An 
enormous  booty,  100  flags,  6  mortars,  7  heavy  and 
67  field-guns,  horses,  oxen,  camels,  and  waggons,  the 
tents  and  equipment  of  three  entrenched  camps,  and 
the  great  gold  and  silver  cloth  pavilion  of  the  Vizier 
himself  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  conquerors.^  The 
light  horse,  following  the  enemy  on  the  23rd,  12  miles 
down  the  road  to  the  Buzeo,  found  nothing  but  dead  and 
wounded  men  and  animals.  The  great  host  of  90,000 
men  was  completely  dispersed,  and  only  a  miserable 
remnant  crossed  the  Danube.^ 

The  behaviour  of  the  Austrian  leader  after  the 
victory  was  as  generous  as  before  it  had  been  modest. 
He  had  adopted  Suvorof's  plan,  and  had  abandoned 
the  traditional  formation  of  Austrian  infantry  in  favour 
of  the  Russian  square,  and  he  was  not  afraid  to  give 
Suvorof  the  credit.     "  The   approval   of  my  arrange- 

^  According  to  one  authority  the  principal  camp  was  so  filthy  that 
one  could  hardly  breathe  there  {Campagnes,  ii.  86). 

2  Campagnes,  ii.  62  et  seq. ;  Pyetrof,  ii.  58  et  seq. ;  Geschichte  des 
Oesterreich-Russischen  und  Tiirkischen  Krieges,  1792,  152  et  seq. 


108  SUVOROF 

ments,"  he  wrote,  "  which  you,  my  unequalled  teacher, 
have  expressed,  is  very  gratifying  to  me,  and  has 
increased  my  confidence  in  myself.'*  Suvorof  himself 
was  in  the  highest  of  high  spirits,  and  enjoyed  to  the 
full  the  honours  which  were  showered  upon  him.  The 
Emperor  made  Coburg  a  Field  Marshal  and  Suvorof 
a  Count  of  the  Empire.  Catherine  presented  each 
commander  with  a  jewelled  sword,  and  Suvorof  received 
in  addition  the  title  of  Count  of  the  Ruimnik,  and  the 
Order  of  St.  Andrew  of  the  First  Class  with  a  device 
studded  with  diamonds. 

The  letter  which  he  wrote  to  Catherine  on  the  9th 
November  1789  is  in  his  most  overflowing  style : 

Most  Gracious  Sovereign — I  am  delighted  by  the 
attention  paid  to  my  old  services  toward  your  Highness 
in  your  Imperial  Highness's  most  gracious  order  to  me 
of  the  18th  October.  The  unlimited,  unexpected,  and 
undeserved  kindnesses  of  your  Majesty,  Great  Empress. 
I  am  now  like  a  newly  enrolled  recruit,  ready  to  give 
up  my  life  for  you.  When  by  divine  decree  it  comes 
to  me  to  take  leave  of  life  and  my  Motherland,  I  shall 
have  nothing  but  God  and  great  Catherine  !  And  bid 
farewell,  your  Highness,  to  the  means  of  my  approach 
to  the  lowest  step  of  your  Highness's  throne — my  great 
spirited  commander,  that  great  man,  Prince  Gregory 
Alexandrovitch  [Potyomkin].  May  the  lustre  of  this 
most  famous  age  of  your  monarchy  extend  to  the  last 
of  time  I  May  your  might  establish  blessings  in  Europe 
and  the  whole  world  !  In  conclusion  I  venture  to  fall 
at  the  sacred  feet  of  your  Imperial  Highness  and  will 
be  with  the  most  spotless  zeal  and  ardour,  most 
Gracious  Sovereign,  your  Imperial  Highness's  most 
obedient  and  most  humble 

Count  A.  Suvorof  Ruimnikski. 
To  his  daughter  he  wrote  with  equal  excitement : 

COMTESSE     DE     DEUX    EMPIRES,     DaRLING    NaTASHA 

SuvoROViE — A  cela,  ah  ha,  you  must  never  be  anything 
but  honest,  virtuous,  and  benevolent.  Tell  Sophia 
Ivanovna  and  the  sisters  that  I've  a  fever  in  my  inside, 


THE  SECOND  TURKISH  WAR       109 

and  who  can  prevent  it  ?  Have  you  heard  yet,  little 
sister,  my  soul,  of  the  rescript  de  ma  magnanime  m^re  on 
a  half  sheet,  as  if  I  were  Alexander  of  Macedon,  emblems 
of  the  St.  Andrew,  fifty  thousand,  aye,  and  above  all, 
darling,  the  first  Class  of  the  St.  George.  There's  your 
daddy !  It's  true  I  just  didn't  die  of  joy.  God's 
blessing  on  you  !  ^ 

To  Major-General  de  Ribas  he  wrote,  in  French,  of 
his  delight  in  Coburg's  friendship : 

I  shall  never  forget  this  fine  honesty,  so  rare,  perhaps 
unexampled,  of  which  I  am  unchangingly  sensible, 
without  the  least  shade  of  distrust.  Our  little  army 
lived  on  brotherly  terms  and  showed  its  worthiness  ; 
duplicity,  equivocation,  enigmas  were  strictly  forbidden 
in  its  ranks. 2 

When  all  the  troops  had  retired  into  winter  quarters 
he  continued  to  correspond  with  Coburg.  On  the 
30th  December  the  latter  wrote  to  him  from  Bucharest : 

The  applause  of  the  universe  is  not  so  sweet  to  me 
as  the  pleasure  of  my  honourable  friend,  to  whom  I  owe 
the  greater  part  of  the  reputation  that  I  have  made.^ 

For  the  time  being  Suvorof  had  everything  that  he 
could  desire,  victory,  fame,  honours,  and  distinctions, 
and  the  unstinted  admiration  of  a  man  who  could  not 
compete  with  him  in  the  favour  of  the  Empress.  After 
a  quiet  winter  he  looked  forward  to  fresh  triumphs  and 
fresh  rewards. 

He  was  in  the  end  not  disappointed.  But  he  had 
to  wait  a  long  time.  The  campaign  of  1790  began  under 
the  threat  of  political  complications,  and  ended  as 
inconclusively  as  that  of  1789.  After  the  Ruimnik, 
Potyomkin,  by  bribery  and  a  show  of  force,  had  obtained 
the  surrender  of  Bendyeri  on  the  Dnyestr,  and  the 
Austrians  had  entered  Belgrad.  The  frontier  line  of 
defences  was  thus  effectively  pierced,  and  the  road  was 

^  Istoritcheskii  Vyestnik  (1900),  Ixxx.  532. 
2  Martchenko,  33.  »  Schmidt,  i. 


110  SUVOROF 

open  for  a  serious  invasion  of  Turkey.  Suvorof  drew 
up  an  elaborate  plan,  he  himself  to  cross  at  Brailof, 
and  Coburg  at  Zhurzha  and  Rushtshuk.  But  the 
energy  of  Potyomkin  was  more  than  ever  paralysed  by 
Prussian  intrigues  in  Poland,  and  a  large  part  of  his 
army  was  despatched  to  watch  that  frontier.  Austria, 
also,  was  nervous  about  Prussia,  and,  after  an  unex- 
pected and  disastrous  failure  of  Coburg  before  Zhurzha 
in  April,  ceased  to  take  an  active  part  in  the  war.  On 
the  19th  September  Coburg  signed  an  armistice,  which 
was  ultimately  merged  in  a  definite  treaty  of  peace. 
Suvorof  at  the  time  of  the  armistice  was  already  on 
his  way  to  join  forces  with  Coburg,  and  had  to  retire 
without  delay,  to  avoid  being  cut  off.  The  Polish 
danger  and  this  loss  of  Austrian  help  made  a  thorough 
defeat  of  Turkey  impossible,  though  the  successful 
conclusion  of  the  Swedish  war  in  August  lessened  the 
strain  on  the  Russian  resources.  Potyomkin  therefore 
opened  negotiations  with  the  Porte  at  Jassy.  By  this 
time  Suvorof  had  done  little  except  occupy  Galatz  on 
the  Danube,  and  equip  a  small  fleet  of  armed  boats. 

Two  letters  which  he  received  from  Coburg  after  the 
conclusion  of  the  Austrian  armistice  seem  to  deserve 
quotation.  They  serve  the  purpose  of  a  mirror,  reflect- 
ing his  character  as  well  as  expressing  that  of  his 
correspondent.  The  first  was  written  immediately 
after  the  suspension  of  hostilities  : 

No  !  my  adored  teacher  !  My  complete  devotion 
to  you  will  never  be  diminished,  however  space  and 
time  may  divide  us.  I  hope,  dear  Prince,  that  our 
separation  will  not  be  perpetual,  and  that  I  shall  yet 
be  so  happy  as  to  have  once  more  the  advantage  of 
your  good  counsel  and  example  to  bear  terror  and 
despair  among  the  infidels.^ 

The  second  was  written  on  the  13th  October : 

I  must  leave  you  on  Wednesday  next  to  take  up 
my  new  command  in  Hungary.     Nothing  grieves  me  so 

1  Pyetrof,  ii.  131. 


THE  SECOND  TURKISH  WAR       111 

much  at  my  departure  as  the  idea  of  going  still  further 
away  from  you,  my  worthy  and  precious  friend  ! 

I  have  appreciated  all  your  magnanimity.  The 
bonds  of  our  friendship  have  been  formed  by  events 
of  the  greatest  importance,  and  on  every  occasion  I  have 
had  to  admire  you  as  a  hero  and  to  cherish  you  as  a 
man  of  the  greatest  worth. 

Judge  yourself,  my  incomparable  master,  of  the 
sorrow  that  I  experience  in  separating  from  a  man 
who  has  so  much  claim  to  my  special  esteem  and  attach- 
ment. You  alone  can  sweeten  the  bitterness  of  my  lot 
by  keeping  for  me  the  affection  with  which  you  have 
honoured  me  up  to  the  present,  and  I  protest  with  all 
sincerity  that  the  frequent  assurance  of  your  friendship 
is  absolutely  necessary  to  my  happiness. 

I  cannot  bring  myself  to  say  goodbye  in  person  ; 
it  would  be  too  painful  for  me.  Judge  of  my  feelings 
by  your  own.  I  must  therefore  confine  myself  to 
assuring  you  of  my  most  lively  affection.  I  beg  you 
to  continue  to  show  the  same  to  me  ;  until  now  it  has 
been  the  joy  of  my  military  career. 

In  return,  my  most  worthy  friend,  you  may  count 
on  my  regard  without  bounds.  You  will  always  be  the 
dearest  friend  that  heaven  has  given  me,  and  no  one 
will  ever  have  as  much  claim  to  the  high  esteem  with 
which,  etc.^ 

This  is  not  the  language  of  flattery,  but  of  friendship, 
and  Coburg's  letters  suggest  a  quality  in  Suvorof  which 
is  not  often  to  be  discovered  in  his  own. 

But  even  letters  of  this  kind  could  hardly  relieve  the 
blackness  of  Suvorof  s  outlook.  A  whole  year  had  been 
wasted,  and  it  was  already  almost  time  to  go  again 
into  winter  quarters.  At  last  Potyomkin,  realising  that 
negotiations  with  Turkey  are  useless  unless  words  are 
supported  by  threats,  was  roused  to  the  conception  of 
a  campaign  on  the  lower  Danube.  The  Turkish  fleet 
on  the  Black  Sea  was  crippled  by  Vice-Admiral  Ushakof , 
and  with  the  aid  of  a  river  flotilla  under  Major-General 
de  Ribas,  the  fortresses  of  Tultchi  and  Isaktchi  were 
taken  in  September.     Here  the  tide  stopped,  and  two 

1  Campagnes,  ii.  106. 


112  SUVOROF 

armies,  under  Lieutenant-Generals  Samoilof  and  Pavel 
Potyomkin,  remained  passive  under  the  walls  of  Izmail, 
until  such  time  as  the  jealousy  of  the  two  Commanders 
should  subside.  A  vigorous  artillery  attack  was  carried 
on  from  the  boats  on  the  river  and  some  batteries  erected 
on  the  opposite  bank,  but  it  was  impossible  by  this, 
without  the  co-operation  of  the  land  forces,  to  do  more 
than  shake  the  defences  of  the  formidable  fortress. 

The  besiegers  grew  dispirited,  and  the  defenders  cor- 
respondingly elated.  The  Russian  transport  was,  as 
usual,  bad,  and  food  supplies  ran  short.  Even  officers 
had  sometimes  to  dine  off  tea  and  a  little  bread,  or  go 
without  any  dinner  at  all,  and  the  fodder  for  the  horses 
was  very  inferior.  To  a  demand  for  a  surrender  the 
Pasha  of  Izmail  replied  that  he  saw  nothing  to  be  afraid 
of.^  He  was  quite  right.  Without  a  change  in  the 
methods  of  attack,  the  place  would  hold  out  as  long  as 
Otchakof,  and  the  besiegers  would  die  in  their  camps  of 
cold,  hunger,  and  scurvy  long  before  the  garrison  began 
to  suffer  any  privations.  At  last,  resolving  upon  a  bold 
stroke,  the  elder  Potyomkin  broke  off  negotiations  with 
the  enemy,  and  at  the  beginning  of  December  sent 
Suvorof  to  take  supreme  command  of  all  the  Russian 
troops  before  Izmail,  and  capture  the  place  at  all  costs. 
On  the  16th  he  wrote  : 

My  hope  is  in  God  and  your  bravery.  According 
to  my  orders  to  you,  your  presence  on  the  spot  will 
unite  all  parties.  There  are  many  generals  there  of 
equal  rank,  everywhere  the  cause  of  a  sort  of  nest  of 
indecision.  Survey  and  arrange  everything.  Pray  God 
and  set  to  work.  There  are  weak  spots,  if  only  you  go 
together.^ 

Suvorof  had  offended  Potyomkin  at  Otchakof.  But 
he  remained  the  indispensable  tool  of  his  ambition. 
Samoilof  and  the  other  Potyomkin  had  just  determined 
to  abandon  the  enterprise.     On  the  13th  Suvorof  arrived 

1  Letters  of  Count  Tchernishef ;  Russ.  Arkh.  (1871),  385  et  seq. 
2  Rtiss,  Star.  (1876),  640. 


THE  SECOND  TURKISH  WAR       113 

at  the  place,  turning  back  some  detachments  which 
were  already  on  their  way,  "  in  devilish  wind  and  snow,"  ^ 
into  winter  quarters.  He  at  once,  after  reconnoitring 
the  ground,  resolved  upon  a  storm.  In  August  1789 
Prince  Ryepnin  had  reached  Izmail  and  severely  battered 
the  walls  with  his  field  artillery.  But  he  also  had  shrunk 
from  ordering  a  storm,  and  the  second  withdrawal  of 
a  Russian  army  had  increased  the  confidence  of    the 


J   JkE  STORM  OF  IZMAIL. 


Russian 
Batten 


I 


garrison.  It  made  no  difference  to  that  of  Suvorof.  It 
was  too  late  to  begin  a  siege,  and  a  storm  was  inevit- 
able. 

The  fortress  of  Izmail  was  a  bastion  of  the  Dobrudzha, 
projecting  into  Bessarabia  on  some  hard  ground  among 
the  swamps  and  lakes  of  the  northern  bank  of  the 
lower  Danube.  It  formed  an  irregular  quadrilateral,  of 
which  the  southern  side,  a  mile  and  a  quarter  long,  was 
formed  by  the  river  bank.  The  western  face  ran  at 
right  angles  from  the  river  for  a  distance  of  about 

1  Russ.  Arkh.  (1871),  398. 

I 


lU  SUVOROF 

1600  yards.  The  eastern  face  was  about  1100  yards 
long.  Except  along  the  river  front,  the  whole  was 
surrounded  by  a  strong  wall  of  earth,  varying  in  height 
from  20  to  30  feet,  and  a  ditch  40  feet  wide  and,  in  some 
parts,  28  feet  deep.  At  the  river  end  of  the  western 
wall  stood  a  great  two-storied  redoubt  of  stone,  and  at 
intervals  along  the  wall  were  projecting  bastions.  The 
river- side  had  no  wall,  but  it  was  defended  by  ten 
batteries,  mounting  85  guns  and  15  mortars,  and  a 
large  fleet  of  armed  boats  of  various  sizes.  The  whole 
perimeter  of  the  place  was  about  four  miles  and  around 
it  were  disposed  200  guns.  On  the  western  side  there 
were  two  gates,  and  on  the  northern  and  eastern  one 
each.  The  garrison  of  35,000  men,  amply  supplied  with 
ammunition  and  foodstuffs,  could  reasonably  expect  to 
hold  it  against  any  but  a  greatly  superior  force,  equipped 
with  a  complete  siege  train. 

Against  this  formidable  place  Suvorof  brought  some 
30,000  men,  nearly  half  of  them  Cossacks  armed  with 
long  lances,  and  no  siege  artillery  at  all.  The  only 
possible  method  of  taking  it  was  a  storm,  and  the 
prospects  of  a  successful  attempt  at  storming  a  fortress, 
surrounded  by  lofty  walls  and  defended  by  forces  superior 
in  numbers  to  those  of  the  attack,  were  very  poor. 
But  this  was  not  the  first  occasion  on  which  Suvorof 
had  violated  rules  in  dealing  with  the  Turks,  and  he 
delayed  not  an  hour  in  beginning  his  preparations. 
Nevertheless,  he  warned  Potyomkin  that  failure  was 
possible.  On  the  14th  he  wrote  that  the  field  artillery 
had  very  little  ammunition.  "  I  cannot  promise,  God 
is  wroth,  and  mercy  depends  on  His  Providence.  The 
generals  and  troops  burn  with  zeal  for  the  service."  ^ 
To  the  enemy  he  showed  a  confident  front.  At  2 
o'clock  on  the  18th  he  sent  in  to  the  Turkish  Com- 
mander Potyomkin' s  letter,  which  had  arrived  before 
him,  demanding  the  surrender  of  the  town,  and  he 
added  a  brief  note  of  his  own. 

1  Quoted  in  Orlof,  Shturm  Izmaila,  42. 


THE  SECOND  TURKISH  WAR        115 

To  the  Seraskir,  chiefs,  and  all  people — I  have  come 
here  with  troops.  Twenty-four  hours  for  deliberation 
— ^free  choice ;  my  first  volley — free  choice  no  more  ; 
storm  is  death.     This  I  leave  to  your  consideration. 

Then  he  set  his  men  to  work  cutting  timber  for  ladders 
and  fascines,  and  throwing  up  two  batteries,  400  yards 
from  the  river  end  of  each  of  the  eastern  and  western 
walls.  These  batteries  were  armed  with  40  12-pounder 
guns,  the  largest  available.  The  Seraskir  delayed  his 
reply  till  the  evening  of  the  19th,  but  the  officer  who 
received  Suvorof's  letter  told  the  Russian  who  brought 
it  that  the  Danube  would  stand  still  in  its  course  and 
heaven  fall  to  earth  before  Izmail  would  be  surrendered.^ 
The  formal  answer  was  less  defiant.  Calling  with 
Prussian  fervour  upon  the  name  of  God,  the  Turk 
protested  that  he  and  his  men  would  die  rather  than 
surrender.  Nevertheless,  if  Suvorof  would  wait  ten 
days,  he  was  ready  to  communicate  with  the  Grand 
Vizier  on  the  subject.  Suvorof  thereupon,  by  way  of 
complying  with  the  regulations,  called  a  council  of  war. 
The  youngest  officer  present,  the  Cossack  brigadier 
Platof,  cried  out  "  Storm  !  "  and  there  was  no  dissent. 
The  22nd  was  fixed  for  the  attempt,  and  with  his  usual 
bold  confidence  in  his  troops,  Suvorof  directed  that 
they  should  be  informed  of  the  strength  of  the  place, 
the  numbers  of  the  garrison,  its  guns,  and  all  the 
difficulties  that  lay  before  them. 

An  eye-witness  thus  described  him  as  he  rode  among 
his  men : 

He  was  not  tall,  he  had  a  big  mouth,  his  face  was  not 
altogether  pleasant ;  but  his  glance  was  fiery,  quick 
and  unusually  penetrating ;  his  whole  forehead  was 
covered  with  wrinkles,  and  no  wrinkles  could  be  so 
eloquent ;  on  his  head,  grey  with  age  and  the  work^of 
war,  only  a  few  hairs  were  left. 

Jack  boots,  badly  polished,  badly  sewn,  broad  top 
flaps  above  the  knee,  trousers,  underclothing  of  white 

1  Orlof. 


116  SUVOROF 

dimity,  shirt  of  the  same  material,  with  yellow  nankeen 
or  linen  facings,  lapels  and  collar ;  white  waistcoat, 
little  hat  with  yellow  brim,  such  was  the  uniform  of  the 
hero  of  the  Ruimnik  at  all  seasons  of  the  year ;  attire 
the  more  strange  that  sometimes,  on  account  of  two 
old  wounds  in  the  knee  and  the  leg,  which  greatly 
bothered  him,  he  was  compelled  to  wear  a  boot  on  one 
leg  and  a  slipper  on  the  other.  If  the  cold  was  extra- 
ordinary he  put  on  a  cloth  shirt  of  the  same  material 
and  colour.  As  a  rule  he  wore  only  his  order  of  St. 
Andrew,  but  on  important  occasions  he  put  them  all  on.^ 

"There,'*  he  declared,  "is  the  fortress.  Its  walls 
are  high,  its  ditches  deep,  but  we  must  take  it.  Our 
Empress  Mother  has  ordered  it  and  we  must  obey  her." 
"  With  you  we'll  take  it,"  they  replied.*  Officers  and 
men,  in  spite  of  the  long  delay,  the  bad  weather,  and  the 
deficiency  of  supplies,  were  worked  up  to  the  highest 
point  of  resolution  by  the  presence  of  Suvorof.  Many 
volunteers  and  foreigners  were  on  the  spot,  and  asked 
for  posts  in  the  storming  parties.  In  the  result  there 
was  an  unusual  proportion  of  officers  engaged  in  the 
attack.  Colonels  commanded  battalions  instead  of 
regiments,  some  had  under  them  only  a  few  score 
sharpshooters,  and  others  marched  with  the  columns 
without  any  command  at  all.  All  were  eager  to  share 
in  the  inevitable  success  of  the  enterprise.^ 

At  dawn  on  the  21st  the  batteries  and  the  armed 
boats  in  the  river  opened  fire,  and  the  40  heavy  guns 
on  the  land  and  the  567  light  guns  on  the  water  poured 
a  hail  of  shot  of  all  sizes  upon  the  walls  and  batteries. 
The  Turks  at  first  replied  vigorously,  and  a  Russian 

1  Russ.  Invalid.  (1827). 

«  Schmidt. 

'  Russ.  Arkh.  (1876).  The  best-known  names  among  those  of  the 
foreign  vohmteers  are  De  Ribas,  Richelieu,  and  Langeron  of  the  French, 
and  the  Prince  de  Ligne  of  the  Austrians.  A  Russian  volunteer  thus 
refers  to  the  French  :  "  They  are  all,  like  true  Frenchmen,  delightful 
but  frivolous  people,  gay  dogs,  and  feather-pated"  (Russ.  Arkh.  (1871), 
394).  A  variation  of  the  English  convention :  "  a  gay  and  polite 
people,  fond  of  dancing  and  light  wines." 


THE  SECOND  TURKISH  WAR       117 

brigantine  was  blown  up  and  lost  with  her  crew  of  200 
men.  But  the  Russian  artillery  as  usual  was  superior 
to  the  Turkish,  and  the  latter  was  eventually  silenced. 
The  Russian  fire  continued  until  past  midnight  on  the 
morning  of  the  22nd.  At  3  o'clock  the  guns  ceased, 
and  a  rocket  gave  the  signal  for  the  assembly  of  the 
storming  columns.  At  half -past  5,  shrouded  in  mist, 
they  moved  in  silence  towards  the  walls. 

Six  points  had  been  selected  for  the  land  attacks, 
and  three  for  boat  landings.  Two  columns  attacked 
the  western  face,  three  the  northern,  and  one  the  eastern, 
and  only  the  western  and  eastern  faces  had  been  previ- 
ously battered  by  artillery.  Two  of  the  northern 
columns,  the  fourth  and  the  fifth,  were  faced  with  tasks 
of  frightful  difficulty.  They  were  composed  of  dis- 
mounted Cossacks  armed  with  long  pikes,  the  most 
unsuitable  of  all  weapons  for  close  fighting  against 
swordsmen  like  the  Turks  ;  and  there  was  no  opening 
of  any  sort  in  the  wall  before  them  except  the  Bendyeri 
gate.  The  fifth  column,  also,  had  to  descend  into  the 
miry  gully  which  divided  the  fortress  into  two  parts, 
called  the  Old  Fortress  and  the  New,  and  climb  the 
unbreached  wall  which  ran  across  it.  The  third  column 
found  its  forty-feet  ladders  too  short,  and  had  to  tie 
two  together  before  any  man  could  reach  the  top  of  the 
wall.  Under  these  circumstances  it  is  not  surprising 
that  the  first  successes  occurred  on  the  eastern  and 
western  sides. 

The  enemy  had  been  warned  by  deserters,  and  some 
of  the  columns  were  seen  as  they  approached  the  ditch. 
But  one  moved  quietly  through  the  mist,  guided  by  the 
faint  glimmer  of  the  stonework  of  a  bastion,  passed  a 
watch-dog  chained  on  the  near  side  of  the  ditch,  and 
got  on  to  the  wall  before  the  drowsy  and  confident 
defenders  opened  fire.  The  first  and  second  columns 
were  seen  as  they  approached  from  the  west,  and  were 
received  with  a  torrent  of  musketry  and  artillery  fire. 
The  marksmen  attached  to  each  column  scattered  along 


118  SUVOROF 

the  edge  of  the  ditch  and  opened  fire  upon  the  Turks 
on  the  wall,  while  the  main  bodies  pushed  boldly  forward. 
The  great  redoubt  near  the  river's  edge  was  an  insur- 
mountable obstacle,  and  the  first  column,  under  Major- 
General  Lvof,  passing  right  under  its  walls,  rushed  at 
the  palisade  which  connected  it  with  the  first  of  the 
shore  batteries.  The  timber  was  climbed  or  beaten 
down,  and  the  nearest  batteries  were  taken  with  the 
bayonet.  A  violent  sortie  from  the  redoubt  was  driven 
in,  and  Lvof,  who  had  been  the  first  man  over  the  palisade, 
led  part  of  his  colunm  round  the  inside  of  the  redoubt 
towards  the  nearest,  or  Brosskii  Gate.  He  and  his 
second  in  command  were  wounded,  but  the  troops 
pressed  on,  burst  open  the  gate,  and  went  on  to  the 
second,  or  Khotin  Gate.  Here  they  joined  forces  with 
the  second  column  under  Major-General  Lassii.  These 
troops  had  scrambled  over  the  wall  of  a  lunette  to  the 
north  of  the  first  gate,  and  were  now  driving  the  enemy 
before  them  into  the  town.  Through  the  opened  gates 
the  reserves  poured  into  the  fortress,  and  on  the  western 
side  the  most  difficult  part  of  the  Russian  task  had  been 
performed. 

The  sixth  column,  under  Major-General  Kutuzof,^ 
was  the  next  to  get  a  footing  within  the  walls.  It 
carried  the  bastion  opposite  the  Russian  battery,  but 
the  defenders  received  reinforcements,  and  a  stubborn 
fight  on  the  wall  was  only  decided  by  the  arrival  of  the 
Russian  reserves.  The  victors  then  pushed  on  towards 
the  north.  In  the  meantime  the  flotilla  under  Major- 
General  de  Ribas  had  discharged  its  landing  parties 
among  the  shore  batteries,  and  a  junction  was  soon 
effected  with  Kutuzof .  Three  sides  of  the  fortress  were 
now  in  Russian  hands,  though  the  Turks  continued  to 
resist  fiercely  among  the  neighbouring  buildings. 

The  columns  which  attacked  from  the  north,  without 
artillery  preparation,  had,  as  was  to  be  expected,  met 

*  Later  famous  as  the  conqueror  of  Napoleon,  and  later  still,  more 
famous  yet  as  the  autocthonous  hero  of  Tolstoy's  War  and  Peace. 


THE  SECOND  TURKISH  WAR       119 

with  less  success.  The  third,  attacking  the  north- 
eastern angle,  spliced  its  ladders  together  under  fire, 
and  not  until  all  its  reserves  were  brought  up  did  it 
succeed  in  getting  a  firm  footing  on  the  wall.  There  it 
divided  and  advanced  to  right  and  left,  pushing  the 
Turks  before  it.  The  fourth  column  attacked  to  the 
east  of  the  Bendyeri  Gate,  and  was  actually  cut  in  half 
by  a  furious  sally.  The  pikes  of  the  unfortunate 
Cossacks  were  deadly  when  their  bearers  were  on 
horseback,  but  even  when  shortened  to  five  feet,  they 
were  almost  useless  encumbrances  when  the  bearers 
were  dismounted,  and  they  proved  a  feeble  defence 
against  the  scimitars  of  the  raging  Janissaries.  For 
some  bloody  minutes  the  latter  stormed  with  impunity 
among  their  adversaries.  The  column  was  saved  by 
the  timely  arrival  of  some  squadrons  of  horse,  and  the 
diversion  provided  by  the  success  of  the  fifth  column, 
further  to  the  east,  enabled  the  Cossacks  at  last  to  mount 
the  obstacle  in  front  of  them  and  join  hands  with  their 
comrades.  The  fifth  column  itself  had  also  suffered 
greatly.  The  final  rush  was  led  by  Trophim  Kutkinskii, 
a  regimental  priest,  who  was  himself  hit  three  times, 
two  of  the  bullets  rebounding  from  his  cross.  After  a 
fierce  struggle  the  fifth  column  joined  with  the  fourth 
and  sixth,  and  the  circle  about  the  doomed  Turks  was 
complete.     It  was  now  about  8  o'clock. 

There  followed  a  ferocious  combat,  into  and  through 
the  streets  of  the  town.  The  Turks  fought  like  trapped 
animals,  and  the  Russians  spared  none.  Every  house 
and  garden  became  a  fortress  in  miniature,  and  the 
large  khans  or  inns,  stone  buildings  surrounding  court- 
yards, were  especially  formidable.  One  after  another 
these  were  battered  to  pieces  by  artillery,  or  taken  with 
the  bayonet,  and  every  one  of  the  defenders  was  killed. 
The  cordon  drew  closer.  A  few  isolated  buildings  held 
out,  notably  a  great  khan  near  the  western  redoubt, 
where  Aidos-Mekhmet  himself  with  2000  men  and  a 
few  guns  continued  to  resist.     But  the  process  of  hunting 


120  SUVOROF 

out  and  killing  went  on  steadily,  and  only  fatigue  com- 
pelled the  Russians  at  last  in  some  cases  to  give  quarter. 
The  Turkish  Commander  finally  offered  to  surrender, 
and  was  permitted  to  evacuate  his  stronghold.  Un- 
happily, one  of  his  Janissaries  fired  a  pistol  and  killed 
the  Russian  officer  who  was  superintending  the  disarming 
of  the  prisoners,  and  all  of  them,  including  Aidos- 
Mekhmet,  were  killed  on  the  spot.^  In  the  great 
redoubt  and  a  few  other  strong  places,  which  held  out 
until  the  Russians  were  exhausted  with  killing,  the 
garrisons  were  taken  alive.  In  all,  9000  Turks  were 
made  prisoners.  By  11  o'clock  all  was  over.  A  few 
of  the  defenders  may  have  escaped.  A  few  more  may 
have  succeeded  in  concealing  themselves  in  the  town. 
But  of  the  whole  garrison  of  35,000  men,  not  less  than 
25,000  must  have  been  killed.  That  is  to  say,  the 
Russian  troops,  after  storming  formidable  defences,  in 
sheer  hand-to-hand  fighting  had  killed  a  number  of 
Turks  equal  to  that  of  their  own  entire  force.  Such  a 
feat  of  arms  is  almost  without  a  parallel  in  history. 
The  sequel  was  as  horrible  as  the  storm  itself.  The 
garrison  were  the  instruments  of  the  most  slovenly 
tyranny  that  ever  abused  a  conquered  province.  But 
the  inhabitants  of  the  town  were  not  all  Turks,  and  many 
of  them  were  better  disposed  towards  the  Russians 
than  towards  the  defenders.  Nevertheless,  the  town 
was  sacked,  and  every  form  of  violence  was  committed 
against  these  wretched  people.  An  enormous  booty 
was  obtained,  and  three  days  of  unlimited  licence,  in 
accordance  with  military  custom,  compensated  the 
victorious    soldiery    for    their    fatigues.^    The    private 

^  The  facts  are  in  dispute.  Some  authorities  say  that  a  Russian 
snatched  at  the  Turkish  leader's  jewelled  dagger,  and  that  the  Janissary, 
firing  at  him,  killed  the  officer  instead  ;  others  that  an  Englishman 
named  Foot,  an  officer  in  the  Russian  flotilla,  tried  to  seize  Aidos- 
Mekhmet,  who  himself  killed  his  assailant. 

*  English  readers  should  perhaps  be  reminded  that  Wellington's 
troops  in  the  Peninsula  enjoyed  the  same  licence.  At  Badajoz,  Ciudad 
Rodrigo,  and  San  Sebastian  the  Spanish  inhabitants  suffered  every 
atrocity  at  the  hands  of  the  English,  who  had  come  to  save  them  from 


THE  SECOND  TURKISH  WAR       121 

plunder  could  not  be  reckoned.  But  265  guns,  100,000 
pounds  of  powder,  20,000  shells,  400  flags,  and  52  ships 
and  boats  were  included  in  the  official  lists.  The  price 
was  officially  estimated  at  1815  killed  and  2400  wounded. 
But  this  was  mere  guess-work,  and  it  would  be  safe  to 
assert  that  400  officers  and  9000  men  were  either  killed 
or  wounded.^  Six  days  were  occupied  in  carrying  away 
the  dead.  The  Russians  were  buried,  the  Turks  were 
flung  into  the  river.  The  losses  in  officers  had  been  very 
heavy  during  the  attacks  upon  the  wall,  and  it  says 
much  for  the  gallantry  of  those  who  led  the  stormers 
that,  out  of  the  original  commanders  and  their  substi- 
tutes, five  were  wounded  and  one  killed.^ 

For  ten  days  after  this  sensational  feat  Suvorof 
remained  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Izmail.  Then  he 
went  to  Jassy,  where  Potyomkin,  full  of  self-satisfaction 
and  good-will,  prepared  a  triumphal  reception.  The 
streets  were  decorated,  and  an  adjutant  was  posted  at 
a  window,  to  give  warning  to  Potyomkin  of  Suvorof  s 
approach.  Accidentally  or  of  set  purpose,  the  conqueror 
of  Izmail  entered  Jassy  by  night,  and  lodged  with  an 
old  acquaintance,  the  Prefect  of  the  Police.  The  next 
morning,  he  set  out  for  Potyomkin' s  residence  in  the 
Prefect's  old-fashioned  carriage,  with  two  men  on  the 
footboard.  The  officer  on  the  watch  informed  Pot- 
yomkin, but  Suvorof  was  too  quick,  leapt  up  the  staircase, 
and  encountered  the  grandee,  hurrying  forward  with 
the  effusive  readiness  of  a  patron,  almost  at  the  top 
of  the  staircase.     They  embraced  each  other.     "  With 

the  French.  Nevertheless,  one  aspect  of  the  sacking  of  Izmail  is 
original.  Suvorof  permitted  the  officers  to  keep  for  themselves  any 
of  the  prisoners  whom  they  pleased,  of  either  sex,  on  a  written  promise 
to  feed  and  lodge  them  and  treat  them  humanely  (Campagnes,  ii.  146). 
The  share  of  the  Prince  de  Ligne  included  valuable  weapons,  Arab 
horses,  and  twelve  Turkish  musicians.     Rtiss.  Star.  (1892),  Ixxiii.  572, 

1  Campagnes,  ii.  109  et  seq.  ;  Pyetrof,  ii.  165  et  seq.  ;  "  Memoirs  of 
Denisof"  in  Buss.  Star.  (1874);  Prince  de  Ligne,  CEuvres  Militaires, 
xiii. ;  Orlof,  Shturm  Izmaila.  A  facsimile  of  Suvorof  s  MS.  report  is 
in  the  Warsaw  Sbornik.  A  vivid  personal  account  of  the  storm  is  in 
the  Russ.  Arkh.  (1905),  i.  138. 


122  SUVOROF 

what  can  I  reward  your  services,  Count  Alexander 
Vassilyevitch  ?  **  exclaimed  Potyomkin.  Suvorof  drew 
back,  and  harshly  replied,  "  With  nothing,  Prince.  I 
am  not  a  merchant,  and  have  not  come  here  to  trade. 
No  one  can  reward  me  but  God  and  the  Empress.'* 
Potyomkin  was  visibly  taken  aback,  and  accepted 
Suvorof's  written  report  with  a  few  formal  words.  They 
never  met  again  on  friendly  terms,  and  Suvorof  lost 
his  most  powerful  advocate  before  the  Empress,  at  the 
time  when  he  most  needed  a  shield  against  the  darts 
of  professional  jealousy.^ 

His  conduct  was  highly  impolitic,  if  not  unnatural. 
Potyomkin' s  admiration  was  probably  genuine,  and  he 
had  certainly  every  reason  to  be  grateful  to  Suvorof. 
He  himself  could  only  hope  for  that  sort  of  greatness 
which  consists  in  being  the  acknowledged  patron  of 
those  whose  own  greatness  is  apparent  to  the  world. 
Like  Louis  XIV.,  he  could  shine  only  by  the  reflection  of 
the  glory  of  his  ministers.  He  was  accordingly  generous 
so  long  as  he  did  not  see  in  his  famous  subordinate 
a  potential  rival.  His  goodwill  towards  Suvorof  was 
probably  less  likely  to  be  affected  by  jealousy,  because 
from  such  an  abrupt,  fantastic,  and  untactful  man  he 
had  no  reason  to  fear  rivalry  in  the  Court  itself,  the 
only  field  in  which  he  was  really,  in  the  last  resort, 
afraid  of  rivalry.  He  could  therefore  afford  to  give 
full  play  to  his  willingness  to  please,  and  if  he  was  the 
self-conscious  favourite  of  the  Empress,  he  was  none 
the  less  the  man  who  had  given  Suvorof  the  opportunity 
of  taking  Izmail,  and  might  without  impropriety  claim 
the  privilege  of  rewarding  him.  But  Suvorof  on  his 
side  was  inflated  with  victory.  He  had  done  something 
that  no  man  had  ever  done  before,  and  felt  that  he 
could  now  at  last  stand  on  his  own  feet.  Potyomkin 
was  immeasurably  his  inferior  as  a  soldier,  and  had 
first  left  him  in  the  lurch  at  Otchakof ,  and  then  rebuked 
him  for  insubordination.     He  now  needed  him  no  more, 

1  Suin  Otyetchestva  (1849). 


THE  SECOND  TURKISH  WAR       123 

and  his  present  arrogance  was  proportioned  to  his  past 
humility. 

The  consequences  of  his  rebuff  to  Potyomkin  were 
immediate.  The  latter  wrote  to  Catherine  to  recommend 
Suvorof  for  promotion  :  "  Since  out  of  all  the  Generals- 
in-Chief,  he  alone  has  been  on  active  service  throughout 
the  campaign,  and,  so  to  speak,  has  saved  our  Allies, 
because  the  enemy,  seeing  our  approach,  never  dared 
to  attack  them,  would  it  not  be  gracious  to  distinguish 
him  by  the  rank  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  of  the  Guards 
or  General  Adjutant  ?  "  ^  The  Empress  agreed,  ordered 
a  special  medal  to  be  struck,  and  made  Suvorof  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel of  the  Pryeobrazhenski  Guards,  of  which 
she  herself  was  Colonel.  This  distinction,  often  bestowed 
upon  Generals  whose  services  had  been  terminated  by 
their  increasing  years,  gave  no  special  gratification  to 
Suvorof.  Potyomkin,  once  repelled,  was  not  inclined 
to  give  him  further  assistance,  and  neither  the  post  of 
General  Adjutant  nor  the  coveted  rank  of  Field  Marshal 
was  offered  to  him.  There  were  ten  other  Lieutenant- 
Colonels  of  the  Guards  having  precedence  over  him, 
and  he  had  the  additional  grievance  of  seeing  a  mere 
favourite  like  Potyomkin  himself  rewarded  with  an 
obelisk  at  Tsarskoe  Syelo,  a  Field  Marshal's  uniform 
sewn  with  brilliants,  and  200,000  roubles  in  money. 

He  had  not  even  the  reward  of  seeing  his  Empress 
reap  the  fruits  of  his  victories.  Her  original  plan  was 
to  create  out  of  Moldavia,  Wallachia,  and  Bessarabia  a 
Christian  State,  of  which  her  grandson  Constantine 
was  to  be  the  first  Prince.  But  the  Emperor  Leopold, 
who  had  succeeded  Joseph  on  the  throne  of  Austria  in 
1790,  if  he  could  not  win  victories  for  himself,  was  at 
least  determined  that  his  more  skilful  neighbours  should 
not  profit  by  theirs.  At  the  Congress  of  Reichenbach 
he  joined  with  the  King  of  Prussia  and  William  Pitt 
in  demanding  that  Catherine  should  surrender  all  her 

1  Russ.  Star.  (1876),  643.  The  rank  of  General  Adjutant  carried 
with  it  the  right  of  personal  access  to  the  Empress  at  any  time. 


124  SUVOROF 

conquests.  The  Empress  agreed  to  give  up  all  except 
Otchakof  and  the  empty  tracts  as  far  as  the  Dnyestr. 
Even  for  this  she  was  for  a  time  threatened  with  war, 
and  Pitt  displayed  great  energy  in  the  name  of  the 
Balance  of  Power.  But  the  Empress  held  out,  and  the 
combination  against  her  had  to  be  content  with  the 
surrender  of  all  the  populated  country  which  the  Russian 
armies  had  won.  Thus  all  Suvorof's  work  was  undone 
for  the  second  time.  And  thus  began  the  long  duel 
between  the  democracy  and  the  despotism  :  Russia, 
for  selfish  and  material  ends,  for  ever  working  out  the 
Divine  purpose,  and  Great  Britain,  the  champion  of 
nationality  and  constitutional  government,  for  ever 
thrusting  the  persecuted  subjects  of  the  Porte  back 
into  the  hands  of  their  cruel,  corrupt,  and  slovenly 
oppressors. 


CHAPTER  VI 


KICKING   HIS    HEELS 


Suvorof  at  Petersburg — Sent  to  Finland — Correspondence — Jealousy — 
On  military  hospitals — Craving  for  work — Daily  life — His  daughter 
— Books  and  newspapers — Ossian — ^Enjoys  a  wedding — Trans- 
ferred to  Kherson — Troubles  with  contractors  and  the  Treasury — 
Hospitals  again — ^Letter  to  a  godson — A  French  war  threatened. 

After  leaving  Moldavia,  Suvorof  spent  three  months  in 
Petersburg.  During  that  time  he  contrived  to  offend 
not  a  few  persons  whom  he  might  well  have  left  alone. 
He  did  not  conceal  his  contempt  for  his  equals  in  rank, 
though,  in  fact,  some  of  them  were  far  from  incompetent. 
"  Is  it  true,"  asked  one  of  them,  "  that  you  don't  think 
much  of  tactics  ?  "  "Of  course,'*  sneered  Suvorof,  "  I 
don't  know  anything  of  tactics  ;  but  tactics  know  me  ; 
as  for  yourself,  you  seem  to  know  nothing  of  either 
tactics  or  practics."  Of  Kutuzof  he  declared  that  he 
was  "  a  clever  man  whom  even  Ribas  could  not  de- 
ceive "  ;  and  in  a  comparison  of  himself  with  Kam- 
yenski  and  Saltikof,  he  said  that  "  Kamyenski  knows 
all  about  war,  but  war  knows  nothing  of  him ;  I  don't 
know  anything  about  war,  but  war  knows  a  good  deal 
about  me  ;  and  as  for  Saltikof,  he  knows  nothing  of 
war,  and  war  knows  nothing  of  him."  ^  Suvorof  in 
fact  was  thoroughly  unhappy.  He  was  useless  as  a 
courtier,  and  while  he  avoided  the  dangerous  paths 
of  political  intrigue,  his  boredom  found  expression  in 

1  Schmidt,  ii.  7,  8. 
125 


126  SUVOROF 

unwise  gibes  and  sneers  against  persons  whose  accumu- 
lated antipathies  did  him  nothing  but  harm. 

He  wrote  in  one  letter  : 

Here  the  mornings  bore  me,  and  the  evenings  give 
me  a  headache  ;  the  change  of  climate  and  life.  Here 
the  language  and  manners  are  strange  to  me  ;  I  can 
make  mistakes  in  them  ;  so  my  situation  isn't  uniform 
— now  tedious,  now  gratifying.  In  this  short  time  it*s 
too  late  for  me  to  learn  field  sports,  which  I  have  never 
learned  up  to  now.  All  this  is  pastime,  not  active 
service  ;  between  stupidity  and  hell  I  see  no  difference. 
There  can't  be  any  contempt  for  me,  I'm  an  honest 
man.  God  will  pay  me.  Malicious  chatter,  even  for 
the  occasional  quenching  of  my  thirst — they  know  that 
it's  more  restrained  with  me  than  with  the  others.  My 
excursions  are  short ;  if  any  obstacles,  there  won't  be 
even  those.^ 

And  in  another  : 

Time  is  short,  the  end  approaches,  worn  out,  six 
years,  and  the  juice  will  be  squeezed  out  of  the  lemon  !  2 

A  change  of  scene  was  provided  for  him  by  Potyomkin. 
The  latter  had  decided  to  give  a  magnificent  entertain- 
ment to  the  Empress  on  the  9th  May.  His  health  was 
already  beginning  to  break  down,  and  Platon  Zubof  had 
already  supplanted  him  in  the  favour  of  Catherine.  But 
he  determined  that  he  should  set  in  a  blaze  of  glory, 
and  this  last  display  of  his,  to  celebrate  the  triumphant 
conclusion  of  the  Turkish  War,  was  to  be  the  most 
magnificent  of  all.  One  thing  alone  would  mar  his  own 
enjoyment :  the  presence  of  the  man  to  whom  his  fame 
was  actually  due.  At  all  costs,  Suvorof  must  not  be  on 
the  spot  to  be  shown  with  the  finger,  the  victor  of  the 
Ruimnik  and  the  hero  of  the  Storm  of  Izmail.  A  few 
days  before  the  great  holiday,  the  Empress  sent  for 

1  Vorontsof  Archives,  xxiv. ;  Journal  of  Khraponski,  26th  April-7th 
May  1791. 

2  Russ.  Star,  (1875),  iii.  242. 


KICKING  HIS  HEELS  127 

Suvorof,  and  told  him  that  he  was  urgently  needed  in 
Finland.     Two  days  later  he  wrote  to  her  from  Viborg : 

Most  Gracious  Sovereign — I  am  in  Finland  and 
waiting  for  your  orders. 

The  answer  was  a  rescript  ordering  him  to  survey 
the  frontier  and  decide  what  points  should  be  fortified 
to  strengthen  it  against  Sweden.^ 

In  his  new  field  of  action  Suvorof  spent  eighteen 
months.  In  that  time,  besides  strengthening  existing 
works,  he  erected  a  new  bastion  at  Neuschlott,  redoubts 
"x)n  the  Kyumen  Parta  and  at  Utti,  forts  at  Ostinoi  and 
Likola,  and  at  Rotchensalm  on  the  mainland  and  the 
neighbouring  islands  a  complete  fortress.  In  all,  his 
new  works  in  the  last  place  mounted  900  guns.  The 
last  was  a  very  thorough  piece  of  work,  and  Catherine 
declared  that  he  had  presented  her  with  a  new  port.^ 
This  sort  of  occupation,  though  it  was  within  his  capa- 
city, was  not  to  his  taste.  He  was  primarily  a  leader 
of  men,  and  he  devoted  himself  with  his  usual  energy 
to  the  improvement  of  the  condition  of  the  troops 
under  his  command.  These,  as  was  the  rule  with  Russian 
frontier  troops,  were  in  a  bad  state.  There  was  con- 
stant disease  with  a  high  rate  of  mortality,  and  deser- 
tions were  frequent. 

He  began  his  special  system  of  marches  and  sham 
fights,  and  apparently  made  a  considerable  improve- 
ment. But  work  brought  him  no  repose.  Other  officers 
were  nearer  the  fountain  of  honour  than  he,  and  were 
promoted  while  he  retained  his  old  rank.  War  was 
threatening  from  the  direction  of  France,  and  he  was 
not  asked  to  take  the  command.  Even  his  work  with 
the  troops  brought  complaints  of  his  severity,  and  echoes 
of  these  reached  him  from  Petersburg.  His  protests 
were  poured  into  his  correspondence  with  friends  and 
acquaintances  in  the  capital.     He  was  an  inveterate 

1  Russ,  Star.  (1900),  civ.  546. 

2  CampagneSy  ii.  150,  151. 


128  SUVOROF 

letter-writer,  and  very  many  of  his  letters  from  Finland 
have  been  preserved.  They  display,  among  other  things, 
his  vanity,  jealousy,  and  sensitiveness  to  criticism  at 
their  worst.  The  principal  recipient  of  these  cries  of 
resentment  was  Dmitri  Ivanovitch  Khvostof,  a  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel in  the  army  and  the  husband  of  Suvorof 's 
niece.^  He  was  a  diligent  reporter  of  all  the  gossip  of 
Petersburg,  and  in  return  received  the  long  succession 
of  his  relative's  protests.  The  earliest  of  these  were 
harpings  on  old  strings :  want  of  recognition  of  the  Storm 
of  Izmail,  resentment  against  Potyomkin,  and  the  favour 
shown  to  his  rivals.  Later  he  passed  to  the  pettiness 
of  his  work  in  Finland,  and  the  suggestions  that  he  was 
overtaxing  the  strength  of  his  troops,  showing  indiffer- 
ence to  their  health,  and  the  like.^ 

Thus  on  the  8th  August  1791  he  writes  to  Khvostof : 

Report  unpleasantly  minimizes  the  victory  of 
P.N.V.R.3  There  was  no  overthrow.  The  army  beats 
the  Vizier,  and  he's  generalissimus. 

And  in  the  same  month  he  sneers  at  another  com- 
petitor : 

C.N.I.S.  [Count  Nikolai  Saltikof]  somewhat  forti- 
fied, temporarily  and  locally,  by  me  and  my  zeal,  now 
exchanges  that  driving  force  for  petits  inUrits, 

Of  Rumyantzof  almost  alone  he  writes  with  respect : 

I  praise  the  talents  of  Count  Peter  Alexandrovitch 
[Rumyantzof].     He  picks  me  out,  I  acknowledge  that. 

1  Agrippina,  daughter  of  Suvorof  s  sister  Anna,  who  had  married 
Prince  Gortchakof  of  Moscow. 

^  These  letters  are  in  the  Sbornik.  Many  of  them  are  printed  in 
Schmidt's  second  volume,  the  Vorontsof  Archives y  Russkaya  Starina 
(1872)  and  elsewhere.  Some  are  dashed  off  in  such  a  style  as  to  be 
incomprehensible — even  to  Russians. 

»  Prince  Ryepnin's  victory  over  the  Turks  at  Matchin.  It  was  the 
final  blow  to  the  Turks,  and  immediately  afterwards  Ryepnin  signed 
a  provisional  treaty  of  peace.  Ryepnin  was  a  very  good  soldier  of  the 
formal  school,  an  aristocrat,  and  a  courtier.  All  three  things  made 
him  obnoxious  to  Suvorof. 


KICKING  HIS  HEELS  129 

But  he  wouldn't  have  liked  my  winter  weather,  because 
he'd  have  thought  it  dangerous  to  our  success.  ...  I 
showed  that  I  alone  would  be  strong  enough  all  through, 
but  look  at  all  that  gang  and  you'll  be  bound  to  acknow- 
ledge that  I  was  alone  and  insufficient. 

Then  on  the  21st  November  he  breaks  out  about 
Izmail  : 

The  Izmail  disgrace  has  not  dropped  out  of  my  mind. 
How  long  a  mere  general -adjutancy  drags  about  from 
Herod  to  Pilate,  from  Pilate  to  Herod  ;  it's  possible  to 
promise  and  put  it  off  till  the  peace,  till  the  next  war, 
till  the  next  peace  ;  the  object's  postponement — if  the 
barbarians  had  surrendered  by  capitulation  that's  little, 
but  by  storm's  life  and  reputation  .  .  .  Izmail  and  the 
consequences  of  my  device ;  the  general  who  took 
Anapa,^  at  every  step  the  same  dispositions,  and  wisely 
too.  The  Matchin  muddle  was  a  toad  to  a  bull  compared 
with  the  Ruimnik. 

Consider  how  I've  to  cut  off  from  the  part  I  first 
played  in  active  military  service,  to  which  I've  been 
accustomed  for  almost  as  many  years  as  you've  been  in 
this  world  ;  cast  about,  and  you'll  find  this  is  the  truth 
and  not  vanity,  though  often  I  seem  at  first  sight  to 
have  been  a  mere  scene-shifter.  In  1774,  when  I  was 
a  Major -General,  I  set  the  whole  great  machine  in 
motion,  from  that  came  Kozludzhi,  and  from  that 
Kainardzhi ;  so  before  and  after  ;  even  in  the  Prussian 
War  as  a  Lieutenant-Colonel  I  had  the  same  column  as 
my  General,  but  with  better  success.  Am  I  to  amputate 
the  man  I  am  by  nature,  and  make  him  a  mere  phan- 
tom ?  On  the  Volga  I  gave  orders  to  100,000  ;  in  the 
South  and  the  Crimea,  to  80,000.  What  magnificence 
have  I  here  with  a  dozen  battalions  !  When  they  gave 
a  better  army  to  Kakhovski  without  any  trouble  at  all. 
He  never  was  to  be  compared  with  me  in  command. 

In  the  same  month  of  November  he  passes  in  review 
a  whole  series  of  rivals  : 

Elmpt  was  taken  as  a  Captain  from  a  foreign 
army ;   I  was  a  sergeant  in  the  Guards.     Prince  Yurii 

*  A  fortress  in  Asia  Minor,  taken  by  Gudovitch  on  the  3rd  July  1791. 

K 


180  SUVOROF 

Dolgoruki  entered  the  service  at  the  same  time  as  my- 
self, but  he  had  been  enrolled  as  a  child  in  the  cradle. 
I  am  senior  to  all  the  others  in  years  and  service ;  they 
were  still  subalterns  when  I  was  already  a  senior  Major  ; 
but  they  have  all  pushed  past  me  ;  Count  Bruce,  as 
Adjutant  of  the  Guards  ;  Ivan  Petrovitch  Saltikof,  with 
the  title  of  Kammer-Junker  and  as  the  messenger 
of  the  victory  near  Frankfort  [Kunersdorf] ;  Nikolai 
Ivanovitch  Saltikof,  with  the  title  of  Quartermaster- 
General  and  as  the  bearer  of  flags  taken  at  Frankfort ; 
Ryepnin,  as  Adjutant  of  the  Guards  ;  Kamyenski,  as 
Quartermaster  and  in  the  artillery  ;  Mushin  Pushkin  ; 
Yurii  Dolgoruki,  they  were  all  subalterns,  when  I  was 
already  a  Staff  Officer. 

Then  again  : 

The  exploit  of  my  part  of  the  army  at  Kozludzhi 
(my  comrade  ran  away)  with  an  enormous  force,  sworn 
to  the  service  of  the  Sherif  of  the  Sandzhak,  was  better 
than  the  affair  at  Matchin,  100  standards  taken  against 
15  there  :  there  they  were  working  with  the  men  of 
the  Ruimnik  and  Izmail,  but  the  cavalry  was  beaten, 
because  it  stood  on  air.  It's  not  myself  that's  speaking 
— the  advantage  of  the  service ;  I've  long  forgotten 
myself. 

The  sophism  of  seniority  on  the  list :  I'm  to  be 
under  his  yoke  ;  to  be  the  ape's  cat's-paw  or  the  owl  in 
the  cage  ;  would  not  utter  annihilation  be  better  ? 

Peace  was  made  with  Turkey  early  in  January 
1792,  and  in  the  spring  he  was  thinking  of  retiring  : 

I  shall  definitely  end  in  the  autumn  .  .  .  through 
work  and  sleeplessness  I've  lost  chest,  throat,  stomach, 
and  I'm  weak  besides  from  discontent. 

On  the  20th  July  he  wrote  : 

My  three  settled  intentions  are  :  retirement,  travel, 
or  foreign  service.  For  the  two  last  I  should  need 
10,000  roubles  in  cash  all  at  once. 

But  the  affairs  of  Poland  were  again  nearing  a  crisis, 
find  immediately  after  this  very  definite  proposal  to 


KICKING  HIS  HEELS  131 

retire,  he  wrote  direct  to  Catherine  to  ask  for  a  command. 
The  Empress  replied  on  the  27th  July  that  there  was 
no  need  for  the  services  of  such  a  man  as  Suvorof ,  and 
he  fell  back  again  upon  his  petty  worries.^  Three  days 
later  he  began  again  to  Khvostof : 

My  eyes  are  very  painful,  I'm  in  weak  health  .  .  . 
thoroughly  bored  with  writing  about  these  matters,  and 
without  necessity  I  shan't.  The  will  of  God  and  the 
Mother  of  her  country  be  done.  The  mortal  remembers 
death  ;  it  is  not  far  from  me  ;  this  22nd  October  I 
shall  have  been  fifty  years  in  the  service  ;  wouldn't  it 
be  better  to  end  my  unspoilt  career  then  ?  Fly  from 
the  world  to  some  village  where  I  should  have  enough 
to  keep  myself  with  1000  roubles  a  year,  and  prepare 
my  soul  for  the  passage  ? 

About  this  time  he  began  to  turn  his  attention  to 
the  charges  that  he  was  too  hard  on  his  men,  wore 
them  out  by  excessive  marching,  turned  them  out  of 
hospitals  when  they  were  sick,  and  so  caused  disaffection 
and  desertion.2  As  a  matter  of  fact,  he  was  always 
very  careful  of  his  men,  spared  his  raw  troops  the  hard 
work  that  he  required  from  his  veterans,  and  he  only 
kept  the  sick  out  of  hospitals  because  he  regarded  these 
places,  with  much  reason,  as  death-traps.  The  com- 
plaints probably  originated  with  the  subordinate  officers, 
who  had  been  accustomed  to  make  irregular  gains  out 
of  sickness  and  mortality,  and  were  punished  by  him  if 
the  sickness  in  their  units  rose  above  a  certain  pro- 
portion.^ His  defence  against  these  charges  he  made  to 
the  authorities,  not  confining  himself  to  protests  to 
Khvostof.  Thus  he  wrote  to  Count  Nikolai  Ivanovitch 
Saltikof  : 

1  See  the  letter  from  Turtchaninof,  Secretary  of  State,  set  out  in 
Schmidt,  ii.  191. 

*  Masson,  in  his  M^moires  Secrets  sur  la  Russie,  i.  316,  caricatures 
Suvorof  as  rushing  through  the  wards  crying  out,  "  I'm  a  doctor  !  " 
administering  rhubarb  and  salts,  and  turning  the  sick  men  out  into 
the  open,  saying  that  Suvorof  s  men  were  not  allowed  to  be  ill. 

'  See  his  instructions  to  his  troops  at  Kinburn,  published  in  Pyetrof, 
Second  Turkish  War,  ii.  Appendix  8. 


182  SUVOROF 

The  hospitals  have  long  been  foully  misused  ♦  I 
haven't  suffered  it  to  continue.  Regimental  and  com- 
pany commanders,  instead  of  caring  for  the  health  of 
the  soldiers,  often  send  them  to  them  from  long  dis- 
tances, and  even  without  investigating  their  complaints, 
and  often,  through  this  method  of  transport,  they 
arrive  half-dead  among  the  pestilential  exhalations  of 
the  dying.  "  Minerals  and  Ingredients,"  but  no  sense  ! 
...  I  have  herbal  remedies  in  the  stores.  One  of  the 
doctors  has  in  his  own  hands  a  hundred  or  more,  but  with- 
out trained  people  in  charge.  When  I  took  up  the  com- 
mand of  the  troops  in  Finland  at  the  beginning  of  this 
year  the  Friederichsham  and  Kyumen  [hospitals]  had  a 
thousand  men  in  them.  In  the  first  months  the  losses 
were  reduced,  and  afterwards  there  were  only  four 
diseases  left  in  them  :  Consumption,  Dropsy,  Stone  and 
Venereal,  and  epilepsy  for  observation.  On  my  de- 
parture there  were  in  Friederichsham  on  sick  leave  from 
the  Nevski  Regiment  about  40  men  ;  a  few  others  in 
the  regimental  hospitals.  My  strict  attention  to  the 
health  of  the  soldiers  has  made  egoism  my  enemy. 

Scurvy  !  Nonsense  !  .  .  .  There  is  no  scurvy  in  Fin- 
land, though  there  may  be  extraordinary  outbreaks 
even  with  me,  as  of  other  diseases.  By  means  of 
cabbage,  tobacco,  and  horse-radish  scurvy  has  been 
stopped,  and  by  cleanliness,  too.  By  the  word  "  Trans- 
formation '*  I  understand  "  evacuation  by  philanthropic 
sanitation."  With  me  it's  from  sick  to  weak,  from  weak 
to  convalescent,  from  that  to  fresh  air,  and  from  that 
straight  to  the  ranks  ;  in  the  end  in  the  ranks  them- 
selves we  get  little  by  little  to  no  need  of  any  sickness 
at  all. 

Suvorof  was  in  fact  making  experiments  in  preventive 
medicine.  Feed  your  men,  clothe  your  men,  keep  your 
men  active,  and  you  will  have  no  diseases  except  those 
which  were  and  are  still  peculiarly  incident  to  military 
conditions  of  life.  After  leaving  Finland  he  published 
his  ideas  about  hygiene,  and  if  they  do  not  all  stand  the 
test  of  modern  science,  they  are  a  proof  of  a  very  sound 
untrained  judgement.^ 

^  See  posty  p.  146, 


KICKING  HIS  HEELS  133 

He  went  on  to  contrast  his  record  with  that  of  Count 
Ivan  Petrovitch  Saltikof,  his  predecessor  in  Finland,  and 
the  cousin  of  his  correspondent. 

In  his  time  there  was  one  day  when  he  had  more 
men  run  across  the  frontier,  or  as  many,  as  I  had  in 
10  months,  500  men.  My  runaways  by  discharge  were 
less  than  300  ;  he  had  700  in  the  Pskof  Regiment  alone. 
I  couldn't  examine  the  previous  year,  the  time  of  Bruce 
and  Herman,  in  detail.  The  latter  founded  the  Kyumen 
hospital,  where  they  died  at  the  rate  of  50  men  a  week. 

As  for  forced  marches,  he  wrote  to  Count  Ivan 
Saltikof  : 

At  the  beginning  of  the  first  war,  from  Ladoga  to 
Smolyensk,  in  mud  and  sleet,  one  dead  and  half  a  dozen 
weak  ;  on  the  scramble  over  the  Ural  Steppe,  back- 
wards and  forwards,  not  one  dead  ;  with  my  corps 
beyond  Kuban  and  Laba  from  Kopuil,  one  dead  ;  be- 
yond the  Danube  with  my  Corps  in  the  first  war  up  to 
Kozludzhi,  not  one  dead  ;  and  in  Izmail  I  did  found  a 
hospital.  ...  In  conclusion,  to  show  you  how  the  hos- 
pitals cured  the  men  in  the  Tauris  [Crimea],  the  con- 
tractors offered  me  a  bribe  of  7000  roubles  to  establish 
them  again. 

The  contractors  in  fact  made  money  out  of  full  hos- 
pitals, and  nothing  out  of  empty  hospitals.  So  the 
regimental  officers  profited  by  a  high  mortality  among 
the  troops.  They  kept  the  dead  soldiers  on  their  books, 
as  political  agents  have  been  known  to  keep  dead  voters 
on  the  register,  and  drew  their  pay  and  allowances  for 
their  own  benefit.  Infected  buildings  helped  the  pur- 
veyors and  the  officers  more  than  the  soldiers  for  whom 
they  were  intended,  and  Suvorof  was  determined  to 
reduce  their  number. 

On  all  these  points  the  right  was  unquestionably 
with  him.  But  he  was  not  content  with  being  right. 
He  wanted  to  be  praised  for  being  right,  and  he  con- 
tinued to  crave  for  some  employment  which  would  take 
him  out  of  reach  of  gossip,  and  at  the  same  time  keep 


184  SUVOROF 

him  hard  at  work.  His  torment  of  spirit  went  on  almost 
uninterruptedly,  and  Khvostof,  diligent  though  he  was, 
could  never  satisfy  the  impatient  old  man  with  his  reports 
of  the  intrigues,  rumours,  and  facts  which  he  came  across 
in  Petersburg.  Tortured  though  he  was  by  every  hint 
of  neglect  or  supersession,  Suvorof  craved  always  for 
more  information. 

I  write  to  you  every  day ;  or  every  twenty-four  hours, 
mixing  night  and  day  in  my  anxiety.  By  not  writing, 
when  you  have  many  couriers,  you  leave  me  in  torturing 
bewilderment  .  .  .  write  much  more  often. 

At  last  he  began  to  write  direct  to  influential  men  in 
Petersburg.  On  the  30th  July  he  wrote  to  Platon  Zubof , 
the  new  favourite : 

Here  I  shall  soon  finish ;  let  another  man  finish 
the  second  class  fortresses.  Your  Excellency  knows 
what  I  thirst  for :  it  is  not  a  jealous  thirst  for  honour 
or  searching  for  rewards,  I  am  bestrewn  with  them,  but 
it  is  my  old  habit  of  fifty  years  which  drives  me  where, 
with  any  sort  of  troops,  I  may  pour  out  the  rest  of  my 
blood  on  the  altar  of  the  mother  of  her  country.  Trust- 
ing to  your  favour,  I  have  the  honour,  etc. 

He  even  abused  his  unfortunate  nephew  for  not 
taking  more  pains  to  press  his  appeals. 

You  were  at  Turtchaninof's  house,  and  you  didn't 
bring  back  the  damned  rogue's  letters.  If  you  didn't 
find  him  at  home,  you  should  have  waited,  even  if  it 
was  for  more  than  24  hours.  .  .  . 

Name  at  once  everybody  from  whom  you  pass  on 
anything  you've  heard  ;  if  anyone  tells  you  anything 
as  a  secret,  he's  so  much  the  more  a  traitor.  .  .  . 

I  want  to  know  bad  news  and  not  good,  because 
pleasant  things  betray  themselves,  unpleasant  things 
are  indicated  for  precaution's  sake  ;  better  prevention 
than  consolation ;  waiting  for  something  to  turn  up 
puts  one's  neck  in  the  noose ;  don't  stand  wheedling, 
better  endure  gruffness  ;  distinguish  real  goodwill  from 
the  fox's  or  sheep's  skin  of  the  sham  ;  distinguish  always 


KICKING  HIS  HEELS  135 

the  right  stuff  from  table  talk  ;  beware  of  pauses,  they're 
spies  ;  don't  begin  a  new  subject  before  you've  finished 
the  first,  don't  answer  an  oak  with  a  cedar,  or  a  rose  with 
a  lily. 

The  rumours  of  impending  service  grew  at  last  more 
definite,  but  his  distress  continued : 

The  rumours  here  send  me,  one  to  Kuban ;  another  to 
the  Caucasus,  a  third  to  Kherson  as  far  as  Otchakof .  .  .  . 

Before  I  had  against  me  the  devil  P.G.A.  [Prince 
Gregory  Alexandrovitch  Potyomkin]  but  with  fits  of 
benevolence ;  ^     now     there     are     7     devils ;     Lucifer 

Martinett,  Asmodeus  the  pious,  Astarot  Ivan  Ts , 

with  other  devils  without  number.  .  .  . 

Without  money,  without  farm  and  garden,  without 
carriage  and  livery,  without  banqueting,  and  without 
friends  and  without  fame  ;  I  am  equal  to  none — need 
I  desire  to  be  equal  to  any  ?  Without  wealth  I  got 
myself  a  name — ^judge — equal  to  none. 

Then  on  the  27th  September  a  final  appeal  to 
Bezborodko : 

Your  Excellency,  remember  your  kindness  to  me, 
which  I  shall  feel  to  my  death,  renew  them  !  Do  not 
hand  me  over  to  my  detractors,  I  don't  interfere  with 
them,  I  abound  in  the  kindnesses  of  Our  Great  Monarch 
although  already  in  the  second  half  century  of  my  service 
to  her.  Don't  exile  me  in  preparations  for  remote 
contingencies.  I'm  not  a  stage-carpenter  soldier. 
Another  man  will  easily  finish  here. 

You're  a  Minister  !  Work  threatens  from  France ; 
the  number  of  troops  is  an  imposing  pretence ;  I  have 
fought  and  conquered,  with  500  against  5000,  ten  times 
our  strength,  and  Gauls  are  not  Prussians.  ...  In  my 
gloom  I  remain,  etc. 

His  old  friend  Coburg  was  already  in  command  of 
the  army  in  Flanders,  and  he  hoped  to  march  against 
the  same  enemy.  Failing  that,  the  French  were 
intriguing  in  Turkey,  and  the  second  best  place  would 
be  the  South.     For  the  moment  he  got  nothing  from 

^  Potyomkin  died  in  October  1791. 


186  SUVOROF 

Bezborodko,  but  on  the  21st  November  came  an  Imperial 
rescript,  ordering  him  to  take  up  a  new  command  in  the 
South,  and  his  dissatisfaction  was  for  the  time  being 
dispelled. 

It  must  not  be  assumed  that  the  miserable  man  who 
appears  in  this  Finland  correspondence  was  the  only 
Suvorof.  He  could  never  be  his  whole  self  without  a 
grievance,  but  he  had  capacity  for  pleasures  of  other 
sorts.  From  his  own  letters  and  the  recollections  of 
other  people  we  get  some  more  attractive  details  for 
the  composite  picture.  This  is  his  own  description  of 
his  daily  life : 

Gorgeous  headquarters  at  Viborg.  Every  Sunday  a 
dance,  a  big  dinner,  and  an  evening  reception ;  on 
holidays  full  dress  parade  according  to  the  rules  of 
tactics.  I  sometimes  sleep  till  midday,  but  occasionally 
I  enjoy  hunting  hares  or  sea  scorpions.  At  my  own  time 
I  receive  reports,  and  for  the  sake  of  discipline  make 
occasional  notes  on  them.  I  make  no  plans,  and  the 
later  I  finish  the  longer  I'm  wanted.  I've  done  some 
work  ;  would  that  others  had  done  some  too.  What  a 
contrast !  Instead  of  looking  after  the  sick  I  hate  them ; 
I  run,  gallop  about  like  an  orderly  of  the  day  ;  I  try  to 
finish  everything  in  one  year  instead  of  ten  ;  instead  of 
gorgeous  dances  I  long  to  turn  out  garrisons  ;  I  crave 
to  be  where  there's  any  prospect  of  being  in  my  element, 
and  I  pant  for  the  field  of  battle  as  if  it  were  the  sacred 
valley  of  the  nine  sisters  ;  I  shun  pomp  and  celebrity, 
desire  for  fame  seems  only  a  desire  for  what  I  have  long 
enjoyed  ;  I  put  away  the  insatiable  thirst  for  rewards, 
as  one  already  bestrewn  with  them  ;  in  my  enthusiasms 
I  follow  unswervingly  the  guiding  hand  of  Minerva, 
and  am  unshakably  convinced  that  I  shall  have  completed 
nothing,  until,  in  the  capacity  of  a  humble  servant,  I 
have  drawn  my  last  breath  in  the  constant  fulfilment 
of  the  will  of  the  Empress. 

The  description  is  not  quite  accurate.  But  it  will 
serve  as  that  of  Suvorof  as  he  appeared  to  himself. 
His  external  behaviour  has  been  sketched  in  more  detail 
by  one  of  his  associates. 


KICKING  HIS  HEELS  137 

He  rose  early,  and  if  he  showed  any  signs  of  contumacy, 
his  servant  Prokhor  was  under  strict  orders  to  pull 
him  out  of  bed  by  the  legs.  Once  out  of  bed,  he  ran 
about  the  room  stark  naked,  or  in  the  garden  clad  in 
shirt  and  boots,  all  the  time  learning  by  heart  phrases 
in  Finnish,  Turkish,  or  Tartar,  or  some  other  foreign 
language  of  military  importance.  Then  he  washed, 
sponging  himself  all  over  with  cold  water,  and  drank 
his  morning  tea,  still  going  on  with  his  studies.  After 
tea  he  sang  part  of  the  service  of  the  Church,  and  went 
off  to  morning  drill.  Drill  finished,  he  returned  home 
and  worked  or  read  the  newspapers.  The  midday  meal 
was  early  and  simple.  As  a  rule  he  drank  a  small  glass 
of  vodka  flavoured  with  spice,  and  ate  a  few  radishes ; 
if  he  was  unwell,  he  drank  schnapps  aggravated  by 
pepper.  He  seldom  dined  alone,  and  never  while  on 
active  service  ;  he  was  never  so  happy  as  when  talking 
hard  over  a  meal.  On  these  occasions  he  had  special 
dishes  for  himself,  fruits  and  sweets  he  never  ate,  and 
he  seldom  drank  wine.  Only  on  festivals  he  treated 
himself  to  champagne.  During  Lent  he  had  Church 
service  in  his  room  almost  every  day,  and  himself  sang 
the  responses.  In  Church  at  Easter  he  kissed  and  gave 
eggs  to  his  friends  and  acquaintances,  according  to 
custom,  but  he  never  accepted  an  egg  himself.  He 
slept  on  a  hay  mattress,  with  two  down  pillows  under 
his  head  ;  over  him  he  had  as  a  rule  only  a  sheet,  but 
in  cold  weather  a  blue  cloak  as  well.  He  wore  neither 
undervest  nor  gloves  ;  the  only  fire  he  liked  in  his  rooms 
was  that  which  warmed  the  water  for  his  bath.  But 
he  very  seldom  actually  stepped  into  the  bath ;  what 
he  did  was  to  warm  himself  in  the  steam  and  then  splash 
himself  with  cold  water.  By  way  of  contrast  with  this 
simplicity  he  was  fond  of  pomade  and  scent,  especially 
eau  de  Havane.  He  kept  three  menservants  and  a 
feldshyer,  but  as  a  rule  paid  little  attention  to  appear- 
ances. He  was  fond  of  animals  and  petted  them,  but 
never  kept  one  himself ;    sometimes,  if  he  met  a  dog. 


188  SUVOROF 

he  barked  at  it,  and  in  the  same  way  he  would  mew  in 
a  friendly  way  at  a  cat.^ 

His  correspondence  with  his  daughter  adds  to  the 
gentler  aspect  of  his  character.  She  was  now  sixteen 
years  old,  and  left  the  Smolni  Institute  to  live  with  the 
Khvostofs.  In  March  the  Empress  made  her  one  of  the 
Ladies-in- Waiting.  This  was  intended  as  a  compliment, 
but  it  made  Suvorof  anxious  about  the  child's  morals : 

It  will  be  enough  to  be  only  a  little  at  the  theatre  in 
the  Hermitage,  poor  Natasha,  don't  be  carried  away 
by  pleasures  !  With  your  love  of  wisdom  and  virtue, 
you  will  cast  a  timely  light  on  the  infectious  rottenness 
of  those  vanities,  so  deadly  to  morality  and  well-being. 
Read  sometimes  in  the  Prayers  and  the  Psalter, 
homilies.  .  .  . 

Be  patiently  loyal  to  the  great  Monarch.  I  am  her 
soldier,  I  am  dying  for  my  country  ;  the  higher  I  am 
raised  by  her  kindness,  the  sweeter  it  is  for  me  to  sacrifice 
myself  for  her.  I  am  rapidly  approaching  the  tomb, 
my  conscience  is  unspotted,  I  am  60  years  old,  my 
body  is  crippled  with  wounds,  and  God  has  left  me  to 
live  for  the  good  of  the  State.  .  .  .  Shun  people  who  love 
being  famous  for  their  wit ;  for  the  most  part  it's  a 
mark  of  perverted  morals.  .  .  .Be  severe  with  men, 
and  don't  say  very  much  to  them.  ...  If  you  happen 
to  be  beset  with  old  men,  show  them  that  you  want  to 
kiss  their  hands,  but  don't  give  them  yours. 

The  girl,  who  was  neither  very  beautiful  nor  very 
wise,  seems  in  fact  to  have  been  in  little  danger.  But 
her  father's  suspicions  of  Courts  and  courtiers  grew 
no  weaker.2    He  began  to  think  of  marrying  her,  and 

*  Ivan  Sergyeyef,  Vospominyenia  [Recollections]  in  Mayak  (1842). 
A  feldshyer  is  a  man  who  has  had  some  experience  in  a  hospital.  He 
may  be  intelligent,  and  is  still  the  only  doctor  available  for  millions 
of  the  Russian  peasantry. 

*  He  once  said  to  Khvostof,  "  For  the  Court  you  want  three  qualities 
— audacity,  flexibility,  and  perfidy."  A  letter  of  Prince  Gortchakof 
to  his  son  Andryci,  who  had  just  been  made  a  Kammer- Junker,  shows 
the  same  temper.  The  Prince  told  Suvorof  of  the  youth's  promotion. 
"  He  began  to  describe  how  he  had  taught  Lexie  [another  son  of  the 


KICKING  HIS  HEELS  139 

considered  the  claims  of  a  Saltikof  and  a  Dolgorukof . 
Khvostof  wisely  persuaded  him  to  drop  the  project  for 
the  time  being.  His  letters  to  her  continue  to  express 
the  warmth  of  his  affection : 

My  soul,  Natasha  !  God's  blessing  with  you  !  Be 
honourable  and  virtuous,  and  shun  idleness.  Would 
that  my  heart  could  reach  you  !  Eh  !  Here  with  us 
there  are  great  excursions  on  the  water,  in  the  forest, 
on  the  rocky  mountains,  and  lots  of  good  things,  fish, 
wild  birds,  flowers,  little  chickens.  As  our  wizard 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Beer  has  come  to  stay  with  us,  the 
weather  is  now  good  ;  the  birds  are  singing,  swallows, 
nightingales,  and  many  others.  Yesterday  we  had 
dinner  on  the  island  ;  to-morrow  we  want  to  sail  to 
the  German  mainland ;  there  we  shall  be  far  away  ; 
everywhere  I  shall  kiss  your  eyes.  Whenever  you  go 
for  a  walk  and  come  home  and  romp  in  the  house,  then 
remember  me,  as  I  remember  you.  .  .  . 

Eh  !  My  soul,  Natasha  !  go  about  in  the  boat,  there 
are  pussy  cats  everywhere  there,  what  splendid  live 
salmon  they  catch  here,  and  I'm  writing  on  Friday,  and 
on  Friday  you  wanted  to  go  to  Countess  Natalia  Volo- 
dimirovna's.  So  it  happens  that  on  the  same  day  and 
at  the  very  same  hour  that  you're  having  dinner,  it'll 
be  time  for  me  to  have  dinner  too.  I've  written  a  great 
deal,  my  eyes  are  as  if  they  were  in  the  specs  that  people 
wear  on  their  noses.  God's  blessing  on  you.  Kiss  your 
Auntie  for  me. 

Natasha  !  Ah,  Good  Lord,  how  bored  I  am  without 
seeing  you  for  so  long.  Good  Lord  !  how  glad  I  shall 
be  to  see  you  and  to  find  how  big  you've  grown.  Pray 
God  I  may  set  eyes  on  you.  .  .  . 

Prince]  how  to  serve  as  a  Cossack,  private  soldier,  sergeant,  and  officer, 
and  praised  him  for  his  quick  understanding  and  his  enthusiastic 
progress  in  all  his  duties,  so  that  he's  now  earning  praise  as  a  leader 
of  men  ,  .  .  and  then,  not  so  much  as  mentioning  you,  he  indulged 
in  criticisms  of  courtiers,  their  approach,  their  gait,  their  bows,  their 
flattering  speech,  their  meaningless  smiles  and  haughty  looks,  their 
hair-splitting,  and  so  forth.  It's  clear  that  he  doesn't  like  it,  and  that's 
why  he's  never  written  a  word  to  me  about  you."  I  have  unfortunately 
lost  the  references  for  both  these  quotations. 


140  SUVOROF 

Yet  other  letters  reveal  him  in  other  capacities.  His 
love  of  reading  had  never  deserted  him,  and  he  read 
not  only  books  but  newspapers.  He  followed  the  course 
of  events  in  Europe  with  thirsty  eagerness,  and  watched 
for  wars  as  sailors  watch  for  fair  winds.  On  the  2nd 
November  1791  he  wrote  thus  to  Baron  Saken  : 

Baron  Fabian  Vilmovitch !  I  have  kept  up  the 
papers — ^for  German,  Hamburg,  Vienna,  Berlin,  Ellanger 
[Elangen]  ;  for  French,  Bas  Rhin,  Courier  de  Londres ; 
Warsaw  for  Polish ;  S.  Petersburg  or  Moscow  for 
Russian  ;  the  little  French  Journal  EncyclopSdique  de 
Bullion,  the  German  Hamburg  Political  Journal.  As 
this  year  is  at  its  end  and  I  must  order  new  ones 
for  the  next,  I  humbly  ask  your  Honour  to  take  on 
yourself  the  burden  of  getting  them — and  be  good 
enough  to  add  the  Nouvelles  Extraordinaires.  Whether 
of  these  above-mentioned  newspapers  you  will  like  or 
will  decide  to  keep  any  of  them,  that  I  leave  in  all  humility 
to  your  determination.  Be  good  enough  to  give  the 
order,  with  some  payment  on  account  as  is  customary, 
and  inform  me  of  the  whole  price  so  that  I  can  pay  you 
the  money  without  delay. 

One  of  the  books  which  affected  him  at  this  time  was 
Macpherson's  Ossian.  True,  he  read  it  in  a  Russian 
translation  of  a  French  translation,  but  even  with  such 
a  double  dilution  of  the  romantic  spirit  of  the  original, 
he  was  delighted.  He  exchanged  letters  with  Kostrof, 
the  translator,  sent  him  money,  even  wanted  to  give 
him  a  life  pension.  Kostrof  dexterously  compared  his 
patron  to  Fingal,  and  Suvorof,  in  one  of  his  letters  to 
Khvostof,  overflowed  into  a  sort  of  Ossianic  prose,  the 
obscurities  of  which  in  some  passages  defy  his  biographers. 

I  wander  in  these  rock-strewn  places  ;  I  sing  songs 
out  of  Ossian.  Oh  !  in  what  darkness  I !  Piercing  the 
gloom  give  me  rather  the  light  of  day.  A  translation 
from  the  English.^ 

^  I  do  not  suppose  that  there  is  in  fact  any  English  original  of  this 
epigram.     It  obviously  refers  to  Ryepnin's  victory  at  Matchin. 


KICKING  HIS  HEELS  141 

Dimming  the  brilliant  lustre  of  all  former  overthrows, 

The  fifteen  thousand  Matchin  scum  he  battered  with  his 

blows ; 
The  hero  puffs  his  loud  bassoon,  and  celebrates  the  stroke 
With  which  a  hundred  thousand  and  the  Grand  Vizier  he 

broke. 

I  visited  Neushlott,  borne  thither  on  the  wings  of  a 
light  wind  emerging  from  the  womb  of  Kutvyenetaipolye 
traversing  the  wastes  of  Pumala,  I  pant  from  the  prolonged 
stress.  Returning,  I  am  in  Kevkenschild  ;  its  coast  is 
not  so  arrayed  in  rocks  as  at  Kutvyenetaipolye.  There 
only  their  fringes  are  to  be  seen.  Look  at  this  crag,  a 
hundred  of  its  dry  oaks  burn  without  ceasing.  A  flaxen 
torch  involves  it  in  a  thick  cloud,  they  fall  and  the  wind 
is  full  of  darkness.  But  what  do  I  see  !  The  solid 
earth  yields  to  the  dense  waves  of  the  well-skilled  Saim. 
Where  is  my  friend  Steinhel  ?  In  the  arms  of  his 
beloved  spouse,  or  in  commerce  with  souls  transmigrated 
into  these  thick  mists,  he  thrusts  me  into  melancholy, 
augments  the  sorrow  which  comes  flying  from  the  South. 
Oh  Bards!  Sing  of  the  joy  that  dwells  there.  .  .  .  Shall 
I  soon  be  borne  by  its  eagles  into  those  lands  of  milk 
and  honey,  where  I  have  made  such  holiday  with  men- 
at-arms  ?  .  .  . 

As  appears  from  these  letters,  he  did  not  despise 
entertainments.  He  was  in  fact  a  thorough  Russian, 
and  enjoyed  eating  and  drinking,  dancing,  and  picnicking, 
as  only  a  Russian  can.  No  doubt  he  got  a  special 
pleasure  out  of  being  the  principal  personage  at  the 
numerous  festivities  of  his  district.  Of  one  of  these  a 
vivid  description  has  been  preserved.^ 

When  his  headquarters  were  at  Friedrichsham,  he 
lived  at  the  house  of  a  lady  called  Grin,  the  widow  of  a 
staff  surgeon.  He  occupied  the  best  apartments,  and 
she,  with  her  daughter  and  niece,  lived  on  the  upper 
floor.  He  treated  her  with  his  usual  affectionate 
familiarity,  drinking  tea  with  her,  and  calling  her 
"  Mummy.**     Both  the  girls  were  to  be  married  on  the 

^  This  account  is  taken  from  a  contribution  by  Milyutin  to  one  of 
the  periodicals  of  1860  or  1861.  The  exact  reference  is  among  my 
papers  in  Petrograd. 


142  SUVOROF 

same  day,  and  the  good  lady  at  last  summoned  up  her 
courage,  and  begged  her  famous  guest  to  give  away  the 
brides.  He  at  once  consented,  and  offered  the  use  of 
his  own  rooms.  To  her  profuse  thanks  he  replied :  "  Not 
a  bit  of  it  I  Not  a  bit  of  it  I  I  love  you,  Mummy  ; 
truly,  as  a  soldier  I  say  it,  I  love  you.  I'm  a  soldier,  a 
straight  fellow,  not  a  double-dealer  ;  where  my  thought 
is,  there's  my  tongue  too.  And,  look  here.  Mummy," 
shaking  his  fist,  "  see  that  I'm  not  hungry  at  your 
supper ;  I'm  a  Russian  soldier,  I  love  shtshi  and  kasha."  ^ 
When  she  feared  that  he  would  object  to  being  crowded 
out  of  his  own  rooms,  he  burst  out :  "  Merciful  God  ! 
Disturb  a  Russian  soldier  !  Is  he  a  cry-baby,  pray  ? 
Give  me  a  garret,  or  even  a  cupboard,  and  a  bundle  of 
hay,  and  I'll  sleep  and  I'll  snore  till  the  cock  crows." 

The  rooms  were  vacated,  dusted  and  made  beautiful. 
On  the  evening  of  the  great  day  the  guests  arrived. 
The  daughter's  husband  was  an  Italian  doctor,  who 
appeared  in  sober  dress.  The  young  teacher  who  had 
secured  the  niece,  had  unhappily  clad  himself  in  the 
latest  Paris  fashion,  with  a  high  stock  and  a  curled  and 
powdered  wig,  smelling  of  scent  at  several  paces'  distance. 
Suvorof  was  in  full  uniform,  with  all  his  Orders.  When 
his  eyes  fell  upon  the  teacher  he  made  a  grimace.  During 
the  actual  ceremony  he  scowled,  looked  at  the  young 
dandy,  wrinkled  his  brows,  sniffed,  cleared  his  throat, 
and  spat.  Then  he  began  to  mutter :  "A  coxcomb  I 
Merciful  God,  a  coxcomb  !  A  head  with  a  campaign 
kettle  on  it  I  A  caperer  !  A  scent-bottle  !  "  And  he 
blew  his  nose  violently. 

At  the  end  of  the  service  the  husbands  were  presented 
to  him.  He  gave  his  hand  cordially  to  the  doctor,  but 
when  the  teacher  appeared  before  him  he  snatched  out 
his  handkerchief,  held  his  nose,  and  looked  with  a  scowl 
at  the  offending  wig.     When  the  dancing  began,  the 

^  "  Shtshi  "  is  a  vegetable  soup,  *'  kasha  "  any  grain,  millet,  rice, 
buckwheat,  barley,  etc.,  eaten  out  of  a  pot.  Our  porridge  and  rice 
pudding  would  be  called  "  kasha  "  by  a  Russian. 


KICKING  HIS  HEELS  143 

General  promenaded  with  the  daughter  and  danced 
with  the  niece.  The  teacher,  blind  and  deaf  to  every 
sign  of  displeasure,  danced,  laughed,  and  ran  about  the 
room,  as  unmindful  of  the  coming  doom  as  the  little 
victims  whose  play  the  poet  contemplated  at  Eton.  But 
all  might  have  been  well  had  he  not,  in  leading  a  lady 
back  to  her  seat,  trodden  on  Suvorof's  toe.  Then 
the  suppressed  eruption  burst  forth.  Suvorof  clasped 
his  outraged  foot,  and  howled :  "  Ow,  ow,  ow !  I 
can't  walk  !  Merciful  God  !  I'm  lame  !  I'm  crippled  !  " 
The  guests  were  dismayed,  the  hostess  shook  with  terror, 
the  hapless  bridegroom  stood  rooted  to  the  floor.  In 
vain  they  offered  Suvorof  a  chair.  His  complaints 
grew  louder.  "  Oh,  the  frizzled  coxcomb  !  He's  knocked 
my  leg  off !  A  head  with  a  top-knot,  a  beastly  big 
top-knot !  Oh  !  Merciful  God  !  I'm  crippled  !  Oh, 
the  glib-tongued  prig,  the  scent -bottle  !  "  Then  he 
turned  upon  Madame  Grin.  "  Mummy,  where's  the 
brush  you  cleaned  the  ceilings  with  ?  "  "  It's  outside. 
Count,"  stammered  the  poor  woman.  "  Show  it  me." 
The  brush  was  brought  in.  "  Ah  !  A  famous  brush  !  " 
vociferated  Suvorof,  glaring  at  the  wig.  The  wretched 
youth  backed  against  the  wall,  expecting  anything  and 
everything.  But  Suvorof  was  content  with  a  long-range 
bombardment,  and  for  once  refrained  from  attacking 
his  enemy  at  close  quarters.  "  A  perfect  barber's 
block !  Splendidly  trimmed,  Merciful  God !  Sleek 
enough  to  clean  a  wall  with  !  There  are  people  who 
can  talk  over  a  whole  town,  and  raise  no  end  of  a  dust.  .  .  . 
But  their  heads — Poof  !  A  mop,  by  the  Lord,  a  mop  !  " 
Then  he  turned  to  the  hostess,  and  began  to  talk  to  her 
about  Moscow  pancakes.  The  guests  gradually  resumed 
the  programme,  and  the  teacher  retired  to  such  consola- 
tions as  his  bride  could  afford  him. 

Whatever  wretchedness  of  spirit  Suvorof  may  have 
poured  into  his  letters  from  Finland,  it  is  impossible  not  to 
believe  that  on  one  night  at  least  he  was  supremely  happy. 

The  rescript  of  the  21st  November  entrusted  him  with 


144  SUVOROF 

the  command  of  all  the  troops  in  the  Government  of 
Yekaterinoslav,  the  Crimea,  and  the  districts  between 
the  Bug  and  the  Dnyestr,  which  had  been  acquired 
by  the  last  war  with  Turkey.  He  had  also  to  inspect 
the  defences  of  the  new  frontier,  and  complete  the 
fortifications  begun  by  Major  de  BoUan.  The  fleet  on 
the  Black  Sea  was  not  under  his  orders,  but  the  troops 
on  board  the  river  flotilla  of  De  Ribas  were.  The 
reason  for  his  appointment  was  the  renewal  of  French 
intrigues  at  Constantinople,  and  he  took  up  his  duties 
with  alacrity,  looking  for  another  war.  The  Polish 
rising  had  been  easily  suppressed,  and  the  country  was 
in  process  of  being  again  partitioned  ;  the  war  with 
France  was  apparently  not  going  to  take  place,  and  the 
only  chance  of  real  service  was  in  the  South.  He  was 
disappointed.  The  energy  of  the  Turks  was  not  equal 
to  their  ill-will,  and  he  had  no  opportunity  of  again 
defeating  armies  which  had  already  contributed  so  much 
to  his  reputation.  In  the  result,  he  had  to  confine 
himself  to  the  same  sort  of  activity  as  in  Finland  :  the 
building  of  forts,  the  care  and  training  of  troops,  and 
of  course  the  writing  of  letters. 

He  was  no  fonder  than  before  of  administrative  work, 
least  of  all  of  the  repairing  of  fortifications,  which  in 
his  view  were  rather  encumbrances  than  means  of 
defence.  Nevertheless,  as  he  had  to  look  after  them,  he 
flung  himself  into  the  distasteful  business  with  his  usual 
energy.  He  at  once  began  to  make  contracts  and  to 
pay  for  work  done  by  means  of  bills  of  exchange. 
These  methods  were  too  rapid  for  his  superiors. 
Turtchaninof  wrote  to  him  explaining  with  great  care 
that  the  political  situation  scarcely  required  such  haste, 
that  there  was  not  much  money  in  the  Treasury,  and  that 
some  of  the  work  must  be  done  more  slowly,  so  that 
the  expenditure  might  be  spread  over  a  longer  period. 
Suvorof  replied  bluntly : 

You  are  putting  an  end  to  my  beginnings,  and  warn 
me  against  projects  of  which  I  have  already  laid  firm 


KICKING  HIS  HEELS  145 

foundations.  .  .  .  For  the  political  situation  please 
enquire  of  the  Vice-Chancellor  ;  I  look  at  things  like  a 
field  officer.  You  would  have  taken  two  months  instead 
of  two  days,  chasing  me  about  as  if  you  were  after  a 
fish  with  a  net,  knowing  I'm  not  a  man  to  sleep.  The 
year  would  have  been  wasted  if  I  had  delayed  here  at 
all  with  the  contractors,  without  whom  it  is  impossible 
to  get  on  in  the  present  state  of  the  country.  You  say 
we  don't  need  them.  You  should  have  told  me  that  in 
Petersburg.  Anyhow,  this  year  it  can't  be  undone  ; 
next  year  you  can  do  what  you  like.  Send  me  the 
money,  and  one  of  your  cashiers  with  it. 

He  did  not  get  what  he  wanted.  An  Imperial  re- 
script approved  in  general  terms  of  his  plans,  but 
directed  him  to  postpone  the  execution  of  a  great  part 
of  them,  and,  as  to  his  contracts,  informed  him  that  no 
department  of  State  except  the  Senate  could  enter  into 
contracts  of  more  than  10,000  roubles  in  value,  and 
those  which  he  had  made  were  in  consequence  invalid. 
This  was  a  great  blow,  and  it  is  not  surprising  to  find 
him  declaring  in  a  letter  to  Khvostof : 

It  is  simple  truth  that  I  prefer  Finland  to  this  place. 

To  Turtchaninof  he  wrote  : 

Honest  people  don't  do  these  things  ;  you  play  with 
your  word,  I  believe  it,  and  you  set  your  sail  to  every 
wind,  seeing  that  they're  inconstant. 

Then  to  Khvostof  again : 

God  help  me  !  I'm  in  such  misery.  Even  Prince 
Grigori  Alexandrovitch  [Potyomkin]  never  so  degraded 
me. 

To  add  to  his  difficulties,  the  contractors  themselves 
began  to  make  claims  against  him  in  person,  and  at  the 
same  time  he  was  called  upon  to  repay  to  the  State 
sums  which  he  had  already  expended  out  of  public 
funds.  He  wrote  to  Khvostof,  instructing  him  to  sell 
his  villages  near  Novgorod  "  for  not  less  than  100,000 
roubles.     Transfer  the   people   to   Suzdal."      Later  he 

L 


146  SUVOROF 

wrote  again.  The  contractors  wanted  28,648  roubles 
and  the  State  67,500,  and  the  reserve  price  of  the 
villages  was  raised  accordingly  to  150,000,  or  at  the 
very  lowest  135,000  roubles.  The  actual  result  of  the 
affair  is  not  known.  But  by  some  means  or  other  a 
compromise  was  reached,  and  Suvorof  was  not  required 
to  pay  anything  out  of  his  own  pocket.^ 

Here,  as  in  Finland,  he  fell  foul  of  the  hospitals.  In 
one  of  his  letters  to  Turtchaninof  he  reported  a  con- 
versation with  one  of  his  staff  officers,  who  wanted  to  go 
back  to  regimental  duties. 

"  Zuibin,  why  are  you  running  away  to  your  com- 
pany ?  There's  no  ill-will  between  us,  is  there  ?  Be 
honest,  and  tell  me."  "  I  get  an  income  of  1000  roubles 
a  year  there.'*     "  How  ?  "     "  From  the  dead  soldiers." 

Zuibin  wanted  to  make  profits  out  of  the  dead  men 
he  would  be  able  to  keep  on  the  strength  of  his  company. 
Suvorof  knew  that  the  prevention  of  this  sort  of  corrup- 
tion was  practically  impossible,  so  far  as  inspection  and 
punishment  were  concerned,  but  he  could  do  something 
to  lessen  the  excessive  mortality  which  made  it  easy. 
He  therefore  carried  on  his  crusade  against  the  hos- 
pitals, and  at  the  same  time  did  his  best  to  teach  officers 
and  men  the  elementary  rules  of  hygiene.  In  a  general 
order  addressed  to  his  medical  officers  on  the  8th  August 
he  published  the  rules  drawn  up  by  his  Staff  Surgeon, 
Yefim  Byelopolski.  The  rules  naturally  take  no  account 
of  microbic  infections,  but  in  their  insistence  upon 
cleanliness,  fresh  air,  and  proper  food  they  are  very 
sound.     Some  passages  deserve  quotation. 

Constantly  inspect  the  causes  of  increasing  diseases, 
and  seek  them  out  not  in  the  hospitals  among  the  sick, 
but  among  the  healthy,  by  regiments,  battalions,  com- 
panies, and  platoons,  and  the  various  separate  com- 
mands, enquiring  into  their  food,  drink,  structure  of 
barracks  and  earth  huts,  the  date  of  their  erection, 

^  I  have  taken  the  whole  of  this  account  from  Pyetrushevski.  The 
letters  are  in  the  Sbornik  at  Petrograd. 


KICKING  HIS  HEELS  147 

their  extent  and  air  space,  cleanliness,  cooking  utensils, 
all  their  contents,  and  their  various  possibilities  of 
debilitating  the  men.  .  .  . 

Endeavour  to  have  a  supply  of  simple  domestic 
remedies  in  every  store.  .  .  . 

Those  brought  in  with  trivial  and  inconsiderable 
diseases,  such  as  little  boils,  little  scrofulous  wounds  or 
spots,  give  them  a  plaster  or  other  remedy  and  send 
them  back  to  their  regiments,  taking  no  notice  of  any 
grumbling  about  it,  because  a  little  disease,  through 
negligence  in  the  hospital,  is  turned  into  a  serious  one, 
sometimes  actually  into  a  mortal  one.  For  the  others, 
after  examination,  prescribe  two  or  three  days'  rest, 
ordering  them  to  come  every  day  to  the  hospital  for 
medicine.  .  .  . 

The  water  of  the  Dnyestr,  although  not  of  perfect 
purity,  is  nevertheless  not  so  bad  as  appears  at  first 
sight ;  because  it  has  everywhere  a  rapid  current ;  all 
harm  which  comes  from  it  consists  in  the  slimy  mud, 
which  settles  heavily  in  the  belly  and  produces  different 
diseases.  Therefore  it  is  necessary  to  let  it  stand  in 
tubs.  .  .  .  Pour  the  water  into  these  tubs  in  the  even- 
ing, and  by  morning  it  will  be  completely  settled  and 
fit  for  cooking  and  drinking.  But  for  drinking  it  should 
only  be  used  in  case  of  need  and  during  a  march  .  .  . 
at  other  times  good  kvass  must  be  in  all  stores  and  in 
hospital.  Healthy  men  may  use  the  Dnyestr  fish  for 
food  without  hesitation,  but  only  if  it  is  fresh,  either 
newly  caught  or  salted  and  well  boiled. 

Scurvy  in  this  country  has  shown  itself  more  danger- 
ous than  elsewhere  ...  it  is  cured  especially  by  clean- 
liness, observed  in  everything,  ...  by  fresh  acid  food 
and  drink,  with  exercise  ;  sometimes  by  change  of  camp- 
ing ground  and  daily  bathing  in  a  swift  flowing  river  .  .  . 
by  some  cabbage,  horse  radish,  etc.  etc.  .  .  .  Bathing 
in  sea  water,  wherever  possible,  cures  scurvy  and  the 
itch  .  .  .  fumigate  the  barracks  with  pitch  and  chips 
of  tar  barrels.  .  .  .  Fever  is  cured  apart  from  purga- 
tives, emetics,  calorifics,  salts,  and  finally  stimulating 
drugs,  especially  by  refraining  from  food  and  drink  and 
by  the  use  of  Siberian  salt  dissolved  in  water.  .  .  . 

The  rules  are  good  enough  so  far  as  they  go.  Dirty 
habits  and  improper  food  are  the  principal  causes  of  the 


148  SUVOROF 

diseases  of  war.  The  most  deadly  of  Russian  military 
diseases  were  scurvy  and  typhus.  The  first  is  due  to 
improper  food.  The  second  is  a  dirt  disease,  spreading 
from  man  to  man  by  means  of  lice.  Both  were  due  to 
national  faults,  slovenliness  in  organising  transport, 
peculation  and  bribery,  carelessness  about  personal 
cleanliness.  The  hospitals  would  not  increase  scurvy. 
But  the  man  who  got  into  a  filthy,  unwashed,  and 
overcrowded  hospital,  however  mild  his  complaint, 
was  exposed  at  once  to  the  infection  of  typhus.  A 
wounded  man  would  of  course  be  in  danger  of  erysipelas, 
and  every  wound  would  become  septic.  As  there  were 
hardly  any  military  doctors  except  those  attached  to 
Generals  and  their  Staffs,  the  sick  and  wounded  were 
generally  left  to  the  care  of  feldshyers,  whose  skill  varied 
greatly,  and  could  seldom  be  equal  to  that  of  a  modem 
medical  student  after  three  months  in  a  general 
hospital. 

With  no  field  ambulances  or  field  hospitals,  so  that 
compound  fractures  without  amputation  meant  death, 
and  even  lightly  wounded  men  often  staggered  into  the 
distant  base  hospitals  with  maggots  ^  breeding  in  their 
flesh,  the  sight  of  such  a  building  after  a  battle  must 
have  been  beyond  modern  imagination.  Even  in  time 
of  peace  it  was  only  too  often  a  breeding  ground  of 
disease,  and  Suvorof,  with  characteristic  directness, 
strove  by  every  means  in  his  power  to  keep  his  men 
out  of  it.  If  Byelopolski's  directions  were  carried  out, 
typhus  and  other  infectious  disorders  would  certainly 
be  reduced. 

One  letter  of  this  time  shows  Suvorof  in  his  sweeter 

1  Maggots  in  wounds  were  not  uncommon  in  Russian  field  hospitals 
during  the  present  war.  In  a  very  fair  Russian  hospital  with  which 
I  was  myself  acquainted,  the  orderlies  washed  a  ward  of  twelve  patients. 
An  orderly  brought  a  basin  of  water  and  a  rag,  wet  the  rag  and  wiped 
the  face  of  each  patient  in  turn.  In  another  hospital  the  orderly  filled 
his  mouth  with  water  and  blew  it  over  the  faces  of  the  patients,  after- 
wards wiping  them.  Washing  a  patient's  body  was  very  rare,  and 
generally  only  happened  if  the  patient  could  do  it  himself. 


4I& 


KICKING  HIS  HEELS  149 

mood.  The  Austrian  General  Karaczay,  whose  steady 
conduct  in  the  field  of  the  Ruimnik  had  contributed  so 
much  to  the  success  of  that  day,  asked  him  to  be  god- 
father to  his  son.  Such  a  request  would  please  Suvorof 
beyond  measure,  and  he  set  down  in  a  letter  to  his 
infant  godson  what  he  considered  the  main  rules  for  his 
future  military  life. 

My  dear  son  Alexander — As  a  military  man,  study 
well  a  Vauban,  a  Coghorn  [Cohorn],  a  Curas,  a  Hubner; 
a  little  theology,  physics,  and  ethics  ;  read  well  Eugene, 
Turenne,  the  commentaries  of  Caesar,  Frederick  II.,  the 
first  volumes  of  Rollin  with  the  continuation,  and  Cte. 
de  Saxe  ;  languages  are  for  literature  ;  dance  ;  fit  up 
and  manage  weapons  a  little.  The  military  virtues  are  : 
bravery  in  the  soldier,  courage  in  the  officer,  valour  in 
the  general,  but  guided  by  the  principles  of  order  and 
discipline,  dominated  by  vigilance  and  foresight.  Be 
frank  with  your  friends,  temperate  in  your  requirements 
and  disinterested  in  conduct ;  bear  an  ardent  zeal  for 
the  service  of  your  Sovereign  ;  love  true  fame,  dis- 
tinguish ambition  from  pride  and  vainglory  ;  learn  early 
to  forgive  the  faults  of  others,  and  never  forgive  your 
own  ;  drill  your  soldiers  well,  and  give  them  a  pattern 
in  yourself.  Constant  practice  of  quick  apprehension 
will  by  itself  make  you  a  great  general.  Learn  to  profit 
by  local  circumstances  ;  be  patient  in  military  work, 
don't  let  yourself  be  daunted  by  reverses  ;  distinguish 
between  objects  true,  doubtful,  and  false  ;  don't  let 
yourself  be  taken  aback  by  an  explosion  from  an  un- 
foreseen quarter.  Preserve  in  your  memory  the  names 
of  great  men  ;  and  follow  them  in  your  marches  and 
operations — but  with  caution ;  never  despise  your 
enemy,  whoever  he  may  be  ;  and  know  well  his  weapons, 
his  way  of  employing  them  and  fighting ;  know  his 
strength  and  his  weakness.  Accustom  yourself  to  tire- 
less activity ;  rule  fortune ;  it  is  the  moment  which 
gives  victory,  master  it  by  the  swiftness  of  Caesar,  who 
knew  so  well  how  to  surprise  his  enemies,  even  in  broad 
daylight,  to  turn  them  and  attack  them  where  and 
when  he  wished,  without  ever  being  compelled  to  cut 
off  their  supplies  of  food  and  fodder ;  and  study  the 
art  of  never  being  in  want  of  supplies  for  your  own 


150  SUVOROF 

troops.     God   raise    you    to    the    level    of    the  heroic 
Karaczay.i 

Naturally  enough,  he  had  not  long  been  in  Kherson 
before  he  began  to  ask  for  employment  elsewhere.  On 
the  5th  July  he  wrote  direct  to  the  Empress : 

I  most  obediently  request  your  Imperial  Highness 
most  graciously  to  permit  me,  in  this  present  quiet,  to 
serve  as  a  volunteer  in  the  German  Allied  Armies,  for 
the  whole  campaign,  retaining  my  present  maintenance 
out  of  your  Royal  bounty. 

Turning,  Most  Gracious  Sovereign,  to  the  most  sacred 
throne  of  Your  Imperial  Highness,  your  most  obedient 
Count  Suvorof  Ruimnikski. 

At  the  same  time  he  wrote  to  Khvostof : 

I  most  obediently  request  the  great  Monarch  to  give 
me  leave  to  serve  in  this  prolonged  campaign  with  the 
German  allied  Army,  with  my  present  maintenance,  i.e. 
pay  and  rations,  with  my  sta:M  and  mess  allowance  of 
500  roubles  a  month.  For  this  I  shall  need  a  passport 
and  ordinary  recommendations.  I  humbly  request  your 
Excellency  for  help  in  fitting  me  out  in  Kherson,  where 
at  present  all  is  quiet,  and  I  have  already  been  a  long 
time  out  of  practice. 

Catherine's  reply  is  dated  the  13th  August : 

You  ask  to  be  a  volunteer  in  the  allied  army.  To 
that  I  reply  that  affairs  at  home  increase  daily  in 
importance,  and  you  will  soon  be  able  to  have  as  much 
military  practice  as  you  want,  here.  Therefore,  in  not 
releasing  you  to  correct  your  pupil,  who,  according  to 
the  latest  news,  is  betaking  himself  across  the  Rhine, 
I  now,  as  ever,  consider  your  utility  to  your  country. 

The  Empress  was  not  going  to  throw  away  her  priceless 
Suvorof  in  an  attempt  to  correct  the  errors  of  his  "pupil,** 
Coburg.  He  could  win  personal  glory  in  France.  But 
more  tangible  profits  for  Catherine  would  soon  be  within 
reach  at  home.  So  he  was  kept,  champing  his  bit,  in 
Klierson,  while  the  Polish  disease  throbbed  to  its  fatal  end. 

^  This  letter  is  set  out  in  the  Appendix  to  Pyetmshevski's  second 
volume. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE   SECOND    POLISH   WAR 

Poland  after  the  Partition — ^Rising  of  1794 — ^Rumyantsof  sends  Suvorof 
into  the  country — Battles  of  Kruptchitsa  and  Brest — Halt  at 
Brest — Battle  of  Kobuilk — Storm  of  Praga  and  capitulation  of 
Warsaw — Suvorof  as  pacificator — Anecdotes  true  and  false — 
Recall  to  Petersburg,  1795 — An  adventure  by  the  way — Upsetting 
the  Court — Sent  to  Tultchin — The  Science  of  Victory — How  it 
worked  in  practice — The  foundation  of  modem  Russian  training — 
Death  of  Catherine  the  Great. 

After  the  first  partition,  the  affairs  of  Poland  for  a  time 
presented  a  less  deplorable  aspect  than  before.  Never- 
theless, the  permanent  Russian  garrison  had  remained  a 
source  of  irritation,  and  discontent,  carefully  fostered  by 
Russian  intrigues,  grew  steadily.  The  new  ideas  which 
were  being  proclaimed  in  France  gave  a  fresh  direction  to 
political  enthusiasm,  and  side  by  side  with  the  national 
movement  against  Russia  marched  a  new  democratic 
movement,  directed  towards  popular  control  of  govern- 
ment. The  two  movements  combined  to  produce  the 
proposed  new  constitution  of  1791,  which  involved, 
among  other  things,  the  abolition  of  the  elective 
monarchy,  the  liberum  veto,  and  the  irresponsibility  of 
Ministers.  The  crown  was  offered,  after  the  death  of 
Stanislav,  to  the  Elector  of  Saxony.  This  project 
alarmed  both  Catherine  of  Russia,  the  dominant  power 
in  Poland  as  it  was,  and  Frederick  William  of  Prussia, 
who  feared  a  combination  between  Saxony  and  Poland 
in  the  East,  while  he  was  already  threatened  with 
unknown  dangers  from  the  French  Republic  in  the  West. 

151 


152  SUVOROF 

At  the  invitation  of  a  section  of  the  nobility,  which  was 
in  fact  superfluous,  both  Powers  objected  to  the  proposed 
constitution.  Austria,  without  asserting  any  claim  at 
the  moment,  gave  them  a  moral  support  which  would 
afterwards  require  the  payment  of  its  price.  Hostilities 
broke  out  in  1792,  as  soon  as  Russia  was  free  from  the 
embarrassment  of  the  Turkish  War,  and  though  the 
Polish  Army  was  now  by  no  means  so  contemptible  as 
the  raw  levies  of  the  first  war,  it  had  the  worst  of 
several  engagements.  This  was  the  campaign  which 
agitated  Suvorof  during  his  stay  in  Finland. 

In  the  result,  the  country  was  for  the  second  time 
partitioned.  The  immediate  excuse  was  that  Frederick 
William,  after  their  first  disastrous  campaign  against 
the  French  Republic,  felt  himself  unable  to  assist  the 
Austrian  Emperor,  unless  he  received  some  compensa- 
tion for  his  sacrifices.  The  only  possible  way  of  com- 
pensating him  was  to  let  him  take  some  more  of  Poland, 
and  as  Catherine  naturally  required  some  return  for  her 
acquiescence,  it  followed  that  she  also  must  obtain  it  in 
the  same  form.  The  Second  Partition  of  Poland,  in 
1793,  therefore  transferred  a  second  third  of  the  whole 
population  into  the  hands  of  Russia  and  Prussia,  and 
the  remaining  third  was  kept  in  the  same  state  of  miser- 
able dependence  as  before.  A  new  rebellion  was  care- 
fully organised,  and  at  the  end  of  March  1794  it  broke 
out  at  Cracow.  On  the  4th  April,  Thaddeus  Kosciusko, 
a  good  soldier,  and  a  disinterested  patriot,  who  had 
studied  in  Paris  and  fought  under  Washington  at 
Saratoga,  beat  a  Russian  force  under  Major-General 
Tormasof  at  Ratslavitsi.  On  the  6th  April  the  popula- 
tion of  Warsaw  rose  in  furious  revolt,  killed  about  2000 
of  the  Russian  garrison,  took  1700  more  prisoners,  and 
after  two  days  of  merciless  fighting  drove  the  remaining 
7000  out  of  the  city. 

This  rebellion  was  a  more  serious  matter  than  that 
of  1770.  By  this  time  Poland  had  an  army.  Many  of 
the  insurgents  were  no  more  than  peasants  armed  with 


THE  SECOND  POLISH  WAR         153 

scythe  blades  on  the  ends  of  long  poles.  But  there  was 
a  strong  nucleus  of  disciplined  troops,  a  very  efficient 
artillery,  and  many  of  the  officers  had  not  only  had  a 
scientific  professional  education,  but  had  served  in 
foreign  armies.  This  regular  force  was  reinforced  by 
the  adhesion  of  several  strong  detachments  of  Polish 
troops  in  the  Russian  service,  who  hurried  to  join  them 
even  before  the  rising  at  Warsaw.  A  system  of  con- 
scription introduced  by  Kosciusko  provided  a  consider- 
able number  of  recruits,  and  by  the  time  that  Suvorof 
came  upon  the  scene  the  number  of  Poles  under  arms 
can  hardly  have  been  less  than  75,000.  Against  these 
the  Russian  troops  available  were  25,000  men  under 
Ryepnin  between  Riga  and  Pinsk,  19,000  under  Der- 
felden,  as  Ryepnin' s  subordinate,  further  south,  and 
Fersen,  with  the  remains  of  the  garrison  of  Warsaw, 
about  12,000  strong,  to  the  south-west  of  the  Polish 
capital.  A  Prussian  force  of  10,000,  of  which  Frederick 
William  himself  soon  took  command,  co-operated  with 
Fersen.  Suvorof,  with  50,000  men,  was  in  Littl6  Russia 
and  the  Crimea,  owing  immediate  obedience  to  Rum- 
yantsof.^ 

The  first  operations  were  indecisive.  The  Prussian 
King  and  Fersen  defeated  Kosciusko,  but  the  latter 
succeeded  in  throwing  himself  into  Warsaw,  where 
they  blockaded  him.  The  Prussians  were  drawn  off  by 
a  rising  in  the  newly  acquired  Prussian  Poland,  and 
Fersen  fell  back,  covering  their  retreat.  Derfelden  was 
withdrawn  by  Ryepnin,  and  by  the  beginning  of  August 
both  sides  seemed  to  be  settling  down,  to  collect  their 
strength  for  vigorous  action  in  the  next  year.  Into  this 
scene  of  sluggishness  and  pusillanimity  Rumyantsof 
flung  Suvorof. 

The  latter,  with  a  special  force  of  some  13,000  men, 
had  been  engaged  in  disarming  the  Polish  troops  in  his 

1  Orlof,  Shiurm  Pragi,  20,  22.  The  Austrian  force  moved  into 
Polish  territory  in  July.  But  this  was  merely  to  secure  in  advance  a 
share  of  the  spoil.     The  Austrians  never  came  into  action. 


154  SUVOROF 

district.  This  difficult  task  was  accomplished  with 
perfect  success,  and  in  less  than  a  fortnight  8000 
men  laid  down  their  arms  without  a  shot  being  fired 
on  either  side.^  The  news  from  Poland  itself  filled 
Suvorof  with  impatience.  He  could  finish  the  business, 
he  declared,  in  forty  days,*  and  he  begged  Rumyantsof 
to  send  him  to  the  theatre  of  real  war.  On  the  12th 
August  the  last  Polish  soldier  had  surrendered.  On 
the  18th  Rumyantsof  told  Suvorof  to  march  against 
the  enemy.  "  Your  Excellency  was  always  a  terror  to 
the  Poles  and  the  Turks,  and  on  every  occasion  you 
burn  with  impatience  and  envy  wherever  there  is  so 
much  as  talk  of  active  service."  Nevertheless,  for  the 
time  being  Suvorof  was  only  to  make  a  demonstration.^ 
Demonstration  or  no  demonstration,  this  was  enough 
to  set  him  on  the  march.  He  left  Nemirof  on  the  25th 
August,  marching  towards  Brest.  On  the  road  he  was 
overtaken  by  an  Imperial  rescript  from  Petersburg, 
ordering  him  to  halt  at  Brest,  to  build  magazines  for 
Derfelden  and  Fersen.     He  replied  to  Rumyantsof : 

The  ignorant  Petersburgians  cannot  make  rules  for 
the  Russian  Nestor  [i.e.  Rumyantsof]  to  me  his  wishes 
only  are  sacred.  Time  is  the  most  valuable  thing. 
Julius  Caesar  conquered  by  speed.  I  shall  wait  patiently 
two  days  for  provisions.  ...  I  must  hurry  towards 
Brest,  if  the  rebels  are  not  beaten  in  the  interval,  but 
not  for  magazine  building  .  .  .  there  are  younger  men — 
or  do  without  altogether.  There  I  must  get  reinforce- 
ments, go  to  Praga,  and  so  cut  off  supplies  from  Litva 
to  Warsaw.* 

From  the  first  he  had  no  doubt  of  his  objective : 
Warsaw,  the  head  and  heart  of  the  rising.     Towards 

*  Campagnes,  ii.  158  ei  seq.    The  disbanded  men  received  all  arrears 
of  pay  due  to  them  and  were  sent  to  their  homes. 

«  Pyetnish.  ii.  23,  41. 

'  The  instructions  of  Rumyantsof  are  set  out  in  Orlof,  105. 

*  Pyetrush.  ii.  51.  Praga  is  the  suburb  of  Warsaw  on  the  right  or 
eastern  bank  of  the  Vistula. 


THE  SECOND  POLISH  WAR         155 

Brest  he  marched  with  his  usual  speed,  with  4500  men 
and  10  guns,  picking  up  6500  more  men  and  6  guns 
on  the  way.  From  Nemirof  to  Varkovitch  is  180  miles. 
This  stage  was  accomplished  in  nine  days,  the  ordinary 
marching  rate  of  Russian  troops  being  65  miles  a  week. 
One  day  was  spent  at  Varkovitch  in  repairing  waggons 
and  baking  bread,  and  then  five  days  of  marching 
brought  him  to  Kovel,  85  miles  further  on,  and  40  miles 
across  the  frontier  of  Poland.  After  a  halt  of  two  days 
he  again  pushed  forward  on  the  11th  September, 
expecting  at  any  moment  to  encounter  the  enemy.^ 

Both  leader  and  men  were  in  high  spirits.  All  were 
in  thin  summer  clothing,  each  man  carried  a  spare  pair 
of  boots  and  biscuits  for  eight  days,  and  two  hospital 
carts  for  each  regiment  and  one  field  kitchen  and  one 
waggon  for  officers'  baggage  for  each  company  or 
squadron  formed  the  whole  baggage  train.  Guides 
were  generally  taken  from  among  the  Jews  of  the 
district.  Suvorof  himself  rode  on  horseback,  attended 
by  his  servant  Prokhor  and  a  single  Cossack,  and  he 
never  got  into  a  carriage.  He  was  constantly  beside 
his  men,  calling  his  veterans  by  their  names  or  the  nick- 
names, "  Eagle,"  "  Fire,"  and  the  like,  which  he  applied 
to  them,  reminding  them  of  their  old  fights  against 
the  Turks,  and  exchanging  the  broad  jests  which  the 
Russian  soldier  still  loves.  If  "  Father  Alexander 
Vassilyevitch  "  rode  past  a  regiment  without  pausing  to 
scatter  these  greetings,  the  men  knew  they  were  guilty 
of  some  fault.  At  the  halts  he  sat  among  the  men, 
sharing  their  coarse  rations,  and  he  slept,  as  always, 
on  a  straw  mattress  or  the  ground.  The  first  stages 
had  been  covered  with  music  and  marching  songs, 
but  as  they  advanced  into  the  enemy's  country  noise 
of  every  kind  was  forbidden.  The  hour  of  departure 
was  never  fixed  ;  the  men  were  to  start  "  at  cockcrow." 
Every  morning  Suvorof  himself  flapped  his  arms  and 
crowed,   and   in   fifteen   minutes   the   troops   were   in 

1  Orlof,  37. 


156  SUVOROF 

movement.  In  this  happy  style  the  little  army  marched 
swiftly  to  meet  the  enemy .^ 

It  is  one  of  the  most  curious  of  Slav  complexities 
that  troops  who  go  to  war  in  this  spirit  of  boyish,  almost 
childlike  gaiety,  should  prove  terrible  adversaries  in 
battle.  The  first  encounter  with  the  Poles  took  place 
at  Divin,  60  miles  from  Kovel,  and  the  insurgents 
found  Suvorof  and  his  men  in  anything  but  a  playful 
mood.  At  dawn  on  the  14th  the  Cossacks  of  the 
vanguard  fell  upon  some  200  Polish  horse  and  cut 
them  to  pieces.  The  few  prisoners  who  were  taken 
said  that  400  or  500  men  of  Syerakovski's  army  were  at 
Kobrin,  20  miles  ahead.  Disregarding  the  suggestion 
that  he  should  send  scouts  to  investigate  the  truth  of 
the  story,  Suvorof  pushed  on  after  a  halt  of  a  few  hours, 
and  the  Cossacks,  starting  at  midnight,  attacked  the 
enemy  at  4  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  15th. 
The  Poles  were  again  taken  completely  by  surprise. 
Hardly  any  succeeded  even  in  getting  on  horseback,  and 
this  detachment,  like  the  first,  was  annihilated.  About 
300  were  killed,  65  were  captured,  and  only  50  escaped. 
By  6  o'clock  all  was  over,  and  a  large  number  of 
horses  and  a  well-furnished  provision  store  were  in  the 
hands  of  the  victors.  Suvorof  and  the  infantry  did 
not  arrive  on  the  scene  until  9  o'clock.  The  whole 
affair  had  been  conducted  by  about  800  Cossacks.^ 

The  battle  with  the  main  body  began  at  9  o'clock 
on  the  morning  of  the  16th  at  Kruptchitsa,  10  miles 
beyond  Kobrin.  Syerakovski,  with  12,000  infantry,  3500 
cavalry,  and  2000  scythemen,  occupied  a  strong  position. 
A  stream  flowing  through  a  marsh  200  yards  wide  ran 
across  his  front,  and  he  extended  his  men  along  the 

*  Campagnes,  ii.  168  et  seq.  The  "  Cockcrow  "  and  other  details 
of  the  manner  of  march  are  taken  from  The  Anecdotes  of  an  Old  Soldier 
aboiU  Suvorof.  The  author,  Starkof,  served  under  Suvorof  in  this 
campaign  and  afterwards  in  Italy,  and  collected  many  facts  from 
Bagration.  His  book  is  invaluable  as  a  representation  of  Suvorof 
among  his  men. 

'  Campagnes,  ii.  170  et  seq. ;  Orlof,  40. 


THE  SECOND  POLISH  WAR 


157 


sloping  ground  beyond  it,  in  front  of  the  village  and 
convent  of  Kruptchitsa.  The  road  passed  over  the 
swamp  opposite  his  centre,  and  an  advanced  post,  with 
some  guns,  held  a  few  buildings  at  the  Russian  end  of 
the  bridge.  Hills  covered  with  thick  woods  in  the  rear 
offered  the  Poles  some  refuge  in  case  of  an  overthrow, 
and  their  left  wing  was  covered  by  another  wood. 
The  battle  lasted  all  day.  A  brisk  cannonade  soon 
drove  the  enemy  out  of  the  Ute  de  poni.      Some  horse 


from  the  Polish  right  then  threatened  to  turn  the 
Russian  left.  Suvorof  countered  their  move  by  sending 
some  of  his  own  cavalry  to  meet  it,  but  they  failed  to 
cross  the  swamp,  and  both  parties  remained  facing  each 
other  over  the  barrier.  Suvorof  then  turned  his  atten- 
tion to  the  enemy's  left.  After  some  bombardment  of 
their  position,  he  ordered  an  infantry  attack,  and  in 
two  columns,  partly  assisted  by  planks  torn  from  the 
neighbouring  cottages,  the  Russians  struggled  through 
the  mud  outside  the  Polish  left  wing,  and  even  succeeded 
in  carrying  four  of  their  little  regimental  cannon  with 
them  on  their  shoulders.     The  field-guns  continued  to 


158  SUVOROF 

fire  across  the  marsh  to  the  right  of  the  bridge.  Some 
Cossacks  and  three  squadrons  of  hussars  scrambled  after 
the  infantry.  The  whole  body  then  formed  and  charged 
up  the  opposite  slope.  The  bulk  of  the  cavalry  swept 
still  further  to  the  right  and  began  to  force  its  way 
through  the  wood.  The  Poles  moved  to  the  left  and 
swung  back  their  left  wing  to  meet  this  flank  attack. 
After  a  stubborn  hand-to-hand  combat  in  the  centre, 
some  of  them  broke  their  ranks  and  fled  into  the 
monastery,  where  they  were  killed  at  the  feet  of  the 
terrified  monks.  But  the  main  body  of  infantry, 
formed  into  three  close  columns,  with  the  cavalry  on  the 
flanks,  fell  sullenly  back,  disputing  every  foot  of  the 
ground.  At  this  point  the  main  body  of  the  Russian 
cavalry  came  up.  The  squadrons  recalled  from  the 
left  wing  crossed  by  the  bridge,  and  fell  upon  the  left 
rear  of  the  retreating  mass.  The  others  on  the  right 
had  encountered  great  difficulties.  At  last  they 
succeeded  in  leading  their  horses  across  floating  roads 
of  hastily  felled  timber,  and  they  attacked  the  retreating 
columns  from  their  right  flank.  The  Poles  were  thus 
charged  from  both  sides,  while  the  infantry  continued 
to  press  them  in  the  rear.  Nevertheless,  they  held 
sternly  together,  and  their  guns  fired  until  the  end. 
Bearing  to  the  left  along  the  road  to  Perki,  they  with- 
drew, as  darkness  fell,  into  the  woods  in  their  rear,  and 
the  Russians  were  compelled  to  abandon  the  pursuit. 
The  Poles  had  lost  3000  men,  and  the  Russians  only 
700.  But  if  the  latter  could  claim  the  victory,  the 
former  could  reflect  that  they  had  saved  all  their  artillery 
and  shown  Suvorof  that  in  this  war  there  would  be  no 
Landskron. 

The  day  had  been  exhausting  for  Suvorof  as  well  as 
for  his  men.  From  the  first  moment  of  the  battle,  he 
had  been  always  at  the  point  of  difficulty,  directing  and 
encouraging  the  troops.  He  had  sent  back  to  Kobrin 
for  the  kitchen  train,  and  an  hour  after  the  last  shot 
had  been  fired  the  soup  was  being  boiled.     He  himself 


THE  SECOND  POLISH  WAR         159 

rode  to  the  top  of  a  mound,  slipped  from  the  saddle, 
crossed  himself,  said,  "  Praise  to  God  in  the  highest !  " 
ate  a  biscuit,  drank  a  glass  of  vodka,  and  lay  down  to 
sleep,  wrapped  in  his  cloak,  under  a  tree.  After  a 
rest  he  leaped  up,  ate  a  meal,  mounted  his  horse,  and 
rode  down  to  the  troops.  They  crowded  round  him 
with  cheers  and  laughter,  while  he  praised  those  who  had 
distinguished  themselves.  Then  he  collected  the  whole 
body,  took  off  his  hat  and  recited  in  a  loud  voice  the 
prayer,  "Almighty  God,  being  enabled  by  Thy  Holy 
Providence  to  come  to  this  hour  of  night ..."  Then 
he  visited  the  wounded  and  gave  instructions  for  their 
disposal,  ordered  the  prisoners  to  be  sent  to  the  rear, 
and  their  weapons  to  be  destroyed.  At  2  o'clock  in 
the  morning  the  march  was  resumed,  with  the  special 
order  "  Cartridges  to  be  kept  dry,"  which  the  old 
Suvorovians  knew  meant  that  they  would  have  to 
ford  a  river.i 

By  5  o'clock  on  the  afternoon  of  the  18th  the 
column  was  within  2  miles  of  Brest,  after  covering 
28  miles  in  39  hours.  Syerakovski  had  received  some 
reinforcements.  Nevertheless,  according  to  the  in- 
formation of  a  Jew,  he  was  determined  to  continue  his 
retreat,  and  had  already  sent  his  baggage  on  ahead. 
Suvorof  decided  to  attack  at  once.  The  further  he 
plunged  into  hostile  territory  the  more  difficult  would 
it  be  to  maintain  his  supplies  without  dangerously 
weakening  his  small  force  to  provide  baggage  guards 
and  foraging  parties.  If  Syerakovski  was  to  be  destroyed 
he  must  be  destroyed  at  Brest.  The  enemy  had  observed 
a  party  of  Cossack  scouts,  but  did  not  appear  to  suspect 
the  presence  of  the  Russian  main  body.  The  direct 
road  to  Brest  crossed  the  river  Bug  by  a  bridge.  Here 
Syerakovski  had  posted  a  battalion  and  two  guns, 
while  the  bulk  of  his  force  lay  encamped  beyond  the 
river,  secured  in  this  way  against  surprise.  But  there 
are  two  kinds  of  surprise,  and  if  the  Poles  were  not  to 

1  Campagnes,  ii.  ;   Orlof,  40  ;  Starkof,  i.  25  et  seq. 


160  SUVOROF 

be  beaten  by  a  direct  attack  at  an  unexpectedly  early 
hour,  they  might  still  be  beaten  by  a  flank  attack  from 
an  unexpected  direction.  Suvorof,  knowing  the  inde- 
fatigable character  of  his  troops,  set  them  the  task  of 
making  a  long  and  circuitous  march  and  then  attacking 
the  enemy  from  his  right  flank. 

At  2  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  19th  he 
advanced  in  two  columns,  the  right  of  cavalry  and  the 
left  of  infantry  and  artillery.     Before  them  lay  two 


\ 

•>Ji'l-f:5PR0flC^  Polish  Line  of  §/Lr,,^^\:'  ,^^ 

^(^aace  or  Russ/^yf^\     ^si^        Battle      i{L3^     \m^  f 


Battle  of  BREST      """""^.....aV''''''''^^  Wl  "^^^^'""nL 


SCALE-£liCUSH  MILES 
O  '/z  I 


rivers,  the  Mutchavets  and  the  Bug.  The  first  they 
forded  unobserved,  but  the  marshes  of  the  further 
bank  caused  some  delay,  and  before  the  whole  force 
was  extricated  it  was  already  daylight.  Three  miles 
separated  them  from  the  Bug,  and  before  they  reached 
it  all  the  church  and  convent  bells  of  Brest  were  sounding 
the  alarm.  Nevertheless  the  pace  was  too  quick  for 
the  Polish  army.  Dashing  forward  to  the  river,  the 
Russians  plunged  through  it,  and  formed  up  on  the 
opposite  bank  without  opposition,  a  mile  away  from  the 
Polish  camp.  As  usual,  the  infantry  were  in  the  centre, 
with  the  fourteen  guns  of  the  field  artillery.     Twenty- 


THE  SECOND  POLISH  WAR  161 

five  squadrons  under  General  Shevitch  were  on  the 
right,  thirteen  squadrons  and  the  bulk  of  the  Cossacks 
under  General  Islyenyef  on  the  left.  The  whole  force 
was  in  the  right  rear  of  the  enemy.  But  the  Poles,  if 
too  slow  to  prevent  the  passage  of  the  river,  had  time 
to  take  up  a  position  facing  the  Russians,  and  the  latter 
had  to  deal  with  an  enemy  equal  in  numbers  and  deter- 
mined to  fight. 

Suvorof  ordered  the  whole  line  to  advance.  Immedi- 
ately, following  the  same  plan  as  at  Kobrin,  the  Poles 
fell  into  three  dense  columns,  thirty  abreast  and  one 
hundred  deep,  with  artillery  at  each  end  of  the  inter- 
vening spaces  and  the  cavalry  on  the  flanks.  Then  they 
began  to  retreat  steadily  towards  the  woods  in  their 
rear,  crossing  the  Russian  line  of  advance  from  right 
to  left.  Over  the  broken  ground  Islyenyef  s  cavalry 
galloped  with  all  speed.  Emerging  from  a  deep  ravine, 
they  were  greeted  with  a  heavy  fire  from  four  guns, 
which  inflicted  serious  loss.  But  they  charged  the 
infantry  of  the  nearest  column  in  flank  and  rear. 
Two  attacks  were  repelled,  and  only  the  third  succeeded 
in  breaking  the  Polish  formation.  The  mass  once 
dissolved,  the  Poles  were  frightfully  mangled,  and  but 
for  the  support  afforded  by  the  other  columns  very  few 
of  the  3000  men  would  have  escaped. 

In  the  meantime  these  other  columns  had  succeeded 
in  keeping  ahead  of  the  Russians,  and,  passing  through 
the  village  of  Koroshin,  took  up  a  position  on  the 
slopes  beyond  it,  with  a  dense  wood  covering  their  right 
flank.  In  this  wood  Syerakovski  stationed  eight  of 
his  big  guns,  supported  by  two  squadrons  of  horse. 
The  remnants  of  the  broken  column  fled  into  safety 
under  the  fire  of  the  battery,  and  Islyenyef  was  com- 
pelled to  draw  off.  But  as  soon  as  four  battalions  of 
Russian  infantry  with  four  guns  and  the  cavalry  of 
the  right  wing  came  within  striking  distance,  the  Poles 
again  formed  their  three  columns  and  again  made  for 
the  woods,  the  battery  covering  their  retreat.      This 

M 


162  SUVOROF 

time  Shevitch  first  came  into  action.  The  nearest 
column,  composing  the  left  of  the  retiring  enemy,  was 
furiously  attacked,  and  as  furiously  defended  itself. 
Quarter  was  seldom  asked  and  seldom  granted,  and 
the  greater  part  of  the  men  composing  the  column  died 
where  they  stood. 

The  centre  column  had  better  fortune.  While  the 
battery  in  the  wood  kept  the  cavalry  of  the  Russian  left 
wing  at  bay,  and  the  cavalry  of  the  Russian  right  wing 
was  engaged  with  the  Polish  left  or  rear,  the  Poles  in  the 
centre  continued  their  withdrawal.  When  attacked  at 
last  by  the  cavalry  they  were  already  almost  under 
shelter  of  the  trees,  and  though  they  lost  six  guns,  the 
bulk  of  the  men  for  the  time  being  escaped.  But  the 
Polish  right,  composed  of  the  remains  of  the  column 
first  attacked,  had  suffered  a  complete  overthrow. 
Islyenyef  received  reinforcements,  attacked  the  battery 
and  carried  it,  and  then,  turning  upon  the  infantry 
of  the  exposed  column,  which  was  already  engaged 
with  the  Russian  battalions,  cut  down  every  man  left 
in  the  open.  The  Polish  horse  in  this  part  of  the 
field  attempted  little  opposition,  and  the  greater  part 
of  it  galloped  to  the  rear,  leaving  the  infantry  to  its 
fate. 

The  fight  had  so  far  pursued  the  same  course  as 
that  at  Kobrin.  But  it  was  little  past  midday,  and 
there  was  no  friendly  darkness  to  cover  the  retreat  of 
the  Poles.  The  bulk  of  the  fugitives  from  the  Polish 
right  were  cut  off  by  the  Russian  infantry,  and  the 
four  guns  attached  to  their  column  were  taken.  There 
remained  the  disorganised  mass  of  the  centre  column 
and  the  debris  of  the  cavalry  and  the  infantry  of  the 
right  and  left.  The  flight  extended  along  the  Warsaw 
road  to  the  village  of  Dobrin.  Beyond  the  village  ran 
the  Krasna,  one  of  the  numerous  swampy  streams  of 
which  the  district  was  full.  This  formed  a  continuous 
barrier,  sweeping  from  west  to  east  until  it  reached 
the  Bug.     The  retreating  Poles  had  been  driven  in  a 


THE  SECOND  POLISH  WAR         163 

north-westerly  direction,  making  for  a  dyke  and  a 
wooden  bridge,  which  afforded  the  only  means  of  cross- 
ing the  swamp.  Some  of  the  fugitives  got  across  the 
bridge,  but  the  Russian  infantry  and  a  detachment  of 
Islyenyef's  horse  from  the  left  wing,  arriving  almost 
simultaneously,  succeeded  in  cutting  off  the  retreat 
of  the  great  mass.  The  bridge  and  dyke  were  partly 
broken  down,  and  the  Poles  driven  back  into  the 
village.  The  regimental  cannon  then  opened  fire  on 
the  houses,  and  the  Russian  field  artillery  began  to 
play  upon  them  from  the  other  side.  Some  of  the 
Polish  cavalry  attempted  to  break  away  across  the 
marsh.  But  many  were  drowned,  others  were  shot 
as  they  struggled  in  the  mud,  and  only  a  handful 
escaped.  The  infantry  in  the  village  were  all  killed 
or  taken,  and  at  2  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  the  Polish 
army  had  ceased  to  exist.  The  artillery,  20  guns  in 
all,  and  2  standards  bearing  the  legend  "  Freedom, 
Equality,  and  Independence  "  were  the  trophies  of  the 
victory.  Syerakovski  and  a  few  hundred  men  fled 
to  Warsaw,  and  others  escaped  the  search  parties  in 
the  woods  and  got  away  in  various  directions.  But 
the  highest  estimate  of  those  who  eventually  reached 
safety  is  2000.  The  prisoners  were  about  500.  All 
the  rest  of  the  10,000  or  12,000  men  who  fought  for 
Poland  on  this  bloody  day  were  dead.  The  losses  of 
the  victors  are  reckoned  at  not  more  than  1000  killed 
and  wounded. 1 

This  battle  was  a  shattering  blow  to  the  insurrection. 
A  large  proportion  of  its  regular  army  had  disappeared, 
and  a  new  Russian  force,  under  a  leader  of  terrible 
rapidity  and  striking  power,  was  in  the  heart  of  its 
territory,  at  a  point  where  he  could  be  joined  by  the 
hitherto   unco-ordinated    detachments    of   Fersen   and 


1  Campagnes,  ii.  179  et  seq.  ;  Orlof,  42.  Suvorof  reported  his  losses 
as  92  killed  and  228  wounded.  In  this  respect  he  was  always  very 
inaccurate.  The  Polish  infantry  were  doing  something  during  the 
six  hours'  fight  besides  being  butchered. 


164  SUVOROF 

Derfelden.  But  the  war  was  by  no  means  over.  Suvorof 
had  at  the  utmost  10,000  men,  of  whom  part  were  now 
sent  back  with  prisoners,  and  others  were  engaged  in 
getting  in  suppUes.  The  country  was  full  of  Polish 
partisans,  and  it  was  impossible  for  him  to  get  into 
touch  with  Fersen,  who  was  in  fact  on  the  western 
side  of  the  Vistula,  with  the  Polish  army  of  Poninski 
between  him  and  Suvorof.  Derfelden  was  compara- 
tively close  at  hand  at  Slonim,  and  thither  Suvorof 
sent  a  message,  begging  him  to  advance  to  Byelostok, 
while  he  also  requested  Ryepnin  to  detach  troops 
from  his  command  to  cover  the  country  in  the  rear 
of  Brest.  Suvorof  was  in  fact  in  some  danger.  To 
the  north  of  him  were  the  hostile  detachments  of 
Vavrzhetski  and  Hedroits,  and  to  the  west  Kosciusko, 
with  Poninski,  Grokhovski,  and  the  remains  of  Syera- 
kovski's  shattered  army.  Without  support  he  might 
be  attacked  at  any  time,  and  to  advance  further  was, 
even  for  him,  impossible.  He  was  therefore  compelled 
to  wait  at  Brest,  foraging  in  the  fertile  country  around 
it,  and  doing  his  best  to  get  the  assistance  which  he 
required. 

The  latter  task  was  not  easy.  He  was  not  in  supreme 
command,  and  Derfelden  was  under  the  orders  of 
Ryepnin,  who  was  not  a  friend  of  Suvorof's.  Nor  was 
Count  Nicholas  Saltikof,  President  of  the  Military 
College  at  Petersburg,^  under  whose  general  directions 
the  whole  war  was  being  conducted.  Requests  for 
help  were  disregarded  or  fulfilled  with  limitations,  so 
that  Suvorof  at  last  wrote  in  despair  to  Rumyantsof  : 

Thus,  my  Lord,  for  nearly  three  weeks  I  have  been 
unable  to  move.  I  can  say  here  what  Maharbal  said 
to  Hannibal  :  "  We  know  how  to  win  battles,  but 
not  how  to  use  our  victories."  The  same  time  has 
been  wasted  at  Brest  as  at  Cannae  and  we  are  nearly 
at  winter  quarters. 

^  This  office  was  not  academic.  It  corresponded  with  that  of  the 
English  Secretary  of  State  for  War. 


THE  SECOND  POLISH  WAR         165 

Nevertheless,  he  and  Rumyantsof  together  disposed 
troops  to  cover  his  communications,  and  while  waiting 
for  news  of  Derfelden  and  Fersen,  he  busied  himself 
with  keeping  his  own  men  in  good  condition,  sending 
the  Cossacks  after  raiding  parties  of  the  enemy,  collect- 
ing supplies  at  Brest,  and  gathering  information  about 
the  fortifications  of  Warsaw.^  At  last,  on  the  15th 
October,  he  learned  that  on  the  10th  Fersen,  adroitly 
passing  the  barrier  of  the  Vistula,  had  beaten  Kosciusko 
himself  at  Matsyeovitsa,  and  that  the  Polish  commander 
was  a  prisoner.  Suvorof's  left  flank,  in  case  of  a  march 
upon  Warsaw,  was  now  clear,  and  the  loss  of  the  wise, 
brave,  and  single-minded  Kosciusko  was  in  itself  a 
mortal  stroke  at  the  heart  of  the  Polish  resistance.  To 
follow  up  this  success  by  a  direct  attack  upon  the 
capital  was  the  obvious  course  for  a  man  of  Suvorof's 
temper,  and  his  dispositions  were  quickly  made.  As 
soon  as  he  heard  of  Fersen's  success,  he  flung  etiquette 
to  the  winds,  and  sent  orders  to  him  and  to  Derfelden 
to  march  to  join  him.  Fersen  had  just  received  a 
direction  from  Ryepnin  to  obey  Suvorof  if  required,  but 
Derfelden  had  orders  to  distribute  his  men  in  winter 
quarters.  The  urgent  advice  of  the  young  Major- 
General  Valerian  Zubof ,  brother  of  the  reigning  favourite, 
fortunately  induced  Derfelden  to  obey  Suvorof  ;  and 
the  plan  for  the  concentration  of  the  three  Russian 
forces  did  not  miscarry.  At  the  same  time  Suvorof 
begged  the  Austrians  and  Prussians  operating  in  the 
south  and  west  to  draw  in  towards  Warsaw,  so  as  the 
better  to  protect  the  left  flank  of  his  line  of  march. ^ 

Suvorof  intended  at  first  to  move  upon  Byelsk. 
There  he  hoped  to  fall  in  with  Derfelden,  marching 
south  from  Byelostok,  and  crush  the  Polish  army  of 
Makranovski.  But  the  Polish  commander,  hearing  of 
Fersen's  victory  about  the  same  time  as  Suvorof, 
retreated  with  such  speed,  that  even  Derfelden  was 

^  Campagnes,  ii.  193  et  seq. 
2  Orlof,  58. 


166  SUVOROF 

unable  to  overtake  him.  Some  encounters  with  his 
rearguard  took  place,  but  he  was  not  brought  to  battle, 
and  Derfelden's  force,  marching  by  way  of  Byelsk, 
Bryansk,  and  Brok,  turned  south  to  join  Suvorof  to 
the  east  of  Warsaw.^  Suvorof  himself  abandoned  the 
march  upon  Byelsk  before  he  heard  of  Makranovski's 
retreat,  and  on  the  18th  he  set  his  troops  in  march 
along  the  valley  of  the  Bug,  through  Yanof,  where  he 
hoped  to  cut  the  Polish  communications  between 
Byelsk  and  Warsaw.  Learning  that  Makranovski  had 
already  passed  him  to  the  north,  he  pressed  on  rapidly, 
sending  an  order  to  Fersen  to  reach  Stanislavof  on  the 
24th  October  and  there  wait  for  him.  But  his  own 
pace  was  too  rapid  for  both  Fersen  and  Derfelden, 
and  in  response  to  the  request  of  the  former  he  moved 
more  slowly  through  Bengrof  and  Sokolof,  and  himself 
did  not  arrive  at  Stanislavof  till  the  morning  of  the 
25th.  There  he  found  Fersen  with  about  11,000  men. 
His  own  force  was  about  8000.  Derfelden,  with  some 
12,000  more,  was  not  yet  on  the  spot.^ 

Getting  information  that  one  Polish  force  lay  before 
him  at  Kobuilk  and  another  15  miles  to  the  south- 
west, at  Okunyef,  he  promptly  despatched  Fersen  with 
all  his  troops  except  1500  cavalry  to  deal  with  the 
latter,  and  prepared  himself  to  attack  the  enemy  at 
Kobuilk.  This  was  a  most  hazardous  thing  to  do.  He 
was  about  20  miles  from  Warsaw,  in  a  hilly  district 
covered  with  swamp  and  forest.  Somewhere  in  front 
of  him  the  enemy  disposed  of  about  40,000  troops, 
whose  quality  was  not  to  be  despised.  One  of  his 
lieutenants  was  an  uncertain  distance  away  to  the 
north,  and  he  deliberately  sent  half  his  own  army  to 
the  distance  of  a  day's  march.  This  gave  the  Poles 
an  admirable  opportunity  for  annihilating  one  of  the 
Russian  detachments.     A  Polish  Suvorof  would  have 

^  One  battalion  marched  through  Byelsk,  Granno,  Sokolof,  and 
Bengrof.     Ibid.  62. 

'  CampagneSy  ii.  215  et  seq. 


THE  SECOND  POLISH  WAR 


167 


availed  himself  of  his  central  position,  fallen  upon  one 
or  other  of  the  forces  in  front  of  him,  and  destroyed 
it  before  either  of  the  remaining  two  could  come  to 
its  assistance.  But  Suvorof  knew  that  he  had  no 
counterpart  on  the  other  side,  and  he  took  a  risk  which 
was  justified  by  the  event.  With  Kosciusko  the  Poles 
had  lost  all  the  higher  qualities  of  soldiers  except 
courage. 

With  his  own  force  Suvorof  started  on  the  night  of 


the  26th  along  the  Warsaw  road.  Isayof,  with  800 
Cossacks  and  10  squadrons  of  cavalry,  pushed  on  2 
miles  ahead  of  the  main  body.  He  had  orders  to  attack 
the  enemy  at  sight.  Struggling  through  a  great  morass 
he  came  upon  the  Poles,  more  than  3000  strong,  at 
daybreak.  They  lay  between  two  woods  a  mile  apart, 
both  of  which  concealed  marksmen  and  cannon,  while 
the  bulk  of  the  infantry  was  arranged  across  the  open 
space,  with  cavalry  on  the  wings.  Immediately  behind 
their  left  the  high  road  ran  through  the  village  of 


168  SUVOROF 

Kobuilk,  and  through  the  forest  in  their  rear  led  several 
tracks  of  inferior  quality.  Isayof  fell  upon  the  enemy 
from  both  flanks  simultaneously.  But  the  cross  fire 
from  the  woods  and  the  steadiness  of  the  Polish  infantry 
beat  off  his  attack.  Suvorof  came  up  as  he  recoiled  in 
disorder,  saw  how  greatly  he  was  outnumbered,  and 
sent  back  instructions  that  the  rest  of  the  cavalry 
should  hurry  forward  with  all  speed,  and  each  unit 
should  attack  as  soon  as  it  reached  the  ground.  Islyenyef 
charged  on  the  left  with  his  Cossacks,  and  Shevitch  on 
the  right  with  the  regular  horse,  and  the  enemy,  yield- 
ing to  successive  shocks,  began  at  last  to  give  ground. 
They  adopted  their  usual  close  formation,  and  in  two 
dense  columns  fell  back  along  the  roads  through  the 
woods.  The  sharpshooters  in  the  wings  were  cut  to 
pieces  as  they  broke  from  the  trees  and  attempted  to 
join  the  main  body,  and  the  cannon  were  all  taken. 

The  column  formed  by  the  troops  of  the  right 
wing,  about  1000  strong,  moved  at  first  towards  the 
right,  and  then  at  a  distance  of  a  mile  from  the  main 
body,  parallel  to  the  high  road.  It  was  followed  by 
Islyenyef.  The  track  was  narrow,  and  the  wood  dense, 
and  it  was  not  until  a  large  portion  of  the  pursuers  had 
been  ordered  to  dismount  and  attack  on  foot  that  the 
enemy  were  at  last  brought  to  bay.  By  this  time 
they  had  been  driven  round  three  sides  of  a  square, 
and  when  the  pursuing  cavalry  finally  got  ahead  of  them, 
they  had  almost  reached  the  high  road  again,  near 
the  village  of  Viskovisk.  A  battalion  of  infantry  after 
desperate  exertions  also  succeeded  in  getting  to  close 
quarters  with  them,  and  a  hand-to-hand  fight  in  a 
small  clearing  ended  in  the  complete  dispersion  of  the 
retreating  column.  Leaving  200  dead  and  bringing 
back  30  prisoners  and  2  guns,  Islyenyef  retired  to 
join  the  Russian  main  forces,  now  hotly  engaged  further 
to  the  east  with  the  second  column  of  Poles.  The 
fugitives  among  the  trees  thereupon  attempted  to 
re-form,  but  Islyenyef  returning  upon  them  compelled 


THE  SECOND  POLISH  WAR         169 

the  whole  body  to  surrender.  He  brought  back  380 
prisoners  in  all.  The  fighting  had  been  as  fierce  as 
any  fighting  between  Poles  and  Russians.  But  this 
party  of  unfortunates  had  had  little  to  eat  for  several 
days,  and  their  captors,  with  characteristic  Slav  friendli- 
ness, shared  their  rations  with  them  on  the  site  of  the 
first  encounter. 

The  second  column  had  made  directly  to  the  rear. 
It  was  pursued,  like  the  first,  by  cavalry,  followed  by 
a  battalion  of  infantry  and  four  squadrons  of  dismounted 
dragoons.  The  high  road  was  wide  enough  to  allow 
the  cavalry  to  attack  with  freedom.  Some  Cossacks 
and  regular  cavalry  also  succeeded  in  getting  ahead 
of  the  column  through  the  woods,  and  it  was  attacked 
by  these  simultaneously  with  the  attack  of  the  cavalry 
and  infantry  in  the  rear.  Five  squadrons  sent  by 
Islyenyef  arrived  in  time  to  leap  from  their  horses  and 
plunge,  sabre  in  hand,  into  the  fray.  For  an  hour  a 
desperate  fight  raged  all  over  the  road  and  the  open 
ground  beside  it.  But  the  numbers  were  not  unequal, 
the  Russian  horse  was  incomparably  better  than  the 
Polish,  and  the  infantry  battalion,  like  all  Suvorof's 
infantry,  was  terribly  proficient  with  the  bayonet.  In 
the  end,  the  second  column  suffered  the  fate  of  the  first. 
It  was  driven  into  the  woods  in  fragments,  and  the  great 
majority  of  the  men  composing  it  were  killed  or  wounded. 
Some  400  were  taken  prisoners  at  this  point.  Out  of 
the  two  columns  about  1000  prisoners  remained. 

The  Russian  losses  in  killed  and  wounded  in  all  these 
hand-to-hand  encounters  were  returned  at  much  less 
than  the  Polish.  The  highest  estimate  places  them  at 
200,  only  one-tenth  of  those  of  the  Poles,  even  if  allow- 
ance is  made  for  the  escape  of  a  considerable  number 
of  fugitives  among  the  woods. ^  Polish  authorities 
claim  that  the  Russian  estimates  of  the  number  of  Poles 
engaged  in  the  battles  of  this  war,  and  consequently  of 
the    numbers    killed    and   wounded,    are   exaggerated. 

1  CampagneSy  ii.  219  e<  seq. ;  Orlof,  64. 


170  SUVOROF 

But  there  is  nothing  remarkable  in  the  fact  that  the 
Polish  losses  were  much  greater  than  the  Russian. 
Once  the  Polish  artillery  had  ceased  to  be  effective  at 
Kruptchitsa  and  Brest,  the  Russian  superiority  with 
the  bayonet  would  be  overwhelming,  musketry  being 
no  more  accurate  on  one  side  than  the  other.  At 
Kobuilk  the  explanation  of  any  disparity  in  casualties 
must  be  different.  In  this  fight  only  two  battalions 
of  Russian  infantry  had  succeeded  in  getting  through 
the  swamp,  churned  up  as  it  was  by  the  bodies  of  horse 
which  had  successively  plunged  through  it,  and  the 
victory  was  largely  due  to  dismounted  cavalry.  The 
moral  of  the  Russians  was  no  doubt  better  than  that  of 
the  Poles,  but  the  temper  of  both  sides  was  very  savage. 
The  relations  between  these  two  races  have  always 
resembled  those  between  English  and  Irish,  and  the 
fighting  in  this  war  was  as  merciless  as  in  the  Irish 
rebellion  of  1798.  The  Poles  always  fought  until  the 
most  desperate  and  uncalculating  valour  could  fight 
no  more,  and  under  such  circumstances  it  is  not  sur- 
prising that  the  beaten  army  suffered  heavily.  Their 
regular  infantry  and  their  artillery  were  incomparably 
superior  in  discipline  and  steadiness  to  those  whom 
Suvorof  had  encountered  in  the  first  war.  But  the 
cavalry  was  bad,  and  seems  to  have  relied  upon  its 
firearms  rather  than  upon  shock  tactics.  In  the  absence 
of  good  cavalry  support  the  passive  courage  of  the 
infantry  was  of  little  use  against  the  Russian  horse. 
Once  the  latter  had  burst  through  the  screen  of  artillery 
fire,  and  the  formation  of  the  Polish  infantry  had  been 
broken,  the  battle  inevitably  became  a  mere  massacre.^ 
There  remained  the  final  task,  the  storm  of  the 
defences  of  Praga  and  the  occupation  of  Warsaw.  For 
this  Suvorof  prepared  with  some  care.     To  ride  over 

1  Suvorof  himself  wrote  to  Rumyantsof  after  the  fight  at  Brest :  "  The 
Poles  fought  bravely,  and  our  soldiers  paid  them  for  their  stubbornness, 
giving  no  quarter."  This  is  quoted  by  Pyetrushevski  (second  edition) 
at  p.  316. 


THE  SECOND  POLISH  WAR         171 

a  line  of  earthworks  defended  by  a  numerous  artillery 
was  not  so  easy  as  to  ride  over  an  army  in  the  open 
field.  On  the  25th  Fersen  returned  from  a  fruitless 
march  on  Okunyef,  and  Derfelden,  coming  into  touch 
with  Suvorof  on  the  same  day,  actually  joined  him 
on  the  30th.  The  total  strength  of  the  Russian  army 
was  now  about  25,000  men,  with  86  field  guns.  The 
Poles  had  some  40,000  troops  still  in  the  field,  but  those 
actually  available  for  the  defence  of  Warsaw  were  not 
more  numerous  than  the  attacking  force,  and  were 
not  of  such  good  quality  as  those  which  had  suffered 
so  heavily  in  the  recent  battles.  Nevertheless  they 
had  prepared  powerful  defences.  The  suburb  of  Praga 
was  divided  from  the  main  city  by  the  unfordable 
Vistula,  at  this  point  about  450  yards  wide,  and  round 
it  had  been  thrown  up  a  line  of  earthworks,  strengthened 
in  many  places  by  redoubts  and  batteries,  with  lines 
of  pot-holes  along  its  front.  Upon  this  the  inhabitants 
of  the  city  had  worked  with  feverish  energy.  Women 
of  the  highest  rank  had  carried  stones  with  their  own 
hands,  and  even  the  unhappy  King,  at  last  taking 
sides  with  his  people  against  his  patron,  had  thrown 
up  a  few  handfuls  of  earth.^  The  position  was  for- 
midable. To  the  south  of  Praga  a  tributary  stream 
ran  into  the  Vistula  through  an  impassable  marsh. 
The  narrow  angle  between  this  marsh  and  the  river 
was  blocked  with  a  wall  and  ditch,  and  on  the  opposite 
bank  of  the  Vistula  batteries  were  ready  to  open  fire 
on  the  flank  of  a  force  advancing  along  the  strip  of 
dry  ground.  From  the  right  bank  of  this  stream  ran 
the  main  line  of  earthworks  and  batteries,  slightly 
diverging  from  the  direction  of  the  Vistula,  until  it 
reached  the  hill  called  Stony  Hill.  On  this  hill  were 
placed  two  of  the  strongest  batteries,  and  from  it  the 
line  of  works  ran  at  right  angles  to  the  eastern  face 
until   it   reached   the   river.     The   distance   from   the 

1  It  is  related  that  a  woman  begged  Stanislav  to  go  away,  because 
whatever  he  meddled  with  was  sure  to  fail. 


172  SUVOROF 

stream  to  the  apex  of  the  angle  was  about  two  miles, 
and  from  that  to  the  river  about  one  and  a  quarter. 
In  some  places  there  were  two  lines  of  trenches,  and 
everywhere  they  were  reinforced  by  "  wolf  holes," 
small  pits  with  sharp  stakes  standing  up  at  the 
bottom  of  them.  The  guns,  104  in  number,  were 
placed  in  batteries  behind  the  wall  and  ditch,  and 
within  the  angle  a  group  of  buildings  known  as  the 
Menagerie  was  barricaded  and  loop-holed  for  defence. 
The  houses  of  the  suburb  itself,  for  the  most  part  poor 
cottages  inhabited  by  Jews,  were  nowhere  less  than 
500  yards  from  the  batteries,  and  there  was  ample 
room  for  the  movement  of  troops  in  the  open  space. 
Two  bridges  connected  Praga  with  the  city  of  Warsaw. 
Four  villages  outside  the  lines  had  been  burnt  to  the 
ground,  so  as  to  afford  a  clear  field  of  fire.^ 

Such  a  position  might  have  been  held  by  a  resolute 
and  well-equipped  garrison,  even  against  Suvorof.  But 
the  Poles  were  not  resolute,  and  their  regular  troops 
were  not  sufficient  to  hold  the  whole  line.  Within 
the  city  divided  counsels  weakened  their  resolution. 
The  extreme  democrats,  headed  by  a  priest  named 
Kollontaj,  resembled  the  French  Jacobins,  and  threatened 
their  own  aristocratic  leaders  as  much  as  their  national 
enemy.  The  oligarchy  paid  for  its  monopoly  of  power 
by  the  loss  of  much  of  the  support  which  it  would  have 
found  in  an  enfranchised  middle  class.  When  all 
should  have  been  thinking  of  nothing  but  duties,  half 
the  intelligent  population  was  thinking  of  little  but 
rights.  Nor  were  the  leaders  of  certain  mind.  De- 
prived of  Kosciusko,  almost  the  only  prominent  man 
in  Poland  who  owed  his  position  to  his  own  merits  and 
had  inherited  no  feuds  with  his  title,  the  nobles  and 
the  generals  could  come  to  no  conclusion.  Some  urged 
an  evacuation  and  a  surrender  of  the  town  either  to 

*  Some  of  the  authorities  say  that  there  was  only  one  bridge  across 
the  Vistula.  I  have  accepted  the  view  of  Friedrich  Schmidt  in  Suin 
Otyetchestva  (1831),  39. 


Mi^^ 


THE  SECOND  POLISH  WAR  173 

Suvorof  or  the  King  of  Prussia,  while  others  clamoured 
for  a  defence  at  all  costs.  General  Tomas  Vavrzhetski, 
who  had  reluctantly  assumed  Kosciusko's  office  without 
his  power,  wished  to  burn  Praga  to  the  ground  and 
defend  the  line  of  the  river.  He  was  overruled,  and  the 
decision  was  taken  to  hold  the  defences  of  the  suburb. 
These,  it  was  supposed,  would  delay  the  Russians  until 
the  winter.  They  would  then  be  compelled  to  retire 
and  look  for  supplies,  and  the  European  situation  might 
change  in  favour  of  the  Poles.  With  this  not  very 
bright  prospect  before  them,  all  the  troops  who  could 
be  spared  were  disposed  along  the  line  of  earthworks, 
and  among  them  were  scattered  some  hundreds  of 
devoted  but  untrained  civilians.  The  total  force  was 
not  more  than  26,000  strong,  the  regular  and  partially 
trained  soldiers  being  about  24,000.^  All  these  were 
stationed  close  up  to  the  works,  and  no  provision  was 
made  for  a  general  reserve.  If  the  Russians  broke 
through  at  any  point,  they  would  find  no  enemy  between 
them  and  the  bridges  across  the  Vistula. 

On  the  29th  Suvorof  and  all  his  principal  officers 
reconnoitred  the  position,^  and  the  troops  were  set  to 
work  upon  the  appliances  necessary  for  a  storm.  On 
the  same  day  some  compliments  were  exchanged  between 
the  two  sides,  which  afford  a  curious  contrast  with  the 
ferocity  of  their  mutual  hatred.  General  Bishefski, 
who  had  been  wounded  and  captured  at  Kobuilk,  was 
sent  into  Warsaw  for  surgical  treatment,  and  a  Russian 
doctor,  who  had  previously  treated  Valerian  Zubof, 
was  released  by  the  Poles,  so  that  he  might  go  to  Peters- 
burg where  the  Favourite  was  lying  ill.  But  General 
Zayontchek  having  demanded  the  return  of  Kosciusko's 
baggage  in  a  tone  which  Suvorof  thought  insulting,  the 
latter  sent  back  his  note  with  a  stern  warning  that  if 

^  Suvorof  himself  estimated  the  Poles  at  30,000.  I  have  adopted 
the  figures  of  Schmidt,  op.  cit.  41 . 

2  The  Poles  fired  vigorously  on  the  Staff  and  their  escort,  and 
Islyenyef  s  horse  was  killed  under  him  (Campagnes,  ii.  231). 


174  SUVOROF 

he  resisted,  he  and  all  his  men  would  be  put  to  the 
sword.^  On  the  2nd  November  everything  was  ready, 
and  the  army,  with  banners  displayed  and  music  sound- 
ing, moved  forward  into  the  positions  marked  out 
for  it.  The  enemy  outposts  were  driven  in,  and  the 
Russians  occupied  a  line  nearly  five  miles  in  length. 
Upon  this  a  vigorous  enemy  would  have  made  a  sortie, 
and  could  hardly  have  failed  to  inflict  heavy  damage. 
But  the  Poles,  surrendering  the  initiative  to  the  other 
side,  remained  quietly  in  their  entrenchments,  and 
Suvorof's  preparations  went  on.  Derfelden  and 
Potyomkin,  the  nominal  commander  of  Suvorof*s 
own  detachment,  lay  opposite  the  northern  face  of 
the  position,  and  Fersen  opposite  the  eastern.  During 
the  night  of  the  2nd  four  batteries  were  thrown  up. 
Two,  mounting  48  guns,  were  placed  in  front  of  Fersen  ; 
one,  with  16  guns,  was  to  prepare  Potyomkin*s  attack 
on  Stony  Hill ;  and  the  fourth,  with  22  guns,  was 
opposite  the  northern  defences. 

Next  morning  the  batteries  opened  fire,  and  a  brisk 
reply  came  from  the  Polish  artillery.  After  another 
survey  of  the  ground,  Suvorof  decided  to  storm  that 
night,  relying  upon  surprise  and  the  prowess  of  his 
troops  to  do  what  had  previously  seemed  impossible 
to  Fersen  and  his  Prussian  ally.  Three  of  the  columns 
were  composed  of  Fersen' s  troops,  all  of  them  burning 
to  avenge  the  losses  which  they  had  suffered  in  the 
streets  of  Warsaw,  and  Potyomkin  and  Derfelden  pro- 
vided two  columns  each.  One  of  Fersen's  columns 
was  to  attack  between  the  marsh  and  the  Vistula, 
enter  Praga,  and  throw  itself  across  the  roads  to  the 
bridges.  On  the  northern  front,  Derfelden's  first 
column  was  to  make  straight  for  the  bridges  in  the  same 
way.  The  fourth  column,  part  of  Potyomkin' s  force, 
was  to  attack  Stony  Hill.  For  the  others  were  indicated 
various  parts  of  the  wall  and  ditch.  In  advance  of 
each  colunm  128  marksmen  were  to  clear  the  wall  of 

*  Campagnes,  ii.  231  et  seq. 


THE  SECOND  POLISH  WAR 


175 


the  enemy,  behind  them  came  272  pioneers  with  fascines 
and  ladders,  then  30  men  with  picks  and  spades,  and 
behind  all  the  infantry.  Some  of  the  cavalry  had  been 
dismounted  to  complete  the  reserves  of  Derfelden's 
second  column  and  both  columns  of  Potyomkin,  in 
support  of  the  actual  storming  parties.  But  a  mounted 
reserve  also  followed  each  column,  and  as  soon  as  the 
wall  was  seized  it  was  to  be  broken  down,  so  as  to 
allow  this   reserve  to   enter  with    the    field    artillery, 


The  Storm  of  PRAGA 


SCAl£'  ENGUSM  MILES. 


The  numbers  refer  to  the 
Storming  Columns 


complete  the  overthrow  of  the  enemy  in  Praga,  and 
threaten  Warsaw  itself  from  the  river  bank.  The 
attack  was  to  begin  at  4.30  in  the  morning,  but  the 
two  columns  of  Fersen's  which  were  to  attack  the 
main  entrenchment  were  ordered  to  start  half  an  hour 
later,  in  the  belief  that  Potyomkin's  attack  on  Stony 
Hill  would  draw  off  part  of  the  troops  from  the  eastern 
face.i 

At    7    o'clock    on  the  night  of    the    3rd    detailed 
instructions   were  read  out  to  all  the  troops.     After 

^  See  the  detailed  instructions  of  Suvorof,  set  out  in  CampagneSy  ii. 
235  ;  Orlof,  78  et  seq. 


176  SUVOROF 

describing  the  positions  and  duties  of  the  different  arms 
the  instructions  proceeded  in  thoroughly  Suvorovian 
style : 

When  we  advance,  the  troops  must  move  quietly, 
not  speak  a  word,  and  not  shoot. 

Getting  up  to  the  wall,  they  are  to  rush  forward 
quickly,  and  at  the  word  of  command  shout  "  Hurra  !  ** 

The  ditch  reached,  without  losing  a  second,  throw 
your  fascine  into  it,  leap  on  to  it,  and  put  the  ladder 
up  against  the  wall ;  the  marksmen  to  shoot  the  enemy 
down  one  by  one — smartly,  quickly,  get  up  two  by 
two  !  the  ladder  short  ?  Bayonet  into  the  wall — climb 
on  to  it,  after  him  another  and  a  third.  Comrade  help 
comrade !  Up  on  the  wall,  thrust  the  enemy  off  with 
the  bayonet,  and  in  a  twinkling  form  up  beyond  the 
wall. 

Don't  bother  about  firing  ;  don't  fire  without  need  ; 
beat  the  enemy  and  push  him  with  the  bayonet ;  work 
quickly,  sharply,  bravely,  Russianly !  Support  your 
own  men,  in  a  body  ;  don't  leave  your  officers.  Keep 
the  front. 

Don't  run  about  into  houses  ;  give  quarter  to  the 
enemy  who  ask  for  it ;  don't  strike  the  unarmed  ;  don't 
fight  with  women  ;  don't  touch  boys  and  girls. 

To  those  of  us  who  die  the  Kingdom  of  Heaven  ;  to 
the  living  glory,  glory,  glory  !  i 

At  5  o'clock  the  signal  rockets  went  up,  and  the 
columns  moved  swiftly  forward.  From  the  Polish  lines 
were  heard  the  confused  hum  of  moving  and  talking 
men,  and,  nearer  and  more  distinct,  the  cries  of  the 
sentries.  But  the  Poles  had  not  expected  an  attack 
so  soon,  and  it  was  only  by  chance  that  Vavrzhetski 
had  come  over  to  Praga  at  4  o'clock.  The  sudden 
outbreak  of  firing  along  the  northern  defences  was  his 
first  warning  of  the  peril  in  which  he  stood,  and  soon 
afterwards  the  leaders  of  Derfelden's  first  column  were 

^  Starkof,  45.  Suvorof  gave  special  instructions  to  Fersen's  men, 
just  before  the  actual  storm.  Among  these  was  an  order  to  give 
freedom  and  a  written  pass  to  any  man  who  laid  down  his  arms. 
Pyetrush.  ii.  109. 


THE  SECOND  POLISH  WAR  177 

clambering  over  the  parapet  at  the  point  where  it 
began  to  run  down  steeply  to  the  bed  of  the  river. 
This  column  was  led  by  the  General  Lassii,  who  had 
distinguished  himself  at  Izmail,  and  he  was  as  success- 
ful on  this  occasion  as  on  the  first.  An  attempt  by  the 
Polish  cavalry  to  disperse  his  infantry  was  frustrated 
by  the  timely  arrival  of  two  Russian  squadrons. 
His  infantry  reserve  came  up  on  his  left,  and  the 
artillerymen,  who  had  been  battering  this  part  of  the 
defences,  chafing  at  their  enforced  inactivity,  hauled  their 
guns  across  the  lines  and  opened  fire  at  point-blank 
range  on  the  Polish  emplacements.  Driving  the  enemy 
before  them,  the  infantry  pushed  through  the  streets 
of  the  suburb  and  seized  the  head  of  the  nearest  bridge. 

The  second  and  third  columns  had  a  comparatively 
easy  task.  They  swarmed  over  the  defences  and  took 
the  batteries  in  the  rear.  Some  Polish  horse  threatened 
an  attack,  but  a  grenadier  battalion  charged  them  with 
the  bayonet,  and  they  turned  and  fled.  These  two 
columns  then  made  for  the  bridges.  The  fourth 
column,  attacking  Stony  Hill,  met  with  more  difficulty. 
The  fire  from  the  guns  and  musketry  was  at  this  point 
very  fierce.  Nevertheless,  throwing  away  their  fascines, 
the  men  swarmed  over  the  wolf  holes  and  the  palisade, 
and  carried  the  batteries  beyond  with  the  bayonet. 
The  slaughter  here  was  great,  and  of  a  battalion  of 
500  Jews,  which  fought  with  the  greatest  courage,  not 
a  single  man  survived. 

As  had  been  expected,  the  furious  fighting  at  the  angle 
of  the  defences  sensibly  lightened  the  task  of  the  two 
columns  attacking  the  eastern  face.  Fersen's  men 
got  quickly  over  the  trenches,  and  drove  the  enemy 
through  the  streets  of  Praga  towards  the  bridges.  The 
seventh  column  turned  the  Polish  detached  line  between 
its  left  wing  and  the  marsh,  some  of  the  men  plunging 
into  the  water  up  to  their  waists,  and  the  defenders 
fell  back  hurriedly.  Their  retreat  was  cut  off  by  the 
cavalry,  and  they  were  driven  back  into  the  narrow 

N 


178  SUVOROF 

angle  formed  by  the  bank  of  the  river  and  the  marshy 
stream.  There,  in  full  view  of  the  inhabitants  of 
Warsaw,  they  maintained  for  a  short  time  a  desperate 
resistance.  But  at  last,  when  many  had  been  killed 
and  some  drowned  in  attempting  to  escape  by  swimming, 
the  rest  laid  down  their  arms.  About  1300  prisoners 
were  taken  at  this  point,  and  rather  more  were  killed 
or  drowned.  The  victors  then  dashed  on  with  all  speed, 
crossed  the  stream  and  joined  with  the  first  and  fifth 
columns  at  the  bridges.  These  were  set  on  fire,  and 
the  retreat  of  the  rest  of  the  defenders  was  altogether 
cut  off. 

It  was  now  day,  and  the  Poles  had  been  completely 
defeated.  Vavrzhetski  had  escaped,  forcing  his  way 
across  a  bridge  through  a  mass  of  fugitives,  but  some 
thousands  of  men  remained  penned  in  the  streets, 
unable  to  advance  or  retreat,  falling  at  every  moment 
under  the  pitiless  fire  of  the  Russian  artillery  or  the 
bayonets  or  sabres  of  the  troops  who  now  pressed  in 
from  every  side.  There  took  place  one  of  those  scenes 
which  sometimes  remind  even  historians  of  the  essential 
beastliness  of  war.  It  will  never  be  known  whether 
soldiers  or  civilians  first  fired  from  the  houses.  But  the 
Russians  found  themselves  assailed  with  every  sort  of 
missile,  fired  or  flung  from  the  windows  or  the  roofs, 
and  in  defiance  of  Suvorof's  express  orders,  no  less 
than  of  the  ordinary  dictates  of  humanity,  they  began 
an  indiscriminate  massacre.  Soldiers  and  civilians, 
men,  women,  and  children,  perished  wretchedly.  There 
was  no  escape  to  Warsaw.  Some  had  crossed  the 
bridges  before  the  approaches  were  cut.  Others  were 
less  fortunate.  They  took  to  boats,  but  these  were 
overcrowded,  and  some  sank  with  all  on  board.  A  few 
people  tried  to  swim  across  and  were  drowned.  Suvorof, 
seeing  that  the  men  had  got  completely  out  of  hand, 
sent  an  officer  into  the  town  to  urge  the  civilian  in- 
habitants to  flee  towards  the  Russian  camp,  and  many 
escaped  in  this  way.     But  a  large  number  died  amongst 


THE  SECOND  POLISH  WAR         179 

the  ruins  of  Praga.  The  burning  bridges  set  fire  to 
the  houses,  and  a  great  part  of  the  suburb  was  burnt 
to  ashes.  The  whole  scene  of  slaughter,  with  the  glare 
and  roar  of  the  flames  and  the  stifling  smoke,  the 
stamping,  shouting  combatants,  and  the  yells  and 
screams  of  the  women  and  children  as  the  raving 
savages  fell  upon  them  in  places  from  which  there  was 
no  escape,  made  an  impression  upon  the  minds  of  the 
Polish  nation  that  will  never  be  effaced. 

It  is  easy  to  provide  explanations,  or  even  partial 
excuses.  Many  of  the  victors  had  not  long  before 
barely  escaped  with  their  lives  from  the  pitiless  pursuit 
of  the  Warsaw  mob.  The  custom  of  the  time  allowed 
plunder  after  a  storm,  and  plunder  always  leads  to 
murder.  The  soldiers,  fighting  in  a  narrow  street,  and 
suddenly  attacked  from  behind,  behaved  like  wild 
beasts  out  of  fear.  The  numbers  of  the  victims  were 
in  any  case  exaggerated.  This  is  true  enough,  and 
there  have  been  similar  episodes  in  the  history  of  most 
European  armies  of  the  same  or  even  later  date. 
Nevertheless,  the  storm  of  Praga,  though  a  bold  feat 
of  arms,  remains  a  blot  on  the  fame  of  the  Russian 
troops  and  their  leader.  Suvorof  had  given  express 
orders  that  no  violence  should  be  done  to  women  and 
children.  But  his  account  of  the  storm  contains  no 
reference  to  the  unnecessary  horrors  which  accompanied 
it,  and  it  is  not  recorded  that  he  addressed  any  rebuke 
to  the  guilty  troops.  On  the  other  hand,  admitting 
the  brutality  of  the  troops  and  the  impotence  of  Suvorof 
to  check  it,  the  storm  of  Praga  was  not  as  bad  as  it 
has  been  represented  by  contemporary  or  recent  enemies 
of  Russia.  The  Russian  soldier,  like  other  Slavs,  will 
kill,  in  the  heat  of  battle,  anything  that  gets  in  his 
way.  But  there  is  no  race,  except  the  Jewish,  with 
which  he  would  not  rather  eat  and  drink  than  fight. 
The  atrocities  committed  at  Praga  were  local  and 
temporary,  and  the  slaughter  was  not  continued  after 
the  battle.     The  Polish  army  lost  about  10,000  killed, 


180  SUVOROF 

and  the  prisoners,  wounded  and  unwounded,  were  about 
12,000.1  The  proportion  of  killed  is  frightfully  high. 
But  this  was  the  last  battle  of  the  war.  Putting  aside 
the  question  where  the  right  lay  between  Russians  and 
Poles,  Suvorof  was  right  in  claiming  that  one  massacre 
which  ends  a  rebellion  is  better  than  the  long-protracted 
killing  which  goes  on  during  guerilla  warfare.  But 
posterity,  which  acquits  him  of  mere  lust  for  blood, 
does  not  put  aside  the  major  question,  and  the  States 
which  bear  the  guilt  of  originating  the  war  must  answer 
for  every  act  of  each  of  their  ministers. 

Even  before  the  last  of  the  defenders  of  Praga  had 
laid  down  their  arms,  the  Russian  cannon  were  firing 
across  the  river  into  Warsaw  itself,  and  one  shell  killed 
the  secretary  of  the  Council  of  the  Republic  during  a 
sitting  of  the  Council.  The  whole  city  was  in  a  panic, 
and  a  stream  of  vehicles  and  foot  passengers  poured 
out  from  the  western  gates.  The  inhabitants  demanded 
a  capitulation,  the  King  supported  them,  and  even 
Vavrzhetski,  who  was  still  for  a  prolongation  of  the 
war,  consented  to  abandon  the  defence  of  the  capital. 
A  deputation  was  therefore  sent  by  the  City  Govern- 
ment to  Suvorof.  In  the  early  hours  of  the  morning, 
in  a  boat  followed  so  far  as  the  darkness  would  permit 
by  the  anxious  gaze  of  an  enormous  crowd,  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  citizens  crossed  the  river.  After  some 
delay,  they  were  brought  to  Suvorof,  who  was  sitting  on  a 
log  of  wood  in  front  of  his  tent,  with  his  sword  across  his 
knees.  They  approached  with  hesitation.  Seeing  their 
doubt,  he  leaped  to  his  feet,  flung  away  his  sword, 
cried  out  in  Polish,  "  Peace,  peace  !  "  and  embraced 
them.  The  deputies  threw  themselves  on  their  knees 
before  him,  but  he  raised  them  and  led  them  into  his 
tent,  where  he  offered  them  wine  and  zakuski.2     The 

^  Orlof,  66  et  seq.  ;  Starkof,  43  et  seq.  ;  Schmidt,  op.  cit. ;  CampagneSy 
ii.  235  et  seq.  ;  "  Memoirs  of  Denisof  "  in  Rtiss.  Star.  (1874),  ii.  Suvorof  s 
account  of  the  storm  is  set  out  in  Orlof,  113  et  seq. 

2  Zakuski  are  the  miscellaneous  sardines,  smoked  fish,  pickles,  and 
so  forth  by  which  Russians  stimulate  their  appetites  before  a  large 


THE  SECOND  POLISH  WAR         181 

poor  men  were  utterly  overcome  by  these  actions  on 
the  part  of  such  a  terrible  enemy,  and  more  than  one 
of  them  burst  into  tears.  The  negotiations  were  brief. 
The  terms  finally  arranged  were  that  all  arms  and  cannon 
were  to  be  deposited  in  a  suitable  place  outside  the 
city  ;  the  bridges  were  to  be  repaired  at  once  and  the 
Russians  admitted  ;  all  Poles  were  to  be  dismissed  to 
their  homes,  with  all  their  private  property  untouched, 
immediately  after  laying  down  their  arms  ;  the  King 
was  to  receive  royal  honours ;  the  civilian  inhabitants 
were  to  receive  no  injury  in  persons  or  goods  or  other 
property ;  the  Russians  were  to  enter  the  city  the 
same  day,  or  the  day  after,  if  a  bridge  was  not  ready 
sooner. 

These  terms  lacked  nothing  of  generosity,  and  the 
deputies  returned  to  the  anxious  crowd  on  the  other 
bank.  The  boats  approached  at  full  speed,  and  the 
cries  of  "  Peace,  peace  !  "  which  the  excited  messengers 
began  to  utter  were  taken  up  and  answered  by  the 
populace  with  the  wildest  enthusiasm.  The  deputies 
were  snatched  from  the  boats  and  carried  up  the  bank 
with  shouts.  But  this  was  only  the  attitude  of  the 
citizens.  The  military  men  were  made  of  fiercer  stuff. 
Vavrzhetski  refused  to  give  up  his  arms.  On  the  morn- 
ing of  the  7th,  the  deputies  started  again  on  their 
anxious  journey.  Suvorof  refused  to  abate  his  terms, 
except  to  say  that  he  would  not  enter  the  town  until 
the  9th,  and  his  own  men  would  help  to  repair  the 
bridge.  If  the  Polish  army  would  not  give  up  its  arms, 
it  must  evacuate  the  city  without  delay.  After  this 
announcement,  he  ordered  Fersen  and  Derfelden  to 
cross  the  Vistula  in  boats  above  Warsaw,  and  prepare 
to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  Vavrzhetski.  He  had  to  post- 
pone his  entry  still  further,  and  finally  agreed  that  it 
should  not  take  place  until  the  12th  November.  But 
before  dawn  on  the  9th  came  an  earnest  request  that 

meal.    They  are  eaten  by  the  guests  standing  at  a  side-table,  or  even 
in  an  ante-room. 


182  SUVOROF 

he  should  lead  his  men  in  at  the  earliest  possible  moment. 
Already  the  irreconcilables  were  restive,  and  even  the 
King  might  soon  be  in  danger.  The  triumphal  entry 
was  actually  made  on  the  10th,  after  the  bulk  of  the 
Polish  military  stores  had  been  successfully  removed. 
Suvorof,  wearing  a  plain  uniform,  and  without  his 
Orders,  received  the  city  keys  and  bread  and  salt  at 
the  Warsaw  end  of  the  bridge.  Russian  authorities 
speak  of  the  cheering  crowds  in  the  streets,  the  shouts 
for  Catherine  and  Suvorof,  and  the  tears  which  sprang 
to  his  eyes  as  he  thanked  God  that  he  had  not  had  to 
deal  with  Warsaw  as  he  had  dealt  with  Praga.  All 
this  is  true  enough,  and  it  was  not  Suvorof  s  way  to 
abuse  a  victory.  But  there  has  always  been  a  noble 
soldier  to  do  the  work  of  a  bad  cause,  and  posterity 
will  not  allow  one  example  of  personal  magnanimity  to 
dull  its  memory  of  Praga  and  the  Second  Partition. 
Suvorof  represented  the  strength,  but  not  the  policy 
of  Russia,  and  the  Poles  who  remained  at  home  and 
cursed,  or  trudged  out  of  the  city  in  the  train  of 
Vavrzhetski  and  Dombrovski,  understood  what  had 
happened  better  than  those  who  crowded  the  streets 
to  welcome  him  into  Warsaw. 

In  dealing  with  popular  risings  of  this  kind  there  is 
one  cardinal  error  which  may  be  committed  by  a  Govern- 
ment :  the  excessive  application  of  force.  Suvorof, 
or  rather  Suvorof  s  army,  had  already  been  guilty  of  a 
massacre  of  innocent  people,  and  this  could  not  be  for- 
gotten. But  he  refrained  from  the  additional  folly  of 
courts  -  martial,  executions,  and  oppressive  fines,  and 
observed  the  golden  rule,  not  to  do  anything  which 
it  would  afterwards  be  out  of  his  power  to  undo.  Very 
much  to  the  disgust  of  the  aristocracy  of  Petersburg, 
he  made  no  forced  levy  upon  the  inhabitants  of  Warsaw, 
proclaimed  a  general  amnesty,  and  gave  a  free  pass 
to  any  soldier  who  laid  down  his  arms  at  any  moment 
before   battle   was   joined.^    At   the   personal   request 

1  Voronis.  Arch,  xii.  142,  384. 


THE  SECOND  POLISH  WAR  183 

of  King  Stanislav  he  released  one  of  the  officers  taken 
at  Praga,  and  of  his  own  free  will  released  500  others, 
sending  the  order  after  the  convoy  of  prisoners,  which 
was  already  well  on  its  way  to  Kief.^  The  news  of  the 
general  amnesty  was  more  destructive  of  the  Polish 
army  than  even  such  bloody  defeats  as  they  had  already 
sustained  at  the  hands  of  Suvorof.  Some  units  sur- 
rendered on  being  overtaken  by  Russian  troops,  others 
did  not  wait  for  a  summons.  Pickets  disappeared, 
scouts  never  returned  from  their  expeditions,  artillery- 
men and  waggoners  cut  their  traces  and  galloped  off 
with  their  horses.  In  ten  days  after  the  Russian  entry 
into  Warsaw  even  the  detachments  of  irreconcilables 
like  Vavrzhetski  and  Dombrovski  had  melted  away. 
By  the  1st  December  thirty  thousand  free  passes, 
given  on  the  sole  condition  that  the  bearers  went  quietly 
to  their  homes,  had  completed  the  work  of  Kobrin, 
Brest,  Kobuilk,  and  Praga.  The  Polish  insurrection 
was  at  an  end,  and  the  Polish  State  with  it. 

Rewards  were  showered  upon  the  conqueror.  After 
the  victory  at  Brest,  Catherine  had  presented  him  with 
a  diamond-embroidered  ribbon  for  his  hat,  and  three 
pieces  of  cannon  out  of  those  which  he  had  captured. 
After  the  capture  of  Praga  she  sent  him  a  field-marshal's 
baton  studded  with  jewels,  and  valued  at  15,000  roubles, 
and  endowed  him  with  an  estate  and  7000  serfs,  part 
of  the  property  of  the  unhappy  King  of  Poland.  She 
wrote  to  him  at  the  same  time  that  she  never  promoted 
any  man  except  in  order  of  seniority,  "  but  you,  by 
your  own  exploits,  have  made  yourself  Field  Marshal."  2 
The  King  of  Prussia  sent  him  the  Orders  of  the  Red 
and  the  Black  Eagles,  and  the  Emperor  his  portrait 
set  in  jewels.  The  receipt  of  the  long-coveted  rank 
of  Field-Marshal  filled  him  with  delight,  and  his  high 
spirits  broke  out  as  usual  into  extravagance.  On  the 
day  on  which  he  went  to  church  to  return  thanks  for 

1  Campagnes,  ii.  280. 
2  State  Archives,  v.  116  ;  printed  in  Russ.  Star.  (1892),  Ixxiv.  37. 


184  SUVOROF 

his  promotion,  he  set  a  number  of  stools  in  a  row,  and 
in  the  presence  of  his  officers  leapt  over  them  one 
after  the  other,  saying  "  Over  Ryepnin — over  Saltikof — 
over  Prozorovski  '* — reciting  with  each  leap  the  name 
of  some  senior  general,  whom  he  had  passed  in  the  race 
for  promotion.  After  this  he  put  on  his  new  uniform 
and  all  his  orders,  and  went  solemnly  to  church.^  The 
most  interesting,  and  probably  the  most  gratifying  of 
all  these  honours  was  the  tobacco-box  presented  to 
him  by  the  town  of  Warsaw  itself,  with  the  inscription 
"  Warsaw  to  her  deliverer."  This  was  no  doubt  the 
gift  of  the  owners  of  property,  who  felt  that  only  Suvorof 
stood  between  them  and  Jacobinism.  The  economic 
state  of  that  country  may  be  imagined,  where  foreign 
conquest  seems  less  terrible  than  domestic  revolution. 

Two  things  are  necessary  for  suppressing  national 
risings  :  unhesitating  energy  in  the  military  operations, 
and  the  most  ostentatious  clemency  immediately  armed 
resistance  is  at  an  end.  Complete  success  may  not 
always  be  achieved  with  these,  but  it  will  never  be 
achieved  without  them.  So  far  as  Suvorof  was  free 
to  act  according  to  his  own  judgement,  he  had  done 
well.  He  had  spared  the  conquered,  while  striking 
down  the  arrogant.  He  had  had  the  opportunity  of 
behaving  like  one  of  Plutarch's  heroes,  and  he  had  used 
it  with  delight.  But  the  Empress  and  her  advisers 
were  less  magnanimous.  On  the  2nd  December  he 
received  detailed  instructions  for  levying  a  contribution 
upon  Warsaw,  the  arrest  of  the  leaders  of  the  April 
rising,  and  the  confiscation  of  public  archives  and  pro- 
perty, including  the  famous  Zaluski  Library.  The  con- 
tribution was  not  levied,  but  the  plunder  and  a  few 
prisoners  were  sent  to  Petersburg,  where  the  books 
formed  the  nucleus  of  the  great  Imperial  Library.     It 

1  This  anecdote  is  told  by  many  contemporaries,  including  De 
S6gur,  who  says  the  scene  took  place  "  in  church."  His  promotion 
offended  not  a  few  of  these  rivals,  and  the  complaints  of  one  of  them 
were  so  loud  that  he  was  dismissed  from  the  service.  Voronis.  Arch. 
xii.  144. 


THE  SECOND  POLISH  WAR         185 

was  also  by  Imperial  orders  that  Derfelden  harried 
the  private  estates  of  Prince  Czartoryski,  a  large 
quantity  of  books,  pictures,  and  furniture  being  wantonly 
destroyed.  These  systematic  outrages,  and  the  indis- 
criminate plundering,  which  marked  and  marks  the 
presence  of  every  Russian  army  in  a  foreign  country, 
undid  much  of  the  good  work  done  by  Suvorof 's  clemency, 
and  the  conquest  of  1794  remained  the  bitterest  of 
Polish  memories  until  obliterated  by  the  still  greater 
savagery  of  1868. 

Suvorof's  fame  was  now  European.  The  Turkish 
wars  had  concerned  only  the  statesmen  of  Western 
Europe,  the  overthrow  of  Poland  aroused  the  interest, 
and  often  the  sympathy,  of  the  peoples.  The  conqueror 
was  most  often  represented  in  an  unfavourable  light. 
Thus  a  caricature  of  the  English  Rowlandson  repre- 
sents him  as  a  monster,  introducing  to  his  Imperial 
mistress  a  train  of  slaves  bearing  dishes  full  of  the 
heads  of  massacred  Polish  women  and  children.  Those 
foreign  visitors,  who  knew  his  private  enemies  better 
than  himself,  took  the  worst  possible  view  of  his  un- 
polished manners  and  his  fantastic  appearance,  as  well 
as  of  his  military  performances.  One  writes  of  him, 
after  his  return  to  Petersburg,  as 

A  little  old  man,  wizened  and  crooked,  who  crosses 
the  rooms  of  the  Palace  with  a  one-footed  skip,  or  runs 
and  gambols  in  the  streets,  followed  by  a  troop  of 
children,  to  whom  he  throws  apples  to  make  them  fight, 
crying  himself  "  I'm  Suvorof !  I'm  Suvorof !  "  If 
the  foreigner  has  difficulty  in  recognising  in  this  old  mad 
man  the  conqueror  of  the  Turks  and  the  Poles,  it  will 
not  be  difficult  for  him  to  suspect  in  these  wild  and 
haggard  eyes  and  this  horrible  foaming  mouth,  the  cut- 
throat of  Praga.  Suvorof  would  be  merely  the  most 
ridiculous  of  buffoons,  if  he  had  not  shown  himself 
the  most  barbarous  of  warriors.  He  is  a  monster, 
whose  monkey  body  holds  the  soul  of  a  butcher's  dog. 
Attila,  his  countryman  and  perhaps  his  ancestor,  was 
neither  so  lucky  nor  so  savage.     His  vulgar  and  farcical 


186  SUVOROF 


■>>  S  J )  ■ 


behaviour  has  inspired  the  soldiers  with  blind  confidence, 
which  served  him  instead  of  military  talents,  and  was 
the  real  cause  of  his  successes.  .  .  .  He  sheds  blood  by 
instinct,  like  the  tiger.  .  .  .  His  exploits  in  Poland 
are  those  of  a  brigand.  He  massacred  the  remains 
of  an  army  already  defeated  by  Fersen  and  deprived 
of  the  gallant  Kosciusko,  who  gave  it  all  its  strength. 
Suvorof,  embracing  the  inhabitants  of  Warsaw,  and 
granting  them  pardon  over  the  corpses  of  twenty 
thousand  citizens  of  every  age  and  every  sex,  resembles 
a  satiated  tiger,  who  plays  with  his  prey  over  the  offal 
of  liis  den.  .  .  .  This  cruel  man  has  nevertheless  some 
virtues  ...  he  values  money  as  little  as  human  blood. 
.  .  .  Such  is  the  too  celebrated  Suvorof.^ 

This  is  obviously  a  clever  distortion  of  the  truth. 
Popular  feeling  always  requires  a  hero  or  a  villain.  It 
cannot  spend  itself  sufficiently  on  causes  and  institu- 
tions. The  man  who  had  done  most  in  the  field  to 
throw  Poland  under  the  feet  of  her  oppressors  was 
thus  made  responsible  for  all  their  crimes.  Many  other 
incidents,  carefully  preserved  from  these  Warsaw  days, 
give  a  more  accurate  picture  of  him.  The  comic  is 
there,  though  the  monstrous  is  not.  His  overwhelming 
successes,  his  honours,  his  unbounded  authority,  and 
his  opportunities  of  displaying  magnanimity  to  the 
fallen,  gave  Suvorof  perpetual  pleasure,  and  his  high 
spirits  as  usual  found  vent  in  all  sorts  of  freaks.^  These 
stories  are  from  the  notes  of  one  of  his  own  officers.^ 

Soon  after  his  arrival  at  Warsaw,  the  Due  de  Polignac  * 
called  upon  him.  Suvorof  kept  him  waiting  an  hour 
in  the  ante-room,  then  popped  out  of  his  cabinet,  bent 

1  Masson,  MhnoireSy  etc.,  sur  la  Russie,  310  et  seq.  The  malicious 
innuendo  "to  make  them  fight"  is  a  very  artistic  addition  to  the 
doubtless  accurate  description  of  Suvorof  throwing  apples  to  children 
in  the  streets. 

*  As  one  admirer  in  Petersburg  put  it :  "  Suvorof  covers  himself 
with  glory  in  Warsaw.  He  won't  stop  playing  the  fool.  But  that  apart, 
he's  a  marvel."     {Voronts.  Arch.  xii.  144.) 

'  Reminiscences  of  Engelhardt. 

*  Duke  Jules  de  Polignac,  Postmaster-General  of  Louis  XVI.  He 
emigrated  in  1789,  and  received  an  estate  in  the  Ukraine  from  Catherine. 


THE  SECOND  POLISH  WAR  187 

double,  with  his  hands  on  his  stomach,  and  crying  out, 
"  Oh !  this  damned  colic  !  It's  kept  you  waiting  an 
hour !  "  Then  they  began  to  talk.  All  went  well 
until  De  Polignac  discreetly  but  unwisely  expectorated 
into  his  handkerchief.  Suvorof  immediately  leapt  away 
with  a  shriek,  "  Oh  !  Oh  !  '*  and  began  to  clear  his 
throat  loudly  and  spit  on  the  floor.  His  body-servant 
Proshka  solemnly  presented  De  Polignac  with  a  clean 
handkerchief,  taking  the  dirty  one  away,  while  another 
servant  paraded  the  room  burning  incense.  De  Polignac 
looked  at  this  performance  with  perfect  composure, 
and  Suvorof,  delighted  to  find  him  made  of  such  sturdy 
material,  began  to  treat  him  affectionately,  and  they 
remained  fast  friends. 

At  a  morning  service  Suvorof  suddenly  cried  out, 
"  A  stink  !  a  stink  !  "  His  adjutant.  Count  Stolipin, 
knowing  that  he  must  do  something  at  once,  walked 
round  the  Church,  found  a  dirty  old  woman  in  the  porch, 
ordered  her  to  be  taken  out,  and  returned.  "Well?" 
asked  Suvorof.  "  Dirty  old  woman,  Your  Excellency," 
was  the  reply.  "  Pah  !  beastly  !  "  and  he  was  quiet 
for  the  rest  of  the  service.  Unfortunately,  his  general 
adjutants  Tishtshenko  and  Tikhanovski  told  him,  after 
the  service,  that  the  smell  really  came  from  the  soldiers 
and  not  from  the  old  woman.  Stolipin  had  lied  to 
keep  him  quiet.  After  dinner  Stolipin,  as  usual,  brought 
the  Field  Marshal  his  glass  of  vodka.  Suvorof  refused 
to  drink,  and  said  to  his  neighbour,  "  He's  fooling  me ; 
says  '  water.' "  ^  Stolipin  thereupon  loudly  repeated, 
"  Vodka,  Your  Excellency  !  "  "  Ha  !  "  said  Suvorof, 
"  he's  angry  "  ;  and  he  refused  again  to  drink.  "  Fooling 
me,  fooling  me."  Stolipin,  really  annoyed,  declared 
that  he  was  forbidden  by  his  patent  of  nobility  to  tell 
lies.  But  the  old  man  only  repeated,  "  Angry,  angry," 
and  Stolipin  retired  in  high  dudgeon.  This  scene  was 
repeated,  according  to  the  narrator,  every  day  for 
several  weeks. 

^  The  Russian  word  for  water  is  voda. 


188  SUVOROF 

The  officer  who  has  preserved  these  stories  was  him- 
self the  unhappy  victim  of  one  of  their  hero's  outbreaks. 
He  was  dining  with  Suvorof,  and  was  rash  enough  to 
smile  at  the  punctiliousness  with  which  the  vodka  was 
handed  round  to  the  guests  in  order  of  seniority.  Suvorof 
leaped  up,  screaming,  "  He  stinks,  he  stinks  !  '*  and 
fled  into  another  room.  They  opened  a  window,  but 
all  in  vain.  Suvorof  continued,  "  Stinks,  stinks  I " 
Then  at  last,  "  There's  a  skunk  at  the  table  !  "  The 
adjutant  understood.  He  approached  the  guest,  ex- 
plained that  he  was  wearing  dirty  boots,  and  must  go 
out  and  clean  them.  The  officer  took  the  hint  and  went 
home. 

Another  subordinate  gives  a  picture  of  Suvorof  at  an 
inspection  of  troops  during  his  survey  of  his  district 
in  August  1795.  Two  regiments  of  cavalry  and  one  of 
infantry  lay  at  Nemirov,  on  the  Bug.  About  midday 
Suvorof  appeared  on  horseback,  accompanied  by  three 
staff  officers  and  a  Cossack.  He  galloped  in  among 
the  infantry,  resting  after  their  dinner,  and  called  for 
a  veteran  drummer,  "  Yakof  Vassilyevitch  Kislyakof  !  " 
The  drummer  ran  up,  and  Suvorof  ordered  him  to  beat 
the  alarm.  The  men  fell  in,  and  were  promptly  marched 
off  towards  the  river.  Cavalry  and  infantry  plunged 
in  and  crossed,  the  footmen  up  to  their  shoulders  in 
the  water.  On  the  other  side  they  marched  ten  miles, 
Suvorof  still  at  their  head,  and  then  carried  out  a  sham 
fight.  There  followed  a  speech  from  Suvorof,  with 
some  quotations  from  his  Science  of  Victory,  and  a 
rebuke  to  the  commander  of  one  of  the  cavalry  regi- 
ments for  some  defects  in  the  housing  of  his  men.  Then 
he  chatted  with  his  old  acquaintances  in  the  ranks, 
praised  the  units  which  had  distinguished  themselves 
in  the  campaign,  bade  farewell,  and  galloped  away.i 

But  there  was  no  period  in  Suvorof's  military  career 
in  which  he  was  so  little  occupied  with  military  affairs 
as   during  his   occupation   of   Poland.     His  hold  over 

1  Starkof. 


THE  SECOND  POLISH  WAR  189 

his  troops  became  in  fact  rather  slack,  and  there  is 
considerable  evidence  of  peculation  and  want  of  dis- 
cipline among  his  officers.^  He  was  engaged  in  the 
despatch  to  Petersburg  of  the  wretched  King  of  Poland, 
the  political  prisoners,  and  the  Imperial  and  military 
plunder.  His  correspondence  with  Khvostof  shows 
him  as  more  cheerful  than  might  have  been  expected, 
speculating  about  the  chances  of  service  in  an  Austrian 
expedition  against  France,  and  worrying  most  about 
the  blot  on  his  own  honour  involved  in  the  prolonged 
confinement  of  Kosciusko  and  his  companions.  At 
the  end  of  October  1795  an  Imperial  rescript  sum- 
moned him  back  to  Petersburg.  Nothing  was  left  to 
do  but  partition  Poland.  The  hunter  had  brought 
down  the  quarry,  and  the  scullions  could  cut  it  up 
without  his  help. 

Avoiding  ceremony,  and  taking  great  pains  to  avoid 
triumphal  receptions  by  the  way,  he  set  out  in  his  plain 
carriage.  One  scene  deserves  to  be  recorded  here.  On 
the  first  or  second  night  after  he  left  Warsaw  he  found 
quarters  prepared  for  him  in  a  little  house.  The  guest 
room  had  the  usual  big  stove  in  it,  and  the  responsible 
officer  had  forgotten  to  turn  out  the  old  woman  who  was 
accustomed,  in  Russian  fashion,  to  sleep  on  the  top 
of  the  stove.  Suvorof  in  due  course  entered,  stripped 
himself  naked,  splashed  himself  with  cold  water,  and 
began  to  prance  about  the  room,  reciting  at  the  top 
of  his  voice,  and  in  the  original  tongue,  some  verses 
from  the  Koran.  At  this  point  the  old  woman  became 
aware  that  something  was  going  on.  Seeing  the  strange 
sight,  and  hearing  the  strange  sound,  she  concluded 
that  she  was  in  the  presence  of  the  Devil  himself,  and 
ejaculated,  with  pious  terror,  "  Avaunt !  The  Heavenly 
powers  are  with  us  !  "  Suvorof,  on  his  part,  was  hardly 
less  frightened  by  this  sudden  yell  from  the  stove,  and 
shouted  with  equal  force.  Help  came,  the  old  woman 
was  removed,  and  the  Terror  of  the  Turks  and  the  Poles 

^  See,  e.g.,  the  Memoirs  of  Denisof  and  Engelhardt, 


190  SUVOROF 

recovered  his  self-possession  and  went  to  sleep.i  But 
for  this  incident  his  journey  was  unexciting. 

On  the  15th  January  1796  he  reached  Petersburg, 
where  the  Empress  received  him  with  special  marks  of 
distinction.  He  was  lodged  in  the  Taurid  Palace,  the 
large,  dull  edifice  which  Catherine  had  presented  to 
Potyomkin.  In  deference  to  his  peculiar  tastes,  all 
the  mirrors  were  draped  with  cloth,  and  a  straw  mattress 
was  laid  on  the  floor  in  his  bedroom.  His  usual  plain- 
ness of  manners  went  with  his  usual  elaboration  of 
Court  etiquette,  and  the  great  woman  must  sometimes 
have  been  embarrassed  by  his  profound  obeisances 
and  fervent  professions  of  loyalty.^  But  she  showed 
him  every  possible  kindness.  At  his  request  she  made 
Khvostof  a  Gentleman-in- Waiting,  and  when  somebody 
suggested  that  the  honour  was  not  deserved,  she  replied  : 
"  If  Suvorof  had  asked  for  it,  I  should  have  made  him 
a  Lady-in- Waiting."  ®  At  a  ball  at  the  Winter  Palace 
she  asked  him,  "  How  am  I  to  treat  so  dear  a  guest  ?  *' 
"  Blessed  Empress,"  was  the  answer,  "  a  drop  of  vodka." 
"  Fi  done  !  "  said  Her  Majesty,  "  what  will  the  Ladies- 
in- Waiting  say  when  they  talk  to  you  ?  "  "  They  will 
feel,  little  mother,  that  they're  talking  to  a  soldier." 
She  gave  him  the  vodka,  and  he  drank  her  health. 
Then  he  knelt  before  her,  and  cried  out :  "  Your 
Majesty's  condescension  makes  me  your  slave.  I  will 
die  for  my  mother  Catherine  !  "  "  Live,"  said  she  very 
properly,  "  for  the  glory  of  your  country."  * 

On  another  occasion  he  entered  her  room  and 
prostrated  himself  three  times  before  the  ikon;  then, 
turning  round,  made  the  same  obeisance  to  her.  She 
did  her  best  to  prevent  him.  "  Mercy,  Alexander 
Vassilyevitch,"  she  exclaimed,  "  what  are  you  doing  ?  " 
And    she    raised    him    and    seated    him    beside    her. 

1  I  have  not  found  the  authority  for  this  anecdote.     Pyetrushevski 
assumes  its  truth,  and  I  have  copied  it  from  him. 

*  Istoritcheskii  Vyestnik  (1900),  Ixxx.  526. 
3  Russ.  Star.  (1900),  li.  573. 

*  Fuchs,  Misc.  107. 


THE  SECOND  POLISH  WAR         191 

"  Mother,"  he  cried,  "  after  God,  you  are  my  only 
hope."  ^  Catherine  could  not  endure  very  much  of 
this  sort  of  thing,  and  her  willingness  to  find  work  for 
Suvorof  at  a  distance  from  the  Court  was  perhaps 
encouraged  by  Platon  Zubof.  This  young  man,  con- 
sidering that  the  favourite  of  Catherine  was  not  the 
inferior  of  any  of  her  subjects,  treated  the  conqueror  of 
Praga  with  familiarity.  When  he  paid  a  formal  visit 
to  the  Taurid  Palace,  Suvorof  determined  to  put  him 
in  his  right  place,  and  received  him  in  his  shirt.^  After 
a  few  weeks  of  Court  life,  which  he  made  as  uncomfort- 
able as  possible  for  the  Court,  he  left  Petersburg,  to 
take  up  his  next  command,  in  the  Governments  of 
Vratslav,  Voznyesensk,  Yekaterinoslav,  Kharkof,  and 
the  Crimea.  In  the  middle  of  March  he  reached  his 
headquarters  at  Tultchin. 

Here  he  remained  for  some  months,  fighting  with 
his  usual  enemies — excessive  sickness,  arrears  of  pay, 
desertions,  bad  feeding,  and  bad  housing  of  the  troops. 
His  chief  object  was  to  get  an  army  into  good  condi- 
tion for  the  approaching  war  with  France.  But  the 
designation  of  Platon  Zubof  as  commander  of  a  Persian 
expedition  aroused  all  his  old  jealousy,  and  the  faithful 
Khvostof  received  the  usual  letters,  but  rather  more 
sarcastic  and  less  clamorously  complaining  than  before. 
The  same  correspondence  shows  that  he  was  making 
occasionally  gifts  of  money  to  poor  relations,  officers 
in  needy  circumstances,  and  other  less  deserving 
acquaintances.  Egoism  and  generosity  as  usual 
flourished  in  him  together,  and  there  is  in  existence 
a  letter  from  his  nephew.  Count  Alexyei  Gortchakof,  to 
Khvostof,  which  shows  the  young  man  busily  engaged  in 
flattering  his  petulant  and  jealous  old  uncle,  making 
himself  indispensable  to  him,  and  getting  two  pro- 
motions in  three  years  without  any  particular  merits 
or  services.     When  he  was  not  thinking  of  his  own 

1  Rtiss.  Star.  (1892),  Ixiii.  39. 
2  Otyetchestvenniya  Zapiski  (1841),  1. 


192  SUVOROF 

wrongs,  Suvorof  could  be  lavish  in  gifts  of  money  and 
was  ready  enough  to  get  jobs  for  his  relations  and 
friends.  His  own  work  was  thoroughly  done,  and  it 
was  at  Tultchin  that  his  system  of  military  training 
was  brought  to  perfection. 

At  one  moment  in  this  period  he  came  into  contact 
with  Grimm.  At  the  latter's  request  Suvorof  sent  him 
a  silhouette  portrait.  The  portrait  was  enclosed  in  a 
letter  overflowing  with  those  precepts  which  ran  so 
easily  down  the  writer's  pen. 

I  ought  in  everything  to  tread  in  the  steps  of  your 
Excellency's  wisdom,  so  renowned  in  Europe.  The 
immortality  of  learning  brings  it  nearer  than  all  else 
to  the  divine.  Its  influence  raises  us  to  the  loftiest 
heights  of  well-doing.  It  inspires  in  us  the  noble  and 
sacred  resolution  to  live  for  the  common  good.  From 
it  we  study  not  to  think  of  self,  to  scorn  the  vicissitudes 
of  fortune,  and  to  sacrifice  ourselves  for  country  and 
mankind. 

Praise  to  the  Lord  of  Hosts  !  I  shall  acquit  myself 
according  to  your  rules.^ 

In  his  work  with  his  men  he  showed  himself  not 
inconsistent  with  these  lofty  sentiments.  It  was  in 
1796  that  he  cast  into  its  final  form  his  famous  Nduka 
Pobyezhdat  or  Science  of  Victory,  containing  those^ 
principles  which  were  to  him  the  Alpha  and  the  Omega 
of  the  art  of  war.  This  little  book  is  of  great  importance, 
not  only  because  it  explains  Suvorof's  own  method,  but 
because  it  has  been  the  foundation  of  all  Russian 
military  training  since  his  death.  Dragomirof,  the 
brain  of  the  Russian  army  during  the  Japanese  War, 
was  an  avowed  disciple  of  Suvorof,  and  the  heroic 
struggles  in  the  Carpathians  and  Armenia  during  the 
recent  war  were  carried  on  in  the  spirit  of  the  same 
tradition.  It  is  in  the  Science  of  Victory,  first  sketched 
in   the   Polish  War,   and   elaborated   during  the  drills 

1  This  was  copied  by  Grimm,  and  is  printed  in  the  Correspondence 
of  Catherine  II,  with  Grimm,  274, 


THE  SECOND  POLISH  WAR  193 

and  sham  fights  of  Tultchin,  that  we  find  the  rules 
for  converting  mobs  of  illiterate  peasants  into  soldiers 
capable  of  almost  incredible  feats  of  physical  strength 
and  endurance.^ 

The  dominant  principle  is  to  teach  the  soldier  to 
go  and  meet  danger  and  not  to  wait  for  it.  Rules  for 
retreat  find  no  place  in  the  book  ;  every  instruction, 
directly  or  indirectly,  bears  upon  movement  in  the 
direction  of  the  enemy.  It  is  divided  into  two  parts. 
The  first,  entitled  Wachtparad,  consists  of  technical 
terms  of  drill  and  their  explanation.  The  second, 
Verbal  Instruction  of  the  Troops^  is  a  collection  of  rules, 
maxims,  aphorisms,  and  exhortations,  directed  towards 
the  moral  inspiration  rather  than  the  technical  training 
of  the  soldier.  This  second  part  deserves  extensive 
quotation.  It  is  a  complete  exposition  of  Suvorof's 
military  creed. 

Boots  close  together,  knees  pressed ;  the  soldiers 
stand  like  a  needle  ;  I  see  the  fourth  man,  not  the 
fifth. 

The  military  step  is  a  yard,  in  deploying  a  yard  and 
a  half  ;   keep  your  distance. 

The  soldier  in  front  on  the  march  dresses  by  the 
elbow,  three  paces  from  rank  to  rank  ;  on  the  march, 
two  ;   no  bother  with  drums. 

Keep  a  bullet  for  three  days,  sometimes  for  a  whole 
campaign,  when  there's  no  need  to  use  it.  Shoot 
rarely,  and  when  you  do,  aim  ;  with  the  bayonet  strike 
hard  ;  the  bullet  misses,  the  bayonet  doesn't  miss  ; 
the  bullet's  a  fool,  the  bayonet's  a  fine  lad. 

Strike  once — ^throw  the  pagan  from  your  bayonet ; 
dead  on  your  bayonet,  one  strikes  at  your  neck  with 
his  sword.  Sword  at  your  neck — jump  back  a  pace, 
hit  again,  strike  another,  strike  a  third  ;  a  champion 
will  kill  half-a-dozen,  and  I  have  seen  more.  Keep 
the  bullet  in  your  musket ;  three  leap  at  you — ^knock 
down  the  first,  shoot  the  second,  do  in  the  third  with 
the  bayonet. 

^  The  book  was  first  published  by  Antonovski  in  1805,  and  has  been 
several  times  reprinted.     It  is  set  out  in  full  in  Pyetrush.  ii.  455  et  seq. 

O 


194  SUVOROF 

Never  pull  up  during  an  attack. 

Fuse  in  the  grape-shot — throw  yourself  at  the  grape- 
shot  ;  it  flies  over  your  head  ;  the  guns  are  yours,  the 
men  are  yours — halt  on  the  spot,  chase,  strike,  give 
quarter  to  the  survivors  ;  it*s  a  sin  to  kill  without  need, 
Wxey're  only  men  like  you. 

Die  for  the  Royal  House,  for  your  Little  Mother,  for 
the  most  famous  House ;  the  Church  will  pray  God  for 
you.     To  him  who  survives,  honour  and  glory. 

Don't  hurt  civilians,  they  give  us  food  and  drink  ;  a 
soldier  is  not  a  footpad.  Booty  is  sacred ;  take  a 
camp,  and  all  is  yours  ;  take  a  fortress,  and  all  is  yours. 
In  Izmail,  besides  that,  they  shared  gold  and  silver  in 
handfuls  ;   and  so  in  many  places. 

Without  orders  no  going  after  plunder. 

There  follow  brief  descriptions  of  different  "  battles  '* ; 
battle  on  the  field,  battle  in  the  trenches. 

The  ditch  isn't  deep,  the  wall  isn't  high  ;  fling  your- 
self into  the  ditch ;  leap  over  the  wall,  charge  with  the 
bayonet,  strike,  chase,  take  prisoner. 

Storm. 

The  enemy  runs  into  the  town,  turn  his  guns  against 
him,  fire  hard  down  the  streets,  keep  up  a  lively  bom- 
bardment ;  go  after  him  at  once  .  .  .  the  enemy 
surrenders,  spare  him ;  the  walls  occupied,  after  the 
plunder. 

The  three  military  arts^  First — ^Apprehension,^  how 
to  arrange  things  in  camp,  how  to  march,  how  to 
attack,  pursue,  and  strike ;  for  taking  up  position, 
final  judgement  of  the  enemy's  strength,  for  estimating 
his  intentions. 

Second — Quickness.  .  .  . 

There  followed  detailed  instructions  for  marches, 
with  necessary  halts  every  six  miles,  four  hours'  rest 
midday  and  six  or  eight  at  night. 

*  The  Russian  word  glazomir  means  literally  "  eye-measure." 
The  French  coup  (Tosil  comes  near  it,  but  there  is  no  exact  English 
translation. 


THE  SECOND  POLISH  WAR  195 

This  quickness  doesn't  weary  the  men.  The  enemy 
doesn't  expect  us,  reckons  us  100  versts  away,  and  if  a 
long  way  off  to  begin  with — 200,  300  or  more — suddenly 
we're  on  him,  like  snow  on  the  head  ;  his  head  spins. 
Attack  with  what  comes  up,  with  what  God  sends  ; 
the  cavalry  to  begin,  smash,  strike,  cut  off,  don't  let 
slip,  hurra  ! 

Brothers  do  miracles. 

Third — Attack.  Leg  supports  leg,  arm  strengthens 
arm  ;  many  men  will  die  in  the  volley  ;  the  enemy  has 
the  same  weapons,  but  he  doesn't  know  the  Russian 
bayonet.  Extend  the  line — ^attack  at  once  with  cold 
steel ;  extend  the  line  without  stopping.  .  .  .  The 
Cossacks  to  get  through  everywhere.  ...  In  two 
lines  is  strength ;  in  three,  half  as  much  again  ;  the 
first  breaks,  the  second  drives  into  heaps,  the  third 
overthrows. 

Then  follow  some  improvisations  on  his  favourite 
theme,  the  terrors  of  military  hospitals. 

Fear  the  hospital — German  drugs  are  deadly  at  a 
distance  ;  utterly  useless  and  harmful ;  the  Russian 
soldier  is  not  used  to  them ;  we  have  in  our  own  stores 
roots,  herbs,  grasses.  A  soldier  is  precious  ;  be  careful 
of  your  health  ;  clear  out  your  bowels  if  you're  stopped 
up ;  hunger's  the  best  remedy.  Who  doesn't  look 
after  his  men — ^for  the  officer  arrest ;  for  the  sergeant 
and  corporal  the  horse  ;  and  the  horse  for  every  one 
who  doesn't  look  after  himself.  .  .  .  Remember, 
men,  the  field  medicine  of  Staff  Surgeon  Byelopolski; 
in  fever  eat  nothing  for  twelve  days,  and  drink  soldier's 
kvass,  which  is  also  a  remedy  ;  and  in  ague  neither 
eat  nor  drink — punishment  for  whoever  doesn't  look 
after  himself.  ...  In  the  camp,  sick  and  weak  ; 
invalids  in  huts,  not  in  villages — ^better  air.  .  .  .  No 
need  to  regret  money  spent  on  drugs,  if  there's  any- 
where to  buy  them.  .  .  .  But  all  that  is  unimportant, 
we'll  understand  how  to  look  after  ourselves  ;  where 
one  man  in  a  hundred  dies,  we  shall  lose  less  in  a  month 
out  of  five  hundred.  .  .  . 

Champions,  the  enemy  trembles  at  us,  but  there  is 
another  enemy  .  .  .  the  damned  can't-tell-er,  hinter, 
guesser,    white -liar,     smooth -tongue,    gossip,    double- 


196  SUVOROF 

meaner,  sleek-talker,  thickhead.  .  .  .  From  the  can't- 
tell-er  come  many  disasters.  For  the  can*t-tell  officer 
arrest,  and  for  the  staff  officer  from  the  chief  downwards 
confinement  to  quarters.^ 

The  soldier's  duty  is  to  be  healthy,  brave,  hard» 
resolute,  truthful,  honourable.  Pray  to  God — from  Him 
is  victory.     Demigods,  God  leads  us.  He  is  our  general. 

Study  is  light,  idleness  darkness  ;  the  proof  of  the 
pudding  is  in  the  eating,  and  if  the  peasant  doesn't 
know  how  to  work  his  plough,  the  corn  doesn't  grow. 
One  trained  man  is  worth  three  untrained  ;  three's  too 
little  for  us  ;  give  us  six,  give  us  ten  to  one — we  shall 
beat  them  all,  crowd  them  up,  take  them  prisoners.  In 
the  last  campaign  the  enemy  lost  75,000  men  by  count, 
just  not  100,000  ;  he  fought  cleverly  and  desperately, 
but  we  didn't  lose  a  full  thousand.  There,  brothers,  is 
the  training  of  a  soldier ;  gentlemen  officers,  what  a 
triumph  I 

Finally  come  the  words  to  be  spoken  at  the  dismissal 
from  parade,  after  the  necessary  praise  or  blame  of  the 
behaviour  of  the  troops.     They  are 

Subordination,  discipline,  cleanliness,  health,  neat- 
ness, bravery,  daring,  courage,  victory,  glory,  glory, 
glory! 

This  Suvorovian  war  gospel  is  a  priceless  document, 
and  explains  both  leader  and  followers  at  once.  The 
simple  Russian  peasant  was  not  a  fit  subject  for  instruc- 
tion in  complicated  movements.  But  his  incomparable 
patience  and  docility  made  him  as  clay  in  the  hands  of 
the  potter  to  a  commander  who  could  win  his  affection 
and  his  trust,  and  when  well  led  he  would  go  forward 
as  long  as  he  could  move  one  foot  before  the  other.     He 

^  His  hatred  of  the  "  can't-tell-er  "  (nyemoguznaik)  was  unquenchable. 
He  was  continually  putting  questions  to  officers  and  men,  and  cared 
little  about  the  absurdity  of  the  answer,  so  long  as  it  was  prompt.  "  If 
he  asked  you,  '  Where's  Calcutta  ?  '  you  might  answer,  '  On  the  Missis- 
sippi,' and  so  long  as  it  came  smartly  he  would  think  you  a  splendid 
fellow  and  embrace  you  with  all  his  heart  "  ("  Memoirs  of  Theodor 
G.  Golovkin,"  in  Istor.  Vyestnik  (1900),  Ixxx.  537).  There  are  countless 
stories  on  this  subject,  most  of  them  of  the  "  well-found  "  kind. 


THE  SECOND  POLISH  WAR  197 

was  a  bad  marksman,  and  at  Kinburn  Suvorof  had 
had  to  denounce  shooting  without  aim,  and  especially 
shooting  from  the  rear  rank  over  the  heads  of  the  men 
in  front.  The  man  who  fired  away  his  ammunition 
too  fast  was  threatened  with  the  penalty  of  running 
the  gauntlet.!  But  in  bayonet  fighting  the  immobility 
of  the  Russian  soldier  made  him  most  formidable.  "  In 
every  case,"  said  Suvorof  at  Kinburn,  "  the  most 
damaging  of  our  weapons  is  our  terrible  bayonet,  with 
which  our  soldiers  are  incomparably  the  best  in  the 
world."  2  It  was  not  the  least  valuable  quality  of  the 
Russian  infantryman  that  he  literally  did  not  know 
how  to  retreat.  But  where  an  offensive  did  actually 
fail,  this  incapacity  was  very  serious  in  circumstances 
where  above  all  others  individual  resource  and  initia- 
tive were  required.  To  teach  him  that  he  had  nothing 
more  to  learn,  that  he  was  capable  of  dealing  with  every 
problem  that  could  possibly  confront  him,  was  all  very 
well  so  long  as  he  could  still  advance.  But  once  his 
formation  was  broken  by  superior  strength,  as  the 
massed  artillery  of  Napoleon  afterwards  showed,  he 
became  a  mere  unit  in  a  mob,  still  capable  of  patient 
suffering,  but  difficult  to  extricate  and  replace  in  an 
orderly  array. . 

We  have  been  provided  with  a  description  of  the 
Suvorovian  system  at  work  during  the  Polish  War. 
A  number  of  foreign  officers  had  the  opportunity  of 
watching  the  Russian  troops,  and  in  1796  Major  Vronski 
collected  the  opinions  of  some  Prussian  and  Austrian 
officers,  and  set  them  out  in  a  report  to  the  Empress. 
Vronski  himself  was  not  a  partisan  of  Suvorof  s,  but  his 
report  is  on  the  whole  very  favourable  to  his  system. 
It  declared  that  he  was  a  very  wise,  very  virtuous, 
and  very  noble  man,  who  nevertheless  had  the  weakness 

^  Instructions  at  Kinburn,  in  Pyetrof  (second  War),  i.  18.  At  the 
battle  of  the  Alma  it  was  noticed  that  many  of  the  men  in  the  Russian 
columns  fired  in  the  air  in  the  same  way  as  at  Kinburn. 

2  Ibid. 


198  SUVOROF 

of  judging  others  by  his  own  standards,  and  was  conse- 
quently incapable  of  understanding  that  they  could 
deceive  him,  when  in  fact  they  most  emphatically  did 
deceive  him.  He  was  richly  endowed  with  military 
gifts,  but  declined  to  follow  the  conventional  rules  of 
tactics,  and  tried  to  open  the  road  to  a  revolution  in 
military  science.  After  praising  the  quality  of  the 
soldiers,  the  report  points  out  that  they  could  be  beaten 
in  the  moment  of  victory,  partly  because  of  their  dis- 
position to  break  their  formation,  and  partly  because 
of  their  drunkenness.  Their  successes  hitherto  had 
been  against  enemies  who  could  not  take  advantage  of 
their  weaknesses.  They  were  not  trained  to  retire, 
and  if  attacked  while  in  disorder  were  quickly  defeated  ; 
even  the  generals  did  not  know  how  to  withdraw  their 
men.  But  the  Russian  patience  made  their  armies 
hard  to  beat ;  and  victory  could  only  be  won  over 
them  by  manoeuvres  which  prevented  them  from 
getting  to  close  quarters  with  the  bayonet,  by  feigned 
retreats  which  broke  up  their  formations,  and  by  steady 
and  sustained  fire,  which  was  especially  effective  against 
Cossacks.^ 

This  is  a  very  just  estimate,  and  it  applies  as  forcibly 
to  the  Russian  soldier  of  later  times  as  to  Suvorof*s 
own  men.  The  principles  of  the  Science  of  Victory 
have  been  the  basis  of  Russian  infantry  training  for 
more  than  a  century.  Careless  of  appearances,  and 
careful  of  the  essential  obedience,  patience,  and  indif- 
ference to  losses  in  the  field,  the  Russian  infantry  have 
always  been  ineffective  with  the  rifle,  terrible  with  the 
bayonet,  and  as  clumsily  passive  in  retreat  as  they 
have  been  vigorous,  persistent,  and  tireless  in  advance. 
Under  Suvorof  they  became  the  most  formidable  in 

1  Suae  Archives,  vii.  2898  ;  quoted  in  Pyetnish.  ii.  x.  292.  Sir  Robert 
Wilson,  the  British  officer  attached  to  the  Russian  armies  which  served 
against  Napoleon,  refers  to  the  Russian  incapacity  for  movements 
"  not  in  union  with  Suvorof's  practice,"  and  adds,  "  The  most  difficult 
of  human  operations  to  the  year  1807  was  the  conduct  of  a  Russian 
retreat."     See  his  Brief  Remarks^  etc.  on  the  Russian  Army,  2. 


THE  SECOND  POLISH  WAR         199 

Europe,  and  though  Wellington's  Peninsular  troops 
would  have  beaten  them  as  they  beat  the  French,  by- 
superior  musketry,  there  was  no  other  infantry  in  Europe 
which  they  need  have  feared  to  meet.  Out  of  this 
training  school  at  Tultchin  came  the  system,  moral 
rather  than  tactical,  which  in  1799  overthrew  French 
armies,  and  with  wiser  statesmanship  would  have 
overthrown  the  French  Republic.  There  is  no  reason 
to  suppose  that  Napoleon  himself,  in  his  Italian  period, 
would  have  been  able  to  defeat  Suvorof.  But  on  the 
17th  November  1796  ^Catherine  died,  and  with  her 
vanished  the  Field-Marshal's  opportunity  of  meeting 
the  first  soldier  of  France. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

DOWNFALL   AND    EXILE 

Paul  I.  and  Pnissianism — Suvorof  fails  to  please — Dismissed — ^Exiled — 
Troubles  with  his  wife  and  his  property — His  son — ^Daily  life — 
Recalled — Recalcitrant — Plans  for  a  French  War — Meditates  a 
monastery — ^Recalled  again,  1799 — War  at  last. 

Whatever  faults  there  may  have  been  in  Suvorof  s 
military  method,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  it  was 
better  than  that  which  paralysed  the  army  after  the 
accession  of  the  Emperor  Paul.  Even  before  he  became 
Emperor,  Paul  had  been  passionately  devoted  to 
military  exercises,  and,  unfortunately,  the  Prussian 
blight  had  fallen  upon  him  more  completely  than  upon 
any  other  person  of  equal  importance  in  Europe.  His 
character  was  extremely  complex,  and  he  passed  from 
one  mood  to  another  with  bewildering  and  dangerous 
facility.  He  was  often  magnanimous,  and  one  of  his 
first  public  acts  as  Emperor  was  to  pardon  and  release 
Kosciusko  and  the  other  leaders  of  the  Polish  insurrec- 
tion. But  he  was  equally  capable  of  severity,  and  a 
personal  interview  with  him  was  as  likely  to  end  in 
exile  to  Siberia  as  in  promotion  in  the  State  service. 
This  instability  of  temper  made  his  interest  in  the 
affairs  of  the  army  extremely  unpleasant  for  officers 
and  men  alike.  Before  he  ascended  the  throne,  he  had 
made  a  tour  of  Europe,  and  became  a  fanatical  admirer 
of  Frederick  the  Great.  Upon  him  he  modelled  his 
life,  and  especially  his  military  life.  At  his  country 
seat  at  Gatchina  he  collected  and  trained  a  miniature 

200 


DOWNFALL  AND  EXILE  201 

army  of  his  own.  The  ideas  which  he  first  carried 
out  on  this  small  scale  were  expanded  after  his  accession, 
so  as  to  include  the  whole  of  the  Imperial  forces.  Detail 
in  all  things  was  his  passion,  and  nowhere  had  he  greater 
scope  for  expressing  his  ardour  for  it  than  in  the  clothing 
and  drilling  of  soldiers.  In  the  army,  therefore,  the 
spirit  of  Prussianism  was  carried  to  the  extreme.  The 
uniforms  were  modelled  on  those  of  Frederick's  soldiers, 
the  Prussian  drill  was  slavishly  imitated,  and  evolutions, 
instead  of  being  used  as  means  to  success  in  real  warfare, 
were  made  ends  in  themselves.  So  far  as  was  possible, 
Paul  reduced  the  army  to  a  machine,  and  himself 
supervised  the  execution  of  his  most  insignificant 
alterations  in  the  littlenesses  of  dress  and  drill.  From 
the  highest  commander  below  the  Emperor  down  to 
the  most  humble  private  soldier,  all  military  persons 
were,  so  far  as  possible,  reduced  to  mere  parts  of  a  life- 
less and  unintelligent  mechanism. 

This  was  one  of  those  fits  of  Prussian  mechanicalness 
which  have  from  time  to  time  at  once  regulated  and 
paralysed  the  wayward  individualism  of  Russia.  Like 
the  other  epidemics  of  efficiency,  it  had  its  good  as  well 
as  its  bad  side.  The  Russian  military  system  had 
sunk,  during  the  reign  of  Catherine  and  under  the 
gorgeous  negligence  of  Potyomkin,  into  the  depths  of 
inefficiency  and  corruption.  Suvorof's  efforts  to  improve 
matters  in  Finland,  Kherson,  and  Tultchin  have  already 
been  described,  and  though  he  was  the  most  active  and 
successful,  he  was  not  the  only  reformer.  But  the 
general  condition  was  lamentable.  The  Guards  were 
splendid,  lazy,  and  incompetent ;  the  other  regiments 
unkempt  and  ill-disciplined.  Patronage  and  jobbery 
in  promotions,  waste  and  peculation  in  the  expenditure 
of  regimental  funds,  absenteeism  among  the  officers, 
the  appropriation  of  large  numbers  of  private  soldiers 
to  service  as  couriers,  orderlies,  or  personal  servants, 
savage  punishments  producing  wholesale  desertions,  and 
a  general  want  of  thoroughness,  method,  and  uniformity 


202  SUVOROF 

in  drill,  had  reduced  the  bulk  of  the  army  to  com- 
plete uselessness.  The  wars  against  the  Turks  and 
the  Poles  necessarily  produced  a  better  state  of  affairs 
among  the  troops  who  actually  took  part  in  them. 
But  in  spite  of  the  constant  warfare  many  officers  and 
men  had  no  experience  of  active  service,  and  the  Guards 
in  particular  did  not  make  a  single  campaign  between 
1742  and  1790.  At  the  death  of  Catherine  the  army 
as  a  whole  was  incapable  of  meeting  that  of  any  other 
of  the  European  Powers. 

Upon  this  mass  of  slovenliness,  dishonesty,  and 
neglect,  the  reforming  zeal  of  the  Emperor  fell  with 
religious  fury,  and  if  he  flew  into  extravagances  in  detail 
he  undoubtedly  produced  an  improvement  in  the  general 
temper  of  the  troops.  The  officers  from  Gatchina, 
where  they  had  been  engaged  in  training  his  model 
army  during  the  last  years  of  Catherine's  reign,  followed 
Paul  to  Petersburg,  and  their  uniforms,  their  drill,  and 
their  theories  were  enforced  upon  the  Guards  and  the 
other  regiments  of  the  old  sort  with  all  the  energy  and 
terrifying  capriciousness  of  the  new  Sovereign.  The 
new  uniforms,  the  long-skirted  coats,  the  tight  trousers, 
the  lacquered  boots,  the  gaiters  and  garters  and  hooks 
and  eyes,  the  powdered  heads  and  beribboned  pigtails 
were  anything  but  an  improvement  upon  the  vest, 
long  coat,  loose  trousers,  and  soft  boots  of  the  time  of 
Catherine.  The  soldier  who  had  to  polish  up  his 
boots  after  a  march  over  a  Russian  road  in  autumn, 
or  sit  up  all  night  to  keep  his  freshly  powdered  hair  in 
order  for  the  morning's  inspection,  was  none  the  better 
soldier  for  the  experience.  Nor  were  the  officers  im- 
proved by  compulsory  attendance  at  lectures,  after 
which  they  might  be  examined  by  the  Emperor  in  person, 
or  by  seeing  him  get  up  early  in  the  morning  to  dress 
the  ranks  for  them  before  drill  began.^     Nevertheless, 

^  One  day  the  Petersburg  garrison  read  a  general  order  to  the  effect 
that  "  the  deceased  general  N.  N.  is  severely  admonished  for  his  ignorance 
of  his  duty  "  ("  Reminiscences  of  A.  M.  Turgyenyef,"  Russkaya  Starina 
(1886),  ii.  40). 


DOWNFALL  AND  EXILE  203 

the  system,  pettifogging  though  it  was,  got  some  sort 
of  method  into  the  army.  It  would  have  succeeded 
more  than  it  did  but  for  the  uncertain  temper  of  the 
man  who  enforced  it.  Paul  was  on  the  throne  for 
four  years  and  four  months,  and  in  that  time  the  number 
of  officers  who  were  placed  on  the  retired  list  or  expelled 
from  the  service  with  ignominy  included  7  Field- 
Marshals,  more  than  300  Generals,  and  more  than  2000 
Staff  Officers  and  other  officers  of  senior  rank.  There 
was  no  certainty  of  tenure,  and  in  consequence  no 
responsibility.  Slovenliness,  if  detected,  was  sure  of 
punishment,  but  there  was  no  real  safety  in  industry 
and  intelligence.  Obviously  such  methods  produced 
innumerable  evasions  and  occasional  conformities,  and 
in  many  cases  an  appearance  of  efficiency  must  have 
been  worked  up  to  cover  actual  negligence  and  incom- 
petence. On  the  other  hand,  the  most  honest  officer  was 
never  sure  of  his  place,  and  one  error  or  omission  of 
the  most  trifling  kind  might  end  in  dismissal  or  even 
exile  to  Siberia.  The  moral  improvement  of  the  army 
was  by  no  means  proportioned  to  the  formal  improve- 
ment. Nevertheless  the  army  of  Paul  was  better  than 
the  army  of  Catherine.^ 

In  the  meantime,  Suvorof  was  pursuing  his  own 
course  at  Tultchin,  and  enough  has  already  been  said 
of  his  methods  to  show  how  little  he  was  likely  to  con- 
form to  the  new  requirements.  Nevertheless,  for  a 
brief  space,  the  relations  between  the  new  Sovereign 
and  the  bizarre  Field-Marshal  remained  friendly,  though 
the  latter,  as  a  client  of  the  detested  dilettante  Potyom- 
kin,  must  have  been  suspect  from  the  first.  The  distance 
between  Tultchin  and  Petersburg  postponed  a  rupture 
with  Suvorof,  while  Paul  busied  himself  with  the  short- 

^  I  have  taken  this  account  from  Pyetrushevski's  chap.  xxii.  For 
details  of  Paul's  character  and  reforms,  see  K.  Waliszewski,  Le  Fils 
de  la  Grande  Catherine,  Paul  i*"".  There  is  a  story  of  a  cavalry  colonel 
who  had  not  enough  smart  boots  for  his  whole  regiment.  He  therefore 
issued  one  boot  to  each  man,  ordering  him  to  put  it  on  the  leg  which 
the  Emperor  would  see  at  the  march  past ! 


SM  SUVOROF 

comings  of  Generals  nearer  home.  But  the  shower  of 
rewards  and  honours  passed  by  him,  and  on  the  26th 
December  he  committed  his  first  offence  against  the 
new  system  by  sending  an  adjutant  to  Petersburg 
with  private  letters.  The  officer  was  promptly  sent  to 
serve  in  another  regiment,  and  Suvorof  was  informed 
that  this  use  of  officers  as  private  couriers  was  degrading 
to  the  service  and  their  rank.  Before  this  rebuke 
reached  him,  he  sinned  three  times  in  rapid  succession. 
He  altered  the  distribution  of  some  of  the  units  in  his 
command,  he  asked  that  the  Cossack  General  Isayof 
should  be  left  on  his  staff  when  he  was  ordered  to  send 
all  his  Cossacks  back  to  their  own  province,  and  he 
granted  leave  to  Lieutenant-Colonel  Baturin  at  a  time 
when  the  Emperor  was  particularly  incensed  against 
the  granting  of  leave  to  officers.  Baturin  was  promptly 
sent  back  from  Petersburg  with  a  severe  rebuke  for 
Suvorof.  But  before  he  returned  another  officer  on 
leave  appeared  in  the  capital,  and  this  unfortunate 
holiday-maker  was  sent  to  Riga.  These  offences  against 
the  regulations  were  publicly  denounced  in  the  Imperial 
Orders  to  the  army.  Another  admonition  was  de- 
spatched to  Suvorof  himself,  but  by  this  time  the 
latter  had  received  the  first  of  the  series,  and  had 
written  to  the  Emperor  asking  leave  to  retire  from 
the  service.  The  answer  to  this  was  a  summons  to 
Petersburg. 

Actual  contact  between  the  two  quick-tempered 
men  was  bound  to  produce  an  explosion.  The  Emperor's 
fury  at  the  informal  proceedings  of  Suvorof  was  matched 
by  Suvorof's  impatience  at  the  pettifogging  regulations 
of  the  Emperor.  His  correspondence  with  Khvostof 
contains  more  than  one  characteristic  outburst.  In 
December  1796  he  was  complaining  that  the  Russian 
national  army  was  being  turned  into  a  Prussian  mer- 
cenary army,  and,  after  the  Emperor's  refusal  to  go 
on  with  the  war  with  France,  he  declared  that  "  the 
Carmagnolists   will   beat  the   Germans,   and  then  the 


DOWNFALL  AND  EXILE  205 

Russians  will  be  bored  into  being  beaten  like  the 
Germans."     And  on  the  3rd  January  1797  he  wrote : 

.  .  .  the  soldiers  are  indescribably  unhappy,  depressed 
and  demoralised  by  boredom.  My  pace  has  been  reduced 
to  three  quarters,  and  consequently  against  the  enemy, 
instead  of  40  versts,  it's  only  30.  I'm  a  husbandman 
at  Kobrin,  only  just  better  than  an  inspector,  which  I 
was  when  I  was  a  Lieutenant-Colonel.  .  .  .  I'm  dying 
from  day  to  day. 

Then  he  sketched  out  the  plot  of  a  drama,  with  him- 
self as  the  ostracised  Aristides,  said  that  it  was  a  good 
opportunity  for  him  to  retire,  and  went  on  to  denounce 
the  new  Prussian  uniforms  and  drill. 

There's  nothing  more  lousy  than  the  Prussians ; 
they  call  their  overcoats  "  lousers  "  ;  you  can't  go  into 
their  sentry  boxes  or  guard  houses  without  getting 
vermin,  and  the  stink  of  their  heads  makes  you  faint. 
We  used  to  be  free  from  vermin — ^the  first  irritation 
of  the  soldiers  was  gaiters — septic  feet.  .  .  .  Kind- 
ness conceals  strictness  ;  you  must  mix  kindness  with 
strictness  ;  otherwise  strictness  is  tyranny.  I'm  strict 
in  maintaining  health,  the  true  art  of  benevolence  ; 
kind  soldierly  strictness  ;  and  from  that  general  brother- 
liness.  And  in  me  capricious  strictness  would  have 
been  tyranny.  Civil  virtue  doesn't  make  up  for  useless 
cruelty  to  the  troops."  ^ 

The  effect  of  the  summons  to  Petersburg  was  to 
determine  him  to  resign  from  the  service.  The  Emperor, 
on  his  part,  was  incensed,  not  only  by  Suvorof's  indif- 
ference to  the  new  rules  of  discipline,  but  also  by  some 
of  the  gibes  and  sneers  which  were  rightly  or  wrongly 
attributed  to  the  recalcitrant  Field-Marshal.  "Pig- 
tails don't  pierce,  buckles  don't  fire,  hair  powder  doesn't 
explode."  And  "  Hair  powder  isn't  gunpowder,  buckles 
aren't  guns,  pigtails  aren't  salvos,  and  I'm  not  a  German 
but  a  true-born   Russian."      On   reaching   Petersburg 

^  These  passages  are  contained  in  a  letter  written  on  the  3rd,  4th, 
5th,  and  6th  January  1797,  and  entitled,  "  A  Gale  of  Thoughts."  It 
is  in  the  Petrograd  Sbornik. 


206  SUVOROF 

on  the  8r(l  February,  Suvorof  asked  leave  to  retire. 
The  answer  was  an  Imperial  Order :  **  Field-Marshal 
Count  Suvorof  having  informed  his  Imperial  Highness 
that  as  there  is  no  war  he  has  no  work  to  do,  for  this 
declaration  is  dismissed  the  service."  On  the  6th 
February,  the  date  when  the  Order  came  into  effect, 
Suvorof's  career  seemed  at  an  end.  He  was  in  his 
sixty-seventh  year,  and  he  prepared  to  withdraw  to 
his  new  estate  at  Kobrin,  and  there  live  like  a  simple 
country  gentleman. 

Arranging  affairs  at  Tultchin,  he  went  to  Kobrin, 
and  began  to  set  the  estate  in  order.  He  found  it  in 
the  occupation  of  8187  serfs  and  their  families.  He 
had  arranged  with  18  of  his  old  ofHcers,  including  his 
biographer,  Anting,  and  his  staff  surgeon,  Byelopolski, 
to  join  him  on  the  estate,  and  had  promised  each  of 
them  a  certain  number  of  serfs,  in  return  for  the  services 
which  he  would  require  of  them.  They  were,  in  fact, 
to  be  estate  agents  for  different  sections  of  the  property, 
with  Lieutenant-Colonel  Koritskii  at  their  head.  But 
the  whole  project  was  overthrown  like  a  house  of  cards 
by  an  Imperial  Order.  On  the  8rd  May  an  Assessor 
of  the  Military  College,  named  Nikolyef,  appeared  at 
Kobrin,  with  instructions  to  remove  Suvorof.  Nikolyef 
expressed  his  regret,  and  said  he  must  obey  his  orders. 
**  I  should  not,"  said  Suvorof;  "I'd  have  said  I  was 
unwell.'*  *  He  made  no  other  protest.  At  10  o'clock 
on  the  morning  of  the  4th  he  took  his  seat  in  his  carriage. 
But  before  starting,  Koritskii  presented  him  with  the 
formal  documents  by  which  ho  divided  more  than  1500 
of  his  serfs  among  Koritskii  -.uul  his  !<  Hows.  Without 
saying  a  word,  Suvorof  signed  the  p.ijx  rs  .md  <h(>vo 
off.  He  went  without  papers,  withoui  his  j(  \v(  Ih  ly, 
and  without  money,  except  a  thousand  muhN  s  \vlii(  h 
he  borrowed  from  Koritskii.  His  destination  was  the 
little  village  of  Kontchansk,  80  miles  from  Borovitchi, 
where  his  father  had  left  him  an  estate  of  1000  male 

>  Ru»a,  Vyeat.  (1884),  xviii.  144. 


DOWNFALL  AND  EXILE  207 

serfs.  On  the  16th  May  he  arrived  at  this  obscure 
place,  which  he  could  have  no  hope  of  ever  leaving 
alive.  The  district  was  unfertile,  swampy,  and  full 
of  timber,  and  the  house  in  which  he  was  to  live  was  in 
bad  repair.  What  had  impelled  the  Emperor  to  exile 
him  to  this  place  will  probably  never  be  known.  The 
utmost  diligence  of  his  Russian  biographers  has  dis- 
covered no  facts  which  could  have  come  to  the  Emperor's 
knowledge  after  Suvorof's  departure  for  Kobrin,  and  it 
is  not  necessary,  to  explain  this  new  degradation,  that 
any  such  facts  should  be  found.  For  the  acts  of  a  man 
like  Paul  reasons  were  not  always  required.  Meditating 
on  Suvorof,  he  no  doubt  recalled  something  which 
revived  his  fury,  and  he  struck  a  second  blow  where 
one  would  have  sufficed. 

These  new  and  dull  surroundings  were  not  the  only 
discomfort  in  which  Suvorof  was  involved.  On  the 
81st  May  Nikolyef  descended  once  more  upon  Kobrin, 
arrested  all  the  officers  who  were  settled  there,  and 
transported  them  to  Kief.  After  some  delay  they  were 
allowed  to  return.  The  rapacity  with  which  they 
secured  their  shares  of  the  property  in  the  first  place 
was  equalled  by  the  extravagance  with  which  they  now 
proceeded  to  dissipate  them,  and  the  estate  suffered 
considerable  damage.  Valuable  timber  was  wasted, 
part  of  the  proceeds  of  sales  of  com  was  embezzled,  and 
money  and  provisions  were  squandered  in  entertaining 
guests.  In  November  1797  Suvorof  at  last  came  to 
the  conclusion  that  he  must  get  rid  of  the  officers  alto- 
gether, and  he  took  steps  to  buy  them  out,  offering 
twenty  roubles  a  serf  to  those  who  would  leave  Kobrin 
altogether,  and  forty  to  those  who  would  remain  on 
the  estate  until  his  death.^ 

He  had  also  trouble  with  his  wife.  Getting  into 
debt,  and  not  satisfied  with  the  allowance  which  he  had 
agreed  to  make  to  her,  she  applied  for  a  sum  of  23,000 

*  There  is  a  mass  of  correspondence  about  these  matters  in  the 
Petrograd  Sbomik, 


208  SUVOROF 

roubles.  The  Emperor  ordered  an  inquiry  to  be  made, 
and  Suvorof  was  ordered  to  pay.  The  result  of  this 
investigation  was  to  show  that  he  was  now  a  rich  man. 
From  his  father  he  had  inherited  2080  "  souls,'*  and 
Imperial  grants  had  given  him  7000  more.  His  income 
amounted  to  50,000  roubles.  Besides  his  estates  in  the 
country,  he  had  a  stone  house  in  Moscow  worth  12,000 
roubles,  and  the  jewels  which  Catherine  had  given  to 
him  were  worth  100,000.  His  debts  amounted  only 
to  17,200  roubles.  But  he  had  given  away  or  promised 
two  dowries,  one  of  60,000  and  the  other  of  30,000 
roubles.^  The  military  trade  has  seldom  been  more 
profitable.  But  it  should  be  noted  that  the  gains  were 
entirely  due  to  gifts  from  the  Throne,  and  there  was  no 
suggestion,  in  the  investigator's  report,  that  Suvorof 
had  obtained  anything  by  either  plunder  or  peculation. 
As  much  could  not  be  said  of  very  many  of  his  pre- 
decessors, contemporaries,  and  successors  in  the  Russian 
service. 

During  this  period  his  son  attracted  the  affection 
which  he  could  no  longer  show  towards  his  wife.  Young 
Arkadii  was  now  fourteen  years  old,  and  his  father 
grew  disturbed  about  his  education.  The  boy  had  been 
living  in  his  sister's  house,  with  one  Sion  as  his  tutor. 
The  latter  was  already  suspected  by  Suvorof  of  extra- 
vagance and  fast  living,  and  when  the  Zubofs  went 
to  Moscow  at  the  end  of  1797,  the  Field-Marshal  wrote 
to  the  faithful  Khvostof  to  remove  him  from  Sion's 
care  altogether.  The  tutor  had  taken  Arkadii  to  his 
own  lodging,  and  was  apparently  going  to  bring  him 

1  Russ,  Vyest.  (1884),  xviii.  144,  158.  Pyetrushevski  has  examined 
a  large  mass  of  documents  relating  to  his  estates,  and  comes  to  the 
conclusion  that  he  was  a  good  landowner,  not  inflicting  savage  punish- 
ments on  his  serfs,  purchasing  substitutes  for  those  liable  to  military 
service,  encouraging  marriage  and  large  families,  and,  as  might  be 
expected,  blaming  parents  for  a  high  infant  death-rate.  But  he  had 
no  scruples  about  migrating  serfs  from  one  estate  to  another,  bringing 
girls  away  to  be  married,  and  generally  asserting  himself  as  the  bene- 
volent despot  he  was. 


.^u.. 


DOWNFALL  AND  EXILE  209 

up  as  a  young  man  of  fashion.     Suvorof  accordingly 
asked  Khvostof  to  take  charge  of  his  son. 

Arkadii  needs  spotless  morals,  not  visits  and  return 
visits  ;  not  intercourse  with  young  bloods,  where  they 
suffer  shipwreck  .  .  .  you  have  a  corner,  his  acquaint- 
ance will  be  Andy  and  Basil,  and  so  until  he's  eighteen, 
and  then  we'll  look  round.  You'll  be  his  Aristotle  ; 
Natasha  was  brought  up  by  you,  he's  her  heir.^ 

A  new  tutor  was  found  in  the  person  of  Ivan 
Dyementyevitch  Kanitsyef,  chosen  "  not  for  his  learning, 
but  for  his  morality."  ^  Kanitsyef  was  to  receive  300 
roubles  a  year  for  his  life.^ 

To  the  boy  himself  Suvorof  wrote  for  the  most  part 
brief  exhortations  of  this  sort : 

Be  well-behaved,  follow  my  rules,  be  obedient  to 
Dimitri  Ivanovitch  [Khvostof],  use  your  spare  time  for 
your  own  enlightenment  in  well-doing ;  the  Lord  God 
be  with  you. 

And  again  : 

To  Arkadii  honour,  morality,  courage;  aversion 
from  equivocation,  enigmas,  phrases;  moderation,  en- 
durance, constancy."  * 

Suvorof  lived  to  see  the  promise  of  his  son,  but  not 
his  performance.  Arkadii  was  with  him  during  the 
greater  part  of  his  last  campaign,  and  afterwards  served 
in  the  Turkish  War  under  Kutuzof.  He  was  a  gallant 
lad,  as  much  loved  by  his  men  as  his  father  had  been. 
But  unhappily  he  was  a  gambler  and  a  spendthrift, 
and  he  had  already  dissipated  much  of  his  inheritance 
when  he  died.  His  coachman  fell  into  that  Ruimnik 
by  whose  waters  his  father  had  gained  his  most  brilliant 
victory.  Plunging  in  after  his  servant,  the  young  man 
injured  his  arm,  was  unable  to  reach  the  shore,  and 
perished.  His  father  would  have  been  proud  of  his 
death  if  not  of  his  life. 

1  Pyetmsh.  (2nd  ed.),  499.  »  lUd. 

»  Ihid.  500.  «  lUd. 


210  SUVOROF 

Apart  from  his  financial  distresses,  which  in  the 
end  did  not  cost  him  more  than  he  could  pay  without 
hardship,  Suvorof's  life  at  Kontchansk  was  of  the 
simplest  kind.  Local  tradition  has  preserved  some  of 
its  details,  his  own  letters  furnish  others,  and  yet  more 
are  to  be  found  in  Nikolyef's  reports.  According  to 
Nikolyef  his  manner  of  life  had  not  changed  very  much, 
and  he  was  still,  as  always,  on  active  service.  He  rose 
two  hours  before  dawn,  drank  some  tea,  and  washed 
himself.  At  dawn  he  went  to  church,  and  took  part  in 
matins  and  the  mass,  himself  reading  part  of  the  service 
and  singing.  At  7  o'clock  he  lunched.  Then  he  slept. 
When  he  got  up  he  washed  again,  looked  in  at  the 
evening  service,  and  after  that  washed  himself  three 
times  and  went  to  bed.  He  never  ate  meat.  He  spent 
the  whole  day  alone,  never  received  visitors,  and  talked 
only  with  his  own  servants  and  a  few  soldiers  who 
remained  about  the  place.  His  ordinary  clothes  were 
of  the  simplest.  On  Sundays  and  holidays  he  put  on 
a  Jager  tunic  and  helmet ;  on  the  most  solemn  festivals, 
his  Field-MarshaFs  uniform  with  all  his  Orders.  As  a 
rule  he  went  about  in  shirt  and  breeches.  On  one  foot 
he  wore  a  boot,  and  on  the  other  a  slipper.^ 

The  people  of  the  village  noticed  other  things.  In 
hot  weather  he  took  off  his  shirt,  and  walked  about  the 
fields  naked  to  the  waist,  with  the  faithful  but  drunken 
Proshka  at  his  heels.  The  people  noticed  that  the 
Field-Marshal's  skin  was  sunburnt,  and  not  at  all  like 
that  of  an  ordinary  fine  gentleman.  On  these  occasions 
he  carried  a  black  knotted  stick.  His  conduct  in  church 
was  sometimes  unusual.  He  crossed  himself  with  great 
fervour  and  very  rapidly,  striking  himself  with  three 
fingers  on  the  forehead,  the  breast,  and  right  and  left 
shoulders.  During  the  service  he  bowed  his  head 
constantly  to  the  ground,  striking  it  with  his  forehead, 
but  without  bending  his  knees.  Sometimes  he  looked 
between  his  legs  at  the  worshippers  behind  him,  and  if 

1  Russ.  Vyest.  (1884),  155. 


DOWNFALL  AND  EXILE  211 

he  saw  anybody  smiling,  he  told  them  after  the  service 
that  they  should  look  at  the  images  of  the  Saviour  and 
St.  Nicholas,  and  not  at  their  master.^ 

In  his  own  letters  we  get  references  to  occasional 
visits  from  friends,  dinners  with  the  village  priest,  and 
firing  salutes  and  feasting  the  villagers  on  Imperial 
birthdays.2  From  other  sources  we  learn  of  strolls 
about  his  garden,  superintending  the  building  of  out- 
houses and  potting-sheds,  and  walks  to  the  top  of  Oak 
Hill,  half  a  mile  away  from  his  house,  whence  he  could 
look  out  over  the  woods  and  waters  of  the  district. 
He  was  often  in  the  houses  of  the  peasantry,  arranging 
betrothals,  attending  weddings,  fondling  babies,  and 
playing  with  the  children.  For  the  winter  he  built 
himself  a  "  bird  room,"  a  large  apartment  fitted  with 
trees  and  plants  and  full  of  little  birds,  where  he  sat 
and  sometimes  had  his  meals.  His  reading  was  no 
doubt  as  constant  and  as  miscellaneous  as  ever,  and  he 
kept  in  touch  with  the  affairs  of  Europe  through  the 
newspapers.^ 

This  quiet  life  was  not  congenial  now  any  more  than 
in  previous  years,  and  on  the  22nd  January  1798 
Nikolyef  had  to  report  that 

The  Count  grows  every  day  more  irritable,  and  hardly 
a  day  passes  without  his  striking  one  of  his  people. 
Even  on  Christmas  Day  itself,  after  morning  service, 
in  the  presence  of  all  his  servants,  he  gave  somebody 
a  cuff.  He  was  angry  with  me  because  I  accidentally 
called  him  "  you  "  instead  of  "  Your  Excellency."  * 

So  early  as  the  1st  October  1797  Suvorof  had  written 
to  the  Emperor  : 

Repent ;  have  pity  on  a  poor  old  man.  Forgive, 
if  he  has  done  wrong  in  anything.^ 

1  Istoritch.  Vyest.  (1886),  xxvi.  408. 

2  Materials  of  Milyutin,  quoted  in  Pyetrush.  ii.  406,  407. 
8  Russ.  Vyest.  (1884),  xviii.  144. 

*  Ibid.  158. 
6  IMd,  156. 


212  SUVOROF 

Other  letters  followed,  to  the  Emperor  and  the 
Empress,  and  Khvostof  was  called  upon  to  present 
them  and  do  his  best  to  get  his  uncle  recalled.^ 

At  last  the  Emperor  resolved  to  end  the  exile  of  the 
great  soldier,  and  on  the  25th  February  sent  his  nephew, 
Prince  Andryei  Gortchakof,  to  summon  him  to  Peters- 
burg. But  the  old  man  was  in  a  testy  mood,  and  for 
a  long  time  demurred.  He  was  old  and  unwell.  He 
had  had  seven  attacks  of  paralysis,  seventy  of  gout, 
and  seven  hundred  of  fever,  and  he  didn't  want 
to  come.  Gortchakof,  fearing  the  Emperor  more  than 
his  uncle,  finally  succeeded  in  persuading  him.  But 
Suvorof  would  only  come  with  ordinary  post-horses 
and  was  not  going  to  hurry.  Glad  to  get  him  on  any 
terms,  Gortchakof  drove  back  with  all  speed  to  Peters- 
burg, and  found  the  Emperor  impatiently  waiting. 
Informed  that  the  Count  would  come,  he  ordered  that 
he  should  be  told  when  he  arrived,  "  whatever  the  hour.'* 
Suvorof  drove  up  at  ten  o'clock  at  night,  when  the 
Emperor  was  already  undressed.  Gortchakof  duly 
made  his  report  to  the  Emperor,  who  came  out  of  his 
bedroom  wrapped  in  a  greatcoat.  "  I  shall  receive 
the  Count  at  9  in  the  morning."  "  Very  good.  Sire. 
And  in  what  uniform  ?  "  "In  the  ordinary  uniform 
of  the  army." 

Clad  in  one  of  his  nephew's  uniforms,  in  the  new 
Prussian  style,  without  any  badges  of  rank,  Suvorof 
presented  himself  the  next  day  at  the  Winter  Palace. 
While  waiting  in  the  ante-room  he  amused  himself 
by  jesting  with  the  other  officers  present,  and  was 
specially  pleased  with  talking  Turkish  to  Count  Kutaizof , 
a  baptized  Turk,  whom  Paul  had  raised  from  among 
his  valets  to  the  ranks  of  the  nobility.  At  a  quarter 
past  nine  the  Emperor  arrived,  and  a  private  interview 
of  an  hour's  length  took  place.  From  this  the  two 
emerged,  the  Emperor  worried,  and  Suvorof  obviously 
in  a  difficult  mood.     Paul  then  invited  him  to  be  present 

»  Russ.  Star.  (1892),  Ixxiv.  674. 


DOWNFALL  AND  EXILE  213 

at  the  morning's  inspection  of  troops.  This  was  in- 
tended as  a  special  compliment.  But  the  old  warrior 
refused  to  be  conciliated.  The  new  Prussian  uniforms 
and  drill  were  too  much  for  him.  He  sneered  at  the 
evolutions,  shuffled  about,  and  constantly  said  to 
Gortchakof,  "  No,  I  can't  stand  any  more  ;  I'm  going." 
Gortchakof  urged  him  to  stay ;  it  would  be  a  breach 
of  etiquette  to  go.  But  at  last  Suvorof's  patience  was 
quite  exhausted.  "  I  can't  stand  any  more  ;  I've  got 
a  belly-ache."     And  off  he  went. 

After  the  inspection  Paul  demanded  of  the  unfortunate 
Gortchakof  what  all  this  meant  ?  The  latter  plunged 
into  such  excuses  as  he  could  invent,  but  Paul  cut  him 
short,  with  obvious  anger.  "  I  speak  to  him  of  the 
services  which  he  can  still  render  to  his  country  and  to 
me ;  I  bring  the  conversation  to  the  point  where  he 
may  ask  himself  for  work — and  instead  of  that  he  turns 
off  to  Izmail,  and  begins  a  long  description  of  the  storm. 
I  listen  to  his  endless  tale,  and  then  again  bring  him 
back  to  the  point — and  instead  of  that,  there  we  are, 
trotted  away  to  Praga  or  Otchakof."  Then  he  turned 
to  the  incident  of  the  inspection.  "  Please,  my  good 
sir,  go  to  him,  ask  him  himself  to  explain  his  conduct, 
and  bring  his  answer  back  to  me  as  soon  as  possible. 
I  shall  not  sit  down  to  dinner  till  you  come." 

Gortchakof,  between  his  all-powerful  Emperor  and 
his  disrespectful  old  uncle,  was  in  a  most  unenviable 
position.  He  found  Suvorof  immovable.  "  I  was  an 
inspector  when  I  was  a  Major-General ;  it's  too  late 
now  to  make  me  an  inspector  again.  Let  them  make 
me  Commander-in-Chief,  and  give  me  my  old  staff,  and 
give  me  a  free  hand,  so  that  I  can  promote  people,  and 
not  go  on  asking.  .  .  .  Then,  if  you  like,  I'll  come 
back  to  the  service.  If  not,  better  go  back  to  the 
village  ;  I'm  old  and  feeble  ;  I  want  to  be  a  monk.  .  .  ." 
"  But  I  can't  tell  that  to  the  Emperor  !  "  "  Tell  him 
what  you  like.  I  can't  change  myself."  From  the 
deep   sea   Gortchakof   returned   in   great   perturbation 


214  SUVOROF 

to  the  devil.  He  reported  that  his  uncle  had  been 
overpowered  by  the  presence  of  his  Imperial  Highness ; 
did  not  accurately  remember  what  he  had  said  ;  very 
much  regretted  his  stupidity ;  would  speak  differently 
another  time  ;  and  would  gladly  profit  by  the  Imperial 
kindness  if  the  Emperor  would  take  him  back  into 
the  service.  "  Very  well,'*  said  the  Emperor,  "  I 
authorise  you  to  take  charge  of  your  uncle.  You  will 
be  responsible  for  him." 

Gortchakof's  new  post  of  Suvorof  -  keeper  proved 
beyond  all  others  formidable.  The  Emperor  several 
times  invited  the  stubborn  old  man  to  dinner,  and 
talked  of  his  future  services.  Suvorof  was  as  deferential 
as  ever,  and  actual  violence  was  sometimes  required 
to  prevent  him  from  prostrating  himself  before  the 
Emperor  and  Grand  Dukes.*  But  he  remained  obdurate, 
took  refuge  in  his  illness  and  feebleness,  and  never 
stopped  playing  pranks,  and  gibing  at  the  new  uniforms 
and  equipment.  Once  he  spent  a  quarter  of  an  hour 
gravely  and  conscientiously  trying  to  get  into  his 
carriage,  to  show  the  impossibility  of  getting  about 
with  a  great  long  sword  sticking  out  behind  him.  At 
an  inspection  he  pretended  that  he  could  not  manage 
his  flat  hat,  and  after  beating  it  several  times  on  the 
ground,  first  with  one  hand  and  then  with  the  other, 
he  ended  by  dropping  it  at  the  foot  of  the  frowning 
Emperor  himself.  Then  he  deliberately  ran  about 
and  bustled  into  the  way  of  a  formal  march  past,  and 
spoilt  the  whole  performance,  showing  the  while  by  his 
expression  his  amazement  and  wonder  what  all  this  tom- 
foolery meant.  Not  content  with  this,  he  kept  muttering 
through  his  nose  and  crossing  himself,  and  when  the 
Tsar  asked  him  what  he  meant  by  it,  he  replied  that  he 
was  only  repeating  the  prayer,  "  Thy  will  be  done.*' 

1  Istor.  Vyest.  (1900),  Ixxx.  527,  "  Anecdotes  of  Theodor  G.  Golov- 
kin."  The  same  observer  declares  that  the  Empress  once  ordered  a 
dish  of  fruit  to  be  offered  to  him.  He  thanked  her  profusely,  and 
ordered  the  whole  dish  to  be  taken  to  his  room  I 


DOWNFALL  AND  EXILE  215 

After  every  occasion  of  this  sort,  Paul  demanded 
an  explanation  from  the  luckless  Gortchakof.  The 
latter  suggested  an  excuse,  went  to  Suvorof,  received 
his  expressions  of  impenitence  and  contumacy,  and 
went  back  to  the  Emperor  with  yet  another  plausible 
invention.  At  length,  after  three  weeks,  Paul  abandoned 
his  attempts  to  get  Suvorof  back  into  harness,  and  dis- 
missed him.i  The  old  man  delivered  himself  of  some 
defiant  cockcrows  and  went  back  to  Kontchansk.^ 

The  Emperor  had  not  given  up  all  belief  in  Suvorof, 
or  ceased  to  hope  for  his  advice.  In  September  1798 
he  sent  Major-General  Prevost  de  Lumian,  who  had 
served  with  the  old  man  in  Finland,  to  ask  his  opinion 
about  the  threatened  war  with  the  French  Republic. 
Suvorof  dictated  the  following  ; 

Austrians  and  Prussians  will  act  against  France 
with  100,000  men  each,  as  follows  : 

1.  Nothing  but  the  offensive. 

2.  Speed  on  the  march,  energy  in  attacks,  cold  steel. 

3.  Never  any  "  methodics  " — ^good  apprehension. 

4.  Full  power  to  the  Commander-in-Chief. 

5.  Fall  upon  the  enemy  and  beat  him  in  the  field. 

6.  Lose  no  time  in  sieges,  unless  some  fortress  base 
like  Mainz  comes  in  the  way.  Sometimes  blockade 
with  an  observation  corps,  sometimes  take  a  fortress  by 
assault  or  storm.     Then  you  lose  less. 

7.  Never  break  strength  to  protect  different  points. 
If  the  enemy  passes  these  points,  so  much  the  better ; 
he  is  all  the  nearer  for  being  beaten. 

8.  ...  Go  forward  fighting,  without  stopping,  and 
straight  to  Paris,  as  the  chief  olDJective,  not  stopping  at 
Landau  except  only  to  secure  the  rear,  not  for  a  retreat, 
of  which  it  is  never  necessary  to  think,  but  for  the 
baggage  trains  ;  and  never  encumber  yourselves  with 
empty  manoeuvres,  counter-marches  or  so-called  "  ruses 
de  guerre,'^  which  please  only  wretched  academicals. 

9.  ...  No  delays,  false  prudence  and  jealousy, 
heads  of  Medea  [sic]  in  the  Cabinet  and  the  Ministry. 

1  Russ.  Vyest.  (1856),  vi.  «  Buss.  Star,  Ixxiv.  575. 


216  SUVOROF 

A  young  Marlborough  will  come  to  light — and  not  a 
few  Suvorofs  and  Coburgs.^ 

For  the  moment  nothing  came  of  the  plan,  and  it 
remained  as  a  hint  of  what  Suvorof  would  do  if  he  were 
given  the  chief  command  against  the  French.  But 
even  if  war  were  declared  it  seemed  very  unlikely  that 
he  would  ever  serve  again.  He  was  now  sixty-eight 
years  old.  His  active  career  had  apparently  come  to  an 
end,  his  health  was  not  good,  and  his  solitary  life  gave 
him  inactivity  without  repose.  He  made  up  his  mind 
that  he  had  better  end  his  days  in  a  monastery.  In 
December  1798  he  wrote  to  the  Emperor  : 

I  most  humbly  request  your  Imperial  Highness  to 
allow  me  to  retire  to  the  Novogorod  Hermitage  at 
Nilof,  where  I  am  resolved  to  end  my  brief  days  in  the 
service  of  God.  Our  Saviour  alone  is  without  sin. 
Forgive  my  abruptness,  Gracious  Sovereign. 

And  he  signed  himself  "  the  most  humble  suppliant  and 
slave  of  God." 

This  appeal  received  no  direct  answer.  But  on  the 
6th  February  of  the  next  year  came  an  Imperial  rescript 
which  must  have  resounded  in  the  exile's  ears  like  a 
clap  of  thunder. 

This  day  I  have  received,  Count  Alexander  Vassilye- 
vitch,  news  of  the  pressing  desire  of  the  Court  of  Vienna, 
that  you  should  lead  its  armies  in  Italy,  whither  will 
also  go  my  corps  of  Rosenberg  and  Herman.  So  there- 
fore and  in  the  present  state  of  Europe,  I  think  it  my 
duty  to  propose  to  you  to  take  the  matter  and  command 
upon  yourself  and  to  come  here  for  your  journey  to 
Vienna. 

1  Fuchs,  History  of  the  War  of  1799,  ii.  1,  6.  Fuchs  was  Suvorofs 
secretary  during  his  last  campaign,  but  a  pretentious  and  careless 
historian.  His  History  includes  two  volumes  of  copies  of  letters, 
general  orders,  and  other  documents,  not  always  accurate,  as  a  com- 
parison with  other  authorities  shows. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE   ITALIAN    CAMPAIGN,    FIRST   STAGE 

The  French  Revolutionary  Armies — Suvorofs  method  compared — Paul 
and  Suvorof — Suvorof  leaves  for  Vienna — People  and  Ministers — 
Arrival  at  Verona — Instructing  the  Austrians — The  march  to  the 
Adda  —  Crossing  the  Adda  —  Entrance  into  Milan  —  Wrestling 
with  the  High  War  Council  at  Vienna — Entrance  into  Turin — 
More  difficulties — Suvorof  wants  to  go  home — Operations  in 
Switzerland — The  French  cross  the  Apennines — The  march  to  the 
Tidone — Battle  of  the  Trebbia — ^Return  to  Alessandria. 

The  French  Revolutionary  armies,  at  first  not  much 
better  than  armed  mobs,  had  by  this  time  worked  out 
a  system  of  warfare  which  made  them  the  terror  of 
Western  Europe.  Moving  habitually  by  forced  marches, 
careless  about  lines  of  communication,  and  living  upon 
the  country  as  they  went,  they  were  too  quick  for  the 
methodical  armies  of  Austria.  In  the  field  they  scorned 
the  flanking  movements  and  carefully  prepared  defen- 
sive positions  of  the  enemy,  and  their  attacks  in  column 
broke  through  the  opposing  lines  in  spite  of  all  that 
individual  bravery  could  do  to  stop  them.  Their  tactics 
alone  would  not  have  given  them  victory.  The  English  in 
the  Peninsula  always  used  a  line  formation  and  beat  them. 
The  real  secret  of  success  of  the  French  was  their  temper. 
Both  leaders  and  men  were  full  of  a  spirit  which  made 
them  indifferent  to  hardships  while  moving  towards  the 
field  of  battle,  and  indifferent  to  dangers  when  they  were 
upon  it.  The  rapidity  of  their  marches  and  the  violence 
of  their  blows  against  the  enemy  were  inspired  by  the 

217 


218  SUVOROF 

same  fanatical  spirit,  whether  that  was  a  passion  for 
liberty  or  a  mere  craving  for  military  glory  or  for 
plunder.  This  spirit  could  only  be  conquered  by 
another  spirit,  and  in  the  end  the  spirit  of  nationalism 
overcame  that  of  revolution.  But  long  before  their 
final  overthrow,  Suvorof  had  already  shown  Europe 
the  secret  of  success,  had  Europe  but  known  how  to  use 
it.  The  Austrian  Court  took  care  that  he  should  not 
arouse  national  feeling  against  the  French.  But  he 
could  use  his  personal  influence  over  his  troops,  and 
with  this  he  impelled  them  to  prodigies  of  valour  as 
astonishing  as  those  of  the  French  themselves.  His 
marches  were  as  rapid,  and  his  men  fought  with  the 
same  indifference  to  loss.  To  the  political  fanaticism 
of  the  French  armies  he  opposed  the  personal  fanaticism 
of  his  own,  and  overthrew  a  cause  by  a  character.  His 
system  was  as  unsystematic  as  that  of  the  French.  It 
had  as  little  to  do  with  paper  combinations,  plans  of 
campaign,  and  theories.  It  consisted  primarily  in  the 
mutual  devotion  of  leader  and  men,  in  their  belief  that 
together  they  could  go  anywhere  and  do  anything,  and 
in  the  second  place,  in  the  physical  training  which 
kept  individual  officers  and  men  at  the  highest  pitch 
of  bodily  efficiency.  It  had  its  limitations,  and  in  the 
end,  when  Suvorof  encountered  a  head  younger  and 
cooler  than  his  own,  he  found  that  there  were  things 
which  could  not  be  done.  But  for  a  time  his  trust 
in  moral  as  the  decisive  thing  in  war  was  justified 
by  an  amazing  series  of  victories.  To  this  strenuous 
task  he  was  now  recalled  by  the  Emperor. 

In  May  1798,  after  his  sensational  triumphs  over 
the  Austrian  forces  in  Italy,  Napoleon  had  sailed  for 
Egypt.  On  his  way  he  seized  Malta,  then  the  property 
of  the  Knights  of  St.  John.  The  Emperor  Paul,  in 
one  of  his  theatrical  moods,  had  allowed  himself  in  the 
previous  year  to  be  styled  Patron  and  Grand  Master 
of  the  Order,  which  appeared  to  him  a  strong  bulwark 
against  democratic  principles.     Taking  the  annexation 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  FIRST  STAGE    219 

of  the  island  as  an  affront  to  his  own  majesty,  he 
despatched  three  armies  to  the  assistance  of  Austria, 
who,  with  Great  Britain,  Turkey,  and  Naples,  now 
formed  the  Second  Coalition  against  the  French.  The 
first  army,  under  Rosenberg,  was  22,000  strong  ;  the 
second,  under  Herman,  11,000 ;  and  the  third,  under 
Numsen,  36,000.  Originally  they  were  intended  to 
operate  against  the  French  in  North  Italy,  Naples, 
and  South  Germany  respectively.  But  early  in  1799 
Herman's  army  was  ordered  to  reinforce  Rosenberg's  in 
North  Italy,  and  Numsen's,  in  co-operation  with  the 
Austrians  and  the  French  imigris  under  the  Prince  of 
Conde,  to  act  on  the  Upper  Rhine  against  the  French 
army  of  Massena  in  Switzerland.  The  Archduke  Charles 
of  Austria  was  the  obvious  choice  for  the  high  command 
on  the  Rhine.  The  Austrians  threatening  the  eastern 
frontier  of  Switzerland  were  under  Count  Bellegarde. 
But  the  Archduke  Joseph  was  too  young  for  the  Italian 
command,  and  to  some  genius  in  Vienna  or  London  it 
occurred  to  ask  that  Suvorof  should  be  sent  as  his 
adviser,  and  in  effect,  as  the  commander-in-chief  of 
the  combined  armies  in  Northern  Italy.^ 

Paul  was  naturally  flattered,  and  consented.  But 
while  this  tribute  from  abroad  forced  him  to  recognise 
Suvorof 's  merit,  he  neither  understood  nor  trusted  him. 
He  even  wrote  to  Herman,  an  officer  after  his  own 
heart,  instructing  him  to  play  the  mentor  to  Suvorof, 
who  was  liable  to  be  carried  away  by  his  imagination, 
moderate  his  outbreaks,  and  see  that  he  did  no  damage 
to  the  troops. 2  Fortunately  for  himself  and  the  army, 
Herman  never  went  to  Italy,  and  the  command  of  his 
force  was  in  the  end  given  to  Rehbinder.  The  post  of 
tutor  was  not  filled  up,  and  so  far  as  Paul  was  con- 
cerned, Suvorof  had  the  utmost  possible  freedom.     The 

*  As  long  before  as  1793  the  Austrian  General  Wiimiser  said  to 
Grimm :  "  Give  us  your  Count  Suvorof  and  15,000  Russians,  and  I 
promise  you  that  in  a  fortnight  we'll  be  in  Mainz  and  have  bagged  all 
the  arms  and  stuff  in  the  place  "  {Voronts,  Arkh,  xx.  332). 

*  Ibid.  xii.  217. 


220  SUVOROF 

Tsar  even  sent  his  son,  the  Grand  Duke  Constantine, 
to  learn  the  military  trade  under  him  in  Italy.  The 
hero  came  in  due  course  to  Petersburg.  On  this  occa- 
sion his  pranks  were  less  serious  than  before.  He  was 
invested  by  the  Emperor  with  the  Maltese  Cross.  He 
fell  upon  his  knees  and  cried,  "  Lord,  save  the 
Emperor  !  **  "  Do  you,**  answered  Paul,  "  go  and  save 
the  Emperors."  Then  some  of  those  present  stepped 
forward  to  raise  the  old  man.  He  leaped  up,  and 
spun  round  on  one  leg.  "  Voila  !  "  he  exclaimed,  "  I 
stood  up  by  myself  !  "  ^  He  was  of  course  surrounded 
by  old  friends  and  new  flatterers.  At  one  of  his  recep- 
tions Nikolyef  had  the  boldness  to  appear.  Suvorof 
greeted  him  with  enthusiasm.  "  Merciful  God  !  My 
chief  benefactor !  Proshka,  set  him  above  all  the 
others  !  "  Thereupon  the  servant  placed  a  stool  on 
the  couch,  and  Suvorof  compelled  the  unfortunate 
official  to  get  up,  and  treated  him  to  a  series  of  pro- 
found obeisances.  2 

He  left  for  Vienna  in  the  middle  of  February  1799. 
Rosenberg's  army  was  already  on  its  way,  but  the  other 
two  were  still  in  process  of  formation.  He  moved  for 
once  by  easy  stages,  and  stayed  for  some  days  at  Mittau, 
where  he  paid  a  formal  visit  to  the  exiled  Louis  of 
France.  Nothing  of  importance  passed  at  this  inter- 
view. But  the  local  gentry  were  given  a  taste  of  the 
old  Suvorof  at  his  own  reception.  As  they  gathered 
in  the  saloon,  the  door  of  his  bedroom  was  suddenly 
opened.  The  hero  appeared  in  his  shirt,  announced 
briefly,  "  Suvorof  is  coming  out,"  and  withdrew.  A 
minute  later  he  emerged,  wearing  full  uniform  and  all 
his  decorations,  and  solemnly  received  the  guests. 
Thus  he  announced  that  the  conqueror  of  the  French 
would  be  no  polished  and  refined  penitent,  but  the 
same  recalcitrant  old  porcupine  who  had  erected  his 
bristles  against  social  and  military  pedants  in  the 
palaces  of  Petersburg  and  on  the  battlefields  of 
1  Russ.  Star,  (1872),  93.  2  /^^-^^  93^  94^ 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  FIRST  STAGE    221 

Turkey  and  Poland.^  His  journey  beyond  Mittau  con- 
tinued to  be  laborious  and  slow.  A  regiment  of 
cuirassiers  overtook  his  carriage  near  Kobrin,  stuck 
in  a  snowdrift.  They  dug  it  out,  the  old  man  hallooing 
at  them  from  the  window,  "  Hurra,  hurra  !  Gallant 
Carabineers  of  the  Ruimnik  !  "  ^  Soon  after  this  he 
abandoned  the  carriage  altogether,  and  continued  his 
way  in  a  post  sledge.  On  the  25th  March  he  reached 
Vienna. 

There  he  was  greeted  with  enthusiasm  by  the  ordinary 
people,  with  affability  by  the  Emperor,  with  a  mixture 
of  admiration,  curiosity,  and  superciliousness  by  the 
military,  and  with  professional  concealment  of  his  real 
feelings  by  Thugut,  the  all-powerful  Minister.  On  the 
whole,  with  his  old  friends  Coburg  and  De  Ligne  to 
sponsor  him,  he  made  a  good  impression,  though  his 
behaviour  at  receptions,  skipping  like  a  goat  from  one 
group  to  another,  and  overwhelming  the  great  ladies 
by  the  profundity  of  his  bows  and  the  lavishness  of  his 
flatteries,  excited  no  little  amusement.^  The  general 
mass  of  the  inhabitants  wished  him  nothing  but  good, 
and  the  crowds  in  the  streets  welcomed  him  without 
reserve.*  But  the  authorities  were  by  no  means  disposed 
to  give  him  their  full  confidence.  The  greatness  which 
seizes  the  affection  of  the  populace  is  the  very  quality 
which  arouses  the  suspicions  of  a  bureaucracy.  Where 
the  people  acclaim  a  leader,  officials  scent  only  an 
undisciplined  servant.  The  Emperor  and  his  advisers 
were  ready  enough  to  make  use  of  Suvorof .  They  made 
him  a  Field-Marshal  in  the  Austrian  Army,  decided  not 
to    encumber    him    with    the    Archduke    Joseph,    and 

1  Russ.  Star.  (1873),  vii.  263. 

2  Loewenstern,  Memoirs,  i.  15. 

3  Vassiltchkof,  Syemyeistvo  Razumovskikh,  iii. 

*  One  eye-witness,  Ribeaupierre,  asserts  that  as  he  drove  through  the 
streets,  in  response  to  the  cheers  for  "  Paul  and  Suvorof,"  he  shouted, 
"  Vivat  Josef  I  "  On  being  reminded  that  the  reigning  Emperor's 
name  was  Franz,  he  exclaimed,  "  Merciful  God !  I  forgot !  Vivat  Franz  1 " 
{Russ.  Arkh.  (1877),  i.  471). 


222  SUVOROF 

appointed  the  veteran  Melas  to  take  command,  under 
him,  of  the  Austrian  Army  in  Italy.  They  provided 
Suvorof  himself  with  an  efficient  staff,  headed  by  the 
Marquis  von  Chasteler,  and  made  up  the  other  great 
Russian  deficiency  by  undertaking  all  the  commissariat 
of  his  army.  This  was  only  to  make  him  a  better 
instrument.  Whatever  his  qualities  as  a  leader  in  the 
field,  they  had  no  intention  of  giving  him  a  free  hand, 
even  in  the  elaboration  of  a  plan  of  campaign.  Four 
members  of  the  High  War  Council  waited  upon  him 
with  a  plan  of  campaign  "  as  far  as  the  river  Adda  "  ; 
and  a  request  that  he  should  express  his  opinion  upon 
it.  He  drew  a  great  cross  over  the  sheet,  and  wrote 
at  the  bottom :  "  The  plan  will  begin  with  the  passage 
of  the  Adda,  and  will  end  as  God  pleases."  This  was 
an  ominous  beginning.  The  Austrian  Ministers  imposed 
restrictions  on  the  liberty  of  their  own  Archduke.  They 
were  not  going  to  give  freedom  of  action  to  an  eccentric 
foreigner,  who  had  been  successful  against  barbarians 
and  insurgents,  but  had  had  no  experience  of  disciplined 
enemies.  Modesty  should  have  reminded  them  that 
they  had  themselves  been  defeated  by  the  same  bar- 
barians, and  gratitude  that  they  had  got  great  profits 
by  his  victories  over  the  insurgents  ;  while  his  very 
presence  among  them  was  a  comment  on  the  fact  that 
against  their  disciplined  enemies  they  had  shown  nothing 
better  than  a  resolute  incompetence.  But  the  pride  of 
a  Hapsburg  Ministry  admits  of  neither  criticism  of  self 
nor  a  generous  estimate  of  others.  When  Suvorof  left 
Vienna  on  the  4th  April,  he  took  with  him  the  express 
orders  of  the  Emperor  himself  that  the  whole  object  of 
his  campaign  should  be  to  protect  the  possessions  of 
Austria,  and  remove  from  them  all  danger  of  a  hostile 
invasion.  Until  the  attitude  of  the  Elector  of  Bavaria 
was  known,  and  until  all  the  French  strong  places  in 
North  Italy  were  reduced,  there  could  be  no  thought  of 
a  concerted  offensive  against  the  French  in  Switzerland 
or  elsewhere.     Suvorof  was  thus  tied  down  to  a  limited 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  FIRST  STAGE    223 

scheme.  It  is  certain  that  these  orders  produced  no 
change  in  his  mind.  His  own  intention  remained  what 
it  had  always  been  :  to  meet  the  enemy  wherever  they 
were  to  be  found,  beat  them,  and  follow  them,  if  necessary, 
even  into  their  own  territory. 

Before  Suvorof  arrived  upon  the  scene,  the  armies 
had  been  already  engaged.  In  spite  of  their  superiority 
in  numbers  and  the  heavy  losses  which  they  inflicted 
upon  the  enemy,  the  Austrians  under  General  Kray 
had  behaved  with  little  energy,  and  had  taken  up  a 
position  under  the  walls  of  Verona  itself..  Nevertheless, 
the  French  were  not  strong  enough  to  press  their  advan- 
tages, and  themselves  withdrew  beyond  the  Mincio.  On 
the  12th  April,  leaving  garrisons  in  Peschiera  and  Mantua, 
they  were  in  full  march  towards  the  Adda.  On  the 
14th  Melas,  five  days  after  his  arrival  at  Verona,  started 
in  pursuit,  and  on  the  same  day  Suvorof  entered  the 
town  and  took  up  his  quarters  in  the  Palazzo  Emilio. 
His  reception  was  even  more  enthusiastic  than  at 
Vienna.  For  some  miles  he  was  accompanied  by  a 
cheering  crowd,  and  the  people  took  out  the  horses  and 
dragged  the  carriage  through  the  streets  with  waving 
flags  and  shouts  of  joy. 

It  was  already  evening.  He  ran  quickly  through  his 
apartments,  noting  with  satisfaction  that  the  mirrors 
were  all  covered,  and  returned  to  the  reception  room. 
Here  were  gathered  the  Grand  Duke  Constantine, 
Austrian  and  Russian  officers,  and  representatives  of 
the  clergy,  the  nobility,  and  the  citizens  of  the  town. 
Going  straight  to  the  Archbishop  he  received  his  blessing, 
and  then  listened  to  the  address  of  welcome  from  the 
town  of  Verona.  He  replied  that  he  was  sent  to  expel 
the  shameless  French,  to  restore  order,  and  to  defend 
Thrones  and  the  Christian  Faith.  He  begged  the 
Archbishop  to  pray  God  for  the  Emperors  and  their 
pious  soldiery,  and  reminded  the  nobility  and  citizens 
of  their  duty  to  be  zealous  for  lawful  government. 
Then    he    abruptly    left    the    room,  and    the    Italians 


224  SUVOROF 

dispersed.  He  returned  with  his  usual  rapidity  to  the 
remaining  officers,  wrinkled  up  his  eyes,  and  asked 
Rosenberg  to  present  the  Generals  to  him.  He  stood 
with  his  eyes  shut.  As  each  unknown  name  was 
pronounced,  he  bowed,  saying,  "  Merciful  God  I  I've 
not  heard  it.  Let  us  know  each  other."  But  whenever 
some  old  acquaintance  came  forward,  he  opened  his 
eyes  and  talked  cheerfully  of  their  old  campaigns. 

When  the  presentations  were  finished,  he  began  to 
walk  briskly  about  the  room.  Then  he  stopped,  and 
again  wrinkling  up  his  eyes,  delivered  a  series  of  extracts 
from  the  Science  of  Victory :  "  Discipline  I  Practice  ! 
The  military  step's  a  yard  ;  in  deploying  one  and  a  half. 
The  head  doesn't  wait  for  the  tail  ;  suddenly,  like  snow 
on  the  head  !  .  .  .  Bullet's  a  fool,  bayonet's  a  lad  !  .  .  . 
We've  come  to  beat  the  godless,  windy,  feather-headed 
Frenchies  :  they  fight  in  columns,  and  we'll  beat  them 
with  columns  !  "  Then  after  a  silence  of  a  few  minutes 
he  turned  swiftly  upon  Rosenberg,  and  said:  "Your 
Excellency !  Please  let  me  have  two  regiments  of 
infantry  and  two  of  Cossacks."  This  was  not  explicit 
enough  for  Rosenberg,  who  answered  suavely  that  it 
was  as  his  Excellency  liked,  and  which  did  he  require  ? 
The  Field-Marshal  was  displeased.  He  wanted  the  men 
to  start  at  once  after  the  enemy,  and  here  was  a  "  can't 
teller  "  in  the  person  of  his  chief  subordinate.  There 
followed  one  or  two  more  Suvorovian  questions  and  one 
or  two  more  unready  replies.  Suvorof  turned  away, 
walked  several  times  up  and  down  the  room,  and  then, 
wrinkling  his  brow,  vociferated :  "  Hinter,  guesser,  liar, 
spellbinder,  soft-soaper,  glib -tongue,  can't  teller!" 
After  this  reply,  as  annihilating  as  any  of  those  recorded 
of  Mr.  F.'s  Aunt,  he  bowed  and  left  the  room,  leaving 
the  unhappy  Rosenberg  to  his  feelings.^ 

The  next  day  he  rode  among  the  troops  in  his  usual 
familiar  style.  Coming  back  to  his  palace,  he  again 
put  the  question  to  Rosenberg.     The  latter  was  no  more 

^  Starkof,  on  Bagration's  authority. 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  FIRST  STAGE    225 

fortunate  than  before.  But  on  this  occasion  Bagration 
came  to  his  rescue,  and  said  that  his  own  regiment  was 
ready.  "  Ah,  you  understand  me,  Prince  Peter !  " 
cried  Suvorof,  "  you  understand.  Get  them  ready  and 
yourself  too  !  "  In  less  than  an  hour  they  reported  that 
the  cavalry  and  infantry  were  waiting.  "  God  be  with 
you,  Prince  Peter,"  said  Suvorof,  "  understand  ;  the 
head  doesn't  wait  for  the  tail ;  suddenly,  like  snow 
on  the  head."  Bagration  put  his  men  in  motion,  and 
they  marched  down  the  road  to  Valleggio,  singing 
their  marching  songs,  and  welcomed  everywhere  with 
immense  enthusiasm.^  On  the  same  day  Suvorof  left 
for  the  headquarters  at  Valleggio. 

Along  the  Mincio,  the  French  had  the  shortest 
defensive  line  in  Lombardy,  protected  on  each  flank 
by  a  strong  fortress,  and,  in  addition,  on  the  north  by 
Lago  di  Garda,  and  on  the  south  by  the  marches  of 
Mantua  and  the  river  Po.  After  the  sanguinary  battles 
around  Verona,  Scherer  had  now  less  than  33,000  men, 
of  whom  7500  were  left  in  Peschiera  and  Mantua. 
Against  him  were  about  55,000  Austrian  and  Russian 
troops.  Vukassovitch,  with  7000  Austrians,  was 
descending  by  Lake  Idro  in  his  left  rear.  On  his  right 
was  Klenau  with  14,500  Austrians.  Parties  of  horse 
were  rousing  all  the  Italians  beyond  the  Po,  and  the 
garrison  of  Ferrara  was  already  shut  up  in  the  citadel. 
Melas,  with  29,000  Austrians,  was  moving  directly 
against  his  left  at  Valleggio,  and  behind  Melas  was  the 
main  Russian  Army,  with  Suvorof  at  its  head.  Under 
such  circumstances  the  line  of  the  Mincio  could  only 
have  been  held  by  a  great  military  genius.  Scherer 
was  a  man  of  ordinary  capacity  and  less  than  ordinary 
resolution.  He  abandoned  his  line  of  defence,  left 
nearly  a  quarter  of  his  army  to  be  besieged  in  the 
fortresses,  and  made  away  with  all  speed  towards  Milan. 

After  him  came  Suvorof.  On  the  16th  the  latter 
inspected  the  Austrians  at  Valleggio.     "  A  good  step  !  " 

^  Starkof,  on  Bagration's  authority. 

Q 


226  SUVOROF 

he  said,  **  victory  I  "  Nevertheless,  he  thought  it  wise 
to  wait  a  few  days,  while  the  Austrian  infantry  were 
initiated  into  the  mysteries  of  the  Suvorovian  bayonet 
practice.  It  was  not  until  the  18th  that  all  the  Russians 
were  concentrated  at  Valleggio,  to  the  number  of  11,000.^ 
On  the  19th  they  started  in  pursuit,  marching  in  three 
columns  towards  Brescia.  A  force  of  5000  under  Count 
Hohenzollern  followed  another  line  from  Mantua  to 
Cremona,  where  on  the  21st  it  captured  a  considerable 
quantity  of  abandoned  siege  guns  and  ammunition.* 
On  the  same  day  the  advance  guard  of  the  main  army 
attacked  Brescia  from  all  sides,  and  the  commandant 
surrendered  with  1264  officers  and  men  and  46  guns. 
This  was  a  promising  beginning.  The  news  so  gratified 
the  Emperor  Paul  that  he  sent  young  Arkadii  Suvorof 
to  the  army  of  Italy  "  to  be  an  eye-witness  of  his  father's 
victories."  '  It  was  not  Suvorof 's  way  to  let  an  unbeaten 
enemy  run  away  from  him,  and  he  pressed  on  with  all 
speed. 

This  energy  was  too  much  for  some  of  the  Austrians. 
They  were  not  accustomed  to  spend  half  the  night 
in  marching,  and  cover  20  miles  in  a  day.  Units 
sometimes  lost  their  way  among  the  lanes  and  gardens, 
fell  into  streams,  and  reached  their  quarters  for  the 
night  long  after  they  were  due.  After  one  night-march 
in  the  rain,  Melas  took  it  upon  himself  to  halt  his  men, 
to  rest  and  dry  their  clothes.  Suvorof  thereupon  sent 
him  the  following  letter : 

Complaints  have  come  to  my  notice,  that  the  infantry 
have  wet  their  feet.  For  that  the  weather  is  to  blame. 
The  march  was  made  in  the  service  of  a  mighty  Monarch. 
Women,  coxcombs,  and  laggards  crave  for  good  weather. 
The  big  chatterer  who  complains  on  service  will  be 
dismissed  from  duty  as  an  egoist.  In  military  practice 
one  must  plan  quickly  and  carry  out  without  delay,  so 
as  to  give  the  enemy  no  time  to  collect  himself.  If 
any  one*s  ill,  he  can  stay  behind.     Italy  must  be  freed 

I  MU.  i.  272.  »  Ibid.  273.  »  Fuchs,  ii.  397. 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  FIRST  STAGE    227 

from  the  yoke  of  the  godless  and  the  French  :  every 
honest  officer  must  sacrifice  himself  for  this  end.  In 
no  army  can  argle-barglers  be  tolerated.  Apprehension, 
quickness,  energy  ! — ^for  this  time  enough.^ 

Coming  from  the  lusty  youth  of  sixty-nine  to  the 
senile  old  veteran  of  seventy  this  rebuke  is  piquant. 
No  more  complaints  were  heard,  and  it  was  not  long 
before  Suvorof  found  that  he  could  rely  upon  the  Austrian 
rank  and  file  as  much  as  upon  the  Russian.  The  dis- 
positions after  the  fall  of  Brescia  were  made  in  expecta- 
tion of  a  speedy  encounter  with  the  enemy.  Kray 
was  left,  with  20,000  men  and  the  siege  artillery,  to 
garrison  Verona  and  blockade  Peschiera  and  Mantua, 
and  Klenau  was  sent  across  the  Po  to  watch  the  French 
in  Ferrara  and  Modena.  The  army  in  the  field  was  still 
in  three  columns.  The  first,  29,000  strong,  contained 
the  Russian  troops  and  the  Austrians  of  Vukassovitch, 
Ott,  and  Zopf,  and  marched  towards  Bergamo.  The 
second,  consisting  of  the  Austrians  of  Frohlich  and 
Keim,  13,000  in  all,  marched  upon  Treviglio.  The  third, 
a  small  force  of  1500  men  under  General  Seckendorf, 
went  by  way  of  Crema,  to  maintain  connection  with 
HohenzoUern,  on  his  way  from  Cremona  to  Pizzighetone. 
The  French  were  on  the  22nd  behind  the  Adda  ;  some- 
what increased  in  numbers  by  the  drafts  from  the 
Lombard  garrisons.  Serurier,  with  8000  men,  was  at 
Lecco  ;  Gregnet,  with  8000,  at  Cassano ;  Victor,  with 
8000,  at  Lodi ;  and  Laboissi^re,  with  4000,  at  Pizzi- 
ghetone. A  small  rear-guard  offered  some  resistance  on 
the  23rd  at  Palazzola  on  the  Oglio,  but  this  was  soon 
brushed  aside.  On  the  24th  Denisof's  Cossacks  galloped 
into  the  streets  of  Bergamo,  and  captured  the  citadel 
and  130  men  with  19  guns.^  On  the  25th  Seckendorf 
entered  Crema  and  captured  30  cannon  and  some  stores, 
and  on  the  same  day  the  two  main  armies  came  face  to 
face  with  each  other  across  the  Adda,  and  prepared  for 
battle. 

1  Fuchs,  ii. ;  Mil.  i.  279.  «  Mil.  282, 


228  SUVOROF 

The  river  was  in  itself  a  good  line  of  defence.  It  was 
wide  enough  to  be  unfordable  ;  in  its  northern  portion, 
where  it  left  the  hills,  the  banks  were  steep  and  high,  and 
from  Cassano  to  its  junction  with  the  Po  it  ran  through 
a  wide  and  muddy  bed,  with  more  than  one  irrigation 
canal  to  increase  the  natural  difficulties  of  the  ground. 
It  was  crossed  by  bridges  at  only  four  places  :  Lecco, 
Cassano,  Lodi,  and  Pizzighetone.  But,  however  useful 
to  an  army  of  sufficient  size,  it  was  too  long  for  that 
of  Scherer.  From  Lake  Como  to  the  Po  it  covers  a 
distance  of  70  miles.  S^rurier  had  to  defend  20  miles, 
from  Lecco  to  Trezzo ;  Gregnet  the  next  18  miles, 
from  Trezzo  to  Villa  Pompeiana ;  and  Victor  and 
Laboissi^re  the  last  32  miles  to  Pizzighetone.  Against 
these  forces  stood  35,000  men  between  Lecco  and 
Cassano,  and  8000  at  Pizzighetone.  Bagration  was 
moving  north  towards  Lecco,  with  Rosenberg  and 
Vukassovitch  behind  him.  Suvorof  himself  stood  at 
San  Gervasio,  opposite  Trezzo,  with  the  Austrian  troops 
of  Ott  and  Zopf.  Melas  faced  Cassano  with  Frohlich 
and  Keim.  Under  these  circumstances  the  value  of 
Laboissi^re  and  a  great  part  of  Victor's  division  existed 
only  on  paper. 

Few  things  in  war  are  so  difficult  as  to  defend  a  long 
line  of  river  against  an  enemy  superior  in  numbers.  If 
the  troops  on  both  sides  are  approximately  equal  in 
character,  only  a  very  grave  miscalculation  of  time  can 
prevent  the  assailant  from  crossing  at  one  point  or 
another,  and  making  good  his  hold  before  sufficient 
numbers  can  be  concentrated  on  the  spot  to  defeat  him. 
But  nothing  can  be  done  when  the  defending  army  is 
strung  along  the  whole  line.  Its  only  hope  is  in  con- 
centration and  mobility.  Scherer' s  army  was  as  widely 
as  possible  dispersed,  and  he  himself  was  the  last  man 
to  move  troops  with  the  speed  required  of  an  opponent 
of  Suvorof. 

Suvorof 's  original  plan  was  to  cross  first  from  San 
Gervasio  to  Trezzo,  and  he  gave  orders  to  that  effect  to 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  FIRST  STAGE    229 

Ott,  sending  the  Cossacks  and  Vukassovitch  to  support 
him.i     But  on  the  night  of  the  25th  he  learned  that  the 


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enemy  were  in  force  at  Lecco,  and  not  wishing  to  leave 
Bagration  without  help  against  what  he  took  to  be 
Serurier's  whole  division,   he   halted  Vukassovitch   at 

1  Mil.  286,  290  ;   Fuchs,  ii.  33,  35. 


230  SUVOROF 

Caprino,  9  miles  from  Lecco,  so  that  in  case  of  need 
he  might  march  to  Bagration's  assistance.  Holding 
back  from  his  main  operations  until  definite  news  should 
arrive  from  the  right  flank,  he  told  Melas  to  attack  the 
next  day  at  Cassano,  and  made  himself  ready  to  follow 
Ott  at  San  Gervasio.  At  8  o*clock  in  the  morning 
of  the  26th,  Bagration,  with  three  battalions  of  infantry 
and  three  regiments  of  Cossacks,  came  into  touch  with 
the  enemy  outposts  and  pursued  them  up  to  the  walls 
of  Lecco.  Here  were  four  French  battalions  and  a 
squadron  of  cavalry  under  General  Soyez.  A  battery 
of  six  guns  covered  the  town  across  the  lake,  which  at 
this  point  is  only  300  yards  wide.  After  a  hard  fight 
in  the  streets  of  the  town  the  French  were  pressed  out, 
but  rallied  among  the  gardens  and  vineyards,  and  with 
their  superior  numbers  even  threatened  to  cut  Bagration's 
communications  with  the  Russian  main  body.  An 
appeal  for  help  brought  up  Miloradovitch  with  a  battalion 
of  Grenadiers  at  4  o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  Milorado- 
vitch was  the  senior  officer,  but  saying  "  this  is  no  place 
to  think  of  ranks,"  he  refused  to  take  over  the  general 
command.  The  fresh  battalion  stopped  the  enemy's 
flanking  movement,  and  two  others  coming  up  under 
Shveikovski  finally  turned  the  scale.  The  town  was 
again  occupied,  an  attempt  at  crossing  in  boats  from 
the  other  bank  was  frustrated,  and  at  8  o'clock  in 
the  evening  the  French  were  in  full  retreat  in  the  hills 
beyond. 

This  affair,  which  had  cost  the  Russians  385  men 
killed  and  wounded,  was  not  in  fact  necessary.  Vukas- 
sovitch  had  found  the  enemy  in  very  little  strength  at 
Brivio,  opposite  Caprino,  and  on  the  night  of  the  same 
day  began  his  preparations  for  crossing.  If  the  thrust 
had  been  made  at  this  point,  instead  of  at  Lecco,  the 
French  in  Lecco  would  have  been  cut  off,  and  must  have 
retreated  without  a  shot  being  fired.  In  the  meantime 
a  change  had  taken  place  on  the  French  side  which  might 
have  materially  affected  the  campaign.     Scherer  had 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  FIRST  STAGE    231 

been  removed  from  his  command,  and  replaced  by 
Moreau.  The  latter  was  as  clear-headed,  bold,  and 
popular  with  the  troops  as  the  former  was  weak, 
irresolute,  and  disliked,  and  the  change  of  leader  meant 
a  great  accession  of  strength  to  the  French  armies. 
Nevertheless  it  came  too  late  to  save  them  from  disaster. 
Moreau  wasted  no  time.  He  learned  of  his  appointment 
at  Lodi  on  the  evening  of  the  26th.  Without  delay  he 
mounted  his  horse  and  galloped  to  the  General  Head- 
quarters, whence  he  scattered  his  orders  for  an  immediate 
concentration.  Gregnet  was  to  draw  in  from  the  north 
upon  Vaprio  and  Cassano,  Victor  to  march  up  the  river 
to  Cassano,  and  Laboissi^re  to  come  up  from  Pizzighetone 
to  Lodi.  S^rurier  was  at  first  ordered  to  move  in 
towards  Gregnet's  left,  but  after  the  news  of  the  threat 
from  Vukassovitch  this  was  countermanded,  and  he  was 
told  to  leave  one  battalion  at  Trezzo,  and  go  back  with 
the  rest  of  his  troops  to  Brivio.  Orders  were  at  the 
same  time  sent  to  Milan  and  other  points  in  the  rear 
for  all  available  units  to  make  for  the  Adda.  If  these 
movements  had  been  completed,  there  would  have  been 
some  16,000  men  between  Vaprio  and  Cassano,  and, 
with  luck,  even  a  crossing  from  San  Gervasio  to  Trezzo 
might  have  been  frustrated  by  a  rapid  march  from 
Vaprio,  only  3  miles  to  the  south.  But  Moreau  was 
too  late  by  at  least  a  day,  and  when  the  fighting  began 
he  had  only  10,500  men  against  24,500.  At  midnight 
on  the  26th  Suvorof  began  to  throw  a  pontoon  bridge 
across  the  river  at  San  Gervasio.  With  considerable 
difficulty,  but  without  any  opposition  on  the  part  of 
the  French,  the  bridge  was  completed,  and  six  companies 
of  Jagers  and  some  hundreds  of  Cossacks  were  already 
on  the  other  side  before  the  French  battalion  in  Trezzo 
opened  fire.  After  them  came  the  first  men  of  Ott's 
division,  behind  them  Bagration's  three  Cossack  regi- 
ments, coming  at  great  speed  from  Lecco,  and  lastly 
Zopf's  division.  In  all,  11,500  men  crossed  at  this  point, 
and  the  solitary  French  battalion  against  them  lost  its 


282  SUVOROF 

only  chance  when  it  allowed  the  bridge  to  be  built 
without  resistance.  Denisof 's  Cossacks,  in  spite  of  their 
previous  exertions,  were  soon  galloping  round  the  rear 
of  the  town,  and  the  French  infantry  barely  succeeded 
in  getting  away  to  Vaprio. 

Outside  Vaprio  they  were  met  by  Gregnet*s  division, 
just  brought  up  from  Cassano.  Moreau  himself  hurried 
to  the  spot,  and  was  nearly  cut  off  by  the  Cossacks.  But 
he  had  time  to  take  up  a  position  between  Vaprio  and 
Pozzo  before  the  battle  was  joined,  and  to  send  a 
message  to  S^rurier,  bidding  him  halt  wherever  he  was. 
This  last  order  seems  incredibly  foolish,  and  was  in  the 
result  fatal  to  S6rurier.  An  attack,  or  even  a  threat 
by  a  force  of  several  thousand  men  against  Suvorof's 
right  rear  would  have  been  invaluable  at  the  crisis  of 
the  battle,  and  once  the  main  body  was  defeated, 
S^rurier,  cut  off  from  Milan  and  pressed  against  the 
mountains  by  both  Suvorof  and  Vukassovitch,  could 
hardly  expect  to  escape.  The  one  chance  both  for 
Gregnet  and  for  Serurier  himself  was  for  the  latter  to 
march  with  all  possible  speed  upon  the  sound  of  the 
guns.  As  things  actually  stood,  Gregnet,  with  some 
assistance  from  Victor,  had  to  face  a  great  superiority 
in  force,  and  S6rurier  was  left  to  fall  like  a  ripe  plum 
into  the  hands  of  the  victorious  army.  Nevertheless, 
the  matter  was  not  easily  decided.  Gregnet  held  up 
against  Ott,  and  even  took  the  offensive,  threatening  to 
turn  his  right  from  the  direction  of  Pozzo.  The  arrival 
of  two  battalions  from  Zopf  did  not  change  the  aspect 
of  affairs,  and  one  of  the  new  battalions  was  cut  to 
pieces  by  the  French  cavalry.  But  a  violent  charge  by 
Denisof 's  Cossacks  drove  back  the  French  infantry  into 
Pozzo,  and  the  Cossacks,  continuing  their  charge,  fell 
upon  four  squadrons  of  chasseurs  a  cheval  which  had 
just  come  up  from  Milan,  and  chased  them  as  far  as 
Gorgonzola,  4  miles  to  the  south-west.  The  Austrian 
infantry  then  attacked  Pozzo  and  Vaprio  simultaneously, 
and  after  some  bitter  fighting  got  hold  of  both.     Moreau 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  FIRST  STAGE   233 

thereupon  decided  that  he  could  not  stand  his  ground 
until  Victor  came  to  his  help,  and  began  to  fall  back 
southwards  towards  Inzago  and  Cassano.  There  he 
hoped  to  fight  a  second  battle  in  conjunction  with 
Victor.  But  hardly  had  his  movement  begun  when 
he  encountered  the  latter' s  troops,  themselves  in  full 
flight. 

Melas,  with  the  divisions  of  Frohlich  and  Keim, 
13,000  men  in  all,  had  attacked  simultaneously  with 
Suvorof.  Cassano  was  a  more  formidable  objective 
than  Trezzo.  Besides  the  river,  there  were  two  irrigation 
canals  to  be  crossed,  and  between  the  left  bank  and  one  of 
these  canals  the  French  had  thrown  up  earthworks  across 
the  road.  Here  3000  men  held  out  for  five  hours.  But 
at  11  o'clock  in  the  morning,  under  cover  of  a  massed 
battery  of  thirty  guns,  the  Austrians  crossed  the  canal 
on  a  pontoon  bridge,  and  carried  the  defences  with  a 
rush,  taking  all  the  guns  and  getting  a  foothold  on  the 
river  bridge  before  the  French  could  destroy  it.  This 
obstacle  once  passed,  all  was  easy.  The  Austrians 
poured  over  the  bridge,  and  drove  the  remainder  of 
the  defenders  of  Cassano  into  the  face  of  the  retreating 
Moreau. 

The  latter' s  only  task  now  was  to  save  his  army  from 
annihilation.  The  direct  road  to  Milan  through  Gorgon- 
zola  was  already  in  the  hands  of  the  Cossacks,  and  the 
troops  who  had  been  in  action  were  ordered  to  march 
by  roads  to  the  south.  Leaving  2000  prisoners  and  19 
guns  in  the  hands  of  the  victorious  Allies,  the  beaten 
army  hurried  away.  The  last  line  of  the  French  defences 
in  Northern  Italy  had  gone.^ 

There  remained  the  troops  about  Lecco  and  the 
division  of  Serurier.  During  the  progress  of  the  main 
battle,  Vukassovitch  had  crossed  at  Brivio,  and  General 
Giglet  with  great  difficulty  carried  his  detachment  into 
safety    at    Como.     Soyez    scrambled    round    the    hills 

^  Mil.  292,  et  seq.     Denisof  s  personal  account  is  in  Russ.  Star, 
1874),  ii. 


284  SUVOROF 

bordering  the  lake,  crossed  it  in  boats,  and  by  a  long 
march  through  Lugano  eventually  reached  the  banks 
of  Lake  Maggiore.  The  position  of  S^rurier  was  hopeless. 
He  had  remained  with  3000  men  at  Verderio,  5  miles 
from  the  field  of  battle,  and  within  earshot  of  the  cannon. 
He  received  no  news  during  the  whole  of  the  27th,  and 
remained  for  the  night  in  a  good  defensive  position 
facing  westwards  between  Verderio  and  Paderno.  At 
the  latter  point  his  right  rested  on  the  river,  and  at  the 
former  his  left  was  strengthened  with  earthworks.  Here 
on  the  28th  he  was  found  by  Vukassovitch.  The  latter 
did  not  expect  to  encounter  anything  but  a  few  scattered 
parties  of  the  French  between  the  Adda  and  Milan. 
But  some  of  his  scouts,  seeing  and  pursuing  a  few  enemy 
horsemen,  followed  them  into  Paderno,  and  reported 
their  discovery  of  a  French  army  to  Vukassovitch.  The 
latter  at  once  attacked  in  front  and  on  both  flanks,  and 
on  the  arrival  of  the  first  of  Rosenberg's  Russians 
Serurier  capitulated.  Nearly  3000  men  were  made 
prisoners  at  this  point  with  8  guns.^ 

Suvorof's  first  encounter  with  the  French  thus  glori- 
ously ended.  The  enemy's  defences  had  been  shattered, 
and  out  of  the  18,000  men  opposed  to  him,  2500  had  been 
killed  and  wounded,  and  5000  captured,  with  27  guns, 
while  his  own  losses  were  not  more  than  2000  men.^ 
The  operation,  in  view  of  the  disparity  in  strength,  had 
not  been  difficult.  But  the  moral  effect  was  enormous. 
In  the  previous  year  the  French  had  swept  everything 
before  them.  Now  they  had  themselves  been  swept 
back  with  an  injury  to  their  prestige  greater  even 
than  the  great  injury  to  their  military  power.  Milan  is 
only  12  miles  from  Cassano,  and  on  the  evening  of  the 
28th  the  Cossacks  of  Motchanof  were  clattering  through 
the  streets  of  the  city,  cutting  down  all  the  French  who 
had  not  time  to  take  refuge  in  the  citadel.  The  main 
army  had  already  left  the  place,  accompanied  by  a  crowd 
of  partisans  of  the  Cisalpine  Republic.     A  garrison  of 

^  Mil.  ii.  296.  '  Mil.  i.  298. 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  FIRST  STAGE    235 

2400  in  the  citadel  was  all  that  was  left  of  the  French 
power  in  Lombardy. 

On  the  29th,  Easter  Sunday,  Suvorof  rode  in  through 
the  Porta  Orientale,  and  in  the  presence  of  a  vast  crowd 
knelt  and  kissed  the  hand  of  the  Archbishop.  "  I  am 
sent,'*  he  said,  "  to  restore  the  ancient  throne  of  the 
Pope,  and  to  bring  the  people  to  obedience  to  their 
Sovereign.  Help  me  in  the  sacred  work."  He  then 
proceeded  through  the  thronged  streets  to  the  house  of 
the  Duchess  Castiglione,  where  Moreau  had  lodged  before 
him.  The  next  day  he  attended  High  Mass  in  the 
Cathedral,  and  entertained  all  the  local  magnates  at 
dinner.  To  the  same  feast  came  Serurier,  to  whom 
Suvorof  quoted  the  distich  of  Lomonosof : 

The  lion  magnanimous  strikes  low  the  evil  race, 
Which  with  his  greedy  jaw  the  wolf  devours  apace. 

"  Translate  those  verses  to  the  General,'*  he  said  to 
Fuchs.  "  I  repeated  them  to  the  Polish  envoys  after 
the  taking  of  Warsaw."  To  Serurier  himself  he  played 
the  magnanimous  lion,  sending  him  to  France  on  his 
verbal  promise  not  to  serve  again  in  that  campaign. 

So  far  his  conduct  at  Milan  had  been  entirely  consistent 
with  his  rank  and  his  mission.  But  the  season  of  the 
year  gave  him  an  opportunity  of  puzzling  the  Italians 
more  than  a  little.  The  Russian  Easter  customs 
include  not  only  the  presentation  of  coloured  eggs,  but 
a  greeting,  consisting  of  three  kisses,  on  the  lips  and  the 
two  cheeks,  accompanied  by  the  words,  "  Christ  is  risen." 
Suvorof  was  not  going  to  abandon  a  cherished  Slav  habit 
out  of  consideration  for  Latin  dignity.  Accordingly 
he  embraced  every  acquaintance  whom  he  met,  not 
excepting  Serurier.  His  troops  pursued  the  same  course, 
and  for  a  brief  space  the  kisses  bestowed  by  military 
men  in  the  streets  of  Milan  must  have  reminded  detached 
spectators  of  an  operatic  chorus.  The  Italian  population, 
feeling  the  kisses,  and  seeing  the  signs  of  the  Cross,  but 
not  understanding  the  Russian  words,  must  have  been 


236  SUVOROF 

hugely  mystified.  Fuchs  heard  more  than  one  of  his 
compatriots  saying,  "  Christ  is  risen,  padrone.  Although 
you*re  an  outlander  and  silly,  all  the  same  you're  a  man." 
And  the  three  kisses  followed.  In  particular,  the  citizens 
must  have  wondered  why  the  strangers  kissed  men  as 
well  as  women.     It  had  not  been  the  French  way.^ 

Suvorof  did  not  waste  much  time  in  initiating  the 
Italians  into  the  mysteries  of  the  Orthodox  Church.  He 
began  serious  work  at  once.  The  necessary  steps  were 
taken  for  abolishing  the  Cisalpine  Republic,  for  dis- 
arming the  National  Guard,  and  for  restoring  the  old 
authorities.  Chasteler  drew  up  a  plan  for  future  opera- 
tions, and  on  the  1st  May  it  was  sent  to  the  Austrian 
Emperor.  This  plan  involved  the  crossing  of  the  Po 
by  Suvorof  for  the  purpose  of  defeating  Macdonald,  the 
clearing  of  the  Alpine  passes  by  the  Austrians,  the  crushing 
of  Mass6na  by  the  Archduke  Charles,  and  a  simultaneous 
invasion  of  Switzerland  by  the  Austrians  from  the  east 
and  by  Suvorof  from  the  south.  This  plan  was  vetoed 
by  the  Emperor,  who  forbade  Suvorof  to  cross  the  Po, 
and  would  not  allow  the  Archduke  to  make  anything 
more  than  a  demonstration,  until  the  Elector  of  Bavaria 
had  shown  clearly  whether  his  army  of  8000  men  was  to 
help  the  Austrians  or  oppose  them,  or  until  the  second 
Russian  army  reached  Austrian  territory.^ 

Thus  the  open  conflict  between  Suvorof  and  the 
Austrian  Court  began.  The  latter  was  playing  for  safety, 
while  he  played  for  victory.  In  the  political  as  well  as 
in  the  military  sense  France  was  weak  and  disorganised. 
After  the  Italian  defeats  she  was  dangerously  exposed 
in  Switzerland,  and  a  heavy  blow  in  that  quarter  must 
have  resulted  in  a  retreat  to  the  frontier.  As  far  as 
Suvorof  was  concerned,  the  direction  to  keep  the  army 

*  Fuchs,  Miscellany^  183.  Fuchs  was  once  called  upon  to  save  a 
child  from  a  Cossack,  who  had  seen  a  likeness  to  his  own  boy,  away 
on  the  banks  of  the  Don,  and  was  kissing  the  young  Italian  with  tears 
in  his  eyes.  The  Cossacks  were  known  as  the  Russian  Capuchins,  on 
account  of  their  long  beards,  but  they  were  reputed  to  eat  children. 

«  Mil.  ii.  311,  314,  595,  598  ;  Fuchs,  ii.  47,  54,  88. 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  FIRST  STAGE    237 

north  of  the  Po  was  ineffective.  By  the  time  that  it 
reached  him,  he  was  already  across  the  river.  But  the 
Archduke  Charles  near  Lake  Constance  and  Count 
Bellegarde  in  the  Tyrol  remained  passive.  The  whole 
strength  of  Austria  was  paralysed  by  fear  of  the  insignifi- 
cant army  of  Bavaria.  In  all  there  were  about  120,000 
efficient  troops  busily  engaged  in  doing  nothing  along 
the  Swiss  frontier,  while  the  French  recovered  from  the 
shock  of  the  loss  of  Northern  Italy.^ 

With  his  immediate  associates  among  the  Austrians 
Suvorof  remained  on  fairly  good  terms.  Thugut  and 
the  War  Council  taxed  his  classical  and  modern  vocabu- 
laries to  the  utmost.  But  on  the  whole  his  officers 
behaved  well.  Of  Melas  he  was  especially  fond,  though 
Fuchs  records  his  jingling  epigram,  "  J'ai  vu  Melas — 
Helas  !  "  He  called  him  "  Papa  Melas,"  and  treated 
him  with  the  patronising  affection  which  he  used  to 
bestow  on  Coburg.  Nevertheless,  Melas  was  desperately 
slow,  and  Suvorof  was  at  last  compelled  to  issue  orders 
direct  to  the  Austrian  army  as  well  as  the  Russian, 
requesting  the  subordinate  commanders  to  report  the 
orders  to  Melas  as  they  received  them.  Chasteler  was 
a  great  favourite  of  his,  and  an  invaluable  Chief  of  Staff. 
But  the  anomalous  arrangement  by  which  the  Russians 
were  dependent  on  the  Austrians  for  their  supplies 
caused  not  a  little  friction,  and  Suvorof  soon  invented 
German  equivalents  for  his  favourite  epithet,  "  Can't 
teller."  He  would  denounce  an  Austrian  as  a  "  Nicht- 
bestimmtsager  "  or  "  Not-clear-say er,"  or  sometimes  as 
a  "  Bestimmtsager,"  a  man  who  was  very  positive  about 
things  of  which  he  knew  nothing.  The  word  "  Unter- 
kunft  "  was  new.  By  it  he  meant  "  Molly-coddling," 
and  he  applied  it  unsparingly. 

It  was  not  until  a  later  date  that  the  Austrian  con- 
nection began  to  interfere  seriously  with  his  military 
designs.  The  stream  of  checks  and  prohibitions  had 
not  yet  begun  to  reach  him,  and  he  busied  himself  after 

1  Mil.  i.  318,  601  ;  ii.  40,  435  ;  Fuchs,  Misc,  119. 


288  SUVOROF 

the  occupation  of  Milan  with  hunting  the  enemy  out 
of  Northern  Italy,  without  much  hindrance  from  Vienna. 
At  first  he  expected  an  attack  from  Macdonald,  and 
on  the  18th  May  moved  south  towards  Piacenza.  But 
getting  no  information  about  Macdonald,  and  learning 
of  an  Austrian  reverse  on  the  St.  Gothard,  he  abandoned 
this  aggressive  movement.  Moreau  had  in  the  meantime 
taken  up  a  strong  position  behind  Alessandria,  from 
which  he  could  fall  on  Suvorof's  rear  if  he  marched 
against  Macdonald,  or  anticipate  him  by  a  shorter  route, 
if  he  made  for  Turin.  Suvorof  determined  to  cut  the 
communications  between  Moreau  and  Switzerland.  But 
Moreau' s  state  was  too  bad  for  any  daring  operations 
in  co-operation  with  the  army  of  Switzeriand.  Food 
was  running  short,  the  Italians  were  in  revolt  on  all  sides, 
and  his  army  was  being  steadily  weakened  by  the 
detachment  of  escorts  for  his  waggon  trains.  He  decided 
to  make  for  Genoa.  After  an  attempt  to  break  out  by 
Way  of  Marengo  had  been  frustrated,  he  left  a  garrison 
in  Alessandria,  and  made  for  the  Apennines  in  two 
columns.  On  the  19th,  Victor,  with  one  of  these,  was 
already  across  the  mountains.^ 

As  soon  as  he  heard  of  Moreau*s  retreat,  Suvorof 
determined  to  march  on  Turin.  The  Austrians  had 
recovered  themselves  in  the  Alps,  and  his  right  flank 
was  now  safe.  Pizzighetone  fell  on  the  9th,  Ferrara 
and  the  Citadel  of  Milan  on  the  23rd.  On  the  25th 
Vukassovitch  occupied  the  hill  of  the  Superga,  which 
dominates  Turin.  The  French  commandant,  Fiorella, 
refused  to  surrender,  but  the  gate  of  the  town  was 
opened  by  treachery,  and  the  garrison  was  soon  blockaded 
in  the  Citadel.  Fiorella  began  to  bombard  the  town, 
and  Suvorof,  rashly  venturing  too  near  the  zone  of 
danger,  was  picked  up  bodily  by  Denisof  and  carried 
into  a  place  of  safety.^    The  arsenal  at  Turin  was  a 

1  Mil.  ii.  8  et  seq.,  409  et  seq.  ;  Fuchs,  ii.  50  et  seq. 
«  "  Reminiscences  of  Denisof,"  Russ.  Star.  (1874),  ii.  638.     "  Damn 
you  1  "  cried  Suvorof,  "  what  are  you  doing  ?  *'  and  he  grasped  Denisofs 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  FIRST  STAGE    239 

great  prize,  and  382  cannon,  15  mortars,  20,000  muskets, 
and  a  vast  quantity  of  every  sort  of  war  material  were 
captured  in  it.  These  afterwards  supplied  Suvorof's 
siege  train.^  The  inhabitants  received  the  Russians 
and  Austrians  with  great  enthusiasm.  But  at  this  point 
differences  in  policy  began  to  make  themselves  seriously 
felt.  Lombardy  had  been  taken  from  Austria  by  the 
French,  and  it  had  been  restored  to  Austria.  But 
Piedmont  had  belonged,  before  the  French  conquest, 
to  the  independent  Kingdom  of  Sardinia,  and  its  exiled 
monarch  was  now  living  in  Sardinia.  Suvorof,  acting 
as  the  restorer  of  the  old  order,  recognised  the  King's 
rights.  On  his  entry  into  Turin  he  issued  a  proclamation 
to  the  inhabitants,  and  declared  that — 

Henceforward  peace,  harmony,  and  order,  both  in 
the  capital  and  in  the  whole  of  Piedmont,  will  be  the 
object  of  my  peculiar  care.  I  believe  that  that  end 
will  best  be  secured  by  the  restoration  of  the  former 
order  of  things.^ 

A  temporary  Council  was  appointed.  Count  St. 
Andre  was  made  Governor  of  Turin,  and  General  Baron 
de  Latour  was  entrusted  with  full  powers  of  adminis- 
tration, military  and  political,  throughout  Piedmont. 
Suvorof  was  in  fact  occupying  Piedmont  as  a  military 
measure,  with  the  intention  of  restoring  it  to  the  King. 
His  proclamations  issued  to  the  Piedmontese  soldiery 
and  people  had  made  this  clear  from  the  first.  On  the 
6th  May  he  announced  his  arrival  in  Piedmont  in  these 
terms : 

The  armies  of  their  Highnesses  the  Roman  and 
Russian  Emperors  have  broken  and  scattered  the  French 
troops,  who  boasted  themselves  invincible.  Those 
armies  are  now  advancing  into  Piedmont  to  restore  your 
good  King. 

hair.  But  he  was  wise  enough  not  to  pull  it,  and  though  they  both 
fell  into  a  hole,  neither  was  hurt. 

1  Mil.  ii. 

«  Mil,  ii.  110,  483. 


240  SUVOROF 

Calling  upon  them  to  take  service  on  the  side  of 
the  Allies,  he  added : 

To  no  other  will  you  be  called  upon  to  swear  allegiance 
than  the  King  of  Sardinia.^ 

These  proclamations  were  dictated  by  natural  justice, 
and  they  were  admirably  suited  to  the  dramatic  instinct, 
the  generosity,  and  the  monarchical  prejudices  of  the 
Russian  Tsar.  But  if  the  Tsar  was  pleased,  the  Kaiser 
was  not,  and  Suvorof's  dispositions  at  Turin,  as  well  as 
the  language  of  his  proclamations,  were  received  with 
lively  displeasure  at  Vienna.  The  Austrian  Court,  for 
ever  thinking  more  of  the  ancient  glories  of  the  House 
of  Hapsburg  than  of  the  rights  and  liberties  of  the 
peoples  of  Europe  and  the  best  means  of  securing  them 
in  the  face  of  the  common  enemy,  viewed  with  grave 
disapproval  these  attempts  to  restore  an  independent 
kingdom  in  Northern  Italy.  The  Emperor  ordered 
Suvorof  to  go  no  further.  He  could  not  tolerate  the 
establishment  of  any  competing  authority  in  Piedmont. 
Austria  had  now  been  engaged  in  war  for  eleven  years, 
and  had  suffered  considerable  losses,  which  ought  to 
be  made  up  by  levies  from  territories  newly  wrested 
from  the  enemy.  Any  troops  raised  in  Piedmont  should 
therefore  be  raised  for  the  Emperor's  service,  and  his 
alone,  and  political  changes  should  await  his  further 
arrangements.^  Suvorof 's  acts  at  Turin  were  accordingly 
rescinded.  The  duties  of  Governor  were  transferred  to 
the  Austrian  Count  Concini,  and  Melas  was  entrusted 
with  all  the  arrangements  for  the  maintenance  of  the 
armies.  Piedmontese  troops  were  raised  for  the  Austrian 
service.  From  the  28th  May  all  proclamations  were 
issued  in  the  name  of  the  Austrian  Emperor  and  signed 
by  Melas,  and  the  King  of  Sardinia  was  never  mentioned 
in  any  of  them. 

1  Raccolta,  etc.  p.  1.  Compare  his  proclamation  of  the  8th  May, 
ibid.  11. 

*  See  the  Emperor's  rescript  of  the  17th  May,  set  out  in  Mil.  ii.  "432. 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  FIRST  STAGE    241 

These  interferences  from  Vienna  infuriated  Suvorof. 
But  this  was  not  all.  The  War  Council  actually  issued 
orders  direct  to  the  Austrian  Generals  in  Italy,  not 
seldom  overriding  Suvorof's  own.  He  overflowed  into 
complaints,  official  and  unofficial.  To  Razumovski,  the 
Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  he  wrote  on  the  27th 
May,  reciting  his  various  grievances  : 

So  that  there's  no  need  for  me  here,  and  I  want  to 
go  home.  This  Cabinet  decree  has  shattered  the  order 
of  all  my  operations.  .  .  .  Every  sectional  general,  not 
for  one  domestic  matter  but  for  everything,  goes  straight 
to  the  War  Council,  so  has  the  right  to  intrigue  in  favour 
of  its  infatuated  preconceptions.  .  .  .  Through  this  War 
Council  sitting  at  the  cross  roads  he  [the  Archduke] 
has  the  right  to  order  them  about  and  tie  my  hands. 
...  Its  lethargy  forces  lethargy  on  the  Archduke. 
That  Prince,  though  zealous  for  the  common  good,  is 
as  tied  as  I  am,  so  far  as  co-operation  with  us  is  concerned, 
just  as  if  he  himself  liked  this  fatal  slowness.  Otherwise 
it  would  have  been  possible  in  this  campaign  for  me  to 
answer  for  Italy,  him  for  Germany  and  Switzerland. 
His  High  Excellency  Baron  Thugut  will  stick  his  nose 
into  these  arrangements.  ...  I  had  picked  out  here  a 
number  of  Piedmontese  volunteer  soldiers,  and  we  could 
have  armed  them.  .  .  .  Would  not  this  have  been  the 
best  of  arrangements  for  the  French  with  their  rapid 
conquests  ?  Their  mighty  liberie  and  igalitS  could  not 
have  stood  long  against  Religion  and  Monarchy  !  And 
what  now  ?  Count  Andrei  Kirilovitch  :  men  who  would 
have  entered  our  service  in  faith  and  faithfulness.  .  .  . 
It's  for  all  these  important  matters  that  I  am  here 
.  .  .  otherwise  I  should  have  done  better  to  go  home 
from  Vienna. 

However  the  War  Council  has  bothered  me,  its  "  one 
or  two  campaigns  "  took  me  one  month.  .  .  .^ 

On  another  date  he  wrote  in  the  same  style  : 

I  am  hampered  by  flattery,  my  bitterest  enemy. 
I  am  very  weary  of  the  diplomatic  style,  with  its 
double-faced    witchcraft.     No  leisure   for   sleep,   .   .   . 

1  Fuchs,  ii.  193. 


242  SUVOROF 

The  Austrian  generals  are  more  like  recruits.  By 
God's  help  the  campaign  will  end.  .  .  .  Either  a  Thirty 
Years'  War  or  Campo  Formio,  and  worse  than  young 
Bonaparte's.  Paris  would  have  lain  open  to  us  in 
the  next  campaign.  The  Adda  was  the  Rubicon.  We 
crossed  it  in  the  teeth  of  the  enemy.  .  .  .  Hardly  one 
of  them  escaped.  I  leamt  only  here  that  they  ran 
here  like  sheep,  and  the  generals  foremost.  In  the  same 
way  every  other  river  in  the  world  can  be  crossed.  The 
Defensive  is  the  Offensive.  ...  Oh  God,  how  useful 
the  Piedmontese  army  would  have  been  to  us  ;  we 
could  have  discharged  it  later,  if  we  didn't  want  it.  I 
am  consoled  in  my  labours  by  the  gracious  rescript  of 
his  Imperial  Russian  Highness.  For  the  Saviour's  sake, 
don't  hinder  me  !  ^ 

He  had,  in  fact,  done  far  more  than  the  Austrian 
War  Council  had  expected.  So  far  as  Italy  was  con- 
cerned, there  was  nothing  left  of  the  French  except 
the  remnants  of  Moreau's  army  in  the  Genoese  Riviera 
and  the  army  of  Naples  under  General  Macdonald 
somewhere  to  the  south  of  the  Apennines.  Similar 
vigour  against  the  French  in  Switzerland  should  produce 
similar  results,  and  the  campaign  of  the  following  year 
would  be  fought  on  French  territory.  But  the  timidity 
of  the  War  Council  was  not  in  the  north  frustrated  by 
the  energy  of  a  second  Suvorof . 

After  long  inactivity,  the  principal  Austrian  armies 
on  the  Rhine  began  to  move  early  in  May,  and  their 
immediate  success  sufficiently  condemned  their  previous 
lethargy.  The  French  were  first  driven  out  of  Grau- 
bunden.  Three  Austrian  forces,  together  38,000  strong, 
pushed  the  13,000  French,  who  defended  that  region, 
towards  the  west.  The  Archduke  then  felt  able  to 
advance  upon  Zurich  round  the  western  end  of  Lake 
Constance.  The  French  army,  among  whose  com- 
manders were  Ney,  Soult,  and  Oudinot,  gave  the 
leisurely  Austrians  more  than  one  lesson  in  the  art  of 
marching  and  fighting.     But  the  odds  were  too  great, 

1  Voronts.  Arkh.  xxiv.  323. 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  FIRST  STAGE    243 

and  they  were  eventually  pressed  back  everywhere. 
On  the  4th  June  the  main  armies  of  the  Archduke  and 
Mass6na  fought  a  pitched  battle  to  the  east  of  Zurich. 
The  Austrians  were  42,000  strong,  the  French  only 
15,000,  and  Mass6na,  in  spite  of  his  strongly  fortified 
position  on  the  hills,  was  at  last  compelled  to  abandon 
the  town  and  cross  the  Limat.  The  Archduke  then 
became  once  more  motionless.  With  70,000  men  at 
his  disposal  against  a  French  force  of  half  that  number 
he  did  nothing  except  send  Jellacic  to  open  up  com- 
munications with  the  army  of  Italy  by  way  of  the  St. 
Gothard.  The  strategic  initiative,  assumed  with  such 
good  results,  was  again  abandoned  to  the  French.^ 

At  the  beginning  of  June  the  situation  of  the  army 
in  Italy  was  not  secure.  The  enemy  had  been  driven 
out  of  the  great  plain,  but  he  had  the  choice  of  three 
ways  by  which  he  might  return  :  through  Switzerland, 
through  the  Western  Alps,  and  from  the  south  over 
the  Apennines.  All  these  lines  had  to  be  covered  by 
Suvorof,  and  while  the  danger  from  the  south  was  the 
greatest,  it  was  nevertheless  necessary  to  employ  part 
of  the  troops  in  guarding  the  passes  from  Switzerland, 
Savoy,  and  the  Dauphin^.  From  the  south,  also,  the 
enemy  might  advance  in  one  of  two  ways,  and  the 
problem  was  to  dispose  the  main  army  in  such  a  way 
as  to  be  able  to  meet  an  attack  from  either  direction. 
By  the  8th  June  the  army  was  thus  widely  distributed. 
Suvorof  himself,  with  21,700  men,  was  stationed  at 
Turin.  Bellegarde  was  at  Alessandria  with  Schveikov- 
ski,  and  at  need,  by  calling  in  Tchubarof  and  Seckendorf 
from  Acqui,  could  bring  up  his  total  forces  to  16,700; 
Ott,  with  7400  men,  was  at  Reggio,  with  outposts  beyond 
the  Apennines  and  beyond  Modena  on  the  way  to 
Bologna.  Kray,  besieging  Mantua  with  nearly  20,000 
men,  Klenau  at  Ferrara  with  5000,  and  the  10,000  men 
under  Haddik  engaged  in  guarding  the  Alpine  Passes, 
were  too  far  away  and  too  busily  engaged  to  be  of 
1  Mil.  ii.  120  ei  seq.    Jellacic  is  pronounced  Yellatchich. 


244  SUVOROF 

use  in  case  of  a  French  attack.  But  Frohlich  and 
Vukassovitch  in  the  valley  of  the  Tanaro,  with  nearly 
8000  men,  were  within  easy  reach  of  both  Turin  and 
Alessandria.  About  80,000  men  could  be  rapidly 
collected  at  either  of  these  places,  and  it  was  unlikely 
that  any  French  force  crossing  the  mountains  from  the 
Genoese  Riviera  would  be  of  substantially  greater 
strength. 

On  the  9th  June  he  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
attack  would  be  directed  towards  Alessandria.  This 
was  due  to  defective  information,  partly  arising  from 
the  deliberate  scattering  of  false  reports  by  Moreau.^ 
Apparently  Macdonald  had  joined  Moreau  by  sea, 
and  both  would  attack  together  from  the  Riviera. 
Calling  in  Ott,  Frohlich,  and  Vukassovitch,  and  asking 
even  Kray  to  send  as  much  cavalry  as  he  could  spare, 
Suvorof  left  Turin  on  the  10th  with  10,000  men,  ex- 
pecting to  meet  and  defeat  the  united  enemy  at  Aless- 
andria. Making  ample  provision  for  the  security  of 
Turin,  Milan,  and  the  line  of  the  Po,  he  gave  orders  for 
bridges  to  be  constructed  on  the  Bormida  and  Tanaro, 
so  as  to  give  the  utmost  freedom  of  manoeuvring  to 
his  army  in  the  field. ^  He  was  still  ignorant  where  the 
blow  would  actually  fall.  But  when  the  shock  did 
come  he  leapt  at  once  into  full  activity. 

One  of  his  preparatory  instructions  sounds  a  charac- 
teristic note.     He  wrote  a  special  letter  to  Bagration : 

Count  Peter  Ivanovitch.  The  troops  of  Count 
Bellegarde  from  the  Tyrol  will  come  up  to  Alessandria, 
uninstructed,  strangers  to  the  handling  of  bayonet  and 
sword.  As  soon  as  your  Serenity  comes  to  Asti,  visit 
me,  and  set  off  at  once  to  Alessandria,  and  there  reveal 
to  the  Bellegarde  troops  the  secret  of  beating  the  enemy 

^  Moreau  said  afterwards  that  he  believed  Suvorof  to  be  too  credulous. 
Orlof,  Suvorof  na  Trebbii,  88,  note  2. 

"  His  detailed  instructions  were  most  complete  and  provided  for 
every  contingency.  The  credit  for  them  should  no  doubt  be  given, 
in  large  measure,  to  Chasteler  and  the  Austrian  staff  officers.  See  Mil. 
ii.  542  ;   Fuohs,  ii.  240,  282,  293. 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  FIRST  STAGE    245 

with  the  cold  steel,  and  carefully  adapt  them  to  this 
conquering  attack  ;  two  or  three  lessons  will  be  enough 
for  the  instruction  of  all  the  detachments,  but  if  there 
is  time,  they  can  study  more  by  themselves  ;  but  do 
you  unlearn  them  how  to  retreat.^ 

However  carefully  he  might  prepare  for  a  possible 
failure,  Suvorof  never  had  any  doubt  of  success.  Field 
works  at  Pavia  and  Milan  were  all  very  well,  but  the 
business  was  going  to  be  settled  by  the  bayonet. 

His  own  march  upon  Alessandria  was  not  wanting 
in  rapidity.  His  troops  left  Turin  at  2  o'clock  in 
the  morning  of  the  10th  June,  and  at  8  o'clock  on 
the  morning  of  the  11th  they  arrived  at  Asti,  33  miles 
away,  in  spite  of  the  bad  condition  of  the  roads  and  the 
heavy  rain.  At  10  in  the  evening  they  resumed  their 
march,  in  company  with  Frohlich's  Austrian  division, 
sending  all  the  heavy  baggage  to  Valenza,  and  making 
ready  for  the  instant  encounter  with  the  enemy.  At 
2  in  the  afternoon  of  the  12th  they  reached  Aless- 
andria.2  There  were  now  in  that  neighbourhood,  under 
Suvorof's  immediate  command,  34,000  men.  Vukasso- 
vitch  was  already  on  his  way  with  4400  more ;  Ott, 
with  5300,  was  on  the  road  from  Piacenza  to  Voghera ; 
and  Hohenzollern,  with  4500,  was  at  Modena.  Suvorof 
therefore  hoped  to  meet  the  enemy  with  nearly  50,000 
men. 

Unfortunately  he  was  at  once  faced  with  the  diffi- 
culty of  feeding  this  large  number  of  troops  so  hastily 
thrown  upon  the  Austrian  commissariat.  The  Austrians 
declared  that  the  task  was  beyond  their  powers,  and  on 
the  evening  of  the  13th  Rosenberg,  with  a  large  body 
of  Russian  troops,  started  on  the  return  journey  to 
Asti.  On  the  assumption  that  the  French  attack  would 
be  from  Genoa,  this  manoeuvre  was  harmless  enough. 
But,  in  the  actual  event,  it  was  highly  dangerous. 
Rosenberg  was  overtaken  at  5  o'clock  in  the  morning 
by  a  letter  from  Suvorof,  the  last  words  in  his  own  hand. 

1  Mil.  ii.  545.  *  jj^i^,  227,  547. 


246  SUVOROF 

Latest  news.  The  French  hke  bees  and  from  well- 
nigh  all  quarters  are  swarming  to  Mantua.  We  must 
hasten  upon  them.  Wherever  this  overtakes  you,  after 
resting  as  much  as  may  be  necessary,  hasten  to  join  us. 
We  shall  start  soon.     They  are  in  force ;   God  with  us. 

Forgive  me.  It  is  circumstances  that  have  given 
you  so  much  trouble.^ 

Suvorof  had  been  badly  served  by  his  spies.  So  far 
from  being  carried  by  sea  to  Genoa,  to  join  in  an  attack 
on  Alessandria  from  the  south,  Macdonald,  strengthened 
by  the  transfer  of  Victor's  division  from  Moreau's  army 
to  his  own,  had  crossed  the  Apennines  to  the  south-east, 
and  on  the  evening  of  the  11th  June  his  right  wing  was 
in  occupation  of  Bologna.  In  all,  he  had  with  him 
36,000  men,  and  after  passing  the  mountain  barrier, 
was  turning  west  to  crush  Suvorof  against  the  army 
of  Moreau,  who  was  simultaneously  making  towards 
Alessandria  from  the  south.^ 

The  two  French  Commanders  had  been  in  communica- 
tion §ince  the  29th  May,  and  while  the  difficulty  of  traver- 
sing the  mountain  paths  between  Pisa  and  Genoa  had 
prevented  a  full  exchange  of  ideas,  the  main  outlines 
of  their  joint  enterprise  were  clear.  It  was  agreed  that 
Macdonald  should  set  his  troops  in  motion  from  Tuscany 
on  the  9th  June,  while  Moreau  started  from  Genoa  on 
the  17th.  Both  armies  had  badly  needed  rest  and 
refitting,  Macdonald's  after  an  exhausting  march  from 
Southern  Italy,  and  Moreau's  after  its  equally  damaging 
if  shorter  retreat  from  Lombardy.*  Once  on  the  road, 
both  moved  with  great  rapidity,  and  Macdonald's  cross- 
ing of  the  Apennines  was  worthy  of  an  opponent  of 
Suvorof.  He  was,  in  fact,  too  quick  for  Moreau.  All 
his  troops  were  in  the  plain  on  the  14th  June,  a  week 

1  Mil.  ii.  230.  «  Mil.  ii.  235. 

•  Macdonald's  march  from  Southern  Italy  to  Florence  occupied 
eighteen  days.  In  that  time  he  covered  about  270  miles,  an  average 
of  15  miles  a  day.  The  country  was  full  of  armed  insurgents,  and 
provided  little  or  no  food.  The  army  reached  Florence  half-starved 
and  in  rags. 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  FIRST  STAGE    247 

after  leaving  Tuscany,  and  in  the  seven  days  they  had 
marched  150  miles  and  beaten  the  Austrians  under 
Hohenzollern  at  Modena. 

The  French  plan  was  daring,  and  against  a  meaner 
adversary  might  have  ended  in  a  brilliant  and  decisive 
victory.     But  no  operation  of  war  is  so  difficult  or  so 
dangerous  as  to  carry  two  different  armies  over  separate 
and  diverging  mountain  passes  into  a  plain,  where  an 
enemy  of  even  approximately  equal  strength  is  waiting 
to  receive  them.     If  they  unite  before  one  of  them  is 
engaged,   they  may  together  crush  the  enemy.     But 
everything  depends  upon  the  punctual  and  exact  per- 
formance of  every  stage  of  the  joint  undertaking,  and 
the  arrival  of  both  forces  intact  at  the  prearranged 
point  of  union.     The  enemy  must  be  fought  by  both 
together,  or,  at  least,  one  must  be  able  to  hold  him 
until  the  other  comes  on  to  the  field.     But  the  matter 
is  never  entirely  in  the  hands  of  the  co-operating  leaders. 
The  utmost  diligence  on  their  part  cannot  ensure  suc- 
cess, unless  the  enemy  himself  permits  it.     A  sluggish 
opponent  may  allow  the  plan  to  succeed.     But  he  must 
almost  invariably  have  the  opportunity,  if  only  he  has 
accurate  information,  of  moving  upon  one  of  the  ap- 
proaching  armies    before   the   other   can   touch    him. 
Suvorof  himself  was  to  learn  to  his  cost  what  fatal 
consequences  may  follow  upon  an  unexpected  delay, 
when  the  enemy  is  bold  and  resolute.     On  the  present 
occasion  he  showed  by  his  own  action  what  such  an 
enemy  can  do,  even  when  there  has  been  no  substantial 
mistake  in  the  calculations  of  the  attacking  commanders, 
and  he  himself  is  taken  by  surprise.     Macdonald  reached 
Modena  on  the  12th  June,  and  Moreau  was  not  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Voghera  till  the  19th,  when  Macdonald's 
fate  had  already  been  decided.     The  interval  was  suffi- 
cient to  give  Suvorof  a  complete  victory,  though  he 
did  not  know  until  early  on  the  13th  that  any  danger 
whatever  was  threatening  him  from  the  direction  of 
Modena. 


248  SUVOROF 

Hohenzollern  had  been  attacked  at  Modena  by 
Ollivier,  who  had  crossed  the  mountains  from  Pistoia, 
and  he  had  been  flung  back  with  heavy  loss  towards 
Mantua.  It  was  open  to  Macdonald  either  to  follow 
him  across  the  Po  to  Mantua,  raise  the  siege  of  that 
fortress,  and  cut  the  communications  of  the  Allies 
through  Verona,  or  else  to  inflict  a  sanguinary  defeat 
upon  some  other  isolated  detachment.  In  either  case 
Suvorof  must  act  quickly.  He  had  been  caught  nap- 
ping. But  to  catch  Suvorof  napping  was  not  to  destroy 
him.  He  had  fixed  upon  Alessandria  as  a  good  base 
for  operations  against  an  attack  from  Genoa.  But  it 
was  not  a  bad  base  for  operations  in  the  direction  of 
Modena.  His  decision  was  taken  on  the  13th,  as  soon 
as  he  heard  of  the  disaster  to  Hohenzollern.  He  must 
settle  accounts  with  Macdonald  before  Moreau  appeared 
on  the  scene.  On  the  14th  he  set  out  with  all  speed 
towards  the  enemy.  Bellegarde  was'left  at  Alessandria, 
and  Suvorof  took  with  him  not  more  than  25,000  men, 
of  whom  three-fifths  were  Russian. 

Macdonald,  on  the  other  hand,  marched  as  rapidly 
against  Suvorof.  Mantua  could  wait.  If  Suvorof  were 
beaten  it  must  be  relieved,  and  until  Suvorof  was 
beaten  it  could  not  be  relieved.  Macdonald,  there- 
fore, pursuing  the  original  design,  threw  out  Montrichard 
in  the  direction  of  Mantua  to  occupy  the  attention  of 
Kray,  stationed  Ollivier  at  Modena,  and  on  the  13th 
began  to  march  with  the  rest  of  his  troops  along  the 
great  road,  to  fling  all  his  weight  upon  Ott  at  Parma. 
On  the  14th,  Victor  descended  unopposed  the  valley 
of  the  Taro,  and  occupied  Borgo  San  Donnino,  where 
he  was  joined  by  Macdonald's  advance  guard  under 
Dombrovski.  On  the  15th,  Victor  and  Dombrovski 
reached  Fiorenzolla  on  the  Arda.  On  the  same  day  Ott, 
obeying  Suvorof's  orders,  had  retreated  as  far  as 
Piacenza.  He  had  been  told  to  fight  a  delaying  action 
between  Parma  and   that  place.^    He  therefore  took 

1  Mil.  ii.  240. 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  FIRST  STAGE    249 

up  a  position  along  the  River  Nura,  and  on  the  16th 
his  outposts  were  already  in  action. 

Suvorof  was  by  this  time  in  full  march  to  his  assist- 


ance. He  ordered  Kray  to  detach  as  many  troops  as 
possible  to  assist  him,  and  also  to  help  Hohenzollern 
and  Klenau  in  threatening  Macdonald's  rear.     Belle- 


250  SUVOROF 

garde  was  instructed  to  cover  the  troops  blockading 
the  citadel  of  Alessandria,  and  to  protect  Suvorof 
himself  against  the  threatened  attack  from  Genoa. 
The  Commander-in-Chief  also  requested  Haddik  to 
send  a  brigade  to  Turin,  and  begged  the  Archduke 
Charles  to  replace  Haddik' s  troops  by  a  detachment 
of  his  own.i    To  Keim  he  sent  a  flying  note  : 

Dear  General — I  am  going  to  Piacenza  to  beat 
Macdonald.  Hurry  on  your  siege  works  against  the 
citadel  of  Turin,  or  else  I  shall  sing  a  Te  Deum  before 
you.2 

Unfortunately  the  striking  army  was  still  dispersed. 
Rosenberg  was  behind  Suvorof  and  did  not  reach 
Alessandria  till  the  evening  of  the  14th.  There  he 
found  the  main  body,  held  up  by  a  delay  in  throwing 
the  bridge  across  the  Bormida,  and  no  real  start  was 
possible  till  10  o'clock  on  the  night  of  the  15th.  Even 
then  Tchubarof ,  coming  from  Acqui  with  three  of  Secken- 
dorf 's  battalions,  was  still  further  in  the  rear,  and  arrived 
at  Alessandria  after  all  the  rest  of  the  troops,  including 
those  of  Rosenberg,  had  left  the  town.  During  this 
enforced  delay  Suvorof  had  issued  a  general  order, 
emphasising  his  favourite  injunctions  : 

Defeat  the  enemy  with  cold  steel,  bayonet,  swords, 
and  pikes.  .  .  .  Don't  slow  down  during  an  attack. 
When  the  enemy  is  broken,  shattered,  then  pursue 
him  at  once,  and  don't  give  him  time  either  to  collect 
or  re-form.  If  he  surrenders,  spare  him  ;  only  order 
him  to  throw  down  his  arms.  During  the  attack  call 
on  the  enemy  to  surrender.  .  .  .  Spare  nothing,  don't 
think  of  your  labours  ;  pursue  the  enemy  night  and 
day,  so  long  as  anything  is  left  to  be  destroyed.^ 

These  directions  were  all  very  well.  But  the  delay 
had  nearly  ruined  Ott.     On  the  16th,  Victor,  with  about 

^  With  great  reluctance  Kray  sent  a  regiment  of  Dragoons.  He 
had  been  ordered  by  the  War  Council  at  Vienna  not  to  spare  a  single 
man  from  the  siege  of  Mantua.     Mil.  ii.  547,  648  ;   Fuchs,  ii.  194. 

2  Mil.  ii.  241.  »  Fuchs,  ii.  304. 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  FIRST  STAGE    251 

7000  men,  came  into  touch  with  his  6000  at  Piacenza, 
and  Ott,  leaving  seven  companies  in  the  citadel,  destroyed 
the  bridge  over  the  Po,  and  fell  back  behind  the  Tidone, 
5  miles  to  the  west.  Fortunately  for  him,  the  French 
were  still  distributed  over  a  great  distance  along  the 
road.  When  Macdonald's  troops  had  all  reached  the 
plain,  Dombrovski  and  Rusca  were  10  miles,  Watrin 
16  miles,  and  Ollivier  and  Montrichard  more  than 
70  miles  to  the  east  of  Victor.^  When  Victor 
attacked  Ott  at  8  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the 
17th,  this  straggling  army  had  been  brought  somewhat 
together,  and  there  were  sufficient  troops  at  hand  to 
give  the  French  an  overwhelming  superiority.  Victor 
himself  attacked  Ott's  left  at  Verrato  di  Sopra,  Rusca 
attacked  his  centre  across  the  high-road  at  Ponte 
Tidone,  and  Salme's  brigade  was  held  in  reserve.  The 
ground  was  difficult,  cut  up  in  every  direction  by 
ditches,  fenceS;  gardens,  and  vineyards,  bu^  the  River 
Tidone  itself,  like  all  the  other  Lombard  rivers  at  that 
season,  was  almost  dry,  and  its  wide  sandy  bed  could 
be  crossed  at  any  point.  The  French  came  on  rapidly, 
until  Ott  was  reinforced  by  some  of  the  advanced 
troops  of  Melas  at  10  o'clock.  His  troops  were  now 
about  9000  against  16,000  French,  and  he  succeeded 
in  making  a  stand  at  the  village  of  Sarmato,  posting  a 
battery  of  8  guns,  covered  by  a  deep  ditch,  by  the 
high-road.  But  by  3  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  a 
violent  attack  on  his  right  wing  had  carried  this  battery, 
the  Austrians  were  falling  back  to  San  Giovanni,  and 
Dombrovski' s  Poles  at  Caramello  were  threatening  to 
turn  their  right  and  cut  off  their  retreat.  At  this  point 
Suvorof  himself  came  upon  the  scene. 

The  march  from  Alessandria  had  been  made  with 
his  usual  remorseless  energy,  and  the  phenomenal 
powers  of  his  troops  redeemed  the  time  lost  at  the 
Bormida.  They  started  from  the  Bormida  in  two 
columns.  The  left  column,  under  Melas,  9  Austrian 
*  Rousset,  Souvenirs  de  Macdonald,  90. 


252  SUVOROF 

battalions  and  12  squadrons  of  cavalry,  marched  by 
Sale  and  Castelnuovo  di  Scrivia.  The  right  column, 
imder  Rosenberg,  20  Russian  battalions  and  4  regi- 
ments of  Cossacks,  was  at  first  ordered  to  go  through 
San  Giuliano  to  Tortona.  But  its  direction  was 
changed  at  San  Giuliano,  and  to  avoid  the  delay  of 
bridging  the  Scrivia  near  Tortona,  it  was  sent  to  Sale. 
From  that  point  it  marched  on  the  heels  of  the  Austrians. 
The  whole  army  thus  moved  east  in  a  long  train  down 
the  road  along  the  right  bank  of  the  Po,  as  the  French 
moved  west  to  meet  them.^  The  Austrian  advance 
guard  under  Daller  succeeded  in  getting  into  touch 
with  Ott  about  10  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  17th. 
But,  as  has  already  been  described,  he  was  not  in 
sufficient  strength  to  resist  the  increasing  pressure  of 
the  French,  and  as  the  rest  of  Melas*  column  came  up 
the  enemy  also  were  reinforced. 

Everything  depended  upon  the  ability  of  the  Russian 
main  body  to  reach  the  scene  of  the  combat  before  the 
outnumbered  and  exhausted  Austrians  were  driven 
into  absolute  rout.  The  soldiers  were  called  upon  to 
do  their  utmost,  and  their  advance  was  made  at  such 
a  speed,  that  a  casual  spectator,  meeting  them  on  the 
road,  might  have  supposed  it  to  be  a  retreat.  The 
Cossacks,  under  Bagration,  pushed  on  ahead,  and  the 
infantry  followed  as  best  it  could.  For  miles  behind 
the  marching  battalions  the  road,  the  ditches,  and 
the  fields  were  marked  with  the  bodies  of  men  who  had 
fallen  from  the  ranks,  not  a  few  of  them  already  dead 
from  exhaustion.  A  long  trail  of  stragglers  toiled  after 
them  in  the  dust,  too  weak  to  fulfil  their  duty,  but 
too  proud  to  give  way  entirely  to  fatigue.  Suvorof 
rode  with  his  men,  galloping  up  and  down  the  labour- 
ing column,  breaking  out  into  homely  jests  and  pro- 
verbial wisdom,  crying  :  "  Forward,  forward,  forward 
— ^the  head  doesn't  wait  for  the  tail,"  praising  those 
who  kept  on,  encouraging  those  who  fell  behind,  and 

1  Fuchs,  ii.  316. 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  FIRST  STAGE    253 

every  now  and  then  dismounting  to  examine,  from 
some  house  or  hillock,  how  many  of  his  troops  were 
still  at  his  command,  before  clambering  into  his  saddle 
and  plunging  once  more  into  the  dust.^ 

The  Cossacks  came  first  into  action,  with  orders  to 
"  Take  the  enemy  army  prisoner,'*  crying,  "  Bas  les 
armes — -jettez  les  armes,'''  and  paying  special  attention 
to  the  guns  and  the  Generals  with  their  Staffs.^ 
Approaching  San  Giovanni,  Suvorof  took  the  four 
regiments  of  Cossacks  and  the  Austrian  Dragoons,  and 
galloped  forward  with  Bagration.  Mounting  a  knoll 
shortly  before  four  o'clock,  he  saw  the  critical  situation 
of  Ott's  right  wing,  and  launched  two  Cossack  and  two 
Dragoon  regiments  against  Dombrovski,  sending  the 
other  two  Cossack  regiments  to  the  left.  The  attack 
was  completely  successful.  Dombrovski's  cavalry 
were  broken,  and  his  infantry  thrown  into  confusion. 
Ott  thus  obtained  a  short  space  in  which  to  re-form. 
At  four  o'clock  the  Russian  Grenadiers  marched  on 
to  the  field.  So  great  had  been  their  effort  that 
Bagration,  begging  for  a  short  rest,  declared  that  the 
companies  which  left  Alessandria  about  100  strong, 
now  contained,  on  the  average,  only  40  men  each. 
"  Only  40  to  a  company  ?  "  exclaimed  Suvorof.  "  Mac- 
donald  will  only  have  20.  Forward  !  Victory  !  Hurra !  " 
And  he  ordered  his  men  directly  into  the  fight,  flags 
displayed,  drums  beating,  trumpets  sounding,  and  the 
choir  of  every  battalion  singing  a  national  air.  The 
soldiers  responded  nobly,  and  men  who  were  well- 
nigh  too  exhausted  to  carry  their  muskets,  advanced 
through  the  crumbling  Austrian  ranks  straight  upon  the 
triumphant  French,  and  drove  them  back  at  the  point 

^  For  this  march  see  Starkof,  127;  "Reminiscences  of  Denisof," 
Russ.  Star.  One  of  Suvorof's  devices,  according  to  Starkof,  was  to 
teach  the  men  a  few  words  of  French.  When  a  group  showed  signs 
of  collapse,  it  was  the  duty  of  the  sergeants  to  call  upon  them  to  repeat 
their  lesson.  Weariness  was  thus  forgotten,  while  the  jaded  scholars 
struggled  over  a  few  more  of  those  heart-breaking  versts, 

2  Fuchs,  ii.  316. 


254  SUVOROF 

of  the  bayonet.  The  attack  was  general.  Ott  advanced 
on  both  sides  of  the  road,  Gortchakof,  with  two  Cossack 
regiments,  in  support  on  his  left,  and  Bagration  with 
the  Russian  infantry  on  his  right.  Little  time  was 
lost  in  musketry  fire.  The  Field-Marshal  galloped 
along  his  front,  crying :  "  Forward,  forward  I  Cut 
them  down,  smash  them  !  '*  and,  with  banners,  drums, 
trumpets,  and  singing,  the  weary  troops  moved  steadily 
to  the  attack. 

They  were  met  as  steadily  by  the  French.  But 
nothing  could  resist  their  determined  pressure.  Sarmato 
was  passed.  Some  of  Dombrovski's  battalions  were 
completely  dispersed,  and  a  French  demi-brigade 
coming  to  their  assistance  was  driven  back  by  the 
triumphant  Cossacks.  Dombrovski  was  pushed  across 
the  Tidone,  and  the  cavalry  of  Suvorof's  right  were 
able  to  wheel  to  the  left  and  attack  Victor  and  Salme 
in  flank.  Forming  square,  the  French  infantry  stub- 
bornly retreated  across  the  river,  and  only  the  fall 
of  darkness  stopped  the  Russian  advance.  Scattered 
groups  of  Cossacks  and  Dragoons  were  still  pulling  their 
horses  out  of  ditches,  or  leading  them  by  the  bridle 
through  the  tangle  of  fences  and  vineyards,  long  after 
night  had  come. 

The  first  day's  fighting,  begun  so  threateningly,  had 
ended  in  an  unequivocal  Russian  success.  Ott  had 
escaped  destruction,  and  the  French  had  been  so  severely 
handled  that  during  the  night  they  fell  back  behind 
the  Trebbia,  covered  by  Salme.^  The  performance  of 
Suvorof's  army  had  been  one  of  the  most  remarkable 
in  the  history  of  war.  In  the  full  heat  of  an  Italian 
June,  they  marched  53  miles  in  thirty-six  hours, 
and  going  straight  into  the  heart  of  a  doubtful  battle, 
drove  the  enemy  off  the  field  after  five  hours  of  stubborn 
fighting.  The  Austrians  had  shown  themselves  in  no 
way  inferior  to  the  Russians.  In  Suvorof's  hands  both 
nations  were  capable  of  equal  endurance  :  evidence  at 
^  Rousset,  92. 


^2* 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  FIRST  STAGE    255 

once  of  his  capacity  and  theirs.     Few  leaders  have  been 
worthy  of  such  desperate  exertions  on  the  part  of  their 


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armies,  and  few  armies  have  given  their  leaders  the 
confidence  that  they  could  safely  be  called  upon  to 
make  them. 


256  SUVOROF 

The  night  was  spent  by  both  forces  in  rest,  but  both 
commanders  were  resolved  to  renew  the  combat  next 
morning.  Suvorof's  motives  are  obvious.  Moreau  was 
somewhere  behind  him,  and  Macdonald  must  be  com- 
pletely defeated  before  the  other  French  army  came 
within  reach.  Macdonald's  reasons  are  not  unim- 
peachable. Watrin's  division  had  come  up  on  the 
evening  of  the  17th,  too  late  to  take  part  in  the  fight, 
and  allowing  for  a  total  loss  of  about  1500  men,  there 
were  now  on  the  French  side  22,000  against  at  least  as 
many  on  the  Russian.  Ollivier  and  Montrichard  were 
still  a  whole  day*s  journey  behind  him,  and  it  would 
have  been  only  prudent  for  Macdonald  to  withdraw  still 
further  in  their  direction,  keeping  Suvorof  entangled 
until  Moreau  was  ready  to  strike.  But  Macdonald 
was  determined  to  fight,  partly  because  of  the  losses 
inevitably  incident  to  a  retreat,  and  partly  because  he 
felt  bound  to  keep  his  agreement  with  Moreau.  In 
any  case,  he  could  easily  defend  himself  in  such  broken 
country,  and  would  not  have  much  difficulty  in  holding 
out  till  Ollivier  and  Montrichard  appeared  on  the  scene.^ 

The  scene  of  this  second  battle  was  the  space  tra- 
versed by  the  River  Trebbia,  between  the  Apennines  and 
the  Po.  This  is  an  open  plain  about  10  miles  across,  inter- 
sected, like  the  rest  of  the  neighbourhood,  by  ditches, 
avenues,  vineyards,  and  gardens.  Through  it  runs  the 
bed  of  the  river,  a  sandy  waste  about  1000  yards  wide, 
traversed  by  a  few  shallow  streams  of  water.  Over 
the  river  bed  troops  could  manoeuvre  with  ease,  and 
the  French  were  accordingly  disposed  on  both  banks 
without  any  risk.  Salme  was  posted  across  the  high 
road  at  San  Niccolo,  with  a  few  squadrons  thrown  out 
as  far  to  the  left  as  Grignano,  and  Dombrovski  held 
Casaligio.  Rusca  and  Victor  were  on  the  right  bank 
of  the  river  in  the  centre,  while  Watrin  lay  at  Piacenza, 
and  blockaded  the  Austrian^  in  the  citadel. 

Suvorof  determined  to  throw  his  weight  upon  the 

1  Rousset,  93. 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  FIRST  STAGE    257 

enemy's  left.  Officers  had  been  sent  out  along  the 
roads  to  get  in  as  many  as  possible  of  the  men  who  had 
fallen  out  from  the  march  of  the  previous  day,  and 
Tchubarof  was  ordered  to  hurry  on  with  all  speed. 
Unfortunately,  Tchubarof  did  not  arrive  in  time  to  be 
of  any  use,  and  Kray  sent  no  help  that  day  from  Mantua, 
so  that  only  the  combatants  of  the  17th,  reinforced  by 
the  recovered  stragglers,  were  at  hand  on  the  18th. 
In  all,  Suvorof  had  no  more  than  22,000  men  at  his 
disposal,  and  was  about  equal  in  strength  to  Macdonald. 
One  step  he  took,  which  hinted  at  his  recognition  of 
the  possibility  of  defeat.  He  ordered  a  bridge  to  be 
thrown  across  the  Po  at  Parpanese,  12  miles  above 
Piacenza.  This  served  two  purposes.  If  Kray  sent 
help,  it  could  reach  Suvorof  by  way  of  the  new  bridge ; 
and  if  the  Field-Marshal  lost  the  day's  battle,  he  could 
withdraw  by  it  to  the  north  bank  of  the  Po,  in  full 
communication  with  Turin  to  the  west  and  Mantua 
to  the  east,  and  with  the  river  between  him  and  his 
combined  enemies.  The  first  motive  was  probably 
uppermost  in  his  own  mind,  the  second  in  that  of  his 
Austrian  staff.  His  own  line  of  retreat  being  thus 
secured,  he  disposed  his  attacking  troops  so  as  to  cut 
into  that  of  the  enemy,  force  a  way  between  their  left 
wing  and  the  Apennines,  and  drive  them  into  the  Po. 

The  attack  was  to  be  made  in  three  columns,  and 
with  his  usual  confidence  he  marked  out  their  line  of 
advance  as  far  as  the  River  Nura,  10  miles  beyond  the 
Trebbia.  Rosenberg  was  in  command  of  the  right  and 
centre  columns,  and  Melas  of  the  left.  The  first,  con- 
sisting of  the  troops  of  Bagration  and  Schveikovski, 
was  to  make  for  Casaligio.  The  second,  consisting  of 
Forster's  division,  was  directed  through  Grignano. 
The  third,  Ott's  division,  was  to  move  along  the  high 
road,  pick  up  the  garrison  of  Piacenza,  and  then  march 
to  the  Nura.  Frohlich's  division  was  kept  in  reserve, 
and  was  to  follow  Ott  as  far  as  the  east  bank  of  the 
Tidone,  and  then,  bearing  to  the  right,  support  Forster. 


258  SUVOROF 

Three  Cossack  regiments  and  12  squadrons  of  Austrian 
Dragoons  were  attached  to  the  right  column,  one  Cossack 
regiment  and  6  squadrons  to  the  centre,  and  one  Cossack 
regiment  and  6  squadrons  to  the  left,  while  6  squadrons 
of  Dragoons  remained  in  reserve  with  Frohlich.  The 
field  artillery  was  similarly  distributed ;  6  guns,  a 
howitzer,  and  a  battery  of  horse  artillery  with  the 
right  column,  2  guns  with  Forster,  and  2  with  Frohlich. 
The  troops  were  to  deploy  at  2  miles  from  the  enemy, 
but  if  the  latter  were  encountered  sooner  than  was 
expected,  they  were  to  deploy  at  once  "  without  confu- 
sion, but  also  without  pedantry  or  superfluous  accuracy. 
.  .  .  The  word  '  halt '  not  to  be  used.  It  is  neither  for 
drill  nor  battle.  Attack,  strike,  cut  down,  hurra,  drums, 
music."  ^ 

The  right  and  centre  columns,  with  the  support  of 
Frohlich,  would  thus  throw  a  weight  of  17,500  men 
upon  Dombrovski  and  Victor,  10,000  strong,  while 
Ott  could  only  bring  4500  to  bear  upon  Salme  and 
Rusca,  who  between  them  had  6000.  The  disparity 
in  strength  was  dangerous,  especially  having  regard  to 
the  difficulty  of  moving  across  the  wide  gap  of  broken 
ground  between  the  centre  and  left.  If  the  enemy 
proved  as  vigorous  as  Suvorof  ought  to  have  expected, 
*'  hurra,  drums,  music  "  could  hardly  have  saved  his 
left  wing  from  destruction,  and  himself  from  being  cut 
off  from  the  bridge  across  the  Po.  This  isolation  of 
his  weak  left  wing  was  one  of  those  dispositions  which 
are  described  by  historians  as  rash  or  bold,  according 
to  the  result  of  the  whole  battle.  Possibly  Suvorof 
intended,  by  thus  refusing  his  left,  to  lure  the  enemy 
into  a  rash  advance  on  that  side,  while  he  fell  with 
unexpected  and  irresistible  force  upon  their  other  wing. 
Whatever  his  intentions,  they  were  in  the  actual  event 
frustrated  by  Melas,  who  was  afraid  of  Ott's  weakness 
and  refused  to  allow  Frohlich  to  bear  to  the  right. 

It  was  already  two  o'clock  when  Bagration  came 
1  Mil.  ii.  261. 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  FIRST  STAGE    259 

into  touch  with  Dombrovski,  and  Suvorof  gave  the 
order  for  a  general  attack.  This  was  not  expected  by 
the  French,  or  at  least  by  Salme,  who  had  actually 
asked  leave  to  go  for  a  few  hours  to  Piacenza.^  As  on 
the  previous  day,  the  first  shock  fell  upon  Dombrovski, 
and  after  a  savage  hand-to-hand  combat,  the  Poles 
were  again  driven  back.  One  battalion  was  cut  off 
and  laid  down  its  arms,  and  the  loss  of  the  whole  division 
amounted  to  500  killed,  a  flag,  2  guns,  and  600  prisoners. 
Victor,  with  his  own  division  and  part  of  Rusca's, 
came  to  the  rescue  of  the  fragments  of  Dombrovski's 
troops,  and  for  a  time  was  able  to  pass  round  the  higher 
ground  to  Bagration's  right,  and  even  threaten  his 
rear.  But  Bagration  threw  fresh  masses  of  infantry 
upon  him,  and  cleared  the  right  wing  with  the  bayonet. 
At  the  same  moment  Schveikovski  came  up  on 
Bagration's  left,  and  drove  back  the  enemy  who  were 
pressing  him  on  that  side.  By  this  time,  also,  Forster 
had  cleared  Grignano  of  the  infantry  of  Rusca's  division, 
and  the  right  and  centre  columns  had  thus  attained  all 
their  first  objectives. 

But  the  divisions  of  Ollivier  and  Montrichard  were 
now  coming  into  action.  The  former  marched  direct 
along  the  high  road.  The  latter,  inclining  to  his  left, 
filled  up  the  gap  between  the  high  road  and  the  troops 
of  Victor  and  Rusca  around  Casaligio.  There  he  met 
Forster,  driving  Rusca  out  of  Grignano,  and  a  vigorous 
battle  was  joined  between  approximately  equal  forces 
along  the  left  bank  of  the  river.  This  was  ended  by 
the  retreat  of  Victor  and  Dombrovski,  who  were  pressed 
back  as  far  as  Settima.  Montrichard  in  his  turn,  his 
left  flank  being  thus  uncovered,  was  bound  to  withdraw 
to  Gossolengo.  This  second  stage  of  the  battle  ended, 
like  the  first,  in  favour  of  the  Russians. 

Meanwhile,  Ott  had  been  in  action  on  the  left.  Salme, 
disregarding  Macdonald's  instructions  to  fall  back  to 
the  river  before  being  attacked,^  found  himself  exposed 

1  Rousset,  93,  94.  2  Rousset,  93,  94. 


260  SUVOROF 

to  both  Ott  and  Frohlich,  the  latter  of  whom  Melas 
had  directed  to  the  left  instead  of  the  right.  They 
attacked  Salme  with  great  energy  about  five  o'clock. 
Salme  himself  was  wounded,  and  the  same  fate  befell 
two  of  his  successors  in  command,  while  his  troops  were 
driven  across  the  river  in  great  disorder.  The  fire  of 
the  French  artillery  on  the  right  bank  saved  them  from 
a  complete  overthrow.  But  they  lost  about  800  killed, 
and  700  remained  prisoners  in  the  hands  of  the  Austrians. 

By  the  time  that  Salme*s  brigade  had  succeeded  in 
re-forming  itself,  darkness  had  already  fallen.  The 
second  day  had  ended,  more  definitely  than  the  first, 
in  Suvorof's  favour.  But  the  crushing  victory  had  not 
yet  been  gained,  and  the  enemy  had  still  a  considerable 
number  of  fresh  troops  at  his  disposal,  and  was  even 
superior  in  numbers.  Only  part  of  Victor's  and  Ollivier's 
divisions  had  been  seriously  engaged,  and  Watrin  had 
not  been  in  action  at  all.  For  this  indecisive  result 
Melas  was  undoubtedly  to  blame.  With  the  assistance 
of  Frohlich' s  eight  battalions,  the  success  of  the  right 
wing  would  have  been  more  thorough,  and  the  want 
of  them  on  the  right  was  not  compensated  by  the 
services  which  they  had  been  able  to  render  Ott.  In 
view  of  the  late  hour  at  which  Ott  came  into  action, 
it  is  clear  that  he  could  not  have  been  seriously  in 
danger  before  nightfall.  If  he  had  done  no  more  than 
hold  his  ground  the  enemy  might  have  been  pushed 
round,  pivoting  on  their  right,  until  they  found  them- 
selves with  their  backs  to  the  Po  and  the  roads  to  the 
Apennines,  or  even  to  Modena,  in  the  hands  of  Suvorof. 
In  that  case  Macdonald  could  not  have  escaped  with 
anything  resembling  an  army.  As  things  stood  on 
the  night  of  the  18th,  after  a  day's  marching  and  fighting, 
the  relative  positions  of  the  two  forces  were  much  the 
same  as  on  the  night  of  the  19th. 

During  the  night  the  battle  was  unexpectedly  re- 
newed. Three  French  battalions  crossed  the  river 
and  attacked  Ott,  and  an  obscure  and  useless  scramble 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  FIRST  STAGE    261 

began  in  the  river  bed  and  lasted  for  an  hour.  It  ceased 
at  eleven  o'clock,  but  not  until  the  fighting  had  become 
general,  and  Rosenberg  and  four  of  his  battalions  pene- 
trated into  the  French  lines  in  front  of  Settima,  and 
remained  there  until  morning.^  On  the  next  day  the 
battle  began  again  in  earnest.  Suvorof  at  last  received 
reinforcements  in  the  shape  of  Tchubarof's  three 
battalions  and  six  squadrons  of  Dragoons  from  Kray, 
but  these  were  not  actually  at  his  disposal  until  after 
the  fighting  had  begun.  He  made  little  change  in  his 
general  dispositions,  but  reiterated  and  emphasised  his 
order  to  Melas  to  send  Frohlich  to  the  support  of 
Forster.  Macdonald,  on  his  part,  had  decided  on  this 
third  day  to  attack.  Dombrovski  was  to  advance  first 
through  Rivalta,  and  then  bear  in  upon  the  Russian 
right  flank,  while  Victor  and  Rusca  marched  directly 
upon  Casaligio.  Ollivier's  line  was  across  the  high  road, 
and  Montrichard's  ran  from  the  road  to  Grignano. 
Watrin  and  Salme  were  to  operate  on  the  right  between 
the  high  road  and  the  Po,  and  the  former  was  if  possible 
to  get  between  Ott  and  the  river.^  All  Macdonald's 
troops  were  thus  on  this  day  in  the  line  of  battle,  and 
he  had  no  general  reserve,  while  Suvorof,  as  before, 
relied  upon  Frohlich  to  turn  the  scale  if  the  balance 
began  to  incline  against  him  at  any  point. 

The  battle  began  about  ten  o'clock  with  a  general 
advance  of  the  French,^  though  Montrichard  did  not 
bring  the  bulk  of  bis  men  into  action  until  noon.  They 
crossed  the  river  in  columns,  headed  by  clouds  of 
skirmishers,  and  with  cavalry  in  the  intervals.  As 
before,  Dombrovski's  Poles  came  first  into  contact 
with  the  Russians,  moving  round  the  slopes  of  the 
hills,  and  threatening  to  turn  their  right.  Suvorof 
promptly  launched  Bagration  against  them.  The 
infantry   charged    them    in    front,    the    Cossacks   and 

1  Gryazef.  "  Rousset,  96. 

3  Suvorof  had  intended  to  attack  at  6  a.m.  ;  Macdonald  at  9.  The 
delay  on  both  sides  was  no  doubt  due  to  fatigue. 


262  SUVOROF 

Dragoons  on  both  flanks  ;  and,  scrambling  up  the  hills, 
the  unfortunate  Poles  barely  succeeded  in  crossing  the 
river,  leaving  another  flag,  a  gun,  and  400  men  in  the 
hands  of  Bagration.  This  third  overthrow  completed 
the  ruin  of  the  division,  and  Dombrovski  took  no  further 
part  in  the  action. 

This  vigorous  advance  of  the  Russian  right  left  a 
dangerous  gap  between  Bagration  and  Schveikovski's 
infantry.  Victor  and  Rusca  seized  the  opportunity, 
and  attacked  Schveikovski  with  horse  and  foot,  cut- 
ting him  off  completely  from  Bagration,  and  driving 
him  back  into  Casaligio.  One  regiment,  Rosenberg's 
Grenadiers,  was  actually  surrounded.  It  was  thrown 
into  square,  and  firing  steadily  on  all  sides,  continued 
to  present  a  bold  front  to  the  clamorous  and  exultant 
French.  Nevertheless,  the  whole  mass  was  driven 
staggering  backwards,  and  defeat  in  this  part  of  the 
field  seemed  assured.  Bagration  attacked  the  advancing 
enemy  in  flank.  But  he  was  in  too  small  force,  and  met 
with  such  resistance  that  he  gave  up  hope  of  saving 
Schveikovski,  and  began  to  fall  back  to  save  himself 
from  being  completely  isolated.  All  seemed  lost. 
Rosenberg  himself  galloped  up  to  Suvorof,  who  was 
lying  on  a  great  stone  in  shirt,  breeches,  and  boots. 
"  Try  and  pick  up  this  stone,"  said  the  Field-Marshal. 
"  You  cannot !  No  more  can  you  make  Russians 
retreat ! "  He  told  Rosenberg  not  to  withdraw  a 
single  step,  and  sent  an  order  to  Melas  to  push  forward 
on  the  left.  At  this  moment  Bagration  rode  up  to 
declare  that  his  men  were  worn  out,  half  were  killed  or 
wounded,  the  muskets  were  foul,  the  enemy  were  still 
coming  on  in  strength.  "  That's  bad,  Count  Peter," 
said  Suvorof.  "  Horse  !  "  He  leapt  into  the  saddle 
and  galloped  up  to  Schveikovski's  reeling  battalions. 
Throwing  himself  into  their  midst  he  cried,  "  Draw 
them  on  !  Draw  them  on  !  Smartly  !  Smartly  !  " 
Then,  as  the  men  came  together  in  better  order  fifty 
paces  to  the  rear,    "  Halt  I  "     Covered   by  a  sudden 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  FIRST  STAGE    263 

outburst  of  artillery  fire  at  point-blank  range,  the 
retiring  troops  turned,  and,  led  by  Suvorof  himself, 
once  more  advanced.  At  the  same  moment  Tchubarof's 
long-expected  battalions  hurried  up,  and  the  united 
forces  drove  the  French  back  across  the  Trebbia.^  The 
right  was  now  safe. 

The  struggle  in  the  centre  had  in  the  meantime  never 
been  doubtful.  Montrichard  attacked  Forster  shortly 
after  midday,  when  the  Russian  right  wing  was  already 
in  difficulties,  but  in  a  very  brief  space  he  suffered  a 
complete  defeat.  Melas,  jealously  keeping  Frohlich  on 
the  left,  had  spared  ten  squadrons  of  Dragoons  under 
Lichtenstein  for  the  support  of  Forster.  Lichten- 
stein,  not  waiting  for  the  French  to  be  checked  by 
artillery  or  musketry,  attacked  them  on  their  right 
flank,  while  Forster  charged  them  in  front.  The  sharp- 
shooters were  driven  in,  the  cavalry  on  the  flank 
scattered,  and  the  whole  body  of  infantry  chased  in 
panic  under  the  protection  of  their  artillery  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  Trebbia. 

This  fortunate  use  of  Lichtenstein's  Dragoons  was 
the  only  display  of  real  activity  which  Melas  made 
during  the  whole  battle.  If  he  had  followed  it  by  the 
despatch  of  all  Frohlich' s  infantry  to  the  right  or  centre, 
the  French  would  almost  have  certainly  been  driven 
from  the  field.  But,  as  if  exhausted  by  this  effort, 
Melas  relapsed  again  into  pedantry,  and  at  the  very 
crisis  of  the  action  summoned  a  council  of  war.  While 
Suvorof  was  at  last  driving  the  French  left  before  him, 
and  their  centre  was  huddling  in  disgraceful  panic  on 
the  far  side  of  the  river  bed,  this  council  solemnly 
decided  to  act  on  the  defensive.  What  would  have 
come  of  this  decision,  if  the  French  had  also  remained 
passive,  it  is  difficult  to  say.     But  the  French  had  not 

1  Starkof,  131 ;  Gryazef.  I  assume  that  the  "  fresh  infantry  "  who 
came  up  at  the  critical  moment  were  Tchubarof  s.  Clausewitz  says 
somewhere  that  they  were  sent  by  Forster.  This  seems  very  unhkely, 
as  Forster  himself  was  hotly  engaged  at  the  same  time  as  Schveikovski. 
It  was,  of  course,  the  proper  moment  for  Frohlich  to  intervene. 


264  SUVOROF 

been  trained  in  Vienna,  and  they  quickly  put  an  end 
to  the  inglorious  repose  of  Melas.  He  found  himself 
attacked  by  Salme  to  the  south  of  the  high  road,  while 
Ollivier,  with  his  entire  division,  turned  his  left.  The 
French  were  soon  in  the  streets  of  San  Niccolo  and 
captured  two  guns. 

The  situation  was  saved  by  Lichtenstein.  This 
gallant  officer  had  four  horses  killed  under  him  during 
the  day,  and  he  behaved  with  as  much  discretion  as 
bravery.^  Calling  his  Dragoons  from  the  pursuit  of 
Montrichard,  he  launched  them  against  Ollivier,  and 
drove  him  in  his  turn  across  the  river  bed.  The 
Austrian  infantry  recovered,  pressed  on  against  their 
opponents,  and  compelled  Salme  to  join  Ollivier  under 
the  shelter  of  his  artillery.  This  advance  was  at  last 
checked  by  the  guns.  But  an  attempt  to  renew  the 
French  attack  was  similarly  frustrated,  and  no  sub- 
stantial move  was  made  by  either  side.  The  situation 
here,  as  on  the  right  and  in  the  centre,  was  stalemate. 

On  the  Austrian  left  the  French  advance  had  reached 
its  furthest  point.  Watrin  had  penetrated  as  far  as 
Calendasco.  But  just  as  Schveikovski's  retreat  had 
compelled  Bagration  to  come  in,  so  Watrin  was  with- 
drawn by  that  of  Ollivier  and  Salme.  He  was  in 
danger  of  being  completely  cut  off,  and  beat  a  hasty 
retreat.  Only  the  lethargy  of  the  Austrians  saved  him 
from  very  heavy  losses. 

It  was  now  six  o'clock,  and  the  general  exhaustion 
of  the  troops  made  further  fighting  impossible,  though 
the  artillery  remained  for  some  time  active  on  either 
side.  At  nightfall  the  two  armies  lay  in  their  bivouacs 
along  the  banks  of  the  river,  their  outposts  only  30 
yards  apart.  Suvorof,  who  had  spent  most  of  the 
day  in  the  saddle,  congratulated  his  generals  on  their 
"  third  victory,"  and  declared  that  on  the  morrow 
they  would  give  Macdonald  his  fourth  lesson.  The 
time  for  the  attack  was  fixed  at  five  o'clock.     But,  in 

*  Report  of  Melas  ;  Fuchs,  ii.  417. 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  FIRST  STAGE    265 

fact,  the  outlook  was  anything  but  cheerful.  Moreau 
was  already  at  Voghera,  and  his  patrols  reached  as 
far  as  Casteggio.  Suvorof  probably  knew  of  this  on 
the  evening  of  the  19th,  and  he  had  to  choose  between 
three  courses.  The  first  was  to  march  against  Moreau, 
leaving  a  strong  rearguard  in  front  of  Macdonald  ;  the 
second,  to  cross  the  Po  at  Parpanese  and  take  up  a 
defensive  position  on  the  left  bank  ;  the  third,  to  make 
all  safe  by  a  decisive  overthrow  of  Macdonald.  He 
might  have  chosen  the  first,  but  in  fact  he  chose  the 
last.  Moreau  behind  him  was  no  worse  than  Macdonald 
behind  him.  In  case  of  failure  there  was  still  the  bridge 
across  the  Po,  and  if  he  succeeded,  Moreau  himself 
would  be  between  two  fires. 

The  problem  was  settled  by  the  retreat  of  Macdonald. 
At  nine  o'clock  in  the  evening  of  the  19th  the  French 
Commander  summoned  a  council  of  war.  His  losses 
had  been  very  heavy  ;  some  infantry  battalions  had 
ceased  to  exist  as  military  units,  the  cavalry  had  been 
reduced  by  almost  half,  and  the  artillery  had  very 
little  ammunition  left.  There  was  no  news  of  Moreau, 
while  detachments  of  Austrians  from  Mantua  had 
already  appeared  at  Modena,  Reggio,  and  Parma,  and 
on  the  northern  bank  of  the  Po  opposite  Piacenza. 
The  spirit  of  the  troops,  many  of  whom  were  Italian 
levies,  was  bad,  and  there  was  no  sign  of  any  failure 
of  resolution  on  the  other  side.  On  the  whole,  it 
seemed  wiser  to  save  the  remainder  of  the  army  by  a 
retreat,  than  to  risk  a  complete  disaster  in  another 
attempt  at  victory.  At  midnight  the  order  was  given 
to  retire,  and  at  six  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  21st 
the  last  units  of  Victor's  division  marched  sullenly 
away,  leaving  the  field  of  battle  to  the  Allies.^  It  had 
been  hard  pounding,  and  the  Russians  and  Austrians 
had  pounded  longest. 

Before  dawn  Suvorof  was  preparing  to  ride  among 
his  troops  and  rouse  them  to  the  attack.     On  receiving 

1  Rousset,  97,  98,  99. 


266  SUVOROF 

the  news  of  the  French  retreat,  he  ordered  the  whole 
force  to  follow  in  pursuit,  Melas  along  the  high  road, 
and  Rosenberg  through  San  Giorgio.  The  Austrians 
displayed  their  usual  indecision.  Melas  contented  him- 
self with  occupying  Piacenza,  and  Ott,  going  on  in  a 
leisurely  fashion  with  some  squadrons  of  cavalry, 
captured  about  200  men  of  the  French  rearguard.  The 
Russian  column  was  more  energetic.  The  advance 
guard,  composed  of  Tchubarof's  comparatively  fresh 
men,  drove  Victor  beyond  the  Nura,  and  a  pitched 
battle  on  a  small  scale  was  fought  by  Rosenberg  at 
San  Giorgio.  The  17th  demi-brigade  was  compelled 
to  lay  down  its  arms,  and  3  flags,  4  guns,  1029  prisoners, 
and  the  baggage  and  papers  of  Victor  himself  remained 
in  the  hands  of  the  pursuers.  Victor's  troops  were  now 
thoroughly  demoralised,  many  took  to  the  hills  in  small 
parties,  and  the  artillery  was  dragged  away  by  the 
horses  of  one  of  the  other  Divisions.^  Other  fighting 
took  place  at  different  points,  and  on  the  25th  June  an 
incautious  detachment  of  Ott's  Division  was  captured 
with  two  guns  at  Sassuolo.  But  the  affair  at  San 
Giorgio  ended  the  operations  against  the  main  army  of 
Macdonald.  On  the  16th  June  a  body  of  3000  Ligurian 
troops  under  La  Poype,  forming  a  connecting  link 
between  the  two  French  armies,  had  crossed  the  Apen- 
nines to  Bobbio,  and,  venturing  too  near  the  main 
body  of  the  Allies,  was  heavily  defeated  by  Vyeletski, 
with  a  single  battalion  of  Austrian  infantry,  50  Dragoons, 
and  20  Cossacks.  Suvorof  was  never  again  disturbed 
from  the  direction  of  Tuscany. 

So  ended  the  first  attempt  of  the  French  to  regain 
Lombardy.  Macdonald's  losses  amounted  to  about 
17,000,  or  half  his  entire  force.  All  his  wounded  in  the 
hospitals  of  Piacenza  fell  into  the  hands  of  Melas,  to 
the  number  of  7500,  and  the  total  number  of  prisoners 
taken  by  the  Allies  was  12,000.  A  large  quantity  of 
baggage,  7  guns,  and  8  flags  were  the  other  trophies  of 
1  Rousset,  100. 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  FIRST  STAGE    267 

the  day.  Especially  tragic  was  the  fate  of  Dombrovski's 
Poles.  These  exiles,  who  had  left  their  country  rather 
than  accept  passports  from  Suvorof,  fought  at  all 
stages  of  the  action  with  desperate  bravery.  Their 
losses  were  frightful,  and  at  the  end  of  the  battle,  out 
of  2000  men,  barely  300  remained  under  arms.  The 
Russian  losses  were  returned  at  680  killed,  2088  wounded ; 
the  Austrian  at  254  killed,  1903  wounded,  and  500  miss- 
ing. Suvorof,  as  usual,  probably  underestimated  his 
own  losses,  and  the  proportion  of  killed  to  wounded 
in  the  Austrian  figures  is  strangely  low.  Nevertheless, 
the  total  losses  of  the  Allies  cannot  have  exceeded 
6000  men.i 

While  the  battles  had  been  raging  across  the  bed 
of  the  Trebbia,  Moreau  had  crossed  the  Apennines  and 
fallen  upon  Bellegarde.  On  the  16th  the  Austrian  out- 
posts were  driven  from  the  hills,  and  on  the  17th  the 
French  were  already  in  the  plain  at  Novi  and  Pozzolo 
Formigaro.  They  were  too  late.  Macdonald  was 
engaged  and  beaten  long  before  Moreau  could  reach 
him.  But  the  presence  of  14,500  men  so  near  to 
Alessandria  was  a  formidable  menace.  Bellegarde  had 
about  as  many  men  under  his  command.  But  2000 
were  blockading  the  citadel  at  Alessandria,  2000  more 
were  at  Tortona,  and  Vukassovitch  and  Seckendorf, 
with  6500,  were  far  away  towards  Nice  and  Acqui. 
Alkaini,  in  accordance  with  Suvorof 's  plan,  abandoned 
the  blockade  of  Tortona  and  fell  back  towards  Ales- 
sandria, and  Bellegarde  himself  sent  to  recall 
Vukassovitch  and  Seckendorf.  With  4200  men  of  La 
Marcelle's  brigade  and  the  troops  of  Alkaini  he  deter- 
mined to  meet  Moreau.  His  proper  course  was  to 
fall  back  behind  the  Bormida.  But  he  came  gallantly, 
if  wrongly,  to  the  conclusion  that  he  must  protect 
Suvorof's  rear  at  all  costs  by  an  attack.     A  stubborn 

^  My  chief  authority  for  this  account  of  the  battle  of  the  Trebbia  is 
Milyutin.  For  the  part  played  by  the  Polish  contingent,  see  also 
Chodzko,  Histoire  des  legions  polonaises,  etc.  ii.  168  et  seq. 


268  SUVOROF 

fight  therefore  began  on  the  20th  between  San  Giuliano 
and  Cassina  Grossa.  So  well  did  Bellegarde  handle 
his  men  that  by  sunset  the  French  were  in  full  retreat. 
But  only  a  part  of  Moreau's  whole  force  had  been 
employed  up  to  this  point,  and  the  arrival  of  fresh 
troops  turned  the  defeat  into  a  victory.  Bellegarde's 
exhausted  Austrians  were  cut  in  two,  and  the  remains 
of  La  Marcelle's  brigade  were  actually  driven  towards 
the  hills,  and  returned  the  next  day  with  great  difficulty 
to  Alessandria.  The  Austrian  loss  was  heavy  ;  850 
killed  and  wounded,  1294  prisoners,  and  5  guns  were 
a  heavy  price  to  pay  for  such  an  object.  Moreau  was 
of  course  unable  to  advance  further,  and  as  soon  as 
Suvorof  began  his  return  to  Alessandria  he  was  com- 
pelled to  fall  back  to  the  mountains.^ 

By  seven  o'clock  in  the  evening  of  the  27th  Suvorof 
and  his  army  had  arrived  at  San  Giuliano.  Moreau 
was  already  out  of  reach  in  the  mountains,  and  the 
army  again  went  into  camp  near  Alessandria.  For 
some  weeks  it  remained  inactive.  The  sieges  of  the 
citadels  at  Turin  and  Alessandria  and  the  fortress  of 
Mantua  were  the  only  operations  of  importance  between 
the  victory  of  the  Trebbia  and  the  end  of  July.  Work 
began  at  Turin  on  the  8th  June,  and  the  garrison 
surrendered  on  the  20th.  Alessandria  was  taken  on 
the  22nd  July.  In  the  beginning  of  July  the  second 
Russian  corps  under  Rehbinder  arrived  in  the  plain, 
and  was  stationed  at  Piacenza.  Its  siege  train  was 
sent  on  to  Mantua,  and  that  place  capitulated  on  the 
last  day  of  the  month. 

1  Mil.  ii.  288. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE   ITALIAN   CAMPAIGN,    SECOND    STAGE 

Correspondence  and  complaints — ^The  French  cross  the  Apennines 
again — Battle  of  Novi — International  fame — A  dinner  party — 
Anecdotes — Plan  of  a  Swiss  campaign — Its  vices  and  dangers. 

During  this  period  of  inactivity  at  Alessandria,  the 
correspondence  of  Suvorof,  with  Moreau  keeping  an 
unbeaten  army  on  the  other  side  of  the  Apennines,  was 
very  feverish.  Letters  from  Vienna  provoked  a  torrent 
of  protests  and  complaints.  On  the  21st  June  the 
Austrian  Emperor  sent  him  a  long  rescript,  showing 
great  anxiety  about  a  French  invasion  of  Piedmont, 
and  referring,  with  singular  want  of  tact,  to  the  "  good- 
luck  "  which  had  so  often  helped  Suvorof  in  war.  The 
rescript  continued  : 

I  beg  you  earnestly,  dear  Field-Marshal,  always  to 
carry  out  my  former  instructions ;  that  is,  abstain 
altogether  from  all  distant  and  uncertain  undertakings, 
corresponding  neither  with  the  present  general  situa- 
tion of  affairs,  nor  with  the  intentions  of  myself  and  my 
sincere  Ally,  the  Russian  Emperor  .  .  .  and  especially 
not  to  lose  sight  of  the  promise  given  by  you  before 
your  departure  from  Vienna,  that  to  every  important 
proposal  or  proceeding  which  should  occur  to  you  as 
suitable  to  the  circumstances  of  the  moment,  you  would 
previously  draw  my  attention.^ 

Suvorof  s  answer  to  this  was  a  detailed  description 
of    Macdonald's    defeat    on    the    Trebbia.     But    there 

1  Fuchs,  ii.  458. 


270  SUVOROF 

followed  reiterated  orders  to  defend  Piedmont  and 
Lombardy,  and  an  express  prohibition  of  any  opera- 
tions in  the  direction  of  Rome  or  Naples  until  the  siege 
of  Mantua  was  successfully  concluded.^  He  was  actu- 
ally meditating  a  descent  on  the  Genoese  Riviera  with 
60,000  men,  and  for  the  protection  of  his  rear  again 
asked  permission  to  equip  Italian  troops  for  the  defence 
of  their  own  country.*  This  met  with  the  usual  pro- 
hibition, and  the  Emperor  went  on  to  express  his 
grave  displeasure  at  hearing  a  rumour  that  the  King 
of  Sardinia  proposed  to  visit  his  late  kingdom  of 
Piedmont,  now  so  happily  recovered  from  the  enemy. 
Suvorof  was  not  on  any  account  to  let  the  King  come 
near  the  theatre  of  war.^  This  blind  selfishness  injured 
Austria  in  more  ways  than  one.  It  limited  the  number 
of  troops  available  for  aggressive  action,  it  alienated 
public  opinion  in  Piedmont,  and  it  deprived  Austria  of 
the  assistance  of  a  patriotic  army  when  Suvorof  had 
gone,  and  the  French  again  descended  upon  Italy.  All 
these  checks  and  interferences  drove  Suvorof  into  a 
fury,  and,  coupled  with  proposals  to  keep  Rehbinder's 
Russian  army  in  Switzerland  to  help  the  Archduke 
Charles,  made  him  at  last  ask  for  his  recall.  Some  of 
his  letters  are  almost  incoherent. 

To  Count  Theodor  Rostoptchin  he  wrote  after  the 
Trebbia : 

The  Russian  God  is  great — The  French  are  sighing, 
the  Imperialists  smile — here  things  go  victoriously, 
but  with  difficulty — Our  best  is  impossible  ;  the  Im- 
perialists are  slow  at  getting  into  line,  the  French 
hot ;  they're  warm,  beaten  many  of  them,  difficult  to 
get  together — and  in  England  there  are  many  gay  folk 
and  my  portrait  out  on  holidays,  and  Simeon  Roman- 
ovitch    praises    me  —  but    my    stockings    have    fallen 

1  Mil.;  Fuchs. 

2  Fuchs,  ii.  472,  482. 

'  Fuchs,  ii.  663.  The  King  had  even  asked  leave  to  serve  under 
Suvorof. 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  SECOND  STAGE   271 

down.  ...  It  would  have  been  better  without  tactics 
and  practics  .  .  .  politics,  criticism,  Thugut,  the 
Directory,  London,  Potsdam — God  protect  us  !  and 
you  and  your  wife.^ 

This  was  written  soon  after  the  Trebbia.  On  the 
1st  July  he  wrote  to  Razumovski : 

Such  mean  deceits,  contrived  with  a  thousand 
clerkish  intrigues  against  me  as  a  foreigner,  compel 
me  not  to  endure  them  for  an  hour,  and  I  must  abandon 
the  service  if  an  opportunity  should  suddenly  present 
itself.  You  are  my  only  means  of  doing  that.  I  shall 
be  content  to  pass  the  remainder  of  my  days,  even  with 
little  means,  as  a  country  gentleman.  ...  I  can 
scarcely  force  myself  to  write  these  lines,  I'm  really  so 
weak.  .  .  .  For  God's  sake,  lead  me  out  of  Purgatory. 
...  I  should  be  ashamed  if  I  didn't  clear  the  rest  of 
Italy  of  the  French  in  this  campaign.  After  that  the 
French  theatre  wouldn't  be  difficult ;  we  should  find 
a  great  part  of  the  people  there  sympathetic. 

(1)  To  clear  Italy  of  the  French,  give  me  full  freedom 
of  decision  ;  (2)  don't  let  the  War  Council  and  its  vile 
projectors  interfere  with  me ;  (3)  I  am  ready,  from 
Switzerland  into  either  Germany  or  France  ;  otherwise 
there's  no  work  for  me  here.  Home,  home,  home  ; 
tell  Vienna  that's  all  my  plan.^ 

To  the  Tsar  himself  he  wrote  on  the  6th  July  : 

The  cowardice  of  the  War  Council,  jealous  of  me  as  a 
foreigner,  the  intrigues  of  double-faced  sectional  com- 
manders in  direct  communication  with  the  Council, 
which  has  hitherto  controlled  all  the  operations  ;  my 
impotence  to  carry  them  out  before  sending  a  dispatch 
a  thousand  versts,  compel  me  most  humbly  to  request 
Your  Imperial  Highness  to  recall  me  unless  things  here 
change.  I  wish  to  lay  my  bones  in  my  own  land,  and 
pray  God  for  my  Sovereign.^ 

1  Voronts.  Arkhiv,  xxiv.  88.  Simeon  Romano vitch  is  Prince 
Vorontsof,  the  Ambassador  in  London.  Tlie  allusion  to  his  stocldngs 
is  a  hint  at  Suvorof  s  disappointment  at  not  receiving  the  Garter. 
He  was  not  aware  that  there  was  no  damned  nonsense  about  merit  in  it. 

a  Voronts.  Arkh.  xxiv.  325.  *  Fuchs,  ii.  472. 


272  SUVOROF  ::. 

On  the  same  day  he  broke  out  again  to  Razumovski : 

"  Luck  !  '*  says  the  Roman  Emperor.  .  .  .  Manager 
Thugut  knows  plumb-line  K[arl].  .  .  .  Enough  pre- 
tences. "  You  want  soldiers  !  What  would  you  have 
done  with  them  if  you  had  been  beaten  ?  "  The  Minister 
didn't  know  that  to  follow  up  a  victory  more  soldiers 
are  wanted.  From  innocent  me  they're  taking  away 
my  ewe  lamb,  Rehbinder. 

Archduke  Charles,  exalted  person,  he  doesn't  even 
give  me  what  he's  ordered  to.  The  Cabinet  wants  to 
emphasize  that  the  enthusiasm  of  Lombardy  is  a 
hallucination  of  mine,  susceptible  foreigner — rather,  so 
as  not  to  disgrace  its  rules  before  Europe,  and  prove 
that  I  ought  to  be  only  a  sentry  at  the  gates  of  the 
folks  at  Vienna. 

The  era  of  the  Tidone  and  the  Trebbia  flies  to  its 
end — what  will  become  of  me  ?  .  .  .  They  have  drowned 
Zenith  and  Nadir.  Very  wisely — I  shall  be  Cincinnatus. 
.  .  .  My  last  victories  have  torn  from  my  hands  5000. 
The  knowalls  have  wasted  more  than  10,000  of  my  men. 
The  common  good  counsels  you  to  replace  them,  not 
simply  stupidly  tear  Rehbinder  from  me.  .  .  .  How  soon 
may  he  be  away  from  me,  and  I  from  here  !  In  the 
uttermost  weakness  of  spirit  and  body — ^whenever  God 
wills  ...  I  shall  hasten  to  my  plough. 

Does  the  Cabinet  know  that  a  complete  siege  without 
the  cover  of  an  observation  corps  can't  go  on  ?  It 
surely  doesn't ;  according  to  its  custom  of  being  beaten 
in  entrenchments.  .  .  .  More  honest  and  more  amiable 
to  fight  the  French  than  me  and  the  common  good. 

I  advise  you,  honoured  friend,  if  it  happens  to  your 
Excellency  to  have  anything  to  do  with  the  troops,  to 
be  good  enough  to  communicate  the  matter  to  me,  their 
Commander,  for  my  consideration.  Vienna  can  never 
be  as  learned  as  I  am  in  military  operations.  Do  not 
set  up  more  War  Councils  :  even  one  will  destroy  my 
faith  and  faithfulness.     Forgive  my  frankness.^ 

Again  to  Razumovski  on  the  8th  July : 

Fortune  has  a  bald  occiput,  and  a  few  dangling  locks 
on  her  forehead.     She  travels   like  lightning — Jail  to 

1  Fuchs,  ii.  472. 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  SECOND  STAGE    273 

catch  her  locks — ^never  again  will  she  return.  Is  not 
one  campaign  better  than  ten  ?  Or,  is  it  not  better 
to  have  the  aim  of  directing  one's  march  eventually 
on  Paris,  than  cleverly  bar  the  way  to  one's  own  gates  ? 

On  the  same  day  to  Count  Pavel  Tolstoy : 

Archduke  Charles,  in  three  or  four  general  engage- 
ments and  victories,  has  inflicted  on  the  enemy  a  loss 
of  five  or  six  thousand.  He  could  have  doubled,  trebled 
it.  Bayonets  !  Here  with  me  the  Germans  hit  hard  ; 
there  it's  altogether  otherwise.  .  .  .  Why  did  the 
Archduke  Charles  not  march  after  his  victory  on  Berne, 
attack  Massena  again  ?  The  French  are  making  levies, 
collecting  a  new  army  to  the  cry  of  "  Vengeance."  ^ 

To  Razumovski  again  on  the  12th  July : 

I  am  having  a  real  attack  of  fever,  though  on  my  legs. 
...  I  write  unhappily,  and  would  that  I  could  write 
it  for  the  last  time  !  .  .  .  Day  and  night  work — carping, 
monstrous  correspondence  with  the  pat-talkers,  ceaseless 
dissatisfaction  with  the  intrigues  of  the  War  Council. 
.  .  .  Would  that  I  had  full  power  to  take  advantage 
of  circumstances,  and  no  one  would  interfere,  especially 
who  have  not  served  in  war.  Projectors.  To — and 
this  one — and  those — take  away  their  pens,  paper, 
and  factiousness.  .  .  .  The  wily  Thugut,  by  nature  an 
honest  patriot,  but  carried  away  by  projectors  of  military 
matters,  for  want  of  true  leaders,  and  for  excess  of  mer- 
cenaries or  parasites.  Their  service  is  for  titles,  ambition 
or  egoism,  hurtful  to  their  country.  I  will  say,  they 
are  brave ;  I  have  tried  them,  and  I  shall  leave  an 
army  more  victorious  than  that  of  Eugen.  But  without 
me  they  won't  beat  the  others.  Mollycoddles  and 
pat-talkers.^ 

This  inflamed  condition  lasted  till  the  end  of  the 
month.  On  the  31st,  hearing  of  the  capitulation  of 
Mantua,  he  wrote  in  great  glee  to  Melas : 

The  fall  of  this  fortress  strengthens  our  army,  and 
makes  it  impossible  to  postpone  any  further  our  pro- 

1  Fuchs,  ii.  472.  «  Ibid.  505. 


274  SUVOROF 

jected  aggressive  movement.  ...  I  urge  your  Ex- 
cellency by  your  attachment  to  his  Most  Gracious 
Majesty  our  Sovereign  and  your  devotion  to  the  common 
good,  to  use  all  your  authority  and  all  your  strength, 
so  that  the  preparations  necessary  for  active  measures 
in  the  Riviera  may  be  completely  finished  in  the  course 
of  ten  days.  Speed  is  now  of  the  greatest  value — delay 
is  a  sin,  unforgivable  for  its  harmful  consequences.^ 

At  this  critical  moment  he  was  deprived  of  the  services 
of  Chasteler,  and  wrote  with  much  feeling  to  Razumovski 
on  the  7th  August : 

My  dear  firebrand,  but  worthy  and  efficient  Chasteler. 
.  .  .  Under  the  walls  of  Alessandria,  out  of  sheer 
wilfulness,  he  was  wounded  in  a  trench  ;  in  his  place — 
not  Zach-Haft,  but  only  Zach  :  good-natured,  quiet, 
learned  ;  but  a  true  projecting  mollycoddle — and  I'm 
in  combustion — God  grant  health  to  Chasteler.^ 

But  with  or  without  his  Chief  of  the  Staff,  he  was 
going  on.  He  had  already  issued  a  proclamation  to 
the  Genoese,  announcing  his  arrival  "  to  set  them  free 
from  humiliation  and  the  savage  yoke  of  France."  ^ 
To  Kray  he  sent  on  the  30th,  bidding  him  come  from 
Mantua  with  every  man  who  could  be  brought  away, 
and  allowing  him  eight  days  for  the  march  of  115  miles.* 
The  Tsar  had  made  him  Prince  of  Italy  after  the  fall 
of  Mantua,  but  this  new  title  pleased  him  less  than  the 
prospect  of  another  battle.  Practically  the  whole  of 
Italy  was  now  in  the  hands  of  the  Allies.  The  Genoese 
Riviera,  the  citadel  of  Tortona,  and  the  forts  of  Coni, 
Gavi,  and  Serravalle  were  all  that  remained  in  French 
hands  in  the  north ;  and  in  central  Italy  they  had  lost 
everything  except  Rome,  Civita  Vecchia,  Ancona,  and 
the  citadel  of  Perugia.  On  the  northern  frontier  they 
had  been  pushed  back  as  far  as  Brigue  by  Victor  Rohan 
and  the  Great  St.  Bernard  by  Haddik.     On  the  western 

1  Mil.  ii.  406  ;  Fuchs,  ii.  638. 

2  Mil.  ii.  606.  '  Fuchs,  ii.  613. 

*  Kray  left  on  the  3rd  August  and  reached  Alessfindrifi  on  the  10th, 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  SECOND  STAGE    275 

they  had  withdrawn  into  Savoy  and  the  Dauphin^.^ 
In  all,  Suvorof  had  108,000  men  at  his  disposal.  In  the 
neighbourhood  of  Alessandria  he  had  his  main  striking 
force  of  about  45,000 ;  Keim,  with  14,000,  watched 
the  passes  from  the  west,  and  11,000  protected  him 
on  the  side  of  Switzerland.  When  Kray  had  left  5000 
men  in  Mantua,  he  was  able  to  bring  to  Suvorof  s  assist- 
ance 19,000  men,  thus  bringing  the  main  body  up  to 
about  64,000.2  His  plans  had  been  changed  several 
times  in  detail,  but  were  finally  settled  on  the  30th 
July.^  He  had  been  busy  collecting  mules  for  the 
transport  across  the  mountains,  and  he  persuaded 
Nelson,  then  in  the  midst  of  his  shameful  co-operation 
with  the  Neapolitan  Bourbons,  to  detach  some  vessels 
to  cut  the  French  communications  with  Genoa.*  He 
directed  General  Klenau,  simultaneously  with  his  own 
invasion  from  the  north,  to  enter  the  Riviera  with  a 
mixed  force  from  the  side  of  Tuscany.  On  the  2nd 
August  he  was  in  motion.  He  found  the  enemy  closer 
than  he  expected. 

A  few  days  were  required  to  reduce  the  fort  of  Serra- 
valle,  and  even  before  the  7th  August,  on  which  it 
capitulated,  news  had  come  in  of  the  strengthening 
of  the  French  outposts  in  the  Apennines,  and  of  their 
increasing  aggressiveness.  On  the  10th  August  a 
detachment  actually  succeeded  in  reaching  Novi,  where 
Suvorof  had  fixed  his  headquarters.  The  full  significance 
of  this  was  not  at  first  perceived,  and  on  the  11th  the 
Field-Marshal  issued  his  orders  for  an  advance  upon 
Genoa  in  four  columns,  in  accordance  with  the  agreed 
plan.  But  within  twenty-four  hours  he  found  that 
he  had  been  forestalled.  Instead  of  attacking  he  was 
once  more  to  be  attacked. 

1  Mil.  iii.  7,  269. 

2  Mil.  iii.  17. 

3  Three  plans  are  set  out  in  Fuchs,  ii.  515,  585,  and  685.     Milyutin 
found  the  final  plan  in  the  Moscow  Archives  (Mil.  iii.  283). 

*  He  also  wrote  to  St.  Vincent  and  the  Russian  Admiral  Ushakof 
(Mil.  iii.  273). 


of  th^  ll^f/iiblK*  At  h/itff^  hti<\  k\fr(rMi  w^-r^  At,  t.hfif  hrw^^u 
Th^  fislfijl^  ifi  th^  Vf«ml^^  AttAfn#>/f  AlAfrriin^  frfo; 
The  thptittttU'tiiH  fi^Afftftt  the  /fr/rf^J"-^    ^^^re   ..  ,.^,,,    1 
hnfa  i4f  hitnkh  wip^plie*  Urf  ihif  ^  rr  the  fU'](\. 


iHifiptit  tiikl  tiAfely  filIe/1  the  p]m*^  /jf  the  f!rk?fc  aw/I  t»/ilf 

//f  ftftly  WA«  ifi  ftpe<'iAHy  fffK\  f!Af»e.  The  wh/rle  fiA^Alry 
#a#  ^iMiKytfliM,  hr  ^^    r^  WAi«j  no  Itrtt^  Utf  the 

h/xf»e«,  mA  ttie  tf  <lvefi»  wete  in  WAfit  ^ 

every  /le^efWftry  (rf  life.  M<mf»y,  el/rthen,  fio//t/«,  WAgiOffH^ 
And  even  ^Artridgeft  were  deft^-ient^  And  «/)trie  dewri* 
hfJ^Ade^i  And  ft'ffitntinU  were  fe/hi«e/l  t/>  ftin/i^le  hAttAlJ^ri 
/rr  f'Vf^n  A  ff'W  <'ornpA/iie«.<  With  thift  Army  trt  rkf^ 
ttuiiVitiH  Jrxtihert  WAfl  now  (;f<>fisin^  the  Apennines,  And  it 
tr^/iild  be  nn/Aif  t^i  ^ftrttrf  ntA  to  Mitrnt  thM  the  mmny 
wh<»rr»  t  »o  mtumnUft  w.  'J^rr  t^>  him,  n^ 

Wily  in  '  's,  trfit  aWj  in  ev  -I  (rl  e/|iiipmeni« 

thts  ffeneh  AttA<?k  was  lAf^ely  impirmi  \ry  politieAJ 
ffi/rtlve*.  The  new  l)ifer't.<xfy,  set  tip  tm  the  l»th  June, 
WA«  M\xitmn  to  ftetMjre  itself  liy  a  success  In  the  fWld, 
And  A  new  JoAn,  A  new  e<ms<'rijjrt>i//n,  And  a  new  yi/'t<rfy 
hA<l  been  projecte<J  Urt  thAt  friirp^me.  The  |)ir  -  •  -  - 
<inf//ftijnfltely  f<;f  itself,  fixed  uptm  ftiivofof  as  tir 
wh<ise  flp^fils  were  to  (jrAce  its  triumph.  Twd  rnw 
Arniies,  **  of  the  Rhine  "  And  **  (A  tfie  Alps,"  were  to  be 
eolleited i  the  Afrny  of  I^Jwity/erlAnd  was  to  be  JnereAse/i 
in  70,m>0  tm^n,  And  thAt  of  ftAly  to  70,000.  The  ('(;rri- 
ummS  of  the  last  was  entrusted  to  Jf/ubert,  and  MoreAii, 
enJoyin«  the  empty  tltkf  (A  CommAndef'lii^Chl^l  (A  th« 
pap'  *    '     nhine,  r* '     '      1   at  hjs  /»wn  re/jiiest, 

AS  J  oit.     Ali  'in/^  all   the  burden 

(4  the  fatigues,  Anxieties,  And  disAppf/intmetitft  of  the 

<  Mhnuiret  du  MtHhhut  de  m,  (Jiff,  U  flld,  MOi 


iMMt  four  luunthiit  hn  ytm  m[\\^ifkk\\^\  Uy  m  y\m« 
JtmM'i«  iM\ly  thirty  ymv^  k4  (^^\  y^m    ' 
NM|mt(^viu  m  **  m  ^ihmuuUim'  iu  vH»um^^  mul  i«  r 
ill  iHi^moity  fvir  wur.'*    Uln  •itiiiy  w»i«  tii  fm^t  not  < 
tliMi  4A,iHHi  utiHMiifi  Itn  qimlity  wmm  kmvL  iMui  hi;^  «id\ 
WA«  M  (»l^H>lf  of  liU  (HMUHi^'  mtlu>v  llmM  hU  tikill,     M 
wnn  for  th«»  »wvMul  tinif*  to  W4vt>  tlu>  \w\m  \if  wv  iiwny 
ftHMii  tli(^  rt^iiiiltN  v»f  Miiotlii^rV  tiluiuli^i^iuK. 

'riit*  ttotuiil  f^httM'|»rl»o  M^iiiikt  Suvoiskf  wii»  uiul«^r» 

tiikf*h    l»y    only    Wft»tHH>    mum»»   tiiul    Uu^no   MiovtMi    tiy 

Umijit^rovmly    so^mmttnl    v\mU,    HU   i\vr'«   rl^iht   wlii|t 

WMji  H^vKt  Into  Uir^o  ooUiiiiiiM  t  tK0  t^i^iiti'^i  iiiuIim'  t#lH^ii« 

i'^<        '  '  '       ^         '  '  Uif»  iUvUly»o«* 

'<<   NN  ""•"    '" '   -    '  •      ■'   •  ■  '   "«  Mill  H.ll^l  tlu> 

If^fti  ooimiMtui)!  or  i'otirM  tiri|(MAl(v  of  mm  mumi.  IVrl^imiii 
with  thf»  loft  whin.  tttlvmioiHl  hi  twvi  oohiOMiM,  JoiihtMl 
hhiiMf  wtiN  with  IVi*i||imii.  (hi  llu«  tilth  Wiitvlii  hml 
almiily  (MMo<^  into  iMMiiMot  with  thi^  AiiHti'iiiii**  in  H(>rm« 
vnlhs  whih^  Jouhort  hinmolf  wu*  wtlll  u  «I'm '-  wywwh 
from  hi»  lUMiivwt  mlvt*wiiry, 

Th(^  HitiuithMi  of  th(^  I'Viii^h,  hml  it  l^^^o  kiuovh 
mrlliir  to  8\iv\MH»f|  w»i«  iu>w  oioM  |HM'iloi»«»  uiul  w  li^ht 
iihilf  nifwki^  ii|iot\  Ht\«  Cyr  iiiliiht  tmvi»  hmvii  mn  ftilut  mm 
IiIh  iiiivtH^h  upon  M»u«(toimhl  Mt  thi^  IVhhln.  Hut  wh^u 
Wtitrhi  (If^rnHMiiliMl  ill  U\f\^P  upon  lUmorHl  hullu^hn  Hi 
AnHtuAtA,  lunl  ilrovt^  hlin  Imok  through  HrrmvMllf»(  U 
WHN  Ktlll  not  WII^vihI  Ihttt  tlu^  whoh*  I'Vnoli  iiriny 
WAN  on  th0  iimMii  In  oiplti^  yst  hiM  iihunihint  oMVuh^Vi 
hf^Uwv  Nov  I  tui  Imfoif^  tlu^  'I'lHilihiw,  Huvoinif  wni*  vt»ry 
hiNullh'inilly  Hwtii'o  of  hlM  f»npniv'ii  inovf^ninntu,  li 
wnn  (Iroithnl  thiit  \\\{n  iittm^k  on  tttillu^ini  wmn  nn^n^ly 
iin  Httf'Mipt  to  h^hovt^  i\it'toiui,  Novrt'tht^h^M,  tMti»^ 
KuihIi'  wfiN  H(Mit  tit  nmko  »i  t'H«onn»ii^Miti(«o  in  tho  VMlloy 
of  tlui  llotnihUi  M\\\  h<^  Hi^nt  Imok  iit  oui^^  tlu^  infornm' 
tion  tluit  HnoduM'  hnNtth>  mthnnn  wiim  h)m  !•>.«( 
AiMjul,    Nuvoi'of   inouiMllHti^ly   oiiIUmI   in   hiw  ♦! 

tro(t|iM,  In  W  opmi  (uumtry  hit  IioimmI  to  un^  htii 
oviii'wlu^hnlnji  Nupprlorlty  of  for<»tt  witli  m'lmtpr  f^ff^oi 


278  SUVOROF 

than  in  the  upper  valleys,  and  he  therefore  refrained 
from  striking  before  the  French  columns  emerged  from 
the  mountains. 

On  the  13th  he  fixed  his  headquarters  at  Pozzolo 
Formigaro,  8  miles  north  of  Novi.  He  ordered 
Bagration  to  take  up  a  position  to  the  south  of  the 
town,  sent  to  his  support  six  Russian  battalions  from 
Derfelden*s  force,  under  the  command  of  Miloradovitch, 
and  told  Kray  to  come  up  from  Alessandria  on  the 
right  wing,  and  attack  the  enemy's  left  as  soon  as  it 
came  out  of  the  mountain  valley.  At  dawn  on  the 
14th  Bagration  found  the  enemy  approaching  in  great 
force,  and  fell  back  to  Pozzolo  Formigaro.  St.  Cyr 
took  possession  of  the  town  of  Novi,  Laboissi^re  occupy- 
ing the  town  and  the  hills  behind  it,  Watrin  moving 
further  into  the  plain  upon  his  right,  and  Dombrovski 
remaining  about  Serravalle. 

In  the  meantime  Joubert  was  coming  up  from  the 
west,  and  if  Kray  had  carried  out  his  original  orders,  a 
general  action  would  no  doubt  have  been  begun,  and 
the  French  would  have  had  to  fight  with  a  dangerous 
gap  between  their  left  and  right  wings.  But  on  Kray's 
urgent  representation  that  his  men  were  too  tired  to* 
fight,  Suvorof  consented  to  his  remaining  inactive. 
Joubert  was  thus  enabled,  undisturbed,  to  effect  a 
junction  with  the  troops  at  Novi.  The  whole  of  the 
15th  was  allowed  to  pass  without  any  movement  in 
strength.^  The  French  commander,  on  the  other  hand, 
spent  the  day  and  the  following  night  in  great  perplexity. 
His  first  view  of  the  plain  satisfied  him  that  the  worst 
of  the  rumours  which  had  come  over  the  Apennines  were 
true,  that  Mantua  had  indeed  fallen,  and  that  before 
him  was  collected  the  flower  of  the  Allied  armies,  in 
numbers  almost  twice  his  own.  A  council  of  war  did 
nothing  to  resolve  his  doubts,  and  his  final  decision  to 

^  Suvorof  rode  along  the  line  to  examine  the  French  position.  In 
his  shirt  and  breeches  he  was  recognised,  skirmishers  fired  at  him,  and 
cavalry  threatened  to  capture  him  (St.  Cyr,  i.  236  ;  Mil.  iii.  41,  303). 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  SECOND  STAGE    279 

fight  was  that  of  the  grenadier  rather  than  the  general. 
The  movements  of  the  troops  reflected  the  confusion  of 
their  leader.  Even  at  dawn  on  the  16th  the  French  had 
not  taken  up  positions  as  for  a  battle,  and  a  large  part 
of  the  left  wing  was  still  in  motion  towards  the  place 
assigned  to  it,  when  the  Austrians  were  already  ascending 
the  heights. 

The  French  position  had  one  great  virtue  and  one 
great  defect.  Stretching  along  the  hills  between  the 
Scrivia  and  the  Orba,  it  overlooked  the  plain,  in  which 
lay  the  army  of  Suvorof.  Everywhere  a  steep  descent 
gave  the  French  an  immense  advantage.  Their  artillery 
and  infantry  could  fire  with  more  effect,  and  the  Allies, 
besides  being  compelled  to  attack  uphill,  would  have 
hardly  any  chance  at  all  of  using  their  cavalry.  In 
addition  to  this  general  superiority  of  position,  the 
French  had  the  walled  town  of  Novi,  not  isolated  in  the 
plain  in  front  of  their  line,  like  Hougoumont  in  front  of 
the  British  line  at  Waterloo,  but  nestling  close  under 
the  hill,  and  jutting  out  like  a  great  bastion  at  the 
junction  of  their  centre  and  right.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  position,  admirably  adapted  for  defence,  was  danger- 
ously ill  supplied  with  means  of  retreat.  Behind  the 
whole  French  line,  and  roughly  parallel  with  it,  ran  a 
number  of  streams,  flowing  through  narrow,  steep,  and 
deep  ravines  into  the  Lemma,  which  in  its  turn  flowed 
into  the  Orba.  Every  movement  to  the  rear  must 
therefore  be  determined  by  the  course  of  these  streams. 
The  only  line  of  retreat  of  the  left  wing  would  be  through 
the  village  of  Pasturano,  across  the  torrent  of  the  Riasco, 
and  then  in  a  south-easterly  direction,  parallel  to  the 
course  of  the  Lemma.  Unless  the  withdrawal  were 
made  in  good  order  and  without  much  pressure  from 
the  enemy,  the  left  wing  must  inevitably  come  into 
collision  with  the  centre,  which  must  also  pass  through 
Pasturano.  The  right  wing  could  escape  by  another 
road,  though  even  that  passed  by  Serravalle  and  ran 
for  some  distance  within  gunshot  of  the  Austrian  garrison. 


280  SUVOROF 

The  general  who  posted  his  troops  in  the  face  of  a  superior 
enemy,  with  badly  broken  ground  in  his  rear  and  only 
one  road  for  the  retreat  of  two-thirds  of  his  whole  army, 
was  taking  a  frightful  risk.  In  the  end  it  was  only  the 
right  wing  of  Joubert  which  escaped  in  military  order. 

After  the  whole  of  the  15th  had  passed  without 
any  serious  move  on  either  side,  Suvorof  resolved  to 
attack  early  on  the  16th.  His  plan  was  simple,  almost 
crude.  He  had  about  35,000  men  within  striking 
distance:  25,000  Austrians  under  Kray,  and  10,000 
Russians  under  Bagration  and  Miloradovitch.  The 
right  wing,  under  Kray,  was  to  attack  the  French 
left  and  drive  it  through  Pasturano  towards  the  Scrivia. 
So  confident  was  the  Field-Marshal  of  success,  that  he 
gave  orders  to  Melas  not  to  attack  the  French  right  on 
the  position  behind  Novi,  but  to  advance  along  the 
Scrivia  and  capture  or  drive  into  the  mountains  the 
enemy  column  which  he  supposed  to  be  advancing  down 
that  valley.  This  column,  he  assumed,  would  be  making 
for  Tortona,  and  it  would  be  cut  off  by  the  triumphant 
advance  of  Kray  to  the  banks  of  the  Scrivia.^  The  plan 
was  based  on  incorrect  information  about  the  intentions 
of  the  enemy  and  the  disposition  of  their  troops,  and  it 
had  in  consequence  a  vital  defect.  Assuming  that  only 
part  of  the  French  was  on  the  hills,  and  that  at  least 
half  their  army  was  advancing  down  the  Scrivia,  it 
provided  only  for  Kray*s  attack  on  their  left,  without 
any  co-operation  from  the  rest  of  the  allied  line. 
About  30,000  Russians  and  Austrians,  including  the 
bulk  of  Derfelden's  division  and  all  the  troops  of 
Rosenberg  and  Melas,  remained  inactive  near  Rivalta. 
Unless  the  enemy  were  extraordinarily  incompetent, 
such  a  partial  attack  could  hardly  succeed. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  French  were  extraordinarily 
incompetent,  and  the  plan  came  nearer  to  success  than 
it  deserved.  Bellegarde  moved  before  sunrise  against 
the  extreme  left  of  the  enemy,  and  Ott  simultaneously 

1  Puchs,  iii.  13  ;  Mil.  iii.  310. 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  SECOND  STAGE    281 

attacked  them  nearer  to  their  centre,  while  Seckendorf 
with  three  battalions  and  three  squadrons  of  cavalry 
passed  round  the  extreme  point  of  the  ridge  and  pressed 
up  the  gorge  of  the  Riasco  on  to  Pasturano  itself. 
Incredible  as  it  seems,  the  French  left  wing  was  not  yet 
in  order  of  battle.  Nor  was  the  right.  Watrin  was  at 
this  moment  still  marching  from  the  Scrivia,  to  take 
up  his  position  to  the  east  of  Novi  in  contact  with 
Laboissiere.  But  here  no  danger  threatened,  whereas 
on  the  left  an  attack  was  actually  being  made.  One 
division,  that  of  Lemoine,  faced  Bellegarde,  and  sufficient 
troops  were  in  line  against  Ott.  But  between  Lemoine 
and  the  Riasco  there  was  a  wide  gap,  which  Grouchy 
was  about  to  occupy  with  his  division.  The  infantry 
reserve  of  Clausel  and  Partounaux  was  still  in  column 
of  march  behind  Pasturano,  when  the  Austrians  were^ 
already  closing  with  the  troops  on  the  ridge.  The 
situation  was  desperate,  and  Joubert  himself,  rushing 
forward  to  steady  his  line,  was  killed  by  an  Austrian 
skirmisher.  The  cavalry  reserve  of  Richepanse  threw 
themselves  between  Bellegarde  and  Grouchy,  but  as 
the  Austrian  infantry  advanced  with  magnificent  steadi- 
ness up  the  slope  in  front  and  Seckendorf  opened  fire 
upon  the  French  in  flank  and  rear,  they  were  driven  back 
into  Pasturano.  Ott  was  as  successful  as  Bellegarde, 
and  his  right  wing,  pushing  hard  against  Lemoine, 
obtained  a  foothold  on  the  crest.  A  vigorous  attack 
along  the  whole  line  might  have  converted  this  local 
success  into  a  complete  victory,  but  Suvorof,  still 
believing  that  Kray  was  strong  enough  to  beat  the  whole 
French  army  on  the  hills  behind  Novi,  made  no  move. 
In  the  meantime  Moreau  had  resumed  command  of  the 
French,  and  behaved  as  steadily  in  this  new  emergency 
as  on  the  Adda.  Urging  the  troops  of  Grouchy  and 
Lemoine  to  stand  fast,  he  summoned  help  from  St.  Cyr, 
who  still  remained  undisturbed  behind  Novi.  St.  Cyr 
promptly  despatched  Colli's  brigade  to  assist  Lemoine, 
and  Clausel  at  last  coming  up  behind  Grouchy,  with  the 


282  SUVOROF 

aid  of  Richepanse  the  Austrians  were  driven  down  into 
the  plain,  retiring  in  good  order  and  firing  steadily  as 
they  went.  Seckendorf  fell  back  in  conformity  with 
the  rest. 

All  the  advantage  of  surprise  was  now  lost.  It  was 
clear  to  Kray  himself  that  he  could  not  carry  out 
Suvorof*s  plan  without  aid,  and  even  while  the  struggle 
was  still  in  doubt  he  had  sent  a  message  to  Bagration 
urging  him  to  attack  St.  Cyr.  But  Bagration  refused 
to  move,  on  the  ground  that  he  had  no  orders  from 
Suvorof.  The  Field-Marshal  was  in  an  even  stranger 
state  than  Bagration.  Shut  in  his  room  at  Pozzolo 
Formigaro,  he  refused  admission  to  every  one.^  It  was 
after  7  o'clock,  when  Kray  had  already  been  com- 
pletely repulsed,  before  he  emerged,  and  rode  out  to 
Bagration.  He  immediately  ordered  an  attack  upon 
Novi  by  Bagration,  with  Miloradovitch  in  support,  and 
directed  Kray  to  renew  his  assault. 

It  was  now  too  late.  The  French  were  in  full  posses- 
sion of  the  ridge,  and  the  second  attack  was  no  more 
successful  than  the  first.  Bagration  was  met  by  a  fierce 
fire  from  the  town  wall,  which  was  manned  by  Gardane*s 
brigade,  and,  moving  steadily  round  the  town  to  the 
right  under  this  galling  musketry,  he  encountered 
Quesnel's  brigade  on  the  ridge.  Quesnel  was  supported 
by  a  reserve  of  four  battalions  and  six  squadrons  under 
Guerin,  and  the  position  was  the  strongest  part  of  the 
whole  of  the  French  line.  The  behaviour  of  the  Russian 
troops  was  beyond  praise.  Fired  upon  in  front  and  in 
flank,  they  moved  as  if  on  parade.^  But  the  utmost 
gallantry  could  not  overcome  the  natural  difficulties  of 
the  ground  and  the  determination  of  the  enemy.  A 
French  battery  on  the  hill  called  the  Belvedere,  im- 
mediately in  front  of  the  Russians,  was  especially 
damaging,  and  their  own  artillery,  firing  upwards  from 
the  level  ground,  threw  its  shot  over  the  heads  of  the 

1  Mil.  iii.  52,  312  ;   Starkof,  161. 
«  St.  Cyr,  i.  250. 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  SECOND  STAGE    283 

defenders.     Gardane  even  issued  from  the   town   and 
charged  them  in  flank.     This  onset  was  repulsed,  but 


Bagration  was  forced  to  withdraw  to  his  original  position 
under  cover  of  his  cavalry. 

While  Bagration  was  re-forming  his  defeated    but 


284  SUVOROF 

still  unbroken  troops,  Watrin  moved  up  into  his  assigned 
position  on  the  right  of  the  French  line.  He  had  been 
ordered  by  St.  Cyr  to  march  from  Bettole  di  Novi  at  as 
great  a  distance  as  possible  from  the  enemy,  so  as  to 
avoid  any  encounter  until  he  was  actually  on  the  ridge 
and  in  touch  with  Laboissi^re.^  But  Watrin,  very 
carelessly  leaving  one  of  his  three  brigades  at  Bettole 
di  Novi,  led  the  other  two  along  the  direct  road  to  Novi 
itself.  This  brought  him  against  the  flank  of  Bagration 
in  front  of  the  town,  but  at  the  same  time  exposed  his 
own  flank  to  the  Russian  reserves.  Suvorof  promptly 
despatched  against  him  a  large  part  of  the  troops  of 
Miloradovitch,  under  the  command  of  Forster,  and 
summoned  Derfelden  with  the  rest  of  his  force  from 
Rivalta.  Forster  was  soon  hotly  engaged,  and  as 
Bagration  again  advanced  against  Laboissi^re,  this 
time  to  the  east  of  Novi,  St.  Cyr  was  hard  pressed. 
Lacking  the  assistance  of  Watrin,  who  ought  to  have 
been  in  line  with  Laboissi^re,  he  was  forced  to  draw 
from  his  reserves  to  strengthen  his  hold  upon  the  ridge. 
But  Gardane  again  sallied  from  the  town  and  harassed 
Bagration,  and  the  defenders  were  not  in  any  way 
shaken.  The  Russians  had  no  better  hope  of  success 
than  before,  when  Derfelden,  deploying  in  perfect  style 
to  the  left  of  Forster,  bore  down  upon  Watrin.  The 
whole  Russian  left  wing  then  advanced,  Watrin  was 
driven  up  on  to  the  hill,  and  Gardane  shut  himself 
once  more  within  the  walls  of  Novi. 

Meanwhile  Kray's  second  attempt  had  failed.  Some 
of  Bellegarde's  troops  actually  reached  Pasturano,  and 
Ott  once  more  got  a  foothold  on  the  hills.  But  the 
infantry  of  Clausel  and  the  cavalry  of  Richepanse  fell 
upon  Bellegarde,  Partounaux  held  up  the  tottering 
ranks  of  Lemoine,  and  the  Austrians  again  fell  back. 
On  this  occasion  the  pursuit  was  pressed  into  the 
plain  itself.  The  Austrian  horse  seized  its  oppor- 
tunity,  swept    down   upon    the   French    infantry,    in- 

1  St.  Cyr,  i.  241. 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  SECOND  STAGE    285 

flicted  heavy  losses  upon  them,  and  took  Partounaux 
himself  prisoner. 

By  1  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  both  sides  were 
exhausted  by  their  exertions,  and  neither  could  claim 
the  victory.  A  decision  could  only  be  obtained  by  the 
introduction  of  fresh  troops.  The  French  had  none, 
except  the  brigade  which  had  been  left  behind  by 
Watrin  at  Bettole  di  Novi  and  was  now  in  line  with  the 
rest.  But  Suvorof  had  still,  in  the  forces  of  Rosenberg 
and  Melas,  a  whole  army  of  unused  men,  and  he  at  last 
bethought  himself  of  them.  He  ordered  the  Austrian 
commander  to  attack  the  French  right,  and  Rosenberg 
to  take  the  place  of  Melas  at  Rivalta.  His  orders  met 
Melas  on  the  road.  The  veteran  had  supposed,  when 
Derfelden  moved  towards  the  battle,  that  it  was  already 
decided,  and  that  the  time  had  come  for  him  to  pursue 
the  scattered  fragments  of  the  enemy.  At  4  o'clock 
Suvorof  ordered  a  general  attack.  By  this  time  Melas 
was  on  the  field,  with  the  infantry  brigades  of  Mitrovski, 
Laudon,  and  Lusignan,  and  the  cavalry  of  Lichtenstein. 
Simultaneously  with  a  new  advance  of  the  right  and 
centre,  Lusignan,  with  Lichtenstein  in  support,  attacked 
Watrin  in  front.  The  fourth  brigade,  that  of  Nobili, 
marched  up  the  right  bank  of  the  Scrivia  and  forced 
Dombrovski  to  retire  from  Serravalle  to  Gavi.  Mitrovski 
and  Laudon,  moving  up  the  left  bank  of  the  river, 
wheeled  round  to  the  west,  and  attacked  Watrin  in 
flank  and  rear. 

This  fresh  attack  was  too  much  for  the  French.  A 
Cisalpine  legion,  forming  part  of  Watrin* s  division,  was 
the  first  to  give  way.  Lusignan  forced  himself  into  the 
gap  and  effected  a  junction  with  Laudon,  and  under 
their  combined  pressure  the  whole  division  was  driven 
into  flight.  St.  Cyr  in  vain  threw  the  106th  demi- 
brigade  against  Lusignan.  The  Austrians  halted, 
Lusignan  was  wounded  and  taken  prisoner,  and  two 
guns  were  for  a  time  lost.  Watrin' s  line  was  for  the 
moment   restored.     But   he   was   given   no   chance   to 


286  SUVOROF 

recover  the  lost  ground.  Miloradovitch  broke  into  Novi 
from  the  north,  and  Derfelden  from  the  east,  and 
Gardane's  brigade,  escaping  with  difficulty,  swarmed 
up  on  to  the  ridge,  with  the  Russians  in  hot  pursuit. 
This  settled  the  fate  of  Watrin,  and  a  third  and  last 
attack  from  Kray  finally  drove  the  French  left  from  its 
position. 

It  was  now  6  o'clock.  The  whole  French  Army  was 
in  retreat,  and  the  retreat  became  a  rout.  Watrin' s 
division  got  away  in  good  order,  but  Grouchy,  Lemoine, 
and  Colli  were  driven  pell-mell  into  the  narrow  streets 
of  Pasturano  and  the  gorge  of  the  Riasco.  The  gorge 
was  filled  with  guns  and  waggons,  through  which  the 
terrified  soldiery  had  to  struggle.  To  add  to  the  con- 
fusion, a  battalion  of  Austrian  infantry  and  some  hussars 
succeeded  in  crossing  the  ravine,  and  opened  fire  on  the 
road.  In  a  few  minutes  this  was  still  further  blocked 
with  dead  animals  and  immovable  vehicles.  These, 
with  the  maddened  fugitives,  the  screaming  and  plunging 
horses,  and  cursing  drivers  and  artillerymen,  filling  the 
bottom  of  the  gorge  from  side  to  side,  while  the  bullets 
rained  on  them  from  above,  presented  for  a  time  an 
impassable  barrier  to  those  troops  who  held  together 
and  tried  to  effect  a  disciplined  withdrawal.  The  sharp- 
shooters were  at  length  driven  off  by  General  Debel, 
who  got  together  a  mass  of  drivers,  artillerymen,  and 
infantry,  and  made  a  charge  upon  them.  But  the  road 
remained  blocked.  The  crowd  of  men  in  Pasturano 
had  to  get  away  as  best  it  could,  scrambling  through 
the  gardens  and  vineyards,  and  dispersing  over  the 
slopes  of  the  hills.  Grouchy  and  Perignan,  with  one 
battalion,  were  captured  in  the  village,  and  Colli,  with 
his  entire  brigade,  was  surrounded  outside  it,  and  forced 
to  surrender.  All  the  artillery  and  baggage  in  the  gorge 
were  left  to  the  victors,  and  nothing  of  the  whole  army 
escaped  in  order  except  a  portion  of  St.  Cyr's  right  wing. 
The  list  of  casualties  was  no  index  of  the  extent  of  the 
French  defeat.     In  killed  and  wounded  they  lost  6500, 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  SECOND  STAGE    287 

while  the  Allies  lost  7000  ;  and  the  French  prisoners 
were  about  4500,  against  1000  taken  from  the  Allies. 
But  the  real  measure  of  Suvorofs  victory  was  the  com- 
plete dispersion  of  the  mass  of  Moreau's  army.  One- 
third  had  been  killed,  wounded,  or  taken.  Another  third 
was  irretrievably  scattered.  Only  a  remnant  escaped 
as  a  military  organisation. 

The  victory  at  Novi,  shattering  as  it  was,  cannot  be 
regarded  as  a  good  example  of  Suvorofs  military  genius. 
The  proper  use  of  overwhelming  numbers  is  to  overwhelm, 
and  by  bringing  different  parts  of  his  army  into  action 
at  different  times,  he  to  a  great  extent  threw  away  his 
advantages.  This  was  not  a  case  like  the  Tidone,  where 
he  brought  his  troops  up  to  the  field  with  great  difficulty, 
and  sent  them  into  action  as  they  reached  the  ground. 
There  was  never  any  reason  why  he  should  not  have 
attacked  Joubert  along  the  whole  line  simultaneously. 
The  reasons  urged  on  his  behalf  are  very  inadequate. 
The  first  is  that  he  intended  Kray's  attack  to  be  a  mere 
feint,  and  hoped  that  the  French  would  descend  into 
the  plain  in  pursuit  of  him,  in  which  case  they  would 
be  destroyed  by  the  cavalry.  This  suggestion  is  incon- 
sistent not  only  with  Suvorofs  whole  character,  but 
with  other  and  equally  stubborn  facts.  His  instructions 
to  Kray  contain  no  hint  of  such  an  object,  and  actually 
bid  him  attack  with  all  his  strength.  Kray  carried  out 
his  orders  to  the  letter,  and,  in  spite  of  considerable 
losses,  repeated  his  attack,  and  asked  Bagration  to  help 
him.  If  the  attack  had  been  a  mere  feint,  there  was  no 
need  to  repeat  it  after  the  first  costly  failure,  except  as 
part  of  a  general  attack.  The  second  plea  for  the  defence 
is  that  Suvorof  did  not  know  that  all  the  enemy  were 
before  him,  and  kept  a  large  force  in  hand  to  deal  with 
the  apprehended  advance  down  the  valley  of  the  Scrivia. 
This  is  a  reason,  but  not  an  excuse.  That  he  was 
ignorant  of  the  distribution  and  objective  of  the  forces 
against  him  is  quite  true.  But  he  kept  back  not  only 
Melas,  but  also  Rosenberg,  and  whatever  threat  might 


288  SUVOROF 

be  made  against  him  at  Tortona,  it  could  not  require 
20,000  men  to  meet  it.  Nothing  would  have  been  easier 
than  to  bring  Melas  into  action  at  the  same  time  as  Kray, 
leaving  Rosenberg  to  cover  Tortona.  In  that  case,  the 
main  body  of  the  French  would  have  been  beaten  in 
three  or  four  hours,  and  any  force  operating  against 
Tortona  would  have  fallen  into  his  hands,  as  S6rurier 
fell  into  his  hands  after  the  passage  of  the  Adda.  Kray's 
attack  was,  in  fact,  entirely  proper  as  a  real,  and  not  as 
a  sham,  attack.  Apart  from  the  sluggishness  of  the 
enemy  in  taking  up  their  positions,  which  Suvorof  had 
no  right  to  expect,  the  condition  of  the  ground  clamoured 
for  such  an  attack.  But  neither  that  nor  any  other 
flank  attack  ought  to  have  been  made,  except  as  part 
of  a  concerted  movement.  Simultaneous  blows  at  the 
centre  and  right  would  have  detained  all  St.  Cyr's  men 
on  the  spot,  and  the  left  wing  would  never  have  recovered 
from  its  first  confusion.  Many  gallant  lives  would  thus 
have  been  saved.  The  only  reasonable  explanation  of 
Suvorof  s  use  of  his  army  at  Novi  is  that  he  was  nearly 
seventy  years  old,  and  that  even  his  abundant  energy 
was  for  a  few  hours  asleep. 

The  victory  so  sluggishly  achieved  was  no  more 
vigorously  developed,  and  the  leisurely  pursuit  of  the 
French  was  ended  on  the  18th  by  a  successful  encounter 
with  their  rear-guard  at  Monte  Rosso.  Moreau  was 
nevertheless  in  such  a  plight  that  pursuit  was  hardly 
necessary  to  complete  his  ruin,  and  a  slight  effort  on 
the  part  of  Suvorof  would  have  achieved  his  object  of 
driving  the  French  entirely  out  of  Italy.  The  first 
cause  of  his  inaction  was  his  anxiety  about  supplies. 
The  preparations  begun  before  Novi  were  still  incomplete, 
the  army  had  with  it  bread  for  no  more  than  two  days, 
and  nothing  would  be  found  on  the  southern  slopes  of 
the  mountains.^  On  the  17th  the  main  body  was  there- 
fore halted  on  the  northern  side  of  the  range,  and  only 
scouts  were  sent  forward. ^    But  this  halt  was  meant  to 

1  Mil.  iii.  77.  332.  «  Mil.  iii.  334  :   Fuchs,  iii.  21. 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  SECOND  STAGE  289 

be  temporary.  In  the  meantime  Klenau  was  going  on 
with  his  invasion  of  the  Riviera  from  Tuscany,  with 
an  army  composed  of  Austrians  from  Mantua,  Italian 
levies,  and  some  Cossacks.  At  Lerici  he  was  helped 
by  some  sailors  sent  by  Captain  Martin,  of  the  English 
ship  Northumberland.^  His  whole  force  amounted  to 
about  9000  men.  He  was  actually  preparing  for  an 
advance  from  Santa  Marta  upon  Genoa  itself,  when,  on 
the  17th  August,  he  received  direct  orders  from  the  War 
Council  at  Vienna  to  abandon  his  plan,  return  to 
Tuscany,  and  do  nothing  until  he  received  further 
instructions.  At  the  same  time  the  Council  ordered 
Melas  to  collect  9000  men  in  Tuscany,  to  restore  order 
and  disarm  the  native  irregulars.  This  army  was  to 
be  under  the  command  of  Frohlich,  who  was  summoned 
to  Vienna  to  receive  his  orders  in  person. 

Suvorof  heard  of  this  fresh  outrage  on  the  part  of 
the  Council  in  a  letter  from  Melas,  who  wrote  on  the 
16th  to  inform  him  that  he  was  actually  carrying  out 
the  instructions  of  the  Council  without  waiting  for  the 
consent  of  the  Field-Marshal.^  Soon  afterwards  Suvorof 
received  a  rescript  from  the  Emperor  Francis,  dated 
the  9th  August,  in  answer  to  his  own  suggestion  of  an 
invasion  of  France  itself.  In  this  the  news  of  Melas 
was  confirmed.     The  Emperor  wrote  : 

The  time  has  now  come  to  detach  a  part  of  my  troops 
to  restore  order  in  the  southern  parts  of  Italy,  especially 
in  Tuscany  and  the  neighbouring  possessions  of  Rome, 
to  put  an  end  to  the  turmoil  caused  there  by  the  popular 
rising. 

And  the  Emperor  peremptorily  forbade  the  invasion 
of  French  territory.'  On  the  lips  of  an  Austrian 
Emperor  the  restoration  of  order  was  synonymous  with 
the  suppression  of  freedom,  and  Suvorof  bitterly  resented 
this  diversion  of  military  forces  from  the  completion  of 

1  Fuchs,  ii.  595,  603,  614  ;  Mil.  iii.  104. 
»  Mil.  iii.  79,  337.  ^  puchs,  ii.  681. 

U 


290  SUVOROF 

the  enemy's  overthrow  to  the  furthering  of  the  private 
ends  of  the  House  of  Hapsburg.  Colonel  Zuccato, 
who  was  engaged  on  his  behalf  in  raising  the  Tuscan 
levies  in  their  own  defence,  immediately  returned  to 
Lombardy,  "  to  save  the  honour  of  the  Russian  uniform 
in  the  eyes  of  the  Italians."  ^ 

Nevertheless,  Suvorof  hoped  that  KJenau  might  be 
allowed  to  go  on  and  capture  Genoa.  On  the  16th  he 
begged  that  the  Emperor  would  not  prevent  the  gather- 
ing of  at  least  thus  much  of  the  fruits  of  Novi,  though 
he  agreed  that  a  French  campaign  was  impossible  till 
the  spring.2  His  private  correspondence  continued  to 
express  his  indignation.  On  the  11th  he  had  written 
to  Count  Rostoptchin : 

All  goes  ill  with  me.  The  orders  sent  every  minute 
from  the  War  Council  weaken  my  health,  and  I  cannot 
serve  here  any  longer.  They  want  to  regulate  operations 
a  thousand  versts  away  ;  they  don't  know  that  every 
minute  on  the  spot  makes  them  change.  They  make 
me  the  agent  of  some  Diedrichstein,  Turpin,  or  other. 
Here's  a  new  arrangement  of  the  Viennese  Cabinet.  .  .  . 
You  will  see  from  it  whether  I  can  be  here  any  longer. 
I  ask  your  Excellency  to  lay  it  before  His  Imperial 
Highness,  as  well  as  the  suggestion  that  after  the 
Genoese  operation  I  shall  ask  formally  for  my  recall, 
and  get  away  from  here.^ 

This  letter  was  followed  by  a  stream  of  others.* 
But  the  question  whether  the  Genoese  enterprise  should 
continue  was  settled  by  events  in  another  quarter.  On 
the  17th  Suvorof  heard  that  the  French  on  the  Swiss 
frontier  had  begun  to  show  signs  of  aggressiveness. 
Victor  Rohan  had  been  driven  down  the  Simplon  as  far 
as  Domodossola,  and  Strauch,  pressed  back  from  the 
St.   Gothard  to  Airolo,   had  retreated  to  Bellinzona.^ 

1  Mil.  iii.  338,  342  ;   Fuchs,  iii.  11. 

2  Mil.  iii.  341  ;   Fuchs,  iii.  16. 

3  Fuchs,  iii.  20. 

*  Ibid.   158,   163,   164.      Suvorof  was  again   suffering  from  fever, 
"  though  still  on  my  feet."  e  Mil.  iii.  344, 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  SECOND  STAGE  291 

On  the  17th  itself  the  enemy  crossed  the  Great  and  the 
Little  St.  Bernard,  and  came  to  blows  with  Haddik 
in  the  valley  of  Aosta.^ 

The  want  of  men,  money,  and  supplies  in  all  the 
theatres  of  war  had  not  deterred  the  Directory  from 
undertaking  offensive  action  in  Switzerland  ag  well  as 
in  Italy.  If  possible,  the  troops  of  Massena  were  in  a 
worse  condition  even  than  those  of  Moreau,  and  the 
consequent  plundering  had  reduced  the  occupied  districts 
to  absolute  destitution.  Nevertheless,  in  spite  of  its 
privations,  the  army  remained  resolute,  and  at  the  urgent 
request  of  the  Directory,  Massena  set  it  in  motion,  con- 
fident that  so  long  as  his  men  could  stand  on  their  legs 
they  would  fight.^  The  Directory  had  constructed  an 
elaborate  plan  for  the  destruction  of  both  the  Archduke 
Charles  and  Suvorof.  But,  in  fact,  Massena's  action 
was  determined  by  the  approach  of  Korsakof,  with  the 
Russian  Army  formerly  under  the  command  of  Herman.  \ 
He  must  strike  at  the  Archduke  before  the  Austrian 
commander  was  joined  by  Korsakof,  or  he  must,  given 
ordinary  energy  on  their  part,  himself  be  expelled  from 
Switzerland.  He  therefore  determined  to  attack  the 
Austrians  at  the  moment  when  Joubert  was  descending 
the  Apennines,  to  escape  dishonour  only  by  perishing 
at  Novi.  Massena  had  64,500  troops  against  73,000, 
and  he  knew  how  to  concentrate  his  strength.  When 
the  fighting  began,  he  had  at  Zurich  only  25,000  against 
the  Archduke's  47,000.  All  the  rest  were  first  thrown 
against  the  Austrians  keeping  touch  between  the  Arch- 
duke and  Suvorof.  The  net  result  of  the  operations 
of  the  13th,  14th,  and  15th  of  August  was  that  the 
French  captured  the  Simplon  and  the  St.  Gothard. 
The  Austrians  had  displayed  all  the  resolution  which 
could  reasonably  be  required  of  soldiers,  and  the  French 

1  Mil.  iii.  357. 

2  Hennequin,  Zurich,  chap.  iii.  The  Swiss  contrasted  the  French 
very  unfavourably  with  the  Austrians,  and  Mass6na's  Swiss  auxiliaries 
deserted  in  large  numbers. 


292  SUVOROF 

such  daring  and  impetuosity  as  have  seldom  been  seen 
in  war.  The  Austrians  were  beaten  in  every  encounter. 
Their  total  losses  were  21  guns  and  little  short  of  10,000 
men,  of  whom  6000  were  prisoners,  while  the  victors 
lost  less  than  2000  killed  and  wounded.^  The  news  of 
these  disastrous  happenings,  too  late  to  save  the  French 
at  Novi,  nevertheless  reached  Suvorof  in  time  to  make 
all  further  thought  of  crossing  the  Apennines  impossible. 
A  final  blow  was  given  to  his  hopes  by  the  latest  news 
from  Klenau.  On  the  22nd  the  commandant  of  the 
French  in  Tortona  agreed  to  surrender  the  citadel  on 
the  11th  September,  if  no  advance  were  made  in  the 
meantime  by  the  French.  A  few  days  later  came  the 
news  of  the  complete  defeat  of  Klenau.  The  latter  had 
been  overtaken  by  an  order  from  Melas  to  send  back 
six  battalions  to  Tuscany,  and  his  Cossacks  to  Lombardy, 
just  when  Watrin  and  Mulisse  left  Genoa  to  attack  him. 
He  obeyed  the  order  of  Melas,  and  was,  in  consequence, 
soundly  beaten  on  the  26th  at  Rapello.^  Suvorof  was 
now  compelled  to  think  of  other  things  than  the  invasion 
of  Genoa. 

For  a  few  weeks  after  the  victory  of  Novi  he  remained 
inactive  in  camp  at  Asti,  enjoying  his  growing  fame. 
The  Tsar  was  carried  away  by  his  feelings,  and  ordered 
the  Guard  and  all  other  Russian  troops,  even  in  his  own 
presence,  to  show  the  same  military  honours  to  Suvorof 
as  to  His  Imperial  Highness's  own  person.^  The  King 
of  Sardinia  having  addressed  him  as  "  our  dear  cousin,'* 
the  Tsar  welcomed  Suvorof  into  his  own  family,  "  since 
all  Kings  were  related  to  each  other."  Outside  Russia 
the  name  of  Suvorof  became  known  as  widely  as  that  of 
Frederick  the  Great  during  the  Seven  Years'  War.  His 
portrait  appeared  in  the  window  of  every  print-shop, 
and  no  one  was  deterred  from  selling  the  fashionable 
subject   by  want   of   acquaintance   with  the   original. 

^  Mil.  iii.  105,  350  ;  Hennequin,  vi. 
*  Fuchs,  iii.  24,  76,  132,  169. 
»  Russ.  Star.  (1884),  iv.  627. 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  SECOND  STAGE  293 

One  enterprising  Austrian  tradesman  coolly  appropriated 
an  English  portrait  of  George  Washington,  and  labelled 
it  "Suwarrow."  In  England,  where  everybody  was 
wildly  excited  by  Suvorof's  triumphs,  the  artists  went 
as  far  astray,  and  he  generally  appeared  adorned  with 
huge  moustaches,  smoking  a  monstrous  pipe,  and  wear- 
ing furs,  gold  chains,  and  boots  which  rivalled  those 
accredited  to  the  famous  Puss.  Gillray,  with  nothing 
but  his  imagination  to  guide  him,  drew  a  ferocious  giant 
of  a  negroid  type,  with  the  customary  moustaches, 
described  it  as  etched  "  from  the  original  drawing  taken 
from  life,"  and  underneath  it  declared  that  "  This 
extraordinary  man  is  now  in  the  prime  of  life — Six 
Feet  Ten  Inches  in  height — never  tastes  either  wine 
or  spirits ;  takes  but  one  Meal  a  day ;  and  every 
Morning  plunges  into  an  Ice  Bath ;  his  Wardrobe 
consists  of  a  plain  Shirt,  a  White  Waistcoat  and  Breeches; 
short  Boots  and  a  Russian  Cloak  ;  he  wears  no  covering 
on  his  Head,  either  by  day  or  night ;  when  tired  he 
wraps  himself  up  in  a  Blanket  and  sleeps  in  the  open  air : 
he  has  fought  29  pitched  battles,  and  been  in  75  engage- 
ments.'* 1  The  Russian  Ambassador  wrote  to  tell  Suvorof 
that  in  a  Birmingham  theatre  he  had  heard  a  song  in 
his  praise  sung  after  "  God  save  the  King  "  and  "  Rule 
Britain."  It  was  greeted  with  thunderous  applause, 
and  was  twice  encored.  A  medal  designer  named 
Bolton  was  anxious  to  issue  a  medal,  and  wanted  a 
portrait.2  Ladies  began  to  wear  Suvorof  hats  and 
feathers.^    Fame  had  nothing  more  to  offer. 

Suvorof  did  not  abandon  his  liking  for  talking  across 
the  dinner-table.  Every  day  he  entertained  a  large 
number  of  guests  at  the  midday  meal,  which  took  place 
at  the  time  of  a  modern  breakfast.  At  his  own  table, 
at  any  rate,  the  fare  was  not  of  a  tasty  kind.     French 

^  Several  of  these  "  portraits,"  including  the  Gillray,  are  in  the 
Suvorof  Museum  at  Petrograd. 

2  Fuchs,  iii.  258. 

3  Russ.  Star.  (1884),  iv.  627. 


294  SUVOROF 

hnigrSs  and  Austrian  officers  found  boiled  meat  and 
kasha  very  inadequate,  in  spite  of  the  enthusiasm  with 
which  he  pressed  the  stuff  upon  them,  and  they  generally 
had  another  meal  immediately  afterwards.  On  these 
occasions  Suvorof  talked  constantly.  He  displayed  an 
intimate  knowledge  of  military  history,  and  could 
describe  in  detail  all  the  principal  fortresses  of  Europe. 
He  was  particularly  fond  of  talking  of  his  own  perform- 
ances. "  A  man,"  he  said,  "  who  has  accomplished 
great  works  ought  to  speak  of  them  often,  so  as  to 
inspire  ambition  and  emulation  in  his  hearers."  He 
must  have  been  very  happy,  sitting  in  the  midst  of  a 
concourse  of  guests,  Russian,  Austrian,  Italian,  French, 
and  English,  every  one  of  them  in  full  uniform  and 
wearing  his  orders,  and  himself  the  unchallenged  leader 
of  them  all.  He  talked  as  a  rule  until  he  was  tired,  and 
then  he  lay  down  to  rest  on  his  straw  mattress.^  One 
of  these  great  triumphs  has  been  described  in  detail  by 
Fuchs,  who  for  once  did  his  duty  by  posterity,  and  set 
down  Suvorof  as  he  was. 

After  welcoming  the  guests,  who  included  Lord 
William  Bentinck,  Suvorof  ordered  some  one  to  read 
the  Lord's  Prayer.  At  the  end  he  said,  "  Who  doesn't 
say  '  Amen  '  won't  get  any  vodka."  Then  he  drank 
to  the  health  of  the  two  Emperors,  and  bade  the  guests 
be  seated.  He  began  at  once  to  talk,  and  expressed 
great  delight  at  having  two  "  High  Excellencies  "  at  his 
table,  in  the  persons  of  Rosenberg  and  Melas.  He 
proceeded  to  make  Melas  repeat  after  him  that  Russian 
title,  in  the  first  syllable  of  which  is  the  most  difficult 
vowel  sound  in  the  language.  Poor  Melas  was  unable 
to  get  over  the  stumbling-block,  and  the  cheerful  Field- 
Marshal  launched  upon  a  long  dissertation  in  German 
on  the  beauty  and  richness  of  his  native  tongue.  Then 
he  asked  Melas  if  he  had  a  Russian  interpreter  in  his 
army.     Receiving  the  answer,  "  No,"  he  declared  that 

1  **  Reminiscences  of  the  Marquis  Marsillac,"  Russ.  Star.  (1879), 
ii.  399. 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  SECOND  STAGE  295 

in  future  he  would  always  write  to  Melas  in  Russian,  "  just 
as  I  wrote  to  Prince  Coburg  at  the  Ruimnik,  '  Coming 
Suvorof.'  1  All  the  heads  of  his  staff  nodded  over  those 
words  like  antiquaries  over  Egyptian  hieroglyphics.  But 
the  victory  on  the  Ruimnik  interpreted  them." 

Turning  upon  Fuchs  and  Miloradovitch,  who  had 
been  entertaining  an  Italian  poet,  he  demanded  why 
they  were  not  talking  to  their  "  dear  guest."  They 
answered  with  one  voice  that  they  had  been  doing 
nothing  else  since  they  sat  down.  He  then  told  them 
to  request  the  poet,  whenever  he  sang,  to  sing  bass. 
He  had  himself  sung  once  with  Dyerzhavin.  He  invited 
the  poet  to  come  to  church  and  listen  to  him. 

At  this  point  some  rather  badly  cooked  beef  was 
brought  to  the  table,  and  Suvorof  directed  his  fire  at 
Lord  William.  "  Take  a  little  more,  Lord  Bentinck  ! 
Now  you,  as  an  old  acquaintance,  will  be  able  to  judge 
of  the  goodness  of  this  roast  beef.  I  love  the  country," 
he  went  on,  "  where  Duke  Portland  and  Lord  Bentinck 
were  bom.  There  also  was  born  Marlborough,  the 
friend  of  Prince  Eugen.  Yes,  and  there  is  my  friend 
the  Prince  of  Coburg.  We  make  the  age  of  Orestes  and 
Pylades  no  empty  fable."  Then  he  went  on  to  praise 
Lord  Chatham,  comparing  him  with  Cicero,  and  spoke 
in  high  terms  of  the  existing  British  Government.  All 
this  while  he  was  pulling  up  his  stockings,  by  way  of 
hinting  to  his  English  guests  that  he  was  in  great  need 
of  the  Order  of  the  Garter.  Then,  after  a  short  pause, 
he  began  to  wink  his  eyes,  smile,  grimace,  and  rub  his 
face  with  his  fingers.  "  This,"  he  declared  to  the  com- 
pany, "  is  the  best  remedy  against  faintness."  And 
without  any  warning  he  began  to  tell  his  adjutant  a 
story  in  German,  the  crisis  of  the  anecdote  being  a 
French  pim.  The  unfortunate  man  understood  hardly 
a  word  of  any  language  but  Russian,  and  escaped  a 
disaster  only  by  the  continual  repetition  of  his  entire 
German  vocabulary,  "  Ja,  gut.     Ja,  gut." 

1  "  Reminiscences  of  De  la  Gardie,"  Russ.  Star.  (1876),  iii.  834. 


296  SUVOROF 

Then  the  Field-Marshal  turned  upon  the  general 
company,  and  informed  them  that  "  a  military  man 
must  know  the  languages  of  the  peoples  with  whom  he 
is  at  war.  In  Turkey  I  studied  Turkish ;  in  Poland, 
Polish ;  in  Finland,  Finnish,"  and  in  proof  of  this  last 
statement  he  declaimed  a  Finnish  poem,  extolling  its 
rhythm.  After  this  he  discoursed  to  Miloradovitch 
about  the  military  virtues,  and  told  him  to  work  out, 
with  the  assistance  of  Fuchs,  the  distinction  between 
vaillanc€y  valour,  courage,  and  bravoure.  His  attention 
was  next  directed  to  the  Italian  poet,  who  was  sitting, 
as  Fuchs  says, "  holding  his  finger  under  his  eye,  according 
to  the  custom  of  the  Italians,'*  and  demanded,  "  What 
are  you  thinking  about  ?  *'  The  bard  replied  with 
enthusiasm,  "  My  imagination  has  transported  me  to 
the  tent  of  Agamemnon,  where  I  sit  in  the  council  of  the 
Greek  chieftains,  and  see  the  fall  of  Troy  and  the  triumph 
of  Hellas.*'  Suvorof  upon  this  delivered  an  address 
of  considerable  length,  which  Miloradovitch  and  Fuchs 
were  bidden  to  translate  for  the  benefit  of  the  poet.  "  I 
have  known  Homer  for  a  long  time.  It  was  my  friend 
Yermil  Ivanovitch  Kostrof  who  made  me  intimately 
acquainted  with  him  in  our  native  language.  I  like 
Homer,  but  I  don't  like  the  ten-year  siege  of  Troy. 
What  slowness  I  How  much  misery  for  Greece !  I 
don't  want  to  be  Agamenmon ;  I  should  not  have 
quarrelled  with  quick-footed  Achilles.  I  like  his  friend 
Patroclus  for  his  quickness  ;  where  he  showed  himself, 
there  the  enemy  was  not.  And  Ossian,  my  travelling 
companion ;  he  fires  me ;  I  see  and  hear  Fingal  in  the 
mist,  sitting  on  the  high  rock  and  saying,  '  Oscar, 
conquer  might  in  arms  ;  defend  the  weak.'  Honour 
and  fame  to  the  singers  !  They  make  us  men  I  They 
are  the  creators  of  social  good.  They  are  the  spark 
flung  into  the  powder.  Even  now  there  rings  in  my 
ears  the  summons  of  his  poetry ;  oh,  the  great  man  ! 
The  genius  !     The  grandissima  testa  !  " 

As  Fuchs  says,  "  Somehow  or  other  we  were  able  to 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  SECOND  STAGE  297 

quench  this  conflagration."  But  another  began  almost 
at  once.  Turning  to  Melas,  he  asked,  "  Was  it  long  ago, 
the  Trojan  War  ?  "  A  more  learned  man  would  have 
fallen  into  the  pit  and  been  denounced  as  a  can't-teller. 
But  Melas,  being  a  simple  soldier,  answered  positively, 
"  A  thousand  years  before  Christ."  "  Ah,  merciful 
God  !  How  long  ago  began,  not  the  period,  but  the  age 
of  our  military  art !  How  it  has  been  mutilated  in  our 
time  !  Why  did  Wiirmser  hide  himself  in  Mantua  ?  " 
"  Surely,"  said  Melas,  "  the  existing  circumstances 
compelled  him."  "  Existing  circumstances,  existing 
circumstances !  Can't-tellness,  molly-coddling,  method- 
ism,  equivocation ! "  vociferated  Suvorof.  This  he 
repeated  several  times.  Then  he  said  to  Fuchs,  "  My 
Prime  Minister  and  High  Chancellor  in  the  war  against 
the  atheists,  write  this  down  clearly,  '  They  love 
mediocrity,  they  don't  endure  talent,  because  it  can't 
bear  the  curb.' "  Then  to  Melas  again,  "  Isn't  it  true, 
papa  Melas,  that  our  war  is  the  first  in  the  world  ?  It 
is  being  waged  by  Paul  I.,  and  in  truth  he  is  the  first  to 
fight  without  covetousness,  to  render  to  each  his  own 
without  reward.  Where  are  there  such  examples  in 
history  ?     Hurrah  for  the  Russian  Tsar  !  " 

At  this  point  Melas' s  adjutant,  Eckhardt,  slapped  his 
forehead,  trying  to  kill  a  fly.  "  Ah,  merciful  God  !  " 
cried  the  horrified  Suvorof,  "  you  didn't  kill  the  fly  ?  " 
"  No,"  replied  Eckhardt,  "  I  drove  it  away."  "  Thanks ; 
we  mustn't  kill  the  poor  mites,  they're  only  looking  for 
food.  Have  you  read  Voltaire  ?  "  "  No."  "  Bravo, 
bravo  !  The  frivolous  levity  of  Voltaire,  the  crack- 
brained  paradoxes  of  Rousseau,  and  the  atheism  of 
Diderot  have  generated  a  hellish  crop  of  rebelliousness. 
But  our  bayonets  have  just  sent  them  flying."  Here 
the  Field-Marshal  shed  a  few  tears.  Then  he  went  on, 
"  What  a  rootless  tree  !  Let  us  pray  to  God — read 
Gellert,  he's  no  sophist,  no  debauchee." 

He  next  treated  three  of  his  guests  in  succession  to 
a   long   and   detailed   conversation   about   his   private 


298  SUVOROF 

estates.  After  this  he  talked  of  his  last  ball,  and 
regretted  the  absence  from  it  of  a  certain  Maria 
Mikhailovna  of  Borovits,  who  would  have  eclipsed  all 
the  ladies  of  this  country.  "  Now,**  he  said,  "  I  shall 
dance  no  more  till  we  reach  Paris,  and  there  I  shall 
dance  the  *  Minuet  k  la  Reine,'  to  the  tune  of  *Vive 
Louis,  vive  Louis,  vive  Louis  ! '  " 

After  nearly  three  hours  of  this  miscellaneous  talking, 
the  old  man  grew  tired,  and  began  to  hang  his  head. 
His  servant  Proshka  dug  him  in  the  back,  and  whispered 
"  Time  to  sleep,  master.*'  He  nodded.  Then,  after 
sitting  for  a  few  more  minutes  in  meditation,  he  declared 
that  "  after  the  thunder  of  the  guns  the  Muses  had  lulled 
me  to  sleep.**  He  crossed  himself,  hopped  from  his 
chair,  trotted  off  to  another  room,  and  threw  himself 
down  on  his  straw  mattress. 

Having  sat  for  three  hours  over  dinner,  "  all  dis- 
persed,'* says  Fuchs,  "  to  look  for  something  to  eat.*' 
Melas  stayed  behind  to  say  to  the  Secretary,  "  Good 
Lord,  how  this  man  busies  himself  with  his  own  pride. 
But  what's  to  be  done  ?  He's  the  only  one  who  has 
anything  to  be  proud  of.  Sit  still,  shut  your  mouth, 
and  wonder."  ^ 

One  or  two  undated  notes  of  Fuchs  may  refer  to 
events  of  this  period.  An  autograph  letter  from  a 
certain  Minister  came  to  him,  written  in  a  cramped  and 
undecipherable  hand.  He  and  the  Secretary  struggled 
with  it  for  some  time,  but  with  little  success.  Then  he 
told  Fuchs  to  send  it  back  with  a  covering  note  : 

We  return  your  impenetrable  secret.  Suvorof  likes, 
in  diplomacy  and  politics,  clear  writing  and  mathe- 
matical accuracy.  Mystical  Delphic  language  is  alien 
to  him.     It  was  the  ruin  of  Greece.^ 

These  classical  allusions  were  constantly  on  his  lips 

and  his  pen.     But  one  of  them  fell  on  stony  ground. 

Coming  across  a  military  surgeon  of  very  questionable 

skill,   he  bade  him   "  cease  to   enrich   Charon."     The 

1  Fuchs.  Misc,  92.  »  Fuchs,  Misc.  138. 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  SECOND  STAGE  299 

doctor  stolidly  answered  that  he  had  never  heard  the 
name  before.  This  hardy  reply  was  too  much  for 
Suvorof .  Running  into  another  room,  he  shut  the  door, 
and  cried  out,  "  Don't  cast  pearls  before  swine."  ^ 

Fuchs  had  an  eye  for  other  things  beside  the  ludicrous, 
and  some  of  his  gleanings  are  worth  preservation  as 
throwing  light  on  the  stronger  aspects  of  the  Field- 
Marshal's  character.  "  I  work  in  minutes,  not  hours."  ^ 
"To  do  good  one  must  make  haste."  ^  "  Love  your 
soldiers  and  they  will  love  you — that's  the  whole  secret 
of  victory."  *  "Be  the  slave  of  your  word,  not  the 
master  of  it."  ^  These  are  not  bad  maxims,  and  his 
description  of  Chasteler  as  "  my  full,  but  badly  arranged 
military  library  "  ^  is  better  than  mere  clowning.  Fuchs 
himself,  in  the  pages  where  he  describes  the  great  dinner, 
is  careful  to  point  out  that  performances  of  this  sort 
were  only  Suvorof's  play,  and  that  in  business  he  was 
energetic  and  kept  close  to  his  work.  That  work  was 
now  largely  concerned  with  the  proposals  for  a  campaign 
in  Switzerland. 

The  first  suggestion  that  Suvorof  should  enter 
Switzerland  came  from  England.  In  May  the  Dutch 
expedition  was  proposed  to  the  Tsar,  and  on  the  13th 
June  Lord  Grenville  sent  the  sketch  of  a  further  plan  : 
that  the  Archduke  Charles  should  march  through  Alsace, 
by  way  of  Belfort,  into  France  ;  that  Suvorof  should 
take  his  place  and  clear  Switzerland  ;  and  that  the 
Austrian  Army  in  Northern  Italy  should  enter  Savoy 
and  the  Dauphine.  This  project  had  the  solitary  merit 
of  concentrating  all  the  Russian  forces  on  one  spot  and 
abolishing  the  difficulty  of  the  joint  operations  in  Italy. 
It  was  at  once  approved  by  the  Tsar,  and,  rather 
unexpectedly,  by  Thugut.  But  the  latter  had  other 
objects  in  view  than  a  military  victory.  He  was  deter- 
mined that  if  the  English  and  Russians  were  going  to 

1  Fuchs,  Misc.  139.  2  jj^-^,  84,  93. 

3  Ibid.  91,  94.  *  Ibid.  110. 

^  Ibid.  110.  «  Ibid.  111. 


800  SUVOROF 

the  Low  Countries,  an  Austrian  army  should  be  on  the 
spot  when  the  time  came  to  share  the  spoils.  Raising 
no  objection  to  the  transfer  of  Suvorof  to  Switzerland, 
he  said  that  the  Archduke  must  be  transferred  to  the 
Lower  Rhine.  This  would  leave  not  more  than  25,000 
men  on  the  frontiers  of  Alsace,  and  would  make  an 
advance  on  Belf ort  impossible.  The  negotiations  dragged 
on  for  some  weeks,  and  on  the  7th  August  Thugut  went 
so  far  as  to  order  the  Archduke  to  leave  Switzerland  as 
soon  as  Korsakof  arrived  on  the  spot  to  replace  him. 
The  immediate  effect  of  this  order  was  to  paralyse  the 
Archduke,  who  could  undertake  nothing  in  a  theatre 
which  he  was  so  soon  to  leave.  Suvorof,  in  the  mean- 
time, had  shown  no  liking  for  a  plan  which  wasted  time 
and  threw  Italy  once  more  into  the  incompetent  hands 
of  Austria.  But  so  long  as  the  plan  retained  its  original 
form,  he  was  prepared  to  acquiesce  in  it.  It  was  not 
until  the  27th  August  that  he  received  orders  from  the 
Austrian  Emperor  to  betake  himself  into  Switzerland, 
and  learnt  that  the  Archduke  was  to  transfer  himself 
to  the  Lower  Rhine. 

The  original  plan,  though  it  involved  the  loss  of 
some  time  in  moving  troops  from  one  theatre  of  war 
to  another,  had  some  good  in  it.  With  Thugut's 
alterations  it  was  incurably  bad.  Even  the  transfer 
of  Suvorof  to  Switzerland  would  have  been  a  sound 
move,  if  only  it  had  not  been  made  conditional  on  the 
withdrawal  of  the  Archduke.  Every  military  argu- 
ment was  in  favour,  not  of  such  a  dispersion  of  forces, 
but  of  a  concentration  against  the  French  in  Switzerland. 
Italy  was  safe,  on  the  Lower  Rhine  the  enemy  could 
only  muster  10,000  or  15,000  men,  and  there  was  little 
to  encourage  the  Directory  in  what  was  going  on  in 
Holland.  A  direct  attack  by  the  Archduke  upon 
Massena,  supported  by  an  invasion  of  Switzerland 
from  Italy  by  Suvorof  and  vigorous  action  by  the 
smaller  Austrian  forces  on  the  Lindt  and  in  the  Grisons, 
must  have  resulted  in  a  complete  victory.     The  Swiss 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  SECOND  STAGE  301 

bastion  would  have  been  abolished,  and  the  French 
frontiers  opened  to  invasion.  In  the  absence  of  some 
almost  impossible  accident,  these  consequences  must 
have  followed.  Even  the  events  of  the  middle  of 
August  had  not  affected  the  vital  principles  of  strategy. 
The  control  of  the  Simplon  and  the  St.  Got  hard  had 
been  lost.  But  it  might  be  resumed,  or  Suvorof  might 
enter  Switzerland  further  to  the  east. 

Nevertheless,  while  all  the  practical  arguments  were 
on  the  side  of  bold  and  combined  aggressive  action, 
the  War  Council  at  Vienna,  enveloped  in  its  hyper- 
political  mist,  saw  nothing  but  its  own  distorted  abstrac- 
tions. With  its  usual  insistence  upon  secondary  and 
private  affairs,  it  subordinated  the  interest  of  the 
alliance  to  that  of  the  Austrian  Empire.  It  was  jealous 
of  English  and  Russian  success  in  the  Low  Countries, 
and  it  was  jealous  of  English  and  Russian  success  in 
Italy.  If  any  plunder  was  to  be  got  in  Flanders,  it 
must  be  got  for  the  House  of  Hapsburg,  and  if  the 
French  were  expelled  from  Italy,  the  fruits  of  the  work 
of  Suvorof  and  Nelson  must  be  gathered  by  Austrian 
armies.  Therefore,  while  reason  and  loyalty  clamoured 
for  a  united  effort  in  Switzerland,  the  elaborated 
intellects  of  Vienna  had  worked  out  their  plan  for 
withdrawing  the  Archduke  into  a  position  where  he 
could  share  in  the  approaching  triumph  in  the  Nether- 
lands, and  for  getting  Suvorof  out  of  Italy,  where  he 
was  for  ever  threatening  to  restore  authority  to  native 
princes,  instead  of  passing  it  over  to  the  pro-consuls 
of  the  Austrian  Empire.  The  War  Council  aimed  first 
and  last  at  the  enlargement  of  Austrian  territory,  and 
its  Allies  were  never  more  than  its  instruments.  The 
Emperor  had  even  the  insolence  to  refer  to  "  the  press- 
ing requests  of  the  inhabitants  of  Belgium,  who  wish 
to  see  appearing  in  their  neighbourhood  part  of  the 
Austrian  Army  in  Germany."  ^    No  one  chafed  more 

1  Letter  of  Thugut  to  Cobenzl  of  the  6th  August ;  set  out  in  Mil. 
iii.  883,  385. 


802  SUVOROF 

at  this  interference  of  politicians  with  questions  of 
strategy  than  did  the  Archduke  Charles.^  The  blame 
for  the  failure  of  the  campaign,  the  consequent  destruc- 
tion of  the  Coalition,  and  the  resurrection  of  French 
power  in  the  next  year  must  rest  upon  the  shoulders 
of  the  statesmen  of  Vienna.  There  have  always  been 
fewer  perils  in  the  hostility  of  Austria  than  in  her 
friendship. 

Bad  as  the  plan  had  now  become,  it  was  made  still 
worse.  It  had  been  agreed  that  the  Austrians  should 
evacuate  their  positions  in  Switzerland  only  when  the 
Russians  were  ready  to  occupy  them.^  But  as  Suvorof 
continued  his  arrangements  for  the  consolidation  of 
his  position  in  Italy,  the  Archduke's  patience  became 
exhausted.  On  the  15th  August,  at  his  first  interview 
with  the  Austrian  Commander-in-Chief,  Korsakof  learned 
to  his  dismay  that  the  Archduke  was  about  to  march 
his  troops  out  of  Switzerland  to  the  last  man,  and  that 
he  himself  was  to  be  left,  with  28,000  Russians,  the 
French  6migr6s  of  the  Prince  de  Conde,  6000  Bavarians, 
and  an  indefinite  but  certainly  weak  force  of  Swiss  in 
English  pay,  to  defend  a  line  of  150  miles  against  enemy 
forces  of  twice  his  strength.^  Suvorof  wrote  on  the 
80th  August,  not  yet  aware  of  the  Archduke's  inten- 
tion, to  beg  him  to  wait  until  Coni  and  Tortona  had 
fallen,  and  the  French  had  been  driven  back  into 
Savoy.  These  operations  would  occupy  two  months.* 
But  before  this  date,  on  the  26th,  the  Archduke  had 
written  to  inform  Suvorof  that  he  was  going  to  carry 
out  his  part  of  the  scheme,  and  on  the  29th  his  van- 
guard had  actually  been  set  in  motion  towards  Schaff- 
hausen.^  At  the  earnest  appeal  of  Wickham,  the  British 
envoy  at  his  headquarters,  he  consented  to  leave  22,000 

1  Letter  of  Wickham  to  Suvorof  of  the  9th  Sept. ;  Mil.  iii.  407  ; 
the  Archduke's  own  Geschichte  des  Feldzugs,  1799,  ii.  149  ;  Hiiffer, 
Quellen,  240. 

2  Mil.  iii.  380,  382,  384.  »  Mil.  iii.  161,  394  ;  Huffer,  240. 
«  Huffer,  311,  326.  »  Ihid.  312,  813. 


ITALIAN  CAMPAIGN,  SECOND  STAGE  303 

men,  under  Hotze,  Jellacic,  and  Zimbschen,  until  Suvorof 
should  actually  arrive.  But  he  took  with  him  38,000 
men.^  The  Allies  were  thus  deprived  of  all  their  existing 
superiority  of  strength  at  the  critical  point,  in  the  hope 
of  succeeding  at  a  later  date  in  a  direction  from  which 
they  were  as  yet  threatened  with  no  danger. 

On  the  3rd  September  Suvorof  learned  with  horror 
that  the  Archduke  had  begun  his  march.^  Waiting 
only  for  the  surrender  of  Tortona,  he  began  his  prepara- 
tions for  departure.^  There  could  be  no  question  now 
of  further  triumphs  in  Italy.  He  must  go  to  Switzer- 
land to  avoid  a  disaster.  His  feelings  during  the 
period  were  expressed  in  some  violent  private  and 
official  letters.  On  the  21st  August  he  broke  out  to 
Count  Stephan  Vorontsof  in  his  crypto-mythological 
style : 

Survey  the  hell  over  which  Momus  reigns,  and, 
stretching  his  jaw  at  the  century's  end  more  mightily 
than  ever  to  the  Alps,  restores  new  Rome,  whose 
foundations  were  near  the  abyss.  Mighty  Pluto, 
conquered  by  his  great-grandchild,  Astoroth,  abandons 
his  bridge-building  across  the  Styx,  and  flies  to  dry 
his  cloak  under  the  roof  of  Mollycoddling.  Most  humbly 
I  begged  long  ago  for  my  recall.  Now  I  have  had  fever 
for  a  week,  though  still  on  my  legs.  This  hell  has 
vomited  the  hydra.  Cassano  20,000,  Tidone-Trebbia 
30,000,  Novi  40,000  ;  now  there  will  be  50,000,  although 
I  have  60,000  in  prisoners  alone.* 

On  the  3rd  September  he  wrote  more  coherently  to 
Razumovski : 

Thugut — that  pettifogger — ^that  owl  from  his  dark 
nest,  as  if  bound  about  by  dreams  of  Skanderbeg,  can 
he  lead  armies,  direct  circumstances  that  change  in 
the  twinkling  of  an  eye  ?  A  conqueror  and  a  commander 
he  can  never  be  except  without  his  political  rules. 
Thugut  is  bound  hand  and  foot  to  detail. 

1  Mil.  iii.  174,  398. 

2  Mii^  iii^  424  ;  Fuchs,  iii.  179,  183. 

3  Fuchs,  iii.  254,  257,  282. 
*  Voronts.  Arkh.  xxiv.  339. 


804  SUVOROF 

This  colossal  Thugut,  having  lost  by  his  defensive- 
ness  the  Netherlands,  Switzerland  with  the  Rhine 
fortresses,  and  Italy,  was  only  stopped  by  Campo 
Formio,  where  he  bent  his  knee  to  Bonaparte.  By  the 
help  of  God  alone  I  began  the  work  of  setting  things 
in  order,  and  then  he  with  his  silly  system  uses  the 
Archduke  to  thrust  me  out  of  France.  My  indignation 
prevents  me  from  writing  more  now. 

So  he  relieved  his  feelings.  But,  as  usual,  though 
his  distrust  and  hatred  of  Thugut  and  the  War  Council 
never  vanished  till  the  final  rupture  of  the  Coalition, 
the  prospect  of  action  made  him  more  cheerful.  On 
the  7th  September  he  wrote  to  the  Tsar  : 

Graciously  forgive  me,  if  in  the  bitterness  of  my 
heart  I  dared  to  ask  for  my  recall  from  here  to  my 
blessed  fatherland.  I  am  now  used  to  bearing  with 
contempt  insults  directed  against  myself ;  but  when, 
by  the  insolence  and  audacity  of  the  Cabinet  of  an 
Ally  whom  you  have  loaded  with  benefits,  some  outrage 
is  done  to  the  glory  and  worthiness  of  my  Sovereign 
and  the  victorious  arms  which  he  has  entrusted  to  me 
— then  I  am  forced  to  incline  towards  a  life  of  peace. 
Henceforward  in  all  places  where  it  shall  please  the 
All  Highest  to  direct  my  life,  I  consecrate  it  to  the 
glorious  service  of  Your  Imperial  Highness.  .  .  .  Now 
I  am  about  to  lead  your  brave  soldiery  into  Switzer- 
land, whither  your  Supreme  Authority  has  pointed  me 
the  road,  and  there  on  a  new  field  of  battle  I  shall 
defeat  the  enemy  or  die  with  glory  for  my  fatherland 
and  my  Sovereign.^ 

On  the  11th  the  French  in  Tortona  surrendered.  On 
the  same  day  the  Russians  left  Alessandria  and  Rivalta 
for  Valenza ;  and  on  the  13th,  in  a  single  column, 
they  crossed  the  Po,  and  made  for  Bellinzona  and  the 
St.  Gothard. 

I  Mil.  iii.  437. 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE   SWISS    CAMPAIGN 

Alternative  routes — ^March  on  the  St.  Gothard — ^The  Pass  taken  by 
storm — Rosenberg's  flank  march  —  The  Devil's  Bridge  —  No 
thoroughfare  over  the  Mountains — Korsakof  s  defeat  at  Zurich — 
In  the  trap — ^Decision  to  fight  out  of  it — ^Battles  in  the  Muottothal 
and  Klonthal — ^Through  to  Claris — Over  the  mountains  again — 
Safe  but  not  sound — Correspondence — ^Recall  to  Russia. 

When,  on  the  21st  September,  the  Russian  Army  left 
Bellinzona,  and  began  to  climb  the  valley  of  the  Ticino 
towards  the  St.  Gothard,  the  general  situation  in 
Switzerland  was  not  safe.  Along  the  Limmat,  from 
the  Aar  to  the  town  of  Zurich,  stood  Korsakof 's  Russians, 
24,000  strong.  Prince  Albert  of  Wiirtemberg,  with 
2500  Austrians,  watched  the  northern  shore  of  the 
Lake,  and  Hotze,  with  8000,  guarded  the  line  of  the 
Lindt,  between  the  Lakes  of  Zurich  and  Wallenstadt. 
Jellacic  was  at  Sargans  with  5000  men,  Linken  at 
Ilanz  with  3500,  and  Auffenberg  at  Disentis  with  3000. 
Strauch  was  beyond  Biasco,  on  the  way  to  the  St. 
Gothard,  with  4500,  Victor  Rohan  with  2500  in  front 
of  Arona,  where  the  Simplon  road  opens  on  to  Lake 
Maggiore,  and  Haddik,  with  7500,  blocked  the  mouth  of 
the  valley  of  Aosta  and  the  Great  St.  Bernard.  The 
French  were  strongest  where  the  Allies  were  weakest. 
On  the  southern  passes  they  had  now  comparatively 
few  men,  and  Lecourbe  had  less  than  12,000  men 
between  Glaris,  on  the  Lindt,  and  Airolo,  on  the  Italian 
side  of  the  St.  Gothard.     But  between  the  Aar  and 

305  X 


806  SUVOROF 

Zurich  Mass^na  had  88,000  men,  and  opposite  Hotze 
Soult  had  11,500.  The  aspect  of  affairs  in  northern 
Switzerland  had  been  completely  reversed.  The 
Austrians  had  deliberately  marched  away,  and  the  French 
were  now  to  teach  them  what  to  do,  if  they  ever  had 
such  a  chance  again.  All  depended  on  the  movements 
of  Suvorof.  If  his  18,000  men  could  reach  Zurich  in 
time,  the  French  superiority,  in  numbers  and  in 
command,  would  disappear.  But  if  the  French  chose, 
they  could  win  a  victory  at  Zurich  which  would  make 
even  the  arrival  of  Suvorof  of  no  importance. 

There  were  in  fact  two  roads  open  to  him.  He  might 
have  gone  by  way  of  Chiavenna  over  the  Spliigen,  or, 
having  come  to  Bellinzona,  might  cross  the  Bernardino, 
descending  in  either  case  into  the  valley  of  the  Upper 
Rhine,  safe  from  any  hostile  interference.  Down  that 
valley  he  might  go  through  Chur  and  Sargans  ;  or, 
crossing  the  Panixer  Pass  from  Ilanz,  fall  upon  the 
French  at  Claris  and  drive  Soult  away  from  the  Lindt. 
This  was  the  safe  way.  On  the  other  hand  was  the 
St.  Gothard.  This,  it  is  true,  was  held  by  a  small  force 
of  the  enemy.  But  it  was  a  pass  which  a  small  force 
could  easily  hold,  and  the  road  over  it  ended  abruptly 
on  the  Lake  of  Luzern  at  Altdorf.  After  that  there 
was  nothing  but  a  mountain  path.  Nevertheless,  for 
Suvorof  this  was  the  direct  road,  and  his  determination 
to  come  to  close  quarters  with  the  enemy  at  the  earliest 
possible  moment  made  him  choose  the  St.  Gothard  route. 
To  him  the  plan  presented  itself  as  a  concentration 
against  a  stationary  enemy.  He  and  Strauch  on  the 
south,  Auffenberg,  Linken,  and  Jellacic  on  the  east, 
and  Hotze  and  Korsakof  on  the  north,  would  move 
simultaneously  against  the  French,  who  must  either 
run  or  be  ruined.  "  The  true  law  of  the  art  of  war  " 
he  wrote  to  Hotze,  "  is  to  fall  direct  upon  the  enemy."  ^ 

1  Letter  of  the  13th  September  ;  Mil.  iv.  17  ;  Fuchs,  iii.  289. 
Compare  his  circular  letter  of  the  5th  Sept.  ;  Mil.  iv.  252  ;  Fuchs, 
iii.  220. 


THE  SWISS  CAMPAIGN  307 

Perhaps  underestimating  the  strength  of  the  French,  and 


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THE  Operations  in 
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S         10  20  30 


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certainly  underestimating  their  capacity,  he  decided  upon 


808  SUVOROF 

a  strategy  which  could  only  succeed  if  the  enemy 
remained  inactive,  and  must  inevitably  involve  him  in 
great  perils  if  they  did  not. 

The  fundamental  error  of  the  plan  being  admitted, 
his  immediate  dispositions  were  nevertheless  well  made. 
He  was  not  going  to  waste  his  men  on  a  blind  rush  up 
a  narrow  gorge.  He  therefore  ordered  Strauch  and 
Derfelden  to  advance  along  the  Ticino  and  attack  the 
actual  pass  in  front,  while  Rosenberg  was  directed,  with 
about  6000  men,  to  go  by  Dongio  and  Santa  Maria  to 
Disentis,  and  take  the  defenders  in  the  rear.  The  two 
columns  of  Russians  were  to  unite  at  Andermatt  and 
descend  the  valley  of  the  Reuss,  while  Strauch  remained 
on  the  St.  Gothard  to  prevent  any  attack  from  the 
Rhone  valley.  Auffenberg  was  to  cross  from  the  Rhine 
valley  to  the  Maderanerthal  and  turn  the  defences  of 
the  Reuss.i 

The  question  of  maintaining  the  supplies  of  the 
Russian  Army  was  not  the  least  difficult  of  those  which 
presented  themselves.  Waggons  could  not  go  over  the 
St.  Gothard.  Suvorof  therefore  instructed  Melas  to 
provide  him  with  1429  mules,  to  be  ready  for  him 
when  he  reached  Taverno.  Each  man  was  to  carry 
food  for  3  days  and  the  mules  were  to  carry  enough 
for  4.  The  expedition  was  thus  equipped  for  a  week 
in  advance.  By  the  expiration  of  that  time  Suvorof 
expected  to  be  at  Schwyz,  where  he  could  get  all  he 
wanted  from  northern  Switzerland,  with  the  assist- 
ance of  Hotze  and  Korsakof.  All  this  was  pure  specu- 
lation. Schwyz  was  90  miles  away  over  the  Alps, 
and  13  miles  a  day  in  such  country  would  be  very 
hard  marching,  even  if  there  were  no  enemy  in  the  way. 
The  assumption  that  communications  would  be  opened 
with  northern  Switzerland  was  also  very  audacious. 
It  postulated  the  continued  inactivity  of  Massena,  and 
whatever  Suvorof*s  experience  of  Scherer,  he  had  no 
right  to  calculate  on  similar  irresolution  in  any  other 

1  See  the  plan  of  attack  in  Mil.  iv.  257. 


THE  SWISS  CAMPAIGN  309 

Frenchman.  The  success  of  his  strategy  depended 
entirely  on  the  luck  being  with  him,  and  he  should  have 
known  that  in  war  there  is  no  luck,  save  in  one's  self 
and  one's  troops.^ 

The  march  from  Alessandria  was  made  with  great 
speed.  The  heavy  baggage  and  artillery  had  been  left 
behind,  to  be  sent  round  by  way  of  Chiavenna  and 
the  Engadine  or  Verona  and  the  Tyrol,  and  25  mountain 
guns  had  been  taken  from  the  arsenals  of  Piedmont. 
In  this  state  the  Russians  covered  more  than  100  miles 
in  6  days.  Arrived  at  Taverno  on  the  15th,  Suvorof 
found  to  his  dismay  that  the  mules  were  not  there. 
There  was  nothing  to  be  done  but  wait.  Even  between 
Taverno  and  Bellinzona  the  road  was  useless  for  waggons. 
Five  priceless  days  were  thus  wasted.  By  the  20th 
650  mules  had  been  collected,  but  the  bulk  of  the  baggage, 
food,  and  ammunition  was  loaded  on  to  the  horses  of 
dismounted  Cossacks.^  On  the  19th  Rosenberg  had 
started  for  Bellinzona.  On  the  21st,  refusing  to  be 
diverted  by  renewed  French  activity  against  Rohan 
and  Haddik,  Suvorof  set  his  main  body  in  motion. 
Bagration  led  the  vanguard,  with  3000  men  and  4  guns. 
Schveikovski  followed,  with  4400  men  and  6  guns. 
Then  came  Forster,  with  3100  men  and  5  guns. 
Derfelden  brought  up  the  rear  with  5000  men  and  10 
guns.  A  handful  of  Cossacks  and  pioneers  was  attached 
to  each  section,  the  remainder  of  the  Cossacks  serving 
on  foot  as  a  baggage-guard.^ 

The  weather  was  bad,  and  the  road  an  ill-kept  track. 
In  streaming  rain  the  columns  moved  along  the  gorge 
of  the  Ticino,  at  first  between  the  densely  wooded  slopes 
beyond  Bellinzona,  and  then  among  the  barren  rocks 
which  shut  in  the  approach  to  the  actual  pass  near 
Airolo.  Derfelden,  with  Bagration,  Schveikovski,  and 
Forster,  reached  Biasco  on  the  21st,  when  Rosenberg 

1  Mil.  iv.  262  ;  Fuchs,  iii.  215. 

2  Mil.  iv.  22,  264,  265  ;  Fuchs,  iii.  291,  313,  315,  339,  347. 
8  Mil.  iv.  26,  270  ;  Fuchs,  iii.  319. 


810  SUVOROF 

had  already  started  on  his  flanking  march  by  Dongio 
and  Santa  Maria.  On  the  22nd  the  Russians  were  at 
Giomico,  and  Strauch,  who  had  been  waiting  for  them 
to  come  up,  moved  on  to  Faido.  With  this  column 
rode  Suvorof  on  a  Cossack  horse.  He  wore  his  plain 
uniform  with  a  thin,  unlined,  and  much-worn  cloak, 
which  he  called  his  "  paternal  cloak."  Gloves,  as  usual, 
he  had  not.  Beside  him  rode  an  old  Italian  named 
Antonio  Gamma.  He  had  lodged  in  Gamma's  house  at 
Taverno,  and  the  two  men  grew  quickly  to  like  each 
other.  "If  I  had  a  hundred  heads,"  said  Gamma, 
"  they  should  all  lie  at  your  feet."  On  the  morning  of 
Suvorof's  departure,  the  Italian  mounted  his  horse 
and  announced  his  intention  of  going  with  him.  To 
his  weeping  and  protesting  family  he  answered  that  he 
was  the  happiest  of  men ;  he  would  be  riding  with  the 
great  Suvorof.  So  the  two  old  men  went  off  together 
into  the  dark  mountains,  where  there  was  such  bloody 
young  men's  work  to  be  done.^ 

On  the  23rd  the  column  reached  Dazio.  Suvorof 
was  holding  Derfelden  back,  so  as  to  give  Rosenberg 
time  to  get  round  the  mountains  to  the  north-east. 
Rosenberg,  on  his  part,  was  struggling  with  continuous 
rain  and  cold  in  worse  country  than  Suvorof,  and  his 
marches  were  wonderful.  On  the  21st  he  covered 
16  miles  from  Bellinzona,  and  on  the  22nd  as  much 
as  20.  The  night  of  that  day  was  spent  at  a  height 
of  8000  feet,  without  any  fuel  to  cook  food  or  to  warm 
the  soaked  and  shivering  men.  On  the  23rd  they 
descended  to  Santa  Maria,  and  went  on  to  Disentis, 
where  they  came  into  touch  with  Auffenberg's  Austrians. 
Leaving  Auff enberg  to  climb  over  into  the  Maderanerthal, 
Rosenberg  pushed  straight  on  to  Tavetsch.  He  had 
marched  from  dawn  till  midnight,  and  had  covered  18 
miles.  The  next  day  he  advanced  towards  Andermatt, 
on  the  St.  Gothard  road,  and  attacked  the  French  on 
the  heights  to  the  east  of  the  village. 

*  Fuchs,  History  of  Suvorof,  ii.  172  ;  Misc.  181, 


THE  SWISS  CAMPAIGN  311 

The  St.  Gothard  was  defended  by  a  French  brigade, 
4250  strong.  About  2000  of  these  were  posted  on  the 
actual  pass  above  Airolo,  700  guarded  the  road  to  the 
Valais  and  the  Furka,  and  the  remainder  faced  Rosen- 
berg. The  natural  defences  were  tremendous.  The 
track  rose  steeply  from  Airolo,  crossed  a  buttress  of 
the  massif,  and  plunged  into  a  gorge  at  the  junction 
of  two  torrents.  Thence  it  rose  again  to  the  top  of  the 
pass  and  the  hospice,  6800  feet  above  the  sea  and  3000 
feet  above  Airolo.  Without  modern  artillery  and  high 
explosives  it  would  have  been  impossible  to  take  such 
a  position  by  direct  attack.  Nevertheless,  in  order  to 
detain  the  enemy  in  front  of  him  while  Rosenberg 
completed  his  turning  movement,  Suvorof  resolved  to 
make  an  attempt.  On  the  24th,  when  Rosenberg  was 
loyally  fulfiUing  his  duty  at  Andermatt,  he  himself 
began  a  vigorous  battle  at  Airolo.  He  advanced  in 
three  columns,  Bagration  and  Schveikovski  turning 
the  enemy's  left,  and  three  battaUons  climbing  the  rocks 
on  the  opposite  bank  of  the  Ticino,  while  Forster  and 
the  bulk  of  Strauch's  Austrians  pushed  straight  through 
Airolo.  The  flanking  columns  started  from  Dazio  at 
3  o'clock  in  the  morning,  and  the  centre  column, 
with  all  the  artillery,  was  held  back  so  as  not  to  come 
into  action  till  the  enemy  had  already  been  shaken  from 
the  flanks. 1 

The  rain  had  ceased,  but  the  day  was  cold  and  misty, 
and  a  biting  wind  met  the  Russians  as  they  moved  up 
the  ravine.  Bagration  came  into  contact  with  the 
enemy  at  2  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  and  was  soon 
fiercely  engaged  with  about  1000  men  posted  in  the 
rocks  and  gullies  round  the  village  of  Bosco.  The 
infantry  and  some  dismounted  Cossacks  succeeded  in 
getting  round  the  enemy's  left  by  a  climb  over  the 
heights  above.  The  left  and  centre  columns  had  by 
this  time  come  into  action,  and  the  French  fell  back 
behind  the  first  of  the  two  torrents.  Here  they  were 
1  Mil.  iv.  275  ;  Fuchs,  iii.  328,  335. 


812  SUVOROF 

again  attacked  in  front  by  Schveikovski  and  Forster, 
and  again  Bagration,  continuing  his  advance  at  a  higher 
level,  forced  them  out  of  their  position.  Step  by  step 
the  defenders  withdrew  to  the  summit  of  the  pass,  where 
they  received  help  from  Loison's  brigade  at  Altdorf. 
Here  Schveikovski  and  Forster  made  a  third  attack 
upon  them.  But  numbers  and  courage  could  make  no 
impression  upon  such  a  position,  and  after  two  attempts 
the  Russians  were  brought  to  a  stand.  Already  1200 
men  had  been  killed  and  wounded,  and  the  survivors 
were  utterly  exhausted  by  their  fighting  and  climbing 
in  clothes  and  boots  unfit  for  such  rugged  work.^  But 
there  was  still  Bagration.  At  4  o'clock  in  the  after- 
noon he  suddenly  appeared  on  the  French  left  and 
threatened  their  rear  from  the  Mont  St.  Gothard. 
They  beat  a  hasty  retreat  towards  Hospithal,  and  the 
Russian  main  body  crawled  up  the  bloodstained  track 
to  the  hospice. 

After  a  brief  rest  at  the  hospice,  the  army  resumed 
its  march.  Half-way  towards  Hospithal  the  French 
again  offered  some  opposition  and  were  driven  back. 
At  Hospithal  they  were  reinforced  by  the  indefatigable 
Lecourbe,  with  the  rest  of  Loison's  brigade.  But  at 
this  point  Rosenberg  at  last  made  his  presence  felt.  He 
had  encountered  the  enemy  on  the  southern  slope  of 
the  Krispalt  early  in  the  morning  and  drove  them  hard 
to  the  west.  Miloradovitch,  with  the  vanguard,  fell 
impetuously  upon  the  main  body,  consisting  of  two 
battalions,  and  pushed  them  over  the  ridge  which 
separates  the  Rhine  valley  from  that  of  Ober  Alp. 
Around  the  Lake  of  Ober  Alp  a  stubborn  fight  took 
place,  and  the  French  musketry  was  continuous  and 
accurate.  But  Miloradovitch  at  last  drove  back  their 
right  wing,  and  the  rest,  fearing  to  be  cut  off  from 

^  It  was  not  until  the  day  of  the  battle  in  the  Muottothal  that  the 
Russians  found  out  the  secret  of  the  French  sureness  of  foot.  Tight 
Prussian  clothes  and  gaiters  and  lacquered  boots  without  nails  were, 
of  course,  worse  than  useless.    See  Starkof,  102. 


THE  SWISS  CAMPAIGN  813 

Andermatt,  gave  way  and  retreated.  They  were  hotly 
pursued,  and  reached  the  village  almost  at  a  run.  So 
close  were  the  Russians  that  the  road  was  nearly  cut 
between  Andermatt  and  the  Umer  Loch,  the  tunnel 
which  leads  to  the  Devil's  Bridge.  But  the  French 
succeeded  in  occupying  the  mouth  of  the  tunnel,  and, 
with  the  reserve  left  in  the  village  by  Lecourbe,  pre- 
pared to  renew  the  struggle.  The  numbers  were  too 
unequal.  As  soon  as  he  could  collect  his  men,  Rosen- 
berg advanced  to  the  attack.  In  the  mist  of  evening 
his  whole  line  charged  with  the  bayonet,  the  French 
were  outflanked  and  driven  past  the  village,  and  they 
were  not  allowed  to  halt  until  they  reached  the  other 
bank  of  the  Reuss. 

It  was  now  7  o'clock,  and  Rosenberg  was  in  the 
rear  of  Lecourbe  at  Hospithal.  Unfortunately  he  was 
not  aware  of  this,  and  camped  for  the  night,  without 
thinking  that  2  miles  away  he  might  have  crushed 
Lecourbe  against  Suvorof.  Lecourbe  himself,  knowing 
the  ground,  was  able  to  carry  his  men  into  safety.  Some 
crossed  the  Furka  into  the  Rhone  valley,  and  he  himself 
with  the  rest,  throwing  his  guns  into  the  Reuss,  climbed 
over  the  Betsberg  and  descended  at  Goeschenen.  The 
exhausted  Russians  made  little  attempt  at  pursuit. 
Veletski's  Austrian  regiment  was  sent  towards  the  Furka, 
and  the  rest  of  Suvorof 's  men  lay  where  the  last  shots 
of  the  battle  left  them.  Thus  ended  the  first  experience 
of  a  Russian  Army  in  mountain  warfare.  The  lesson 
had  cost  2000  casualties.  But  it  had  done  nothing  to 
shake  the  confidence  of  Suvorof  in  his  troops  or  of  the 
men  in  their  leader.^ 

1  In  a  despatch  to  Hotze  from  Hospithal,  Suvorof  broke  out  into 
German  doggerel.     The  following  is  an  equivalent  : 

The  twentieth  we  loaded  every  ass  ; 

The  twenty-first  climbed  Rosenberg  the  pass  ; 

The  twenty-second  Wildfield  went  to  fight ; 

The  twenty-fourth  Mount  Gothard  stormed  by  might ; 

And  thus  have  we  by  bayonet  and  sword 

The  poor  down-fallen  Switzerland  restored. 
Mil.  iv.  283.     "  Wildfield  "  is  Tierfeld,  i.e.  Derfelden. 


814  SUVOROF 

Early  in  the  morning  Suvorof  left  Hospithal,  and  he 
immediately  effected  a  junction  with  Rosenberg.  His 
next  task  was  to  pass  the  Urner  Loch  and  the  DeviPs 
Bridge.  From  Andermatt  he  sent  General  Kamyenski, 
with  one  of  Derfelden's  regiments,  to  follow  Lecourbe 
over  the  Betsberg.  With  the  main  body  he  marched 
through  the  village  and  prepared  to  force  the  direct 
passage.  The  place  was  naturally  impregnable,  and 
if  the  defending  force  had  been  large  enough  to  beat 
off  attacks  from  the  flank  as  well  as  in  front,  even 
Suvorof  might  have  been  turned  back.  The  Reuss  is 
not  very  deep,  though,  like  all  similar  streams,  it  is 
very  rapid,  and  its  bed  is  sown  with  boulders.  The 
road  itself  at  that  time  ran  at  a  rather  lower  level  than 
to-day,  and  the  existing  bridge  was  actually  built  on 
the  top  of  the  other.  The  old  bridge,  over  which 
Suvorof  had  to  pass,  was  about  75  feet  above  the  surface 
of  the  water,  which  at  this  point  plunges  down  a  series 
of  falls  with  mist  and  a  loud  uproar.  Before  crossing 
the  bridge  the  road  runs  along  the  right  bank  through 
the  tunnel  called  the  Urner  Loch.  This  is  about 
80  yards  long,  and  in  those  days  was  no  higher 
than  could  be  traversed  by  a  pack-horse.  Emerging 
from  this  passage,  the  road  traverses  a  shelf  of  the 
precipice,  turns  sharply  to  the  left  over  the  bridge, 
and  then  again  to  the  right,  following  the  left  bank 
down  the  stream.  The  old  bridge,  30  yards  long, 
was  composed  of  two  arches,  the  larger  springing  from 
the  right  side  of  the  gulf  to  the  left,  and  the  smaller 
covering  the  gap  between  the  abutment  of  the  first  on 
the  left  side  and  the  principal  mass  of  the  cliff.  On 
both  sides  of  the  abyss  the  rocks  rise  very  steeply, 
without  any  covering  of  soil  or  trees,  and,  except  by 
the  road  itself,  there  is  no  passage  that  can  be  found 
without  great  exertion  and  great  danger.  The  whole 
scene,  at  the  time  of  year  when  Suvorof  came  upon  it, 
is  gloomy  and  full  of  menace. 

The  French  troops  on  the  spot  belonged  to  those 


THE  SWISS  CAMPAIGN  315 

resolute  men  who  had  recently  taught  the  Austrians 
how  to  conduct  mountain  warfare.  On  the  24th  there 
were  two  battalions  of  Loison's  brigade  in  readiness, 
and  on  the  morning  of  the  25th  they  were  joined  by 
a  battalion  of  grenadiers  under  Lecourbe  himself,  fresh 
from  their  night  march  over  the  Betsberg.  The  bulk 
of  the  defenders  were  on  the  right  bank,  between  the 
mouth  of  the  tunnel  and  the  bridge,  with  a  single  gun.^ 
Two  companies  were  posted  on  the  heights  above  to 
prevent  a  turning  movement,  and  a  small  detachment 
was  on  the  Russian  side  of  the  tunnel.  For  some 
inexplicable  reason  the  French  did  not  take  the  obvious 
course  of  destroying  the  bridge  and  distributing  all 
their  forces  along  the  left  bank.  In  the  event  they 
began  to  break  down  the  bridge  when  it  was  too  late, 
and  they  were  driven  across  it  in  such  confusion  that 
it  was  easily  repaired,  and  provided  a  convenient  passage 
for  the  whole  Russian  Army. 

Miloradovitch,  followed  by  the  rest  of  Rosenberg's 
troops,  led  the  way,  and  after  them  came  Derfelden. 
They  were  greeted  by  a  burst  of  firing  from  the  tunnel, 
and  no  attempt  was  made  at  a  direct  attack.  While  a 
steady  fire  was  kept  up  on  such  of  the  enemy  as  appeared 
on  the  opposite  bank  a  detachment  of  300  volunteers, 
under  Colonel  Trubnikof,  scrambled  over  the  rocks  to 
the  right.  At  the  same  time  Major  Tryebogin,  with 
200  others,  descended  into  the  bed  of  the  torrent, 
waded  across  it,  sometimes  up  to  the  waist  in  water, 
struggled  up  the  opposite  bank,  and  got  a  footing 
among  the  rocks.  Tryebogin's  party  was  followed  by 
a  whole  battalion  of  grenadiers,  and  the  French  were 
attacked  from  all  sides. 

The  defenders  in  front  of  the  bridge,  with  Tryebogin 
and  the  grenadiers  firing  from  their  right,  and  Trubnikof 

1  Hennequin,  344.  Hennequin  says  that  Lecourbe  had  apparently 
no  cannon  with  him.  The  Russian  authorities  say  that  he  had,  and 
it  is  difficult  to  suppose  that  eye-witnesses  can  have  imagined  a  cannon 
where  none  existed. 


816  SUVOROF 

and  his  800  showering  bullets  and  rocks  upon  their 
heads  from  their  left,  were  soon  in  hard  case,  and  a 
belated  attempt  was  made  to  destroy  the  smaller  arch 
of  the  bridge.  The  advanced  post  must  either  retire 
or  stand  and  be  cut  off  when  the  bridge  collapsed. 
Seeing  them  in  confusion,  the  leading  Russian  battalion 
rushed  boldly  through  the  tunnel,  took  without  blench- 
ing the  scattered  fire  of  the  enemy  in  front  and  the 
more  steady  volleys  of  those  on  the  other  side  of  the 
stream,  and  drove  some  of  their  opponents  into  the 
gulf  or  across  the  bridge.  Those  who  remained  were 
all  killed  or  taken,  and  the  gun  was  thrown  into  the 
torrent.  The  Russians  were  for  a  time  held  up  by  the 
gap  in  the  bridge.  But  the  troops  on  the  left  bank  were 
now  well  in  the  rear  of  the  scene  of  action,  and  Kamyenski 
had  effected  a  junction  with  them.  The  situation  of 
the  French  was  made  still  more  hopeless  by  the  arrival 
of  Auffenberg  at  Amsteg  by  way  of  the  Maderanerthal. 
Lecourbe,  with  his  usual  energy,  struck  back  at  him, 
and  drove  him  up  the  Thal.^  But  this  was  only  to 
enable  the  troops  at  the  Devil's  Bridge  to  get  away. 
The  French  retreat  was  made  in  good  order.  They  fell 
steadily  back  to  Altdorf,  and  Suvorof's  army  marched 
as  steadily  after  them  down  the  pass.  On  the  26th 
there  was  a  brisk  fight  at  Altdorf,  and  Rosenberg  drove 
Lecourbe  out  of  the  road  towards  the  west.^ 

Up  to  this  point  Suvorof's  design  had  been  carried 
out,  but  not  with  clockwork  precision.  The  situation 
was  not  encouraging.  The  weary  troops  had  now 
traversed  40  miles  of  mountain  country  in  3  days, 
and  had  had  some  hard  fighting  as  well.  They 
were  already  faced  with  the  prospect  of  insufficient 
food,  in  spite  of  the  supplies  which  had  been  found 
at  Andermatt,  Amsteg,  and  Altdorf.  They  were  a  day 
behind  the  time-table,  and  many  of  the  mules  laden 
with  food  were  still  struggling  along  the  St.  Gothard, 
while  others  had  been  lost  by  accidents  on  the  road. 

1  Mil.  iv.  66,  57.  «  Ibid.  58. 


THE  SWISS  CAMPAIGN  317 

Before  Suvorof  lay  the  Lake  of  the  Four  Cantons, 
surrounded  by  lofty  mountains,  which  plunged  directly 
into  the  lake,  leaving  no  space  for  a  road  on  either 
side.^  To  the  left  there  was  no  passage  by  which  he 
could  reach  Korsakof.  To  the  right  the  defile  of  the 
Schachenthal  wound  upwards  to  the  Klausen  Pass, 
beyond  which  lay  the  valley  of  the  upper  Lindt.  In 
front  the  snow-crowned  mass  of  the  Rosstock,  rising  to 
9000  feet  above  the  sea,  barred  his  way  to  Schwyz  and 
Zurich.  Over  it  wound  two  tracks,  by  which  the  tourist 
may  still  scramble  to  the  Muottothal  with  great  pleasure 
in  the  holiday  season.  But  at  the  end  of  September 
such  paths  in  the  Alps  present  great  difficulties,  and 
it  was  Suvorof's  fortune  to  find  the  snow,  the  mist,  and 
the  cold  wind  at  their  worst. 

Two  other  roads  lay  open  to  him,  the  St.  Gothard 
and  the  Maderanerthal.  But  he  was  not  yet  aware  of 
what  was  going  on  in  the  north,  and  he  had  no  reason 
to  think  of  getting  away  from  the  enemy.  A  man  of 
such  a  temper  as  his  was  not  to  be  deterred  by  any 
natural  difficulty,  and  upon  his  troops  he  knew  that 
he  could  rely  to  the  uttermost  extremity  of  human 
strength.  The  men  were  in  want  of  food  and  boots, 
the  pack  animals  and  horses  were  exhausted,  and 
Suvorof  himself  not  only  shared  the  common  physical 
discomforts  but  bore  the  additional  burden  of  his 
responsibility.  He  ordered  the  march  to  go  on,  over 
the  Rosstock  to  Schwyz,  and  of  the  two  paths  he 
chose  that  which  lay  furthest  from  the  lake.  This  was 
concealed  from  the  view  of  Lecourbe,  but  at  the  same 
time  was  the  longer  and  the  less  practicable  of  the 
two.  Its  highest  point  was  the  Kinzig  Pass,  6500  feet 
above  the  level  of  the  sea,  and  5000  feet  above  Altdorf. 

The  Russians  had  entered  Altdorf  at  midday  on  the 

*  It  used  to  be  alleged  by  Russian  historians  (e.g.  Mil.  iv.  59)  that 
the  Austrian  officers  attached  to  Suvorof  had  neglected  to  inform  him 
that  there  was  no  road  round  the  lake  from  Altdorf  to  Schwyz.  This 
allegation  is  disproved  by  Hiiffer,  Quellen,  356,  363.  Suvorof  was  told 
that  this  part  of  the  route  was  a  mere  footpath. 


818  SUVOROF 

26th.  At  5  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  27th 
the  troops  of  Bagration  wound  their  way  through  the 
streets  of  Borglen,  on  the  slopes  of  the  Rosstock. 
Military  order  soon  vanished,  and  the  march  assumed 
the  form  of  a  scramble  in  single  file  up  a  path  which  often 
disappeared  entirely  from  view.  At  one  point  the  men 
could  hardly  find  a  foothold  on  a  ledge,  at  another 
they  struggled  through  screes,  at  a  third  they  found 
themselves  in  deep  snow.  The  condition  of  the  animals 
was  terrible.  A  Cossack  might  lead  his  horse  safely 
over  a  dangerous  spot,  but  many  a  horse  or  mule, 
stumbling  across  treacherous  ground  with  a  load  of 
stores,  part  of  a  gun,  ammunition,  or  priceless  biscuits, 
lost  its  footing  and  was  broken  among  the  rocks.  Not 
seldom  a  soldier  or  a  muleteer  was  dragged  down  by 
a  struggling  beast  and  perished  with  it.  The  mist 
clung  about  the  men,  soaked  them  like  heavy  rain, 
and  increased  every  difficulty  and  danger  of  the  passage. 
Tight  coats,  belts,  and  breeches  prevented  free  move- 
ment. Boots  gave  way,  and  every  discomfort  that  can 
afflict  a  soldier  on  the  march — cuts,  bruises,  and  wet 
cold — played  havoc  with  toes  and  feet.  Over  the  highest 
point  of  the  ridge,  after  the  last  abrupt  climb,  began 
a  difficult  descent,  made  worse  than  usual  by  the  recent 
rains,  which  had  in  some  places  washed  away  every 
semblance  of  a  path.  The  Russian  advance-guard 
staggered  into  the  Muottothal  at  5  o'clock  in  the 
evening.  A  journey  of  12  miles  as  the  crow  flies  had 
occupied  as  many  hours.^ 

The  men  of  the  Army  of  Italy  took  no  time  for  rest 
while  there  was  an  enemy  before  them.  Bagration,  with 
some  mounted  and  dismounted  cavalry,  pushed  on  to 
Mutten,  and  attacked  the  French  in  the  village.  Not 
a  man  escaped  of  the  144  men  who  were  there  ;  57 
were  killed  and  87  taken.  Bagration  then  disposed 
such  of  his  men  as  had  reached  the  spot,  in  readiness 

1  In  1894  a  Swiss  brigade,  in  bad  weather,  made  the  same  passage 
in  11  hours.     Hennequin,  354,  n.  3. 


THE  SWISS  CAMPAIGN 


319 


to  receive  an  attack  from  the  direction  of  Schwyz.     The 
last  of  the  main  body  had  not  yet  left  Altdorf.     The 


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whole  path  behind  Bagration  was  filled  with  a  long 
train  of  men  and  animals,  and  the  situation  of  those 


820  SUVOROF 

on  the  upper  levels — hungry,  cold,  and  footsore,  with 
no  shelter  from  the  biting  wind — was  miserable  beyond 
description.  There  was  no  wood  to  make  fires,  and 
fortunate  indeed  was  the  party  which  could  lay  hands 
on  a  candle  end,  shield  it  with  paper,  and  by  its  aid 
crawl  safely  into  a  place  where  the  wind  was  shut  away 
by  the  rocks.^  The  last  men  of  the  main  body  drew 
up  in  the  Muottothal  late  in  the  evening  of  the  28th, 
and  the  rear-guard  and  the  stragglers  of  the  baggage- 
train  were  not  got  in  till  the  30th.*  The  appearance 
of  this  crowd  of  dirty,  ragged,  and  ravenous  strangers 
filled  the  inhabitants  of  the  valley  with  horror  and 
suspicion.  They  hid  everything  they  could,  and  ex- 
pected the  worst.  But  the  discipline  of  the  Russians 
was  not  yet  destroyed.  So  hungry  were  they  that 
the  first  arrivals  devoured  their  potatoes  and  cabbage 
raw.  But  they  paid  for  everything  they  took,  and  at 
last  their  friendliness  conquered  even  the  terrors  of 
the  children.* 

The  difficult  and  perilous  march  had  not  escaped 
the  notice  of  the  enemy.  Lecourbe  was  as  little  in- 
clined as  Suvorof  to  let  a  foe  escape  with  impunity. 
He  begged  Mass^na  to  send  troops  to  Schwyz  and  at 
least  8000  men  to  Claris,  ordered  Molitor  to  watch  the 
Klonthal  and  throw  some  men  into  the  Muottothal, 
and  directed  the  officer  commanding  at  Schwyz  to  hold 
the  valley  against  the  invading  Russians.  He  was 
convinced  of  success.  "  Suvorof  with  his  18,000 
Russians  is  in  our  hands,"  he  wrote  to  Mass6na  on 
the  27th.*  He  himself  had  very  few  men  on  the  spot, 
and  they  were  hardly  less  weary  than  the  Russians 
themselves.  Nevertheless,  with  about  900  of  them 
he  engaged  the  rear-guard  in  Altdorf,  and  on  the  29th 
followed  it  vigorously  up  the  Schachenthal,  capturing 

1  Gryazef,  96.  *  Mil.  iv. 

3  Russ.  Star.  (1900),  ci.  131.     The  authority  is  the  son  of  the  Pro- 
testant pastor  of  the  valley. 
*  Hennequin,  351,  352. 


THE  SWISS  CAMPAIGN  821 

150  men,  60  horses,  and  a  considerable  quantity  of 
ammunition  and  stores.^ 

In  the  meantime  events  had  happened  which  changed 
the  whole  aspect  of  the  campaign.  Up  to  this  point, 
whatever  the  trials  and  sufferings  of  his  own  troops, 
and  whatever  the  vexations  which  he  had  personally 
experienced  at  the  hands  of  his  Allies,  Suvorof  had 
been  pressing  on  to  a  junction  with  another  army, 
with  the  aid  of  which  he  intended  to  destroy  the  main 
force  of  the  French.  •  At  Schwyz,  too,  he  expected  to 
find  ample  supplies  sent  to  meet  him  by  Korsakof  and 
Hotze.  But  on  the  28th  September,  when  his  main 
body  was  still  struggling  down  into  the  Muottothal, 
Colonel  Suitchof,  who  had  been  sent  with  a  squadron 
of  Cossacks  in  the  direction  of  Claris,  returned  with 
appalling  news.  Korsakof  had  been  beaten  at  Zurich 
and  had  retreated  to  Schaffhausen  ;  Hotze  had  been 
beaten  on  the  Lindt,  and  no  news  could  be  got  of  his 
subsequent  movements  or  his  present  situation;  and 
Massena  himself  was  in  all  probability  already  at 
Schwyz.     Everything  had  gone  to  smoke. 

This  meant  the  complete  failure  of  all  Suvorof's 
plans  for  the  overthrow  of  the  French  power  in  Switzer- 
land, and  the  consequent  imminence  of  his  own  destruc- 
tion. The  defeat  of  Korsakof  at  Zurich  had  been  as 
overwhelming  as  that  of  Moreau  at  Novi,  and  much 
more  skilfully  done.  Mass6na  had  beaten  a  stupid 
and  arrogant  commander  by  admirably  conceived  and 
executed  manoeuvres.  Leaving  the  streets  of  Zurich 
littered  with  his  artillery,  his  baggage,  and  his  wounded, 
Korsakof  had  burst  his  way  through  the  enemy's  line, 
and  carried  away  into  safety  some  5000  exhausted, 
though  not  dispirited  troops.  Some  other  units  eventu- 
ally reached  him.  But  for  practical  purposes  his  army 
had  ceased  to  exist. ^    The  triumph  of  Massena  had  been 

^  Hennequin,  357. 

^  Mil.  iv.  chap.  Ix. ;  Hennequin,  chap.  x. ;  Dedon,  Relation  DHaiUe^ 
etc.  (Paris,  1801),  an  admirable  account  of  Massena's  passage  of  the 
Limmat. 

y 


822  SUVOROF 

consummated  by  three  other  victories,  no  less  important 
in  their  cumulative  effect.  Soult  had  beaten  Hotze 
on  the  Lindt,  killing,  wounding,  or  capturing  almost 
half  of  his  force.  Jellacic  had  attacked  Molitor  at 
Claris,  but  on  learning  of  Soult's  success  had  retreated 
beyond  the  Rhine,  as  far  as  Maienfeld.  Molitor  had 
then  turned  upon  Linken,  and  chased  him  with  such 
vigour  to  Schwanden  that  he  continued  his  retreat  to 
Uanz.  By  the  29th  all  the  French  Armies  were  free  to 
deal  with  Suvorof.  Mass6na  marched  upon  Schwyz, 
and  Molitor  to  the  mouth  of  the  Klonthal,  as  the  Field- 
Marshal  collected  his  hungry  and  exhausted  soldiers  in 
the  Muottothal  and  prepared  for  the  hunters  to  close 
upon  him  in  the  trap. 

Any  other  commander  in  such  a  situation  might  have 
thought  of  capitulating.  For  Suvorof  there  was  only 
a  choice  of  ways  of  extricating  himself  by  force.  He 
summoned  a  council  of  war.  Bagration  was  early 
on  the  spot  and  found  the  Field-Marshal  in  great 
distress.  In  full  uniform  and  wearing  all  his  orders  he 
paced  rapidly  up  and  down  the  room,  and  not  noticing 
the  entry  of  Bagration,  broke  out  into  disjointed 
utterance :  "  Parades — drills — ^great  respect  for  one's 
self — defend  one's  self — hats  off ! — merciful  Lord  !  .  .  . 
Aye,  and  it  must  be  .  .  .  and  in  time  .  .  .  but  needs 
more  to  know  how  to  wage  war,  know  the  lie  of  the  land, 
be  able  to  calculate,  not  allow  one's  self  to  be  deceived, 
understand  how  to  beat.  .  .  .  But  to  be  beaten  is  easy 
.  .  .  throw  away  so  many  thousands  !  .  .  .  and  such 
men!  .  .  .  in  one  day  .  .  .  Merciful  Lord ! "  Bagration 
withdrew,  and  left  the  old  man  to  himself. 

When  he  returned,  and  the  full  council,  including 
the  Grand  Duke  Constantine,  assembled,  Suvorof  wore 
a  different  aspect.  He  bowed  to  the  officers,  shut  his 
eyes,  and  remained  silent  for  a  few  moments.  Then 
he  glared  fiercely  at  the  company,  and  began  a  vehement 
address  :  "  Korsakof  is  smashed  and  driven  behind  the 
Rhine.     Hotze  is  beaten,  we  have  no  news  of  him,  and 


THE  SWISS  CAMPAIGN  823 

his  corps  is  scattered.  Jellacic  has  retreated.  All  our 
plan  is  destroyed."  Then  he  launched  upon  a  passionate 
denunciation  of  the  Austrian  Government,  recited  all  the 
checks,  slights,  and  provocations  which  he  had  suffered  at 
its  hands  since  he  entered  Italy,  and  ascribed  the  defeat 
of  Korsakof  to  its  withdrawal  of  the  Archduke.  He 
described  the  miserable  condition  of  his  own  troops, 
their  want  of  food,  clothing,  and  ammunition,  all  due 
to  the  delay  of  5  days  at  Taverno.  But  for  that  delay 
Korsakof  would  not  have  been  beaten  at  Zurich.  All 
was  due  to  the  perfidy  and  treachery  of  Thugut  and  the 
War  Council  at  Vienna.  Now  they  were  on  the  verge 
of  ruin.  "  One  hope  left  to  us  is  in  Almighty  God ; 
another  in  the  bravery  and  unselfishness  of  our  soldiers. 
We  are  Russians.  God  is  with  us.  Save  the  honour 
of  Russia  !  Save  the  son  of  our  Emperor,  the  pledge 
of  his  gracious  Imperial  confidence  !  "  And,  bursting 
into  tears,  he  flung  himself  at  the  feet  of  the  Grand 
Duke. 

The  young  man  raised  him  and  embraced  him,  unable 
to  speak.  When  the  old  man  had  recovered  himself, 
Derfelden,  the  senior  officer  present,  declared  the  opinion 
of  all.  Derfelden  was  sixty-four  years  old,  but  he  spoke 
with  as  much  fire  as  Suvorof  himself:  "Father  Alex- 
ander Vassilyevitch  !  We  see  and  know  what  threatens 
us.  Surely  you  know  us,  father,  you  know  fighters, 
the  devoted  ministers  of  your  will,  who  love  you  beyond 
all  reckoning.  Trust  us  1  We  swear  to  you  before 
Almighty  God,  for  ourselves  and  all  the  rest,  whatever 
may  betide.  You  will  find  no  cowardice  in  us — we're 
Russians  and  don't  know  the  loathsome  thing — and  no 
grumbling.  Let  a  hundred  thousand  enemies  stand 
before  us,  and  let  the  mountains  in  our  way  be  twice — 
ten  times  as  high ;  we  shall  conquer  both ;  we  shall 
overcome  everything  and  not  shame  the  arms  of  Russia. 
If  we  die  we  shall  die  with  glory  !  Lead  us  where  you 
think  fit ;  do  as  you  know  how ;  we  are  all  yours, 
father  1     We  are  Russians  !  " 


824  SUVOROF 

This  was  followed  by  a  general  cry  :  "  We  swear  it 
before  Almighty  God  1  "  Suvorof,  who  had  listened 
to  his  old  comrade-in-arms  with  closed  eyes,  opened 
them,  looked  proudly  upon  his  followers,  and  cried: 
"  I  hope  I  Joy  I  Merciful  God,  we  are  Russians  !  I 
thank  you  I  Thanks  I  We  shall  beat  the  enemy ;  a 
victory  over  them  and  intrigue  together — victory  there 
shall  be  I  "  1 

There  was  no  question  of  going  on  to  Zurich,  nor 
can  there  have  been  much  debate  about  the  direction 
of  the  next  march.  To  push  on  to  Schwyz  was  to  court 
disaster.  The  only  possible  route  was  over  the  Bragel, 
5000  feet  high,  into  the  KlonthaL  At  Glaris  there 
would  be  a  chance  of  uniting  with  Linken,  and  after- 
wards with  Hotze  and  Korsakof.  Orders  were  issued 
accordingly.  Auffenberg  was  to  leave  at  once,  beat 
the  enemy  from  the  Bragel,  and  drive  them  as  far  as 
possible  down  the  Klonthal.  Early  on  the  next  day, 
the  30th,  Bagration  was  to  follow  him,  and  both  were 
to  push  on  to  Glaris  itself.  Schveikovski's  division 
was  to  start  after  Bagration.  Rosenberg  and  Forster 
were  to  hold  the  Muottothal  until  all  the  rest  had  got 
over  the  Bragel.  Rosenberg  in  particular  was  to  fight 
to  the  last,  not  to  yield  a  step  to  the  enemy,  and,  if 
possible,  to  drive  him  as  far  as  Schwyz,  but  no  further.* 

Auffenberg's  brigade  started  immediately,  cleared 
the  pass  of  the  enemy's  outposts,  and  descended  into 
the  Klonthal.  Bagration  and  Schveikovski  left  early 
next  morning,  and  at  3  o'clock  in  the  afternoon 
were  trudging  in  straggling  formation  through  the 
boulders,  undergrowth  and  swampy  ground  between 
the  cliffs  and  the  head  of  the  lake,  which  filled  a  large 
part  of  the  other  valley.  They  found  Auffenberg 
already  hotly  engaged.     The   Austrians,   2000   strong, 

*  Starkof,  210,  281.  According  to  Starkof,  Suvorof  said,  "  Jellacic 
and  Linken  have  retreated."  In  fact,  at  this  time  the  retirement  of 
Linken  was  not  known  to  Suvorof.     He  only  heard  of  it  in  the  Kldnthal. 

*  Fuchs,  iii.  348. 


THE  SWISS  CAMPAIGN  325 

had  been  in  action  since  the  morning.  The  French 
battalion  at  the  head  of  the  lake  had  been  driven  back 
along  the  narrow  road  between  the  water  and  the 
mountains  as  far  as  the  eastern  end  of  the  lake.  There 
Molitor  brought  up  another  battalion,  and  Auffenberg 
in  his  turn  was  compelled  to  give  ground.  In  spite 
of  his  superior  numbers  the  Austrian  commander  made 
no  attempt  at  a  turning  movement,  and  was  unable 
by  repeated  frontal  attacks  to  dislodge  the  French.^ 
Molitor  himself,  clamouring  for  further  reinforcements, 
was  equally  unable  to  defeat  Auffenberg,  and  the  affair 
was  not  settled  even  after  the  arrival  of  Bagration. 

Three  of  the  latter's  battalions  were  sent  up  the 
heights  to  the  left,  and  three  advanced  straight  down 
the  valley.  Auffenberg  simultaneously  withdrew, 
followed  by  Molitor,  who  was  attacked,  as  soon  as  he 
passed  the  head  of  the  lake,  in  front  and  on  the  left 
flank.  The  French  were  driven  back  with  heavy  loss 
into  the  gap,  but  they  rallied  there  and  held  their 
ground  until  the  evening.  Suvorof  and  Schveikovski 
came  up  after  dark.  More  of  the  baggage-animals 
were  lost  on  the  mountains,  and  the  Russians  camped 
for  the  night  in  rain  and  mist,  shivering  with  cold  and 
half-fed. 

The  rest  of  the  army  in  the  Muottothal  had  in  the 
meantime  fought  a  battle  of  a  decisive  character.  At 
dawn  on  the  30th  there  had  been  some  firing  between 
the  outposts,  but  during  the  morning  the  Russians 
remained  quietly  in  their  bivouacs.  Rosenberg  and 
Miloradovitch  with  three  regiments  occupied  the 
village  of  Mutten;  Rehbinder  with  his  own  regiment, 
a  battalion  of  Jagers,  and  two  regiments  of  dismounted 
Cossacks  lay  in  front  of  the  Franciscan  monastery, 
a  mile  lower  down  the  stream  of  the  Muotto ;  and  another 

*  Milyutin  alleges  (iv.  132,  317)  that  Auffenberg  actually  entered 
into  negotiations  with  Molitor.  This  is  denied  by  Angeli,  and  the 
French  have  no  records  of  it.  Almost  certainly  it  is  not  true. 
Hennequin,  362,  n.  2. 


826  SUVOROF 

battalion  of  Jagers  and  a  handful  of  Cossacks  under 
Major  Sabanyeyef  a  mile  still  further  towards  Schwyz. 
The  three  regiments  of  infantry  and  two  of  Cossacks, 
which  together  composed  the  rear-guard,  were  at  this 
time  still  descending  the  pass  some  miles  away.  There 
were  about  5500  men  at  Rosenberg's  disposal  in  the 
valley. 

On  the  other  hand  Mass^na,  after  a  hurried  journey 
by  water  to  Altdorf,  had  returned  to  Schwyz.  By  noon 
he  had  about  8000  men  on  the  spot,  and  with  these  he 
marched  upon  Sabanyeyef  at  the  mouth  of  the  narrow 
valley.  The  first  shots  were  exchanged  about  2  o'clock, 
and  the  Russians  fell  slowly  back  upon  Rehbinder, 
who  on  his  part  came  up  to  meet  them.  Rehbinder's 
men  went  gallantly  forward  with  the  bayonet,  and 
made  no  fewer  than  six  charges  upon  the  French.  The 
latter,  being  greatly  superior  in  numbers,  eventually 
drove  back  the  Russians  and  captured  one  of  their 
guns.  But  Rehbinder  himself  led  a  counter-attack, 
and  after  a  murderous  combat  the  gun  was  carried 
off  in  triumph.^  Shortly  afterwards,  it  being  then 
about  5  o'clock,  the  remaining  three  Russian  regi- 
ments came  up  from  Mutten.  Miloradovitch  passed 
through  the  disordered  fragments  of  Rehbinder's  regi- 
ment and  closed  upon  the  enemy,  while  the  two  Cossack 
regiments  clambered  round  the  sides  of  the  valley, 
separated  into  little  groups,  and  attacked  them  in  flank. 
The  Cossacks  were  especially  effective,  not  only  inflicting 
loss  upon  the  French  but  also  greatly  embarrassing 
them  by  their  unexpected  appearances  and  sudden 
withdrawals.  The  French  at  last  gave  way  and  were 
driven  headlong  down  the  valley  for  more  than  two 
miles.  Some  of  the  Cossacks  outran  them,  and  fell 
upon  their  rear-guard  at  the  narrow  entrance  of  the 
valley.  But  night  stopped  the  pursuit,  and  the  Russian 
main  body  withdrew  to  the  village  of  Mutten. 

On  the  next  day  the  fighting  was  renewed.     Rosenberg 

1  Starkof,  271. 


THE  SWISS  CAMPAIGN  327 

had  now  his  full  strength  with  him  and  could  put 
about  7000  men  into  line.  The  exact  French  numbers 
are  unknown.  But  their  total  strength  can  hardly 
have  been  less  than  15,000.  Massena  sent  a  column, 
the  composition  of  which  is  unknown,  over  the  heights 
to  the  north.  These  troops  went  astray  and  took  no 
part  in  the  fighting.  It  is  nevertheless  beyond  question 
that  the  French  troops  actually  engaged  were  very 
superior  in  numbers  to  the  Russian.^  The  formation 
of  the  ground  favoured  the  defenders.  The  road  from 
Schwyz  crossing  the  torrent  of  the  Muota  at  Ibach 
follows  the  left  bank  into  the  gorge,  through  which  the 
water  hurries  down  from  the  Thai  itself.  At  the  entrance 
to  the  narrowest  part  of  the  defile  the  track  once  more 
crosses  the  stream  over  a  stone  bridge,  and  then  mounts 
the  rocks  on  the  right  bank.  Two  miles  beyond  the 
bridge  the  path  emerges  into  the  open  valley,  which 
at  its  widest  part  is  about  a  mile  across.  On  the  morning 
of  the  1st  October  the  Russian  advanced  post,  a  regi- 
ment of  infantry  and  some  Cossacks,  stood  at  the  point 
where  the  torrent  of  Klingen  Tobel  crosses  the  road,  a 
mile  above  the  stone  bridge.  Two  regiments  of  infantry 
and  four  of  Cossacks  under  Rehbinder  were  stationed 
two  miles  behind  them,  and  the  rest  of  the  force  lay 
at  the  village  of  Mutten,  further  still  to  the  rear. 

At  11  o'clock  the  French  came  on  in  three  columns 
headed  by  skirmishers.  Massena  himself  with  a  strong 
reserve  and  5  guns  held  the  narrow  mouth  of  the  valley. 
The  first  attacking  column  with  artillery  followed  the 
road.  The  other  two,  pressing  into  the  open  ground, 
marched  along  to  right  and  left  of  the  stream.  The 
Russian  outpost  retired,  as  on  the  previous  day,  firing 
steadily,  and  attacking  any  incautiously  advanced 
parties  with  the  bayonet.  They  were  met  at  the  monas- 
tery by  Rosenberg,  who  had  drawn  up  his  main  body 

^  Massena  had  Mortier's  division,  a  demi-brigade  from  that  of  Loison, 
Hasan's  division,  and  a  reserve  of  grenadiers  at  Schwyz.  Mil.  iv.  319  ; 
Hennequin. 


828  SUVOROF 

in  two  lines  across  the  valley.  The  retreating  detach- 
ments passed  to  right  and  left  of  these  lines  and  re-formed 
on  their  flanks.  The  whole  mass  then  bore  down  upon 
the  French,  fired  a  volley,  and  charged  with  the  bayonet. 
With  these  serried  ranl«;  in  front  and  swarms  of  yelling 
Cossacks  on  right  and  left  the  French  were  unable  to 
deploy,  fell  into  disorder,  and  were  driven  pell-mell 
down  into  the  gorge. 

There  they  were  met  by  the  reserve,  and  the  Russian 
advance  was  for  a  time  completely  stopped.  But  the 
Cossacks  got  round  on  the  flanks,  and  the  whole  body  of 
the  French  was  pushed  through  the  defile  as  far  as  the 
Klingen  Tobel.  Here  the  fugitives  made  another  stand. 
Wasting  no  time  on  frontal  attacks  in  a  place  as  difficult 
as  the  Devil's  Bridge  itself,  Rosenberg  sent  his  Cossacks 
round  the  rocks  overhanging  the  French  left.  They 
passed  completely  round  the  enemy  infantry,  and 
attacked  the  gunners.  Then  Forster's  infantry  rushed 
down  the  road;  the  French  resistance  once  more  col- 
lapsed ;  and  a  desperate  struggle  for  safety  began  on 
the  narrow  road,  blocked  with  artillery  and  ammunition- 
waggons.  Many  of  the  runaways  fell  into  the  torrent 
from  the  stone  bridge,  and  the  Russians  mercilessly 
slaughtered  the  rearmost  of  those  who  kept  on  their 
feet.  The  rout  continued  as  far  as  Schwyz.  The 
67th  demi-brigade  met  the  pursuers  at  Schonenbuch, 
and  Rosenberg  withdrew  his  main  body  to  the  Muotto- 
thal.  But  some  of  the  mounted  Cossacks  chased  the 
enemy  into  the  streets  of  Schwyz  itself.  About  1200 
prisoners,  including  General  Lacour,  remained  in  the 
hands  of  the  victors,  and  several  cannon  with  limbers  and 
ammunition  were  taken,  and  either  buried  or  thrown 
into  the  torrent.  The  losses  of  both  sides  in  killed  and 
wounded  are  uncertain.  About  1500  French  wounded 
were  brought  back  by  the  Russians,  and  were  left  in 
the  monastery,  and  it  is  probably  not  unfair  to  estimate 
the  total  casualties  of  the  French  at  about  4000  men. 
Some  600  Russian  wounded  were  left  behind,  and  the 


THE  SWISS  CAMPAIGN  329 

total  Russian  losses  were  about  1000  killed  and  wounded 
and  a  few  prisoners.^ 

Mass^na  was  modest  in  his  estimate  of  the  import- 
ance of  this  battle.  But  in  fact,  he  had  suffered  a 
complete  defeat  where  he  had  expected  a  decisive 
victory.2  Rosenberg  had  not  only  saved  Suvorof 
from  pursuit,  but  had  driven  the  French  headlong 
before  him,  and  inflicted  such  loss  upon  them  that  he 
was  afterwards  able  to  climb  over  the  crest  of  the 
Bragel  without  any  interference.  The  night  after  the 
battle  was  spent  by  the  troops  in  collecting  the  dead 
and  wounded,  and  an  eager  search  for  the  food  carried 
by  the  dead  French  or  thrown  away  by  the  panic- 
stricken  survivors.  Great  was  the  rejoicing  when 
some  Cossack  found  a  cheese  or  a  sausage  in  the  woods ; 
and  even  soldiers'  biscuits  were  carefully  collected  and 
devoured  on  the  spot.^ 

The  day  of  the  great  victory  in  the  Muottothal  had 
been  spent  by  the  other  half  of  the  army  in  fighting  as 
fierce  though  not  so  successful.  On  the  night  of  the 
30th  September  Bagration  and  four  grenadier  battalions, 
a  battalion  of  Jagers,  and  four  companies  of  Austrian 
infantry  had  scrambled  up  the  rocks  to  the  left  of  the 
road  and  attained  a  position  directly  above  the  right 
flank  of  the  French.  Molitor's  patrols  encountered 
them,  and  before  dawn  the  rattle  of  musketry  was 
heard  all  over  the  heights.  This  was  the  signal  for 
Schveikovski  to  advance  boldly  down  the  valley.  A 
scrambling  fight  among  the  pine  trees  and  precipices 
drove  the  French  light  troops  along  the  side  of  the 
mountain,  while  their  main  body  retreated  4  miles 
along  the  road  until  it  reached  the  valley  of  the  Lindt. 

Here  desperate  fighting  took  place.  Molitor  was 
determined  at  all  costs  to  prevent  Suvorof  from  effect- 
ing a  junction  with  the  Austrians  in  the  north.     He 

1  Starkof,  219. 

*  See  his  Bulletin  Historique,  set  out  in  Hennequin,  506. 

8  Starkof,  219. 


880  SUVOROF 

threw  a  battalion  and  a  half  with  4  guns  across 
the  river  at  Netsthal,  and  blew  up  the  bridge  when 
some  of  the  pursuing  Russians  were  actually  upon  it. 
The  rest  of  his  troops,  two  battalions  and  a  half  with 
3  guns,  he  drew  back  to  the  north  of  Netsthal. 
Here  he  was  at  once  attacked  by  the  Russians,  and  as 
each  battalion  in  turn  emerged  from  the  valley  it 
threw  itself  upon  the  French.  The  latter  after  a 
determined  struggle  gave  way,  and  left  300  prisoners, 
a  flag,  and  one  gun  behind  them.^  Molitor  fell  back 
to  Nafels,  while  his  detachment  on  the  other  side  of 
the  river  maintained  a  brisk  fire  on  the  flank  of  the 
pursuers.  Rallying  at  Nafels,  the  French,  inferior  to 
the  Russians  in  nothing  but  numbers,  turned  and 
drove  them  back  to  Netsthal.  This  attack  and  counter- 
attack were  twice  repeated.  The  third  charge  of  the 
Russians  almost  carried  the  bridge  at  Nafels,  and  the 
two  forces  were  struggling  desperately  on  the  middle 
of  the  bridge  when  a  final  effort  of  the  84th  demi- 
brigade  turned  the  scale.  A  fourth  onslaught  again 
reduced  the  French  to  extremities,  and  the  road  to  the 
north  seemed  at  last  to  be  definitely  in  the  hands  of 
the  Russians,  when  the  2nd  Swiss  demi-brigade,  followed 
by  some  of  Gagan's  division,  came  up  from  the  rear. 
Molitor  harangued  the  Swiss,  reminded  them  of  an 
earlier  Swiss  victory  on  the  same  ground,  and  launched 
his  new  reinforcements  at  the  bridge.  The  Russians 
were  driven  back  once  more  to  Netsthal.  There  a 
group  of  Cossacks  and  a  battalion  of  infantry  had  at 
last  succeeded  in  crossing  the  river  and  driving  back 
the  detachment  on  the  right  bank,  but  the  impetuous 
advance  of  the  French  main  body  compelled  them  to 
withdraw.  Nevertheless,  the  struggle  was  not  even  yet 
decided,  and  once  more  the  Russians  succeeded  in 
pressing  on  to  Nafels.  As  night  fell,  Gagan  himself 
came  up  behind  Molitor  with  a  fresh  battalion  of 
grenadiers,    and    about    9    o'clock    400    of    the    94th 

1  Mil.  iv.  148  :   Venanson's  Narrative  in  Jomini,  vol.  xii. 


THE  SWISS  CAMPAIGN  331 

demi-brigade  reached  Nafels.  The  arrival  of  these 
new  troops  settled  the  fate  of  the  day.  For  the  sixth 
time  the  Russians  were  driven  back,  this  time  beyond 
Netsthal,  and  Molitor  firmly  established  himself  for 
the  night  in  the  position  which  he  had  taken  up  in 
the  morning.  The  conduct  of  the  Russian  troops  on 
this  occasion  left  nothing  for  criticism,  but  that  of  the 
French  was  beyond  praise.  The  losses  on  either  side 
remain  as  uncertain  here  as  in  the  Muottothal.  But 
the  flanking  fire  of  Molitor's  detachment  across  the  Lindt 
more  than  made  up  for  any  inferiority  in  his  numbers, 
and  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  the  Russian  casualties 
were  the  heavier. 

This  heavy  fighting  between  Netsthal  and  Nafels  had 
been  carried  on  by  Bagration  and  Auffenberg.  Suvorof, 
with  the  bulk  of  Schveikovski's  division,  had  entered 
Claris.  There  he  was  joined  by  Rosenberg.  On  the 
2nd  October  the  latter  began  his  march  over  the  Bragel. 
Before  setting  out,  he  sent  a  messenger  to  Schwyz 
demanding  rations  for  12,000  men,  who  were  to  enter 
the  town  on  the  next  day.  Deceived  by  this,  or  shaken 
by  their  overthrow  of  the  1st,  the  French  made  no 
attempt  at  an  attack.  Not  till  the  3rd  did  their  van- 
guard enter  the  valley,  and,  pushing  on  towards  the 
pass,  gather  in  a  few  score  prisoners,  a  large  number 
of  horses  and  mules,  and  the  cannon  which  the  Russians 
had  pitched  into  the  ravines.  After  a  toilsome  march 
and  two  nights  on  the  rocks  of  the  Bragel  the  last  of 
Rosenberg's  rear-guard  were  gathered  into  Claris.  The 
whole  army  was  in  a  most  miserable  state.  Their 
clothes  and  boots  were  in  rags,  they  had  suffered  all  the 
hardships  of  continual  marching  and  fighting,  cold, 
wet,  and  hunger,  and  when  the  French  magazines  at 
Claris  and  the  resources  of  the  inhabitants  had  been 
exhausted,  each  man  received  little  more  than  a  few 
biscuits  and  a  pound  of  cheese.  Officers  and  soldiers 
were  in  the  same  state.  No  one  would  allow  Suvorof 
to  go  on  foot.     But  Rehbinder's  boots  were  without 


882  SUVOROF 

soles,  and  if  any  general  was  in  better  case  it  was  not 
because  he  had  claimed  the  privileges  of  his  rank. 
Misfortune  had  reduced  all  to  one  common  level  of 
physical  wretchedness,  as  it  had  raised  all  to  one  common 
level  of  reputation. 

Suvorof  was  faced  on  the  4th  October  with  the  same 
difficulty  of  choosing  a  way  of  escape  as  had  confronted 
him  in  the  Muottothal,  six  days  before.  The  obvious 
route  was  through  Netsthal  and  Nafels.  True,  Molitor 
barred  the  way,  and  had  shown  by  his  fighting  on  the 
1st  that  his  own  temper  and  that  of  his  troops  were 
of  the  most  resolute  and  fiery  description.  But  Molitor 
until  the  night  of  the  4th  had  only  8000  men  with  him, 
and  the  rest  of  the  available  French  troops  were  distri- 
buted between  the  mouth  of  the  Muottothal  and  the 
Lakes  of  Zurich  and  Wallenstadt.  Suvorof  had  still 
16,000  men,  who  had  already  proved  themselves  to  be 
inferior  to  none  in  the  world  in  spirit.  There  can  be 
no  doubt  that  if  he  had  marched  straight  upon  Netsthal, 
even  Molitor  must  have  yielded  the  passage.  There  was 
besides  Jellacic,  who  could  make  a  diversion  in  the  rear 
of  the  French. 

These  were  obvious  facts,  and  even  if  Suvorof  did 
not  know  the  exact  situation  and  strength  of  the  French 
troops  in  front  of  him,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that, 
in  ordinary  circumstances,  he  would  have  marched 
straight  ahead.  But  the  circumstances  were  not 
ordinary.  Apart  from  the  want  of  ammunition,  which, 
more  than  the  want  of  food,  reduced  the  actual  fighting 
value  of  his  army,  the  ill-feeling  against  the  Austrians 
had  reached  a  point  beyond  which  it  could  hardly  be 
suppressed.  There  had  as  yet  been  no  hint  of  dis- 
loyalty or  want  of  co-operation  between  the  different 
units  of  his  army.  But  their  own  hardships,  consequent 
upon  the  destruction  of  Korsakof's  force  at  Zurich, 
which  in  its  turn  was  attributed  to  the  retirement  of 
the  Archduke  from  Switzerland,  had  confirmed  in  the 
minds  of  the  Russian  officers  and  men  that  contempt 


THE  SWISS  CAMPAIGN  333 

and  distrust  of  Austria  as  an  ally,  which  had  been 
created  by  previous  experience  and  their  knowledge 
of  the  Viennese  plan  of  campaign.  Linken,  too,  had 
run  away  without  being  beaten  ;  and  Jellacic  could 
not  be  trusted  to  do  anything  else.  The  time  had 
come  to  abandon  the  attempt  to  support  those  who 
had  never  supported  them,  and  to  save  the  remainder 
of  the  precious  Russian  Army  for  the  further  purposes 
of  the  Tsar.  It  was  therefore  decided  at  a  Council  of 
War,  held  on  the  4th  October,  to  make  for  Chur  by 
way  of  the  Panixer  Pass  and  Ilanz  ;  and  a  message  was 
sent  on  to  Linken  to  have  20,000  rations  ready  at  Chur 
for  the  6th  and  Tth.i 

On  the  night  of  the  4th  began  the  last  stage  of  the 
march  into  safety.  The  heavily  wounded  were  left 
behind  and  commended  to  the  mercy  of  the  French. 
Bagration  on  this  occasion  commanded  the  rear-guard. 
He  had  at  his  disposal  the  same  units  as  those  which 
had  formed  his  vanguard  at  the  beginning  of  the 
campaign.  But  their  total  strength,  once  nearly  3000, 
was  now  only  2000.  One-third  of  his  force  had  been 
killed,  wounded,  or  captured.^  As  the  rest  of  the  army 
marched  away,  he  drew  his  force  across  the  valley  in 
front  of  Schwanden.  Molitor,  who  knew  of  Suvorof's 
intention  on  the  4th,  sent  one  battalion  along  the  Alps 
to  the  right  of  Bagration,  where  its  fire  could  command 
the  road  to  Engi  and  the  Panixer  Pass.  But  with  the 
aid  of  an  additional  battalion  Bagration  was  able,  in 
spite  of  his  want  of  artillery,  to  hold  Molitor  in  check 
with  the  bayonet  alone  during  the  whole  of  the  5th. 
Falling  slowly  back  to  Engi  he  remained  there  for  two 
hours,  resisting  all  attempts  of  the  French  to  dislodge 

1  Mil.  iv.  153,  327.  Suvorof  wrote  in  his  own  hand,  "  There  is  no 
hope  of  the  Imperialists."  Weyrother  had  written  to  Jellacic  on 
the  3rd,  telling  him  that  Suvorof  was  going  to  move  on  to  Wallenstadt, 
and  Jellacic  actually  took  steps  to  meet  him.     Huffer,  402. 

'  Mil.  iv.  156.  The  losses  of  his  six  battalions  amounted,  between 
the  14th  September  and  the  6th  October,  to  499  killed,  524  wounded, 
and  141  missing — in  all,  1164  men.     Bagration's  Journal,  54. 


834  SUVOROF 

him.  As  night  fell  he  got  away  with  difficulty  to  Matt, 
closely  pursued  by  the  enemy,  who  captured  a  con- 
siderable number  of  prisoners,  horses,  and  mules.^ 

The  night  was  spent  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Elm, 
and  a  part  of  the  troops  was  under  arms  until  daybreak. 
At  2  o'clock  in  the  morning  the  vanguard  moved  up 
the  defile  towards  the  Ringenkopf,  and  when  the  light 
came    the   main   body  was   beyond   the   reach  of   the 
enemy.     The  weather  was  worse  than  before.     Heavy 
rain  in  the  valley  and  snow  on  the  heights,  a  bitterly 
cold  wind,  and  dense  mist  combined  to  render  this  the 
most  terrible  of  all  the  marches  of  Suvorof 's  army.    The 
local  guides  fled  and   left  the  soldiers  to  take  care  of 
themselves.     The  hardships  of  the  Rosstock  and  the 
Bragel  were  forgotten  in  the  extremity  of  endurance 
and    exertion    required    by    the    Panixer    Pass.      The 
soaked  and  shivering  column  wandered  as  best  it  could 
among  the  rocks.     In  many  places  a  false  step  meant 
death,  and  not  a  few  of  those  who  sat  down  to  rest 
perished  of  cold.     More  than  300  unhappy  beasts  of 
burden   fell   with   their   precious   loads   and   were   left 
behind.     All  the  remaining  cannon  were  flung  over  the 
precipices.     An  officer,  rashly  venturing  on  horseback, 
rolled  from  top  to  bottom  of  one  of  the  fatal  slopes 
and  was  dashed  to  pieces.     Suvorof  himself  was  held 
in  his  saddle  by  two  Cossacks,  and  to  all  his  requests 
to  be  left  alone  his  sturdy  protectors  answered  nothing 
but  "  Sit  still  1  "  *    At  one  point  a  few  Cossack  lances 
were  burnt  to  provide  him  with  hot  tea,  and  no  other 
fuel  was  to  be  found  for  the  whole  army  but  similar 
weapons  and  the  pack-saddles.     But  the  spirit  of  the 
commander  and   his  followers   remained  what   it   had 
always   been,  and   if  they  groaned,  it  was  not  in   re- 
proach.    Most  spent  the  night   of  the   6th   along   the 
mountain  track.     Only  the  vanguard  under  Milorado- 
vitch  succeeded  in  reaching  the  little  village  of  Panix, 

»  Mil.  iv.  156,  157  ;   Hennequin,  380,  381  ;  Gryazef,  181. 
>  Gryazef,  183. 


THE  SWISS  CAMPAIGN  335 

on  the  southern  slopes,  4500  feet  below  the  summit  of 
the  pass.  Others  found  shelter  in  the  pinewoods.  The 
majority  were  left  without  food  or  fuel  or  any  other 
protection  than  that  of  the  rocks.  By  midday  on  the 
7th  most  of  the  troops  had  come  into  Panix,  and  the 
march  was  resumed.  In  the  evening  Suvorof  reached 
Ilanz,  and  stragglers  were  still  crawling  into  the  town 
on  the  following  morning.  Some  200  men,  too  ex- 
hausted to  move  further,  were  taken  prisoner  at  Panix. 
The  remainder,  now  about  15,000  strong,  reached  Chur 
on  the  8th.  There  they  lit  fires  and  cooked  food, 
repaired  their  boots  and  cleaned  their  weapons,  laughed, 
jested,  and  sang,  and  prepared  for  new  encounters  with 
the  enemy .1  In  seventeen  days  one  quarter  of  the 
whole  original  force  had  been  lost,  with  all  the  pack- 
animals,  artillery,  and  baggage.^  Nevertheless,  there 
were  brought  into  Chur  no  less  than  1400  French 
prisoners.^ 

Suvorof's  defeated  soldiers  had  no  reason  to  doubt 
that  after  a  short  rest  they  would  be  able  to  face  any 
enemy  that  might  be  brought  against  them.  Their 
failure  had  been  due  to  the  stupidity  of  the  Austrian 
Cabinet,  the  rashness  of  Korsakof,  and  the  obstacles 
thrown  in  their  own  way  by  Nature.  Of  what  had  been 
in  their  leader  and  themselves,  patience,  courage,  and 
a  mutual  loyalty  not  to  be  broken  by  any  act  or  event 
proceeding  from  without,  they  and  he  remained  in  full  and 
abounding  possession.  Such  virtues  in  such  men  are 
increased  rather  than  diminished  by  suffering ;  and  if 
Suvorof  and  his  army  had  been  proud,  strong,  and  terrible 
when  they  swung  gaily  out  of  Bellinzona,  they  were 
prouder,  stronger,  and  more  terrible  when  they  dragged 
their  bleeding  feet  over  the  cobble-stones  of  Chur. 

Nevertheless,  the  shock  to  both  leader  and  men  had 
been  too  severe.  March  discipline,  never  very  strong, 
had  disappeared  in  those  terrible  mountains,  and  at 

^  Mil.  iv.  chap.  Ixiii. ;  Hennequin,  379,  ei  seq. 
*  Mil.  iv.  330.  3  Ibid.  148. 


836  SUVOROF 

Claris,  Ilanz,  and  Chur,  the  inhabitants  had  suffered 
from  the  irresponsible  and  purposeless  plundering  which 
always  marks  the  track  of  a  demoralised  Russian  Army.^ 
Suvorof  himself,  though  still  emitting  flashes  of  his  old 
energy,  began  to  waver  in  his  purpose.  On  the  7th 
October,  when  his  rear-guard  was  still  trailing  over  the 
savage  ridge  of  the  Ringenkopf,  he  wrote  from  Panix 
to  the  Archduke  Charles  saying,  that  if  the  latter  would 
provide  food  and  ammunition,  he  was  himself  prepared 
to  unite  in  a  fresh  attempt  against  the  enemy.^  On  the 
road  from  Chur  to  Feldkirch  he  repeated  this  offer.' 
But  the  Archduke  could  not  adopt  his  plans,  and  he 
could  not  adopt  the  Archduke's.  Wickham,  the  English 
envoy,  met  him  at  Feldkirch  with  Colloredo,  an  aide-de- 
camp of  the  Archduke,  but  was  unable  to  produce  an 
agreement.  His  own  opinion  of  Suvorof  was  of  the 
most  unfavourable  kind.  It  would  have  been  impossible 
for  any  English  diplomatist  to  appreciate  a  man  whose 
manners  so  lacked  the  calm  repose  of  a  perfect  gentle- 
man. But  Suvorof  showed  himself  not  only  eccentric, 
but  thoroughly  unwilling  to  co-operate  any  further 
with  Austrians.  The  Archduke,  on  his  side,  lost 
patience.*  On  the  18th  October  Suvorof  held  a  Council 
of  War.  It  resolved  unanimously  that  from  the  Im- 
perialists nothing  was  now  to  be  expected  but  treachery, 
that  on  no  account  should  a  forward  movement  be 
undertaken,  and  that  for  the  necessary  refitting  of  the 
troops  a  halt  should  be  made  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Rhine.^  This  finally  settled  the  question  of  a  renewal 
of  hostilities  by  the  Alliance. 

Suvorof's  own  temper  is  apparent  from  his  corre- 
spondence. On  the  20th  he  wrote  from  Linden  to 
Count  Peter  Tolstoy : 

*  Wickham's  Correspondence ^  ii.  258. 

«  Fuchs,  iii.  855.  '  Ibid.  381,  424. 

*  See  the  correspondence  in  Mil.  iv.  351  et  seq.  ;  Fuchs,  iii.  381 
ei  seq. ;  Hiiffer,  150  et  seq. 

^  Report  of  Suvorof  to  the  Tsar;  Fuchs,  iii.  440,  443. 


THE  SWISS  CAMPAIGN  337 

The  General  wants  to  spellbind  me  with  his  Demo- 
sthenics.  You  are  within  three  steps  of  him — settle 
with  him,  and  let  me  know ;  I  have  my  answer  ready 
for  his  knowallness.  The  hero  on  the  defensive  has  let 
them  wrest  from  him  in  this  campaign — all  through 
protecting  the  hereditary  dominions.  .  .  .  How  can  he 
not  be  ashamed  before  the  conqueror  ?  And  he  makes 
these  proposals  to  me  !  Let  him  polish  up  his  tarnished 
glory.  Let  him  take  his  strong  army  and  enter  Switzer- 
land now ;  in  a  month  he  must  free  it ;  if  not,  I  shall 
have  refitted  in  quarters  and  shall  be  ready  to  act  with 
him,  even  in  a  winter  campaign.^ 

And  in  some  notes  of  the  same  day,  entitled  "  Military 
Physics,"  he  showed  the  same  resentment  against  the 
Archduke : 

The  Archduke  Charles,  being  not  at  the  Court  but 
on  active  service,  is  a  General  like  Suvorof,  except  that 
the  latter  is  the  senior  in  experience,  and  it  is  he  who 
has  overthrown  the  theories  of  the  century,  chiefly  by 
his  conquests  in  Poland  and  Italy  ;  the  rules  of  military 
science  are  his  province.  All  argument  and  interviews 
would  be  superfluous. 

And  among  the  rules  appended  to  this  are  some 
characteristic  touches : 

No  jealousies,  no  counter-marches,  no  demonstrations, 
which  are  only  child's  play.  ...  It  is  a  question  of  a 
month.  One  need  only  be  on  one's  guard  against  the 
bottomless  pit  of  systematic  rules. ^ 

Also  on  the  20th  October  he  wrote  to  Razumovski : 

This  crooked  Thugut  will  fling  Europe  and  himself 
into  danger.  I  declare  that  Potsdam  will  suffer  from 
his  cunning  with  the  other  Cabinets — a  worse  man  than 
any  of  them  ;  but  will  it  be  for  long  ?  In  a  brief  space 
they  and  he  and  Vienna  will  be  swallowed  up  by  the 
new  Rome. 

^  Fuchs,  iii.  447  ;    Voronts.  Arkh.  xxiv.  348. 
2  Fuchs.  iii.  455. 


338  SUVOROF 

Out  of  his  bilious  eyrie  he  enticed  me  from  Italy, 
where  my  heart  was  set  on  Lyons  and  Paris.  .  .  .  The 
Archduke  Charles  left  Switzerland.  The  price  was 
Lieutenant-General  Korsakof — to  the  joy  of  the  gallows- 
birds — the  price  was  I  and  a  great  and  high-tempered 
Ally — the  price  was  every  atom  of  the  common  cause  ! 

The  various  beliefs,  opinions,  and  customs  of  our 
Ally's  armies — I  long  ago  put  many  of  them  to  the  proof, 
and  found  them  false — only  further  evidence  in  this 
campaign.  All  their  commanders,  mercenaries,  spying 
for  Thugut  for  their  living,  were  bound  indissolubly  to 
me  by  duty  and  friendship,  and  from  that  fact  sprang 
all  my  incredible  victories  and  conquests.  The  existing 
Army  of  Italy  in  its  present  state,  through  the  pestilential 
contrivances  of  Thugut,  will  remain  dead  capital,  as  I 
am  here  at  this  moment,  and  the  Archduke  Charles 
himself,  too.    For  new  Campo  Formios  or  Reichenbachs.^ 

At  this  point  the  Tsar  himself  interfered.  Enraged 
by  Suvorof's  stream  of  complaints,  and  finally  by  the 
defeat  of  Korsakof,  he  wrote  on  the  22nd  October  to 
the  Austrian  Emperor,  before  receiving  the  report  of 
Suvorof 's  Council  of  War,  to  put  an  end  to  the  Alliance : 

Seeing  my  troops  abandoned  and  thus  delivered  to 
the  enemy  by  the  Ally  on  whom  I  counted  most,  his 
policy  contrary  to  my  views,  and  the  safety  of  Europe 
sacrificed  to  the  plans  of  your  Monarchy  for  its  own 
aggrandisement ;  having  besides  every  ground  for  being 
dissatisfied  with  the  double  and  artificial  methods  of  its 
Minister,  of  whose  motives,  out  of  regard  for  Your 
Imperial  Majesty,  I  desire  to  remain  ignorant — I  declare 
to  you,  with  the  same  loyalty  which  made  me  fly  to 
Your  aid  and  co-operate  in  the  success  of  Your  arms, 
that  from  this  moment  I  abandon  Your  interests,  to 
occupy  myself  solely  with  my  own  and  those  of  my  other 
Allies.2 

He  therefore  ordered  Suvorof  to  return  to  Russia. 
Before  receiving  the  order  of  recall,  the  old  warrior 
addressed  a  final  warning  and  appeal  to  the  Archduke  : 

1  Fuchs,  iii.  449  ;   Voronts.  Arkh.  xxiv.  348. 
*  Mil.  iv.  388. 


THE  SWISS  CAMPAIGN  339 

It  is  an  old  soldier,  nearly  sixty  years  in  harness, 
who  speaks  to  you,  who  has  led  the  troops  of  Joseph  II. 
and  Francis  II.  to  victory,  and  confirmed  Galicia  in  the 
power  of  the  illustrious  house  of  Austria ;  who  is  not 
for  the  babble  of  Demosthenes,  nor  for  the  Academicians 
who  do  nothing  but  destroy  judgement,  nor  for  Hannibal's 
Senate.  I  am  not  for  jealousies,  demonstrations, 
counter-marches  ;  instead  of  these  puerilities — appre- 
hension, quickness,  energy  are  my  guides. 

Let  the  two  armies  serve  the  two  Emperors,  the 
Coalition,  and  all  Europe,  like  honest  heroes !  .  .  . 
Otherwise,  there  will  be  more  Campo  Formidos  [sic] ; 
already  you  see  the  new  Rome  walking  in  the  steps  of 
the  old ;  gaining  friends,  she  will  come  to  honouring 
Germany  with  the  title  of  Ally,  as  she  did  Spain,  Holland, 
and,  a  little  earlier,  Italy ;  to  reduce  her  later  in  her 
own  time  to  the  lowest  level  of  estimation,  the  rank  of 
client  or  subject,  and  the  territory  of  flourishing  nations 
into  provinces.^ 

Soon  afterwards  came  his  order  of  recall,  and  he  left 
the  scene  of  his  disastrous  and  yet  glorious  campaign. 

1  Letter  of  the  29th  October  ;  Mil.  iv. ;  Fuehs,  iii.  478. 


CHAPTER  XII 

RETURN  AND    DEATH 

Letting  himself  go — Meeting  with  Korsakof — Catching  the  wind — 
Christmas  games — ^Taking  it  out  of  Thugut's  son-in-law — Corre- 
spondence with  Nelson — Breaking  down — Desperate  remedies — 
Another  blow  from  Paul — ^Arrival  at  Petersburg — Death. 

During  his  profitless  argument  about  plans  of  campaign 
and  on  his  journey  home,  Suvorof  swam,  or  rather 
skipped  into  the  ken  of  more  than  one  curious  observer. 

De  Rover6a,  an  officer  of  the  Swiss  levies,  called  upon 
him  at  Lindau,  and  has  recorded  his  interview  with  "  a 
man  of  middle  height  and  lean,  clad  in  a  white  woollen 
shirt,  carelessly  buttoned  breeches,  and  a  much-worn 
hat,  with  an  old  boot  on  one  foot  and  a  slipper  on  the 
other ;  his  face  wrinkled  as  if  pulled  about  by  hard 
thinking."  Suvorof  received  him  warmly,  put  his  hand 
on  his  shoulder  and  spoke  to  him  in  French,  throwing 
back  his  head  and  screwing  up  his  eyes.  At  the  end  of 
the  conversation  he  kissed  Rover^a  on  the  forehead  and 
invited  him  to  dinner.^ 

At  the  same  place  Suvorof  effected  a  junction  with 
the  Prince  de  Cond6  and  the  beaten  army  of  Korsakof. 
His  first  encounter  with  the  latter  caused  him  great 
agitation.  When  the  defeated  Commander  came  to 
present  his  report,  the  Field-Marshal  was  pacing  up  and 
down  his  room  among  a  group  of  officers  and  civilians, 
and   fumbling   at   his   clothes.     "  Merciful   God ! "   he 

^  G.  de  Tavel,  Mhnoires  de  F.  de  Roveria. 
340 


RETURN  AND  DEATH  341 

exclaimed,  "  I  ought  to  receive  Alexander  Mikhailovitch 
decently ;  he's  the  pattern  of  civility  himself,  he's  a 
courtier,  he's  a  gentleman  of  the  chamber."  Then  he 
stopped,  shut  his  eyes,  and  pulled  at  his  cuffs.  The 
unhappy  Korsakof  entered,  and  halted  in  confusion  at 
the  sight  of  the  company  in  which  he  was  to  be  received. 
Suvorof  looked  up,  gave  him  a  slight  bow,  took  his  re- 
port, and  shut  his  eyes  again.  Then  he  broke  forth, 
"  Alexander  Mikhailovitch  !  What  have  we  done  ? 
The  Trebbia,  the  Tidone,  Novi— sisters.  But  Zurich  ?  " 
And  he  raised  himself  on  tiptoe,  threw  back  his  head, 
and  made  a  very  bitter  grimace.  He  repeated  his  words, 
and  then  demanded  a  spontoon  from  one  of  the  officers 
who  stood  near.  Holding  it  at  the  present,  he  demanded, 
"  Alexander  Mikhailovitch  !  How  did  you  do  honour 
to  Mass6na  ?  This,  thus,  was  it  this  way  ?  Then  you 
did  him  honour  in  no  Russian  style ;  merciful  God  ! 
not  in  Russian  style."  Then  he  gave  back  the  spontoon ; 
backed  towards  the  door  of  his  cabinet ;  called  Korsakof, 
and  shut  himself  up  with  his  miserable  subordinate  for 
a  whole  hour.  Korsakof  came  out  looking  like  a  dead 
man.i 

But  soon  afterwards  Suvorof  treated  Korsakof  in  a 
different  fashion.  On  the  24th  October  he  formally 
received  a  number  of  officers,  including  Korsakof,  an 
Austrian  General,  and  the  Due  de  Berry,  who  represented 
Conde.  On  this  occasion  he  directed  his  wrath  against 
the  Austrian.  He  greeted  De  Berry  with  great  warmth, 
and  expressed  his  indignation  at  the  way  in  which 
Conde' s  army  had  been  treated.  Turning  upon  the 
Austrian,  he  demanded  if  they  wanted  to  destroy  the 
French  SmigrSs  ?  Then  he  went  on,  "  You  have  brought 
me  an  order  from  the  Archduke.  At  Vienna  I  am  at  his 
feet,  but  here  it  is  quite  different,  and  I  take  orders  only 
from  my  Sovereign."  Then  he  went  about  among  the 
Russians,  praised  those  who  had  distinguished  themselves 

^  This  is  related  by  Suvorof  s  Secretary,  Trefurt,  in  Rtiss.  Star, 
(1876),  i.  214. 


342  SUVOROF 

in  Switzerland,  and  told  one,  who  had  not,  that  he  ought 
to  resign  his  commission.  Poor  Korsakof  overheard 
this,  and  tried  to  steal  out  of  the  room  before  the  eye 
of  the  terrible  Commander-in-Chief  fell  upon  him.  But 
Suvorof  was  too  quick  for  him.  The  occasion  for  a  slap 
at  Austria  was  too  good  to  be  missed,  and  instead  of 
humiliating  Korsakof,  the  veteran  declared  in  a  loud 
voice,  "  You  saw,  gentlemen,  that  Korsakof  has  gone 
out,  though  he  said  nothing  to  me,  or  I  to  him.  He  is 
more  unfortunate  than  guilty ;  50,000  Austrians  never 
stirred  a  foot  to  support  him.  They're  the  criminals. 
They  wanted  to  ruin  him  ;  they  thought  they  would 
ruin  me  too,  but  Suvorof  was  too  damned  quick  for 
them.  Tell  the  Archduke,"  turning  to  the  Austrian, 
"  that  he  will  answer  to  God  for  the  blood  shed  before 
Zurich."  1 

The  French  imigri,  Marsillac,  who  had  been  through 
the  Italian  and  Swiss  campaigns,  left  the  army  at  Lindau. 
"  Tell  the  Comte  d'Artois,"  said  Suvorof,  on  saying 
farewell  to  him,  "  that  Hannibal  and  Suvorof  crossed 
the  Alps."  2  Up  to  this  point  his  prouder  self  seems 
to  have  been  uppermost.  But  when,  at  the  beginning 
of  December,  he  reached  Prague,  where  he  received  the 
order  of  recall  from  the  Tsar,  the  impish  side  of  his 
nature  was  in  the  ascendant,  and  the  anecdotes  are  of 
a  more  ludicrous  sort.  It  was  at  Prague  that  a  Swedish 
officer  saw  him  in  church,  prostrating  himself  twenty 
times  in  an  hour,  each  time  for  about  two  minutes.  He 
invited  the  Swede  to  dinner,  and  in  the  middle  of  the 
meal  put  on  his  guest's  hat.  When  he  said  farewell, 
he  gave  the  officer  "  a  very  sincere,  but  not  very  pleasant 
kiss."  3 

In  the  same  town,  his  orderly  officer  Kononof  heard, 
at  2  o'clock  in  the  morning,  a  strange  disturbance  in 
the  Field-Marshal's  room.     Suvorof  woke,  and  began  to 

1  Voronts.  Arkh.  xx. 

2  Russ.  Star.  (1879),  ii.  400. 

8  "  Reminiscences  of  De  La  Gardie,"  Russ.  Star.  (1876),  iii.  883. 


RETURN  AND  DEATH  343 

run  about  the  room.     Proshka  came  in.     "  Ah !  "  cried 
Suvorof,  "  damn  you,  you've  let  the  wind  through  the 
door  ;   I'm  cold  ;    catch  it,  catch  the  wind.     I'll  help." 
Thereupon  the  two  began  to  run  about  the  room.     At 
last  Proshka  opened  the  door,  pretended  to  throw  some- 
thing out,  and  said,  "  I've  got  hold  of  it  and  put  it  out." 
"  Thanks,    thanks — now    I'm    warm ;     but    just    now, 
damn  you,  it  was  freezing."     Then  came  in  the  cook, 
in  cap  and  apron,  and  asked,  "  What's  to  be  cooked  for 
lunch  ?  "     "Cook  me  something  Armenian, ' '  said  Suvorof. 
"  Aye,  aye,  sir."    "  Cook  me  something  Tartar."     "  Aye, 
aye,  sir."     "  Cook  me  something  Jewish."     "  Aye,  aye, 
sir."     "  But  not  French,  and  not  German."     "  Aye,  aye, 
sir."     "  And  then  some  Russian   shtshi."     "  Can't  be 
done."     "  Why  ?    Ah,  you  can't  -  teller  !     Impossible  ? 
Tell  me,  you  damned  don't-knower,  why  it's  impossible  !  " 
"  There's  no  smyetana."     "  Pull  yourself  together,  pull 
yourself  together  !     No  smyetana  ?     I  won't  listen  to 
him — I  want  my  shtshi !     Hit  him,  Proshka  !  "     "  All 
right,"  said  the  cook,  "  I'm  going  out  myself."     And 
he  went  out  and  slammed  the  door.     "  Look,  Proshka," 
cried  Suvorof,    "  how  angry  he  is.     Let's  get  away ; 
I'm  horribly  afraid."     At  this  point  Proshka  came  out, 
and  Kononof  asked  him,  "  What  .  .  .  ?  "     "Well,  you 
see,"  answered  Proshka,  "  the  Field-Marshal  just  now 
dozes  and  wakes  up,  and  all  his  military  contraptions 
go  to  his  head,  and  so  he  clears  them  up  with  these 
pranks."    "  And  what's  he  doing  now  ?  "  asked  Kononof, 
hearing  a  murmuring  from  inside  the  room.     "  He's 
saying  his  prayers."^ 

The  Swedish  General  Armfeldt  witnessed  a  great 
popular  demonstration  in  a  theatre.  The  house  was 
crowded,  and  three  times  the  ordinary  prices  had  been 
paid  for  the  tickets.  When  Suvorof  appeared  in  his 
box  the  place  resounded  with  shouts  of  "  Hurra,  vivat 

^  "  Anecdotes  of  Kononof,"  Russkaya  Besyeda  (1860).  Shtshi  is 
a  vegetable  soup,  and  smyetana  the  sour  cream  which  is  always  served 
with  it. 


844  SUVOROF 

Suvorof !  "  A  prologue  in  his  honour  was  recited  from 
the  stage,  and  was  greeted  with  a  fresh  outburst  of 
enthusiasm.  He  bowed  repeatedly,  and  attempted  in 
vain  to  persuade  the  people  to  cry  "  Vivat  Franz  !  " 
Finally  he  blessed  them  all.  No  one  laughed,  and  many 
bowed  low  as  to  the  priest.  All  this  was  solemn  and 
dignified.  But  after  the  first  act  a  young  lady  burst 
out  of  her  box  to  get  a  close  view  of  the  great  man.  He 
asked  that  she  should  be  presented  to  him,  and  held  out 
his  hand.  Repenting  of  her  temerity,  she  hesitated, 
whereupon  he  took  her  by  the  nose  and  kissed  her,  to 
the  great  dehght  of  the  bystanders. ^ 

With  his  usual  determination  to  make  poor  foreigners 
comply  with  Russian  customs,  he  insisted  on  playing 
all  the  ordinary  Russian  games  at  Christmas — forfeits, 
blind  man's  buff,  fortune-telling,  and  the  like.  Into  all 
these  he  threw  himself  with  the  greatest  zest,  dancing, 
singing,  skipping  about,  and  laughing,  no  doubt  to  the 
amused  contempt  of  guests  like  the  English  Lord  Minto 
and  the  Austrian  Count  Bellegarde.^ 

But  Suvorof's  most  outrageous  performance  was  at 
the  house  of  Baron  Nostitz,  a  son-in-law  of  the  detested 
Thugut.  The  Baron  invited  him  to  a  great  ball  given 
in  his  honour.  He  drove  up  to  the  house  in  full  uniform. 
The  front  of  the  edifice  was  hung  with  flags  and  wreaths, 
and  the  grand  staircase  was  crowded  with  the  beauty 
and  fashion  of  Prague,  all  agog  to  welcome  the  hero. 
Suvorof  popped  out  of  the  carriage,  and,  seeing  the 
dazzling  group  before  him,  promptly  blew  his  nose  with 
his  fingers.  The  ladies  turned  away  in  horror,  while 
Proshka  gravely  presented  him  with  a  handkerchief. 
Restored  to  order,  he  mounted  the  staircase  as  solemnly 
as  possible,  bowing  to  right  and  left,  and  entered 
the  ball-room.  The  orchestra  played  the  Russian 
Anthem,  an  Austrian  General  gave  a  solo  on  the  violon- 
cello, and  the  Baroness  Schlyk  sang.     This  lady  was 

^  I  quote  this  from  Pyetrushevski. 
2  For  Lord  Minto's  opinion,  see  his  Life  and  LeUers,  iii.  107. 


RETURN  AND  DEATH  845 

with  child,  and  after  her  performance,  the  distinguished 
guest  went  up  to  her,  and  in  the  presence  of  the  whole 
company,  blessed  her,  congratulated  her  on  the  approach- 
ing birth,  and  kissed  her  on  the  forehead. 

Leaving  the  Baroness  to  her  blushes,  Suvorof  opened 
the  ball  with  his  hostess,  and  then  promenaded  the 
rooms  with  his  host.  The  orchestra  began  to  play  a 
valse,  and,  after  watching  the  dancers  revolving  in  this 
very  un-Russian  fashion,  he  grasped  his  adjutant, 
Baron  Rosen,  and  proceeded  to  spin  round  the  room 
in  an  opposite  direction  to  the  rest.  After  several 
collisions  he  stopped  panting,  and  told  Rosen  that  he 
must  teach  him  "  this  famous  dance."  Nostitz,  anxious 
at  once  to  please  his  terrible  guest,  and  save  the  limbs 
and  garments  of  the  ladies  from  any  more  of  his  devas- 
tating experiments,  proposed  to  show  him  the  pictures. 
Some  of  these  represented  Suvorof's  own  victories. 
Pausing  in  front  of  one  of  them,  the  Field-Marshal 
broke  out,  "  Moreau  retreats  !  Does  Your  Excellency 
want  to  see  how  he  really  did  retreat  ?  It  was  just  like 
this."  He  thereupon  trotted  from  the  room,  with  all 
his  suite  after  him,  skipped  down  the  grand  stair- 
case, threw  himself  into  his  carriage,  called  out, 
"  Home  !  *'  and  drove  off,  leaving  Nostitz  to  discover 
for  himself  what  Suvorof  thought  of  Thugut  and  all 
his  relations.^ 

Suvorof's  correspondence  at  this  time  was  not  as  a 
rule  important.  One  or  two  sparks  of  the  old  fire 
appear  in  his  letters  to  Koluitchof,  who  had  taken  the 
place  of  Razumovski  at  Vienna.  "  To  me  death  is 
better  than  the  defensive."  "  Not  with  the  pen  shall 
we  conquer  Paris."  ^  But  the  most  interesting  parts  of 
his  correspondence  are  the  letter  which  he  received 
from  Lord  Nelson  and  his  reply.  The  compliments 
with  which  the  two  great  egoists  be-lathered  each  other 
were  not  unjust,  though  the  physical  resemblance  which 

^  "  Anecdotes  of  Kononof,"  rjM  sup. 
2  Russ.  Star.  (1900),  cii.  320,  322. 


M6  SUVOROF 

it  gave  them  so  much  pleasure  to  discover  is  difficult 
to  detect.  Nelson's  letter  was  written  on  the  22nd 
November  from  Palermo : 

My  Dear,  Dear  Prince  and  Brother,  there  is  not  that 
man  in  Europe  who  loves  You  equal  to  myself.  All 
admire  Your  Great  and  Glorious  atchievements,  as 
does  Nelson,  but  he  loves  You  for  Your  despising  of 
wealth  as  it  may  stand  in  the  way  of  Your  duty,  for 
being  indeed  the  faithful!  servant  of  Your  Sovereign, 
in  this  alone  I  presume  to  claim  the  dear  name  of 
Brother.  I  know  that  my  atchievements  are  not  to  [be] 
named  with  Yours.  But  the  Bounty  of  my  own 
Sovereign,  that  of  the  Emperor  of  Russia  and  his 
Sicilian  Majesty  and  the  Grand  Signor,  have  loaded 
me  with  honors  and  wealth,  in  these  joined  to  You  we 
show  an  example  to  the  World  that  fidelity  will  be 
amply  rewarded.  This  day  has  made  me  the  Proudest 
man  in  Europe,  I  am  told  by  a  person  who  has  seen 
You  for  many  years  that  in  our  stature  persons  and 
manners  we  are  more  alike  than  any  two  people  ever 
were.  We  are  certainly  relations  and  I  entreat  that 
You  will  never  take  from  me  the  Dear  Name  of  Your 
Affectionate  Brother  and  sincere  Friend 

Bronte  Nelson. 

Suvorof's  answer  was  written  in  French  by  his  friend 
Baron  Andrei  de  Byuler.  But  he  could  not  keep  his  own 
hand  out  of  it,  and  the  last  sentence  of  the  letter  and 
the  postscript,  with  its  sidelong  thrust  at  Lady  Hamilton, 
were  dashed  in  by  himself.  The  date  is  the  12th  January 
1800: 

My  dear  Baron  and  Brother  !  If  ever  a  memory  is 
precious  to  me,  it  is  just  that  of  an  Admiral  of  the  first 
merit  like  Yourself.  Contemplating  your  portrait,  I 
have  certainly  found  some  resemblance  between  us 
two ;  so  one  might  say  that  fine  spirits  meet  and  our 
ideas  have  coincided.  It  is  a  distinction  the  more  for 
me,  and  I  am  delighted  at  it ;  but  more  at  resembling 
You  on  the  side  of  Your  character. 

There  is  no  reward,  my  dear  Admiral,  of  which 
Your  eminent  merits  do  not  make  you  worthy,  and  in 


RETURN  AND  DEATH  347 

which  Your  brother  and  friend  does  not  share  most 
vividly.  Jealous  to  preserve  that  title,  and  Your 
friendship,  which  bears  the  stamp  of  honesty,  I  beg  You 
to  be  so  good  as  to  continue  to  give  me  news  of  You 
and  to  believe  in  the  most  perfect  reciprocity  of  my 
feelings  for  You,  with  which  I  am  always  Your  affec- 
tionate brother  and  sincere  friend.  Victory,  Glory, 
Prosperity  for  the  new  Year. 

Prince  Alexandre  Italiiski. 

COMTE    SUWOROW    RyMNIKSKI. 

P.S. — I  thought  you  [gone]  from  Malta  to  Egypt 
to  crush  there  the  rest  of  the  supernatural  atheists  of 
our  times  by  means  of  the  Arabs  !  Palermo  is  not 
Cithera.  The  magnanimous  Sovereign  is  for  us.  For 
the  rest,  illustrious  brother,  why  don't  you  give  the 
world  some  more  Aboukirs  to  think  of  ?  Happy  New 
Year  !     Happy  New  Century  !  P.  A.  It.^ 

These  profuse  compliments  make  very  attractive 
reading.  The  physical  resemblance  between  them  was 
not  very  strong.  Both  were  of  fragile  appearance,  and 
there  is  one  highly  ideahsed  portrait  of  Suvorof,  in 
which  his  wrinkled  and  whimsical  old  face  is  polished 
down,  with  photographic  art,  into  a  real  similarity  to 
that  of  Nelson.  But  the  physical  likeness  was  actually 
remote.  There  was  a  more  real  resemblance  in  temper. 
They  were  equal  in  their  passion  for  perfection  in  their 
own  service,  in  their  questionless  acceptance  of  the 
commands  of  their  Sovereigns,  in  their  indifference  to 
the  political  origins  of  their  wars,  in  their  contempt  of 
secret  and  underhand  dealings,  in  their  special  hatred 
of  the  French,  in  the  ceaseless  energy  of  their  move- 
ments and  the  directness  of  their  blows  upon  the  enemy, 
in  their  simple  vanity  and  in  their  love  of  reputation. 
There  was  no  Lady  Hamilton  in  Suvorof's  life,  and 
Nelson  had  none  of  Suvorof's  jealousy.     But  as  men 

^  The  Nelson  letter  was  given  to  De  Byuler  by  Suvorof.  He  obtained 
Suvorof  s  reply  from  Admiral  Tchitchagof,  who  got  it  from  a  friend  in 
London.  Both  are  printed  in  Russ.  Star.  (1872),  738  et  seq.  Inaccurate 
Russian  versions  are  in  Fuchs,  iii. 


848  SUVOROF 

of  war  they  were  justified  in  recognising  each  other  as 
twins. 

The  extreme  liveliness  which  Suvorof  displayed  at 
Prague  did  not  conceal,  from  himself  or  from  others, 
the  fact  that  he  was  growing  rapidly  old  and  weak. 
The  Swiss  campaign  had  worn  him  out.  He  began  to 
feel  the  cold,  and  he  was  troubled  with  a  constant  cough. 
Nevertheless,  he  refused  to  admit  defeat,  and  bore  up 
in  the  face  of  Death  as  if  He  were  only  another  Mass6na 
or  Molitor.  He  wore  the  same  thin  clothes,  did  the 
same  gynmastics,  and  splashed  himself  with  the  same 
cold  water.  But  on  his  way  from  Prague  he  had  to  stay 
a  few  days  at  Cracow  for  medical  treatment. 

At  Vishau  in  Moravia  he  invited  some  of  the  local 
magnates  to  dinner.  After  the  meal  he  drank  to  the 
health  of  the  two  Emperors,  and  some  children  sang  a 
cantata  in  his  honour,  and  gave  him  a  present.  Tears 
of  joy  ran  down  his  cheeks.  He  sat  the  children  round 
him  and  gave  them  each  a  dainty  and  a  sip  out  of  his 
own  liqueur  glass.  An  hour  and  a  half  he  talked  with 
them,  telling  them  of  his  own  children,  often  shedding 
a  few  tears.  "  To-day,"  he  said  more  than  once,  "  I 
have  entertained  the  most  pleasant  guests  I  have  ever 
had.  O  innocence  !  And  I,  my  dear  children,  will 
soon  be  like  you.  You  delight  me  so  much  that  I 
cannot  part  with  you."  And  he  stayed  an  hour  longer 
than  usual  at  the  table.  Then  he  told  his  servants  to 
put  away  the  children's  gifts  with  a  copy  of  the  cantata. 
He  gave  a  copy  of  his  own  portrait  to  each  of  the  children, 
admonished  them  a  second  time,  despatched  them 
along  the  road  of  honour  and  virtue,  and  kissed  and 
blessed  each  one  with  the  sign  of  the  Cross,  thanking 
them  heartily  for  the  honour  they  had  done  him.^ 

When  he  reached  Kobrin,  intending  to  stay  there 
four  days,  he  was  seriously  ill,  and  had  in  fact  to  stay 
for  forty.  On  the  25th  February  1800  he  wrote  to 
Count  Theodore  Rostoptchin : 

1  Rus8.  Star,  (1887),  Ivi.  201. 


RETURN  AND  DEATH  849 

Prince  P.  I.  Bagration  will  tell  you  about  my 
suffering  body,  I  am  beginning  with  a  cough,  of  late 
increasing  .  .  .  nevertheless,  I  am  still  so  strong  natur- 
ally that  though  it  is  there  at  one  moment,  at  another, 
when  there's  no  wind,  there's  no  cough.  For  a  month 
I  have  eaten  very  little,  but  been  on  my  feet.  Seeing 
the  fever  threatening  fiercely,  I  ate  almost  nothing  for 
six  days,  and  in  bed.  I  feel  that  I  almost  did  not  get 
over  it  .  .  .  but  what's  the  use  ?  The  rash  wanders 
from  place  to  place  ;  and  I  by  no  means  foresee  a  speedy 
end  of  it.  My  intention's  to  increase  my  nourishment 
a  little  .  .  .  but  there's  doubt  about  the  fever  as  i^y 
tongue  still  hints  at  it.  There's  hope  in  quarantine. 
I  have  bored  you  ;  that's  my  Shrovetide  holiday.^ 

The  old  body  was  in  decay,  and  the  process  was  not 
prevented  by  the  desperate  remedies  of  its  inhabitant. 
The  Emperor  sent  a  physician  called  Weikart  to  look 
after  Suvorof.  But  the  patient  refused  skilled  assistance. 
"  What  I  want,"  he  protested,  "  is  a  cottage  in  the 
country,  my  prayers,  kasha,  and  kvas.  Am  I  not  a 
soldier?"  "You're  not,"  said  Weikart.  "You're 
generalissimus  !  "  "  True,"  was  the  answer,  "  but  the 
soldier  takes  me  for  his  pattern."  Nevertheless,  he 
yielded  in  the  end,  and  showed  signs  of  rallying. 

But  he  remained  very  ill.  One  of  his  few  companions, 
Baron  Rosen,  wrote  a  letter  which  shows  what  a  difficult 
patient  he  was.  For  four  days  he  had  had  nothing  to 
eat  or  drink  except  some  soup  and  English  beer : 

We  never  leave  him.  You  know  what  he  was  in 
good  health ;  he's  twice  as  bad  ill ;  but  with  all  that 
we  are  glad  to  make  any  sacrifice  for  our  benefactor, 
and  a  man  who  is  the  prop  and  stay  of  his  country.^ 

This  irritable  temper  in  the  patient  was  a  sign,  if  not 
of  returning  health,  at  least  of  continuing  vitality.  He 
still  corresponded  at  great  length  with  Khvostof,  going 
with    occasional   complaints    and   reproofs   into    great 

^  Fuchs,  iii.  653.     The  rash  was  doubtless  eczema. 
2  nuss.  Star.  (1900),  ci.  329. 


350  SUVOROF 

detail  about  the  reception  destined  for  him  at  Peters- 
burg, about  spending  his  last  days  in  the  country,  about 
building  a  stone  house  with  a  church  close  by,  about 
the  pension  attached  to  his  Order  of  Maria  Teresa,  about 
the  three  Austrian  cannon  promised  him  by  Catherine, 
which  he  had  not  yet  received,  and  even  about  the  next 
year's  campaign  and  the  means  of  restoring  peace  to 
Europe.  One  letter,  evidently  written  in  a  period  of 
decline,  contains  this  pathetic  touch  : 

I  should  have  liked  sometimes  to  be  in  public  in  my 
foreign  uniform  ;  it  was  a  glorious  thing  for  the  great 
Emperor  that  a  subject  of  his  should  have  served  and 
won  it.* 

At  last,  at  the  end  of  March,  he  resumed  his  journey, 
thinking  no  doubt  of  the  flags  and  soldiers  and  cheering 
crowds  that  he  would  see  in  the  streets  of  the  capital. 
He  reckoned  without  the  capricious  brutality  of  the 
Emperor.  On  the  31st  March  came  a  public  Imperial 
order,  and  a  rescript  to  himself.  In  defiance  of  orders, 
he  had  maintained  on  his  staff  in  Italy  and  Switzerland 
a  General  of  the  Day,  and  he  was  required  to  justify 
his  conduct.  Broken  in  health,  and  bearing  the  addi- 
tional burden  of  his  ungrateful  master's  displeasure,  he 
crawled  towards  Petersburg.  He  received  a  friendly 
public  welcome  at  Stryelna,  15  miles  outside  the  capital. 
His  carriage  was  surrounded  by  a  large  crowd,  who 
pressed  upon  him  fruit  and  flowers,  and  the  women 
held  up  their  children  to  receive  his  blessing.  This  was 
all  his  triumph.  He  drove  slowly  into  the  empty 
flagless  streets  of  Petersburg  at  10  o'clock  on  the  night 
of  the  1st  May,  and  went  straight  to  bed  in  Khvostof's 
house. 

On  the  4th  Khvostof  wrote  to  the  Emperor  to  say 
that  the  old  man  had  arrived  "  in  a  very  weak  condition.'  * 
Paul,  whose  harshness  has  never  been  explained,  had 

*  Martchenko. 
*  Russ,  Star.  (1900),  ci.  329. 


RETURN  AND  DEATH  351 

the  grace  to  send  Bagration  to  inquire  after  the  health 
of  his  great  servant.  Bagration's  account  shows  him 
apparently  on  the  point  of  death  : 

I  found  Alexander  Vassilyevitch  lying  on  his  bed ; 
he  was  mightily  weak  ;  he  fell  into  a  swoon,  and  they 
rubbed  him  with  spirit,  and  gave  him  snuff.  Coming 
to  himself,  he  looked  at  me,  and  in  his  big  kindly  eyes 
the  look  of  life  shone  no  more.  He  gazed  long  at  me, 
as  if  getting  to  know  who  I  was  ;  then  he  said,  "  Ah  ! 
.  .  .  It's  you,  Peter  !  How  are  you  ?  "  and  he  was 
silent  and  forgot  himself.  A  minute  later,  he  again 
looked  at  me,  and  I  reported  to  him  all  the  Emperor's 
commands.  Alexander  Vassilyevitch  seemed  to  revive, 
but  it  was  with  a  great  effort  that  he  said,  "  Make — my — 
homage — at  the  feet — of  the  Tsar — Peter  !  my  ear — ill !  " 
and  he  groaned,  and  fell  into  a  faint .^ 

But  this  was  no  more  than  the  fatigue  of  his  long 
journey  and  his  disappointments.  He  clung  to  life  for  a 
short  time  longer,  and  from  the  midst  of  his  decay  there 
came  some  flashes  of  the  old  spirit.  Count  Kutaizof 
waited  upon  him  one  day  in  the  name  of  the  Emperor. 
The  sick  man  feigned  ignorance  of  the  identity  of  his 
visitor,  and  pressed  him  with  question  after  question 
to  explain  who  he  was.  Kutaizof  was  a  baptized  Turk, 
who  had  begun  his  Russian  life  as  the  Emperor's  body- 
servant,  and  had  been  promoted  to  the  nobility  and 
entrusted  with  confidential  business.  The  remorseless 
cross-examination  drew  out  the  whole  story,  after  which, 
"  Proshka,  Proshka  !  "  cried  Suvorof  to  his  own  man. 
"  Yes,  sir  ?  "  "  See  there  !  If  only  you  keep  clean  and 
don't  drink  you  may  rise  to  be  a  nobleman  yourself, 
some  day  !  "  ^ 

When  he  was  actually  lapsing  into  unconsciousness 
the  jesting  was  less  spiteful.  CalHng  earnestly  for 
Khvostof,  he  whispered  in  his  ear,  "  Dear  friend,  oblige 
me  by  not  writing  any  verses  on  my  death."  ^    This  was 

1  Starkof,  271. 

»  Russ.  Star.  (1884),  iii.  147  ;   (1892)  Ixxiv.  583. 

8  Russ.  Arkh.  (1873),  706  ;  (1871),  109. 


852  SUVOROF 

his  last  joke.  Memory  and  speech  became  confused, 
and  after  several  refusals,  he  consented  at  last  to  receive 
the  supreme  unction  and  bid  farewell  to  his  friends  and 
relations.  On  the  18th  May  he  became  unconscious, 
and  for  three  days  the  anxious  listeners  heard  nothing 
but  murmuring  about  plans  of  campaign,  with  more 
than  one  earnest  repetition  of  the  word  "  Genoa." 

The  murmurs  at  last  came  to  an  end,  and  at  two 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  the  17th  the  poor  flame  was 
quenched. 

It  is  largely  owing  to  his  connection  with  Poland 
that  Suvorof  once  enjoyed  the  reputation  of  being 
nothing  but  a  butcher  on  a  large  scale,  caring  as  little 
for  the  lives  of  his  own  men  as  for  those  of  his  country's 
enemies.  In  fact  he  was  nothing  of  the  sort.  He  was 
terrible  in  battle,  but  he  is  free  from  the  guilt  of  indis- 
criminate killing.  The  excesses  of  Izmail  and  Warsaw 
were  due  less  to  his  own  defects  of  character  than  to 
those  of  his  army,  defects  which  still  are  the  defects 
of  all  Slav  armies  alike.  His  published  orders  contain 
more  than  one  injunction  that  non-combatants  must  be 
spared,  and  in  things  within  his  own  control,  notably 
in  his  treatment  of  the  Poles  after  his  conquest,  he 
showed  himself  a  man  of  clemency.  There  was  indeed 
in  him  a  great  store  of  affection,  which  was  as  manifest 
in  his  treatment  of  conquered  enemies,  of  his  own  troops, 
and  of  his  children,  as  in  his  love  of  sitting  among  his 
pet  birds,  mewing  at  strange  cats,  and  barking  cheerfully 
at  dogs. 

Suvorof  was  a  Russian,  and  any  judgement  of  him 
which  is  based  on  references  to  Western  standards  of 
conduct  is  certain  to  be  unfair.  He  was  Russian  in 
his  piety,  in  his  indifference  to  appearances,  in  his 
contempt  of  all  ranks  below  the  throne,  in  his  lavishness 
of  affection,  in  his  naked  and  unashamed  egoism  and 
jealousy,  in  his  carelessness  about  discipline  and  method, 
in  his  mastering  of  his  troops  through  their  love  rather 


RETURN  AND  DEATH  353 

than  their  respect.  It  would  be  as  easy  to  write  him 
down  a  buffoon,  a  toady,  or  an  intriguer,  as  a  butcher, 
and  those  of  his  contemporaries  who  did  not  care  to 
penetrate  beneath  the  surface  of  a  man  saw  in  him 
nothing  but  one  or  all  of  these.  But  the  faults  of  a 
Russian,  though  no  greater,  are  more  conspicuous  than 
those  of  other  Europeans.  He  knows  no  standards  of 
conduct  but  his  own,  and  the  expression  of  his  self  is 
his  habit,  almost  his  duty.  All  of  Suvorof's  vices  are 
thus  proclaimed  most  loudly  by  Suvorof.  His  grovellings 
to  Potyomkin,  his  sneers  at  Ryepnin,  his  frantic, 
querulous,  and  unremitting  appeals  to  Khvostof,  these 
are  obvious.  No  man  ever  loved  a  woman  more 
passionately  than  he  loved  war,  and  to  secure  that  he, 
and  he  alone,  should  command  against  an  enemy,  he 
stooped  to  conduct  to  which  ordinary  men  are  driven, 
if  at  all,  only  by  force  of  animal  instinct. 

His  buffoonery  stands  on  another  level  from  his 
jealousy,  though  a  hasty  critic  would  reckon  both  among 
his  vices.  It  was  not  in  fact  a  vice.  It  was  an  expres- 
sion not  of  a  moral  defect,  but  of  his  peculiar  virtue  as 
a  leader  of  Russian  troops.  In  an  officer  of  any  other 
army  it  would  have  been  a  fault.  In  a  Russian  it  was 
an  adjunct  of  authority,  almost  a  substitute  for  it.  In 
no  other  country  in  the  world  is  it  so  easy  to  appeal  to 
the  affections  of  the  common  people  as  in  Russia,  and 
the  man  who  ventures  to  treat  them  as  his  equals  will 
have  a  greater  influence  over  them  than  the  man  who 
cannot  stoop  from  his  superior  rank.  Modem  military 
discipline  in  Russia  has  been  inspired  by  political 
motives,  and  systematic  harshness  was  the  substitute 
'for  "  Revolutionary "  brotherhood.  Suvorof,  in  the 
days  when  the  peasant  had  not  begun  to  think  of  politics, 
chose  the  other  method  of  securing  the  obedience  of 
his  men.  It  is  not  an  English  method.  An  Englishman 
can  as  little  afford  to  show  himself  without  dignity  as 
without  clothing.  He  must  keep  his  romps,  like  his 
dishabilU,  for  his  family.     Each  in  fact  believes  that  to 

2A 


B54  SUVOROF 

expose  himself  to  his  fellow-men  is  to  treat  them  as  his 
brothers.  But  whereas  the  Englishman  finds  that  a 
reason  for  treating  strangers  with  reserve,  to  the  Russian 
it  is  a  reason  for  treating  them  with  familiarity.  The 
one  exposes  himself  only  to  the  limited  circle  of  his 
natural  family,  the  other  exposes  himself  to  strangers 
so  as  to  increase  his  family,  as  it  were,  by  adoption. 

Suvorof  thus  played  the  fool  not  merely  without 
injury  to  his  influence  over  his  men,  but  to  its  advantage. 
When,  after  exchanging  chaff  with  a  market  woman,  he 
rushed  off  to  the  nearest  stream  crying,  amid  the  shouts 
and  laughter  of  his  soldiers,  "  I've  burnt  myself !  I've 
burnt  myself !  "  he  was  strengthening,  not  loosening, 
the  bonds  between  him  and  them.^  To  this  tie  of 
affection  was  of  course  added  that  of  equal  effort  and 
equal  endurance  on  his  part.  If  they  lay  out  in  the 
open  at  night,  so  did  he.  If  they  were  soaked  in  fording 
a  river,  so  was  he.  If  they  slept  little  and  ate  less,  so 
did  he.  Showing  them  thus  that  he  called  upon  them 
for  no  sacrifice  which  he  was  not  ready  to  impose  upon 
himself,  and  joining  freely  in  their  broad  jests  and 
laughter,  he  got  from  them  that  highest  form  of  obedience, 
the  deliberate  submission  of  their  wills  to  his,  because 
their  greatest  delight  was  in  giving  him  pleasure. 

It  is  indeed  only  to  a  careless  observer  that  Suvorof 's 
littleness  would  appear  to  outweigh  his  essential  great- 
ness. Simple  in  his  vanity  and  jealousy,  in  his  personal 
habits,  in  his  piety,  and  in  his  carelessness  of  his  own 
rank  as  well  as  of  that  of  others,  he  was  simple  also  in 
his  ambition.  He  had  no  craving  for  power  or  wealth. 
His  sole  desire  was  to  raise  himself  to  the  level  of  those 
great  men  of  antiquity  whose  example  he  so  often  held 
up  for  the  imitation  of  others.  It  was  not  so  much  that 
he  loved  the  applause  of  ordinary  people  as  that  he 
craved  for  the  approbation  of  Epaminondas.  It  is  true 
that  he  bestowed  his  smiles  and  his  bows  with  delight, 
because  he  felt  that  it  was  the  duty  of  a  great  man  to 

1  1st.  Vyest.  (1900),  Ixxx.  526. 


RETURN  AND  DEATH  355 

give  pleasure  to  his  admirers.  But  his  heart  glowed 
not  so  much  at  the  sight  of  the  shouting  crowds  in  the 
streets  and  theatres,  as  at  the  reflection  that  at  last  he 
had  made  himself  worthy  of  inclusion  in  the  "  Lives  " 
of  Plutarch.  Many  men  have  been  impelled  by  less 
honourable  motives,  and  many  men  have  been  driven 
by  the  same  desire  of  fame  to  crimes  of  which  he  was 
incapable. 

Such  a  man,  if  he  had  many  enemies,  was  not  without 
friends.  Presumptuous  incompetence  was  his  natural 
foe,  and  unhappily  he  alienated  many  whose  friendship 
would  not  have  been  unworthy  of  him.  The  craving 
for  unquestioned  supremacy,  which  so  often  mars  a 
great  character,  must  inevitably  repel  all  self-respecting 
men,  except  those  who  frankly  recognise  that  their 
own  merits  are  inferior,  and  those  who,  conscious  of 
their  own  equal  or  even  superior  worth,  are  yet  mag- 
nanimous enough  to  suppress  their  feelings  in  the 
public  interest.  But  modesty  and  generosity  of  temper 
are  not  the  most  common  of  human  qualities,  and  these 
masterful  folk  work  most  productively  in  independence. 
Suvorof 's  associates  were  divided  into  avowed  rivals  and 
devoted  followers.  There  was  at  least  one  good  soldier, 
Ryepnin,  among  the  former.  But  the  enthusiasm  of 
the  rank  and  file  was  generally  not  greater  than  that 
of  his  subordinate  officers,  and  there  were  many  like 
Coburg  and  Melas,  whose  public  spirit  and  magnanimity 
enabled  them  to  bear  from  an  equal  in  rank  what  to 
less  modest  men  would  have  seemed  patronage  or 
insolence. 

His  military  methods  were  as  simple  as  his  personal 
habits.  He  had  to  deal  with  a  people  of  great  natural 
ability,  but  without  education.  The  private  soldier 
was  a  strong,  docile,  and  illiterate  serf,  and  the  officer, 
even  if  he  knew  enough  of  Prussian  methods  to  manoeuvre 
troops  in  the  field,  knew  nothing  of  staff  work.  With 
this  powerful  but  clumsy  instrument  Suvorof  had  to 
win  all  his  victories.     His  own  nature  rejected  elaborate 


856  SUVOROF 

plans  of  campaign,  but  if  he  had  been  himself  inclined 
to  them,  he  could  not  have  relied  upon  his  subordinates 
to  carry  them  into  execution.  Physical  strength  and 
personal  courage  were  the  two  things  which  he  could 
always  be  sure  of  finding  in  his  men,  and  rapid  marches 
and  hand-to-hand  fighting  were  all  his  scheme  of  war. 
If  it  be  the  mark  of  genius  to  adapt  its  raw  material 
perfectly  to  its  ends,  then  Suvorof's  military  genius 
was  of  a  high  order.  At  the  time  when  it  appeared 
most  brilliant,  during  the  brief  Italian  campaign  of 
1799,  there  was  no  other  soldier  in  Europe  whom  he 
need  have  feared  to  meet.  The  contrast  presented  by 
the  Austrian  performances  under  Suvorof's  direction 
with  their  achievements  before  his  coming  and  after 
his  departure  is  not  explained  merely  by  the  changes 
in  the  French  command.  The  Austrians  gained  as 
much  by  the  presence  of  Suvorof  as  the  French  lost  by 
the  absence  of  Napoleon. 

In  some  respects  he  actually  anticipated  Napoleon. 
He  had  not  Napoleon's  gift  for  organisation,  nor  did  he 
learn  to  use  artillery  in  great  masses.  But  he  knew 
that  the  first  and  last  thing  in  war  is  to  destroy  armies, 
not  to  occupy  territory;  that  victory  almost  always 
inclines  to  the  leader  who  fetters  his  enemy's  will  by 
taking  the  offensive  ;  that  plans  are  less  important  than 
the  capacity  of  an  army  to  adapt  itself  to  an  emergency ; 
and  that  rapid  marches  and  determination  in  shock 
fighting  are  worth  more  than  elaborate  drill.  In  all  this 
he  was  Napoleonic,  and  his  dealing  with  Macdonald  and 
Moreau  was  an  example  of  the  use  of  the  containing 
force  and  the  mass  of  manoeuvre  which  the  great  French 
leader  himself  might  have  envied. 

As  a  commander  he  had  the  defects  of  his  virtues. 
His  dislike  of  plans  of  campaign  was  rooted  in  his  healthy 
contempt  for  the  formalism  which  was  the  characteristic 
vice  of  his  age.  But  his  reaction  from  slavery  to  forms 
carried  him  too  far.  It  was  not  plans,  but  only  a  rigid 
adherence  to  plans,   when  the   original   circumstances 


RETURN  AND  DEATH  357 

had  changed,  which  he  need  have  avoided.  He  was 
beyond  question  right  in  making  the  accumulation  of 
energy,  aggressive  force,  sometimes  inhibited  but  never 
relaxed,  the  first  principle  of  his  military  system.  Unless 
an  army  is  constantly  and  unremittingly  poised,  so 
that  at  the  bidding  of  its  directing  mind  it  can  strike 
with  all  its  weight,  there  is  nothing  in  any  plan  to  make 
it  an  effective  military  instrument.  An  army  which  is 
prepared  to  remain  passive  is  an  army  which  is  beaten. 
In  this  respect  Suvorof's  genius  was  of  the  first  rank. 
But  the  most  active  commander  will  be  none  the  worse 
for  having  in  his  mind  a  general  outline  of  future  possi- 
bilities, provided  he  is  ready  to  abandon  any  preconceived 
course,  as  soon  as  the  facts  beyond  his  control  make  it 
dangerous.  The  one  thing  that  he  can  never  accurately 
foresee  is  the  action  of  his  enemy,  and  he  should  be 
prepared  in  advance  to  deal  with  it.  He  must  have  a 
plan,  which  includes  knowledge  of  his  own  intention 
and  a  guess  at  that  of  his  opponent,  and  must  be  ready 
and  able  to  vary  it  if  his  guess  proves  to  be  wrong. 

Modern  German  practice  ignores  the  consequence  of 
enemy  movements.  It  forms  its  own  design,  and  persists 
in  it  so  long  as  its  strength  lasts,  trusting  to  its  own 
overwhelming  application  of  force  in  general  to  obliterate 
any  local  and  temporary  alterations  imposed  by  the 
other  side.  French  practice  trusts  nothing  to  this 
general  superiority  of  mere  numbers,  but  considers  the 
possible  alternatives,  taking  into  account  all  the  likely 
moves  of  the  enemy,  and  contriving  its  own  measures 
so  as  to  gather  a  superior  strength  for  a  blow  at  a  vital 
point  at  some  stage  of  the  action  after  the  first,  so 
dealing  with  any  new  situation  which  may  be  established 
by  the  first  conflict  of  forces.  This  flexibility  has  shown 
itself  of  a  higher  order  than  the  German  rigidity.  It 
relies  less  upon  brute  strength,  and  more  upon  individual 
capacity,  upon  Suvorof's  "  apprehension,  quickness, 
and  energy,"  displayed  at  a  critical  moment  at  a  criti- 
cal place.     In  this  French  sense  a  "  plan  of  campaign  " 


858 


SUVOROF 


would  have  enabled  Suvorof  to  avoid  his  Swiss  disaster. 
In   Turkey   and    Poland    he  had  not  to  deal  with  a 


formidable  adversary,  and  he  could  trust,  like  a  modern 
German,  to  the  conscious  moral  superiority  of  his  own 
men  to  redress  any  local  inequality  which  might  appear. 


RETURN  AND  DEATH  359 

His  first  encounters  with  the  French  in  Italy  gave  him  no 
warning.  Macdonald  and  Joubert  exposed  themselves 
to  him,  and  paid  the  full  price  of  their  temerity.  But 
Massena  was  of  a  different  calibre,  and  the  omission  to 
take  his  probable  actions  into  account  led  Suvorof  into 
a  course  which  could  have  met  with  success  only  against 
an  uncalculating  enemy. 

The  trade  of  the  professional  soldier  may,  like  many 
others,  be  censured  by  a  rigid  moralist.  The  man 
who  undertakes  to  kill  without  question  at  the  bidding 
of  others  will  inevitably  make  himself,  on  occasion, 
the  instrument  of  evil.  Suvorof,  if  he  fought  in  Turkey 
for  the  improvement  of  the  world,  aided  a  very  dis- 
reputable cause  in  Poland.  But  great  virtues  not 
seldom  flourish  in  ill  ground,  and  the  bold  and  energetic 
performance  of  any  arduous  duty  affords  an  example 
and  an  incentive  to  posterity.  Nor  is  Suvorof  or  any 
other  man  to  be  judged  only  from  his  victories.  A 
man  is  not  always  at  his  best  when  he  is  most  successful. 
Often  he  applies  to  the  imperfect  execution  of  a  faulty 
project  higher  powers  than  he  shows  in  a  completed 
achievement.  Suvorof  triumphed  beyond  the  reach 
of  criticism  in  his  Turkish  and  Polish  enterprises.  But 
he  was  never  more  greatly  himself  than  in  his  rashly 
undertaken  and  disastrously  frustrated  expedition  into 
Switzerland.  A  man  of  ordinary  merit  could  have  got 
himself  into  the  Muottothal,  but  no  man  of  less  than 
heroic  stature  could  have  beaten  his  way  into  safety 
at  Chur.  The  whole  of  the  campaign  of  1799  is  an 
astonishing  exhibition  of  fortitude  and  energy  on  the 
part  of  so  old  a  man.  Whatever  his  faults,  it  is  impos- 
sible to  withhold  admiration  from  him.  After  reaching 
almost  the  summit  of  his  desires,  he  had  been  crippled 
by  disfavour  and  exile,  at  an  age  when  most  men 
have  little  to  contemplate  but  their  own  imminent 
extinction.  But  he  kept  himself  firm  in  body  and 
spirit,  yielding  neither  to  luxury  nor  to  despair,  and 
in  the   end,   when   his   disabilities   were  removed,   he 


860  SUVOROF 

rushed  to  the  crowning  of  his  life's  work  with  the 
eagerness  and  certainty  of  a  youth  approaching  his 
first  attempt.  Throughout  his  hfe,  glowing  through 
the  tissue  of  his  follies,  there  shines  the  pure  light  of 
this  passion  for  perfection  in  his  work.  He  ends  his 
autobiography  with  this  exhortation :  "I  ask  my 
descendants  to  follow  my  example  :  to  begin  every  task 
with  the  blessing  of  God,  to  their  last  breath  to  be 
faithful  to  their  Sovereign  and  country,  to  shun  luxury, 
idleness,  and  covetousness,  and  to  seek  fame  through 
truth  and  well-doing."  It  is  an  exhortation  which  the 
cynic  will  not  deny  him  the  right  to  utter.  Whether  to 
produce  such  virtues  in  such  men  is  ever  worth  the  cost, 
the  infliction  of  so  much  suffering  and  death,  and  the 
diffusion  of  so  much  wickedness  over  so  large  a  part  of 
the  surface  of  the  earth,  is  another  question. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Note  on  Proper  Names. — I  have  transliterated  the  Russian  names  as  well  as  I  can. 
Having  adopted  a  scheme  for  them,  I  was  bound  to  use  the  same  scheme  for  Turkish 
names.  But  Polish  and  Austro-Slav  names,  being  originally  spelt  in  our  Latin 
characters,  I  have  had  to  leave  untouched.  It  is  not  symmetrical,  but  I  could  not,  on 
the  one  hand,  re-spell  Kosciusko  as  Kostsiushko,  nor,  on  the  other,  spell  Martchenko 
as  Marczenko.  An  English  reader  will  at  any  rate  make  no  serious  mistake  if  he 
pronounces  my  Russian  and  Turkish  names  as  they  are  spelt  here,  and  there  are  not 
many  of  the  others. 

Angeli,  M.  von.   Erzherzog  Karl  von  Oesterreich.    Vienna,  1896. 
Annals      of      the     Fatherland     (Otyetchestvenniya     Zapiski). 

Petrograd. 
Anthing.     Campagnes  du  feldmarechal  Souwarrow  (trans,  from 

German).     London^  1799. 
Aragon,  Marquis  de.    Le  Prince  Charles  de  Nassau- Siegen. 

Paris,  1893. 
Archives  of   Prince  Vorontsof  (Arkhiv  Knyazya  Vorontsova). 

Moscow,  1870. 
Bagration,  Prince  P.  I.     Journal  of  the  Campaign  of  1799. 

(Suvorof  Museum.     Petrograd.) 
BiBiKOF.    Memoir  of  I.  Bibikof. 
BoGDANOviTCH.     The   Campaigns  of  Rumyantsof,  Potyomkin, 

and  Suvorof  in  Turkey  (Pokhodi  R.,  P.  i  S.  v  Turtsii). 

Petrograd,  1852. 
Buturlin-Valentini.    La  Guerre  avec  les  Turcs.     Berlin,  1829. 
Charles   of  Austria,   Archduke.     Geschichte   des   Feldzuges 

von  1799.     Vienna,  1819. 
Chodzko.     Histoire  des  Legions  polonaises   en   Italic.     Paris, 

1829. 
Clausewitz.    Hinterlassene  Werker.    Berlin,  1832. 
Danilyevski.     The  Pugatchyof  Rebelhon  (Pugatchefskii  Bunt). 

Petrograd,  1904. 
DuMOURiEZ,  Gi^NiiRAL.     Mcmoircs.     Paris,  1848. 
Engelhardt,  L.  N.    M^moires  (Zapiski  Engelgarta).    Moscow, 

1868. 

861 


862  SUVOROF 

FucHS,  E.    History  of  the  Campaign  of  1799  (Istoria  Kampanii 

1799  goda).     Petrograd,  1825. 
Collection    of    Miscellaneous    Works    (Sobraniye    raznuikh 

sotchinyenyi).     Petrograd,  1827. 
Georoel,  Abb]6.     Voyage  k  St-P6tersbourg.     Paris,  1818. 
Hennequin,  Caft.     Ziirich  ;  Mass^na  en  Suisse.     Paris,  1918. 
Historical  Messenger.     (Istoritchyeskii  Vyestnik.) 
HtJFFER,  H.     Quellen  zur  Geschichte  der  Kriege  von  1799  und 

1800.     Leipzig,  1900. 
JoMiNi,  Baron  A.  H.  de.    Histoire  des  guerres  de  la  Revolution. 

Paris,  1820. 
Journal  de  la  si^ge  de  Cracovie. 
Laverne.     Histoire  du  feld-Mar^chal  Suvorof. 
Lecourbe,  G^n^ral.     Correspondance.     Paris,  1895. 
Letters  and  Papers  of  Suvorof  (Pisma   i   Buinagi  Suvorova). 

Petrograd,  1900. 
LiGNE,  Prince  de.     Melanges  militaires.     Vienna,  1865. 
LoEWENSTEiN,  G^N^RAL,  Baron  DE.     Mcmoircs.     Paris,  1903. 
Martchenko.     Suvorof  in  his  Autographs  (S.  v  svoikh  rukopi- 

sakh).     Petrograd,  1900. 
Maslovski,  D.  F.    Article  "Suvorof"  in  Russian  Biographical 

Dictionary. 
Masson.     Memoires  s^cr^tes  sur  la  Russie.     Paris,  1797. 
MiLYUTiN.     History  of  the  War  of  1799  (Istoria  Voini  1799  goda). 

Petrograd,  1852,  1857. 
MiNTO,  Countess  of.    Life  and  Letters  of  Sir  Gilbert  Elliot, 

First  Earl  of  Minto.     London,  1874. 
Orlof,  N.  a.    Suvorof  on  the  Trebbja  (S.  na  Trebbii).    Petrograd, 

1893. 
The  Storm  of  Praga  (Shturm  Pragi).     Petrograd,  1894. 
The  Storm  of  Izmail  (Shturm  Izmaila).     Petrograd,  1891. 
Suvorof 's  Campaign  of  1799,  according  to  the  recollection  of 

Gryazyef  (Pokhod  Suvorova  1799  goda,  etc.).     Petrograd, 

1898. 
Pyetrof,  a.  N.     The  War  of  Russia  with  the  Turks  and  the 

Pohsh  Confederates  (Voina  Rossii  s'Turtsami  i  Polskimi 

Konfederatami).     Petrograd,  1874. 
The    Second    Turkish    War    (Vtoraya   Turetskaya    Voina). 

Petrograd,  1880. 
Pyetrushevski.     Generahssimus  Prince  Suvorof  (Generalissimus 

Knyaz  Suvorof).     Petrograd,  1884,  1900. 
RoussET.    Memoires  du  marechal  Macdonald. 
RovER^A,  F.  DE.     Memoires.     Paris,  1848. 
Russian  Antiquities  (Russkaya  Starina). 
Russian  Archives  (Ruskii  Arkhiv). 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  363 

Russian  Discourses  (Russkaya  Besyeda), 

Russian  Invalid  (Ruskii  Invalid). 

Russian  Readings  (Russkoe  Tchtyeniye). 

St-Cyr,  Gouvion  de.     Memoires.     Paris,  1829. 

Schmidt,   Frederich  von.     Suvorof  und   Polands  Untergang 

(S.  i  Padyeniye  Polshi).     Petrograd,  1867. 
Segur,  Comte  de.     Memoires.     Paris,  1827. 
Son  of  the  Fatherland  (Suin  Otyetchyestva). 
Starkof.    Anecdotes  of  an  Old  Soldier  about  Suvorof  (Anekdoti 

Staravo,  etc.).    Moscow,  1847. 
Suvorof  Collection  (Suvorovskii  Sbornik).     Warsaw,  1900. 
ToTT,   Baron  de.     Memoires   sur  les   Turcs   et   les  Tartares. 

Amsterdam,  1785. 
Vassilyef.     Suvorof.     Vilna,  1899. 
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Razumovskikh) . 
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VoLNEY.      Considerations    sur    la    guerre    actuelle    des    Turcs. 

London,  1778. 
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de  Russie. 
Le  Fils  de  la  Grande  Catherine,  Paul  I. 
Wickham,  W.     Correspondence.     London,  1870. 
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Campaigns  in  Poland.    London,  1816. 


INDEX 


Adda,  crossing  of  the,  227 
Austrian  High  War  Council,  222, 

236,  240,  289,  301,  332 

Bagration,  General  Prince,  225, 
228,  230,  244,  262,  282, 
284,  311,  318,  324,  329,  351 

Bellegarde,    General   Count,    219, 

237,  243,  267,  277,  280,  281, 
344 

Catherine  II.,  1,  8,  83,  87,  108, 

123,  183,  190 
Coburg,  Prince  of,  94,  99,  110 
letters  of,  to  Suvorof,  107,  109, 
110 

Derfelden,  General,  93,  153,  164, 

166,    171,    181,    185,    284, 

309,  323 
Devil's  Bridge,  314 
Dombrovski,    General,    182,    183, 

248,    251,    253,    254,    259, 

261,  277,  285 

Fokshani,  battle  of,  96 

France  and  Poland,  19,  21,  25, 
28  ;  and  Turkey,  89  ;  war 
with,  135,  150,  199,  204, 
215,  218 

French  Revolutionary  Armies,  217 

Hirsof,  battle  of,  50 

Izmail,  siege  and  storm  of,  112 

Joubert,  General,  276,  277,  278, 
281 

Karl,  Archduke,  of  Austria,  219, 
236,  242,  291,  302,  336 

Kinburn,  battle  at,  87 

Klenau,  General,  225,  227,  243, 
275,  289,  292 

KlonthaL  battle  in  the,  324,  329 


Korsakof,  General  Prince,  302, 340 
Kosciusko,  152,  165 
Kozludzhi,  battle  of,  53 
Kray,  General,  223,  243,  249,  274, 

275,  278,  280 
Kutchuk-Kainardzhi,  Treaty  of,  57 

Landskron,  battle  of,  22 
Lecourbe,  General,  305,  312,  313, 
315,  316,  320 

Macdonald,  General,  238,  242,  244, 

246,  247,  248 
Mass6na,  General,  219,  243,  244, 

246,  247,  291,  321,  322,  326 
Melas,    Field-Marshal,    222,    226, 

228,    233,    237,    251,    257, 

258,    260,    263,    266,    280, 

285,  289,  292,  294,  298 
Miloradovitch,  General  M.  I.,  50, 

230,  280,  284,  312,  315,  326 
Molitor,  General,  322,  325,  329 
Moreau,   General,  231,   238,  244, 

246,  247,  267,  276,  281 
Muottothal,  battle  in  the,  326 

Nelson,  Admiral,  275,  345 
Novi,  battle  of,  278 

Otchakof,  siege  and  storm  of,  90 
Ott,  General,  243,  244,  248,  251, 
280,  281 

Paul,   Tsar,   200,   219,   220,   292, 

338,  349,  350 
Potyomkin,  Count  G.  A.,  65,  86, 

87,  92,  93,  109,   111,   112, 

121 
Praga,  170  ;    storm  of,  174 
Pugatchyof,  rebellion  of,  62 

Rosenberg,  General  A.  G.,  219, 
224,  245,  250,  257,  262, 
266,  308,  309,  316,  324,  327 

Ruimnik,  battle  of  the,  99 


365 


866 


SUVOROF 


Rumyantsof,    Field-Marshal,    89, 
40,  52,  56,  60 

Scherer,  General,  225 

S6rurier,  General,  227,  281,  282, 

234,  235 
Stalovitch,  battle  of,  24 
Suvorof,  A.  V. — 
ancestry,  1 

appearance,  2,  115,  847 
birth,  1 

characteristics  and  habits,  60, 
65,  67,  69,  71,  74,  136,  137, 
182,  293,  299,  848,  352 
death,  352 
domestic  affairs,  57,  58,  78,  74, 

207 
education,  2 

honours  and  rewards,   26,   49, 
79,  108,  123,  183,  274,  292 
military  qualities  and  methods, 
9,  40,   192,  197,  203,  215, 
218,  287,  306,  355 
anecdotes  of,  64,  83,  125,  141, 
184,    186,    187,    188,    189, 
190,    191,    212,    220,    221, 
235,    294,    298,    340,    341, 
342,  343,  344,  348,  351 
battles  and  sieges  of,  Landskron, 
22  ;    Stalovitch,    24 ;    Cra- 
cow, 29  ;  Turtukai,  42,  47 ; 
Hirsof,  50  ;  Kozludzhi,  53  ; 
Kinburn,     87  ;     Otchakof, 
92  ;     Fokshani,    95  ;      the 
Ruinmik,  99  ;  Izmail,  112  ; 
Kruptchitsa,    156 ;    Brest, 
160  ;  Kobuilk,  167 ;  Praga, 
174;   the  Adda,  227;   the 
Trebbia,  251  ;  Novi,  277  ; 
St.  Gothard,  311  ;    Devil's 
Bridge,  314  ;  Klonthal,  329 
correspondence  with — 

Bibikof,  A.  I.,  26, 28, 30, 31, 34 
Catherine,  108,  127,  150 
Khvostof,  D.  I.,  77,  128,  129, 
130,    131,    134,    135,    145, 
150,  204,  205,  209,  350 
Nelson,  346 


Suvorof,  A.  V.  (contd.) — 

correspondence  with  (contd.) — 
Paul,  211,  216,  304 
Potyomkin,  G.  I.,  66,  76,  81 
his  son,  209 
his   daughter,   91,   108,    138, 

139 
his  godson,  149 
others,  9,  10,  11,  20,  44,  45, 
46,  47,  72,  73,  76,  77,  109, 
126,    131,    138,    135,    140, 
144,    145,    154,    164,    192, 
226,    241,    244,    245,    250, 
273,    274,    290,    298,    808, 
837,  345,  349 
stationed  at — 

Ladoga,  9 ;  Poland,  18  ; 
Crimea,  69  ;  Kuban,  70  ; 
Crimea,  70 ;  Astrakhan,  74 ; 
Petersburg,  81  ;  Krement- 
chug,  82  ;  Kief,  83 ;  Kin- 
burn,  86 ;  Otchakof,  91  ; 
Kinburn,  92  ;  Moldavia, 
93  ;  Petersburg,  125 ;  Fin- 
land, 127  ;  Petersburg,  190 ; 
Tultchin,  191 ;  Kontchansk, 
210  ;  Verona,  223  ;  Milan, 
235 ;  Turin,  238  ;  Aless- 
andria, 269  ;  Asti,  292 
estimate  of  his  character,  352 
Suvorof,  Varvara  I.,  57,  73,  74 
Suvorof,  Arkadii  A.,  59,  208,  209, 

226 
Suvorof,  Natalia  A.,  59,  91 
Suvorof,  Vassilii,  1 

Tartars,  the,  69,  78 

Thugut,  Baron  von,  221,  299,  300, 

304 
Trebbia,  battle  of  the,  251 
Turks,  the  military  methods  of, 

36  ;     first    war    with,    39  ; 

and   the    Crimea,  69,   73  ; 

second  war  with,  85 
Turtukai,  capture  of,  42,  47 

Victor,  General,    227,    228,    233, 

238,  246,  248,  251,  266 
Viom^nil,  Baron  de,  25 


THE   END 


Printed  in  Great  Britain  by  R.  &  R.  Clark,  Limited,  Edinburgh. 


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